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Abstract 
 
 
The explanation of social behaviour requires an understanding of individual 
orientations to social issues as these exist relative to others. This thesis argues 
that whilst the attitude concept and social representations have illuminated 
certain aspects of social behaviour, both are handicapped by a restricted focus. 
The former’s focus on the evaluation of attitude objects excludes a reference to 
wider societal processes. The latter provides an account of societal 
contingencies, but excludes an explanation of individual orientations towards 
objects and issues in the social environment. This thesis postulates the point of 
view concept to bridge this gap, that provides an explanation of social 
behaviour at the situational level. This complements attitude and social 
representations in a nested, multilevel explanation of social behaviour. The 
point of view is defined as an outlook towards a social event, expressed as a 
claim, which can be supported by an argument of opinion based on a system of 
knowledge from which it derives its logic. It reflects an individual’s 
orientation towards a social object, relative to others. This thesis has 
demonstrated, in a series of empirical studies, that the point of view can be 
typified in three categories. A monological point of view is closed to another’s 
perspective. A dialogical point of view acknowledges another’s perspective 
but dismisses it as wrong. A metalogical point of view acknowledges the 
relativity of its’ perspective, and concedes to an alternative the possibility of 
being right. These different types were demonstrated to be characterised by 
differences in positioning and in individuals’ capacity to fit a given social 
reality. Such relational outcomes accrue as a function of the socio-cognitive 
structure of points of view in relation with another perspective. This thesis 
demonstrates that points of view, alongside attitudes and social 
representations, provides a multilevel explanation of social behaviour.  
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Points of view; Perspective taking; Attitudes; Social Representations; 
Social behaviour; Social judgment; positioning; argumentation; Social 
psychology; Intercultural relations. 
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
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Numerous scholars have noted and documented the pervasiveness of the ‘attitude’ 
construct in social psychology (McGuire, 1985, 1986; Zaller & Feldman, 1992; Farr 
1996; Gaskell, 2001; Howarth, 2006). McGuire (1986) has documented how the 
study of attitudes spans the historical development of the discipline, from its 
inception at the turn of the twentieth century to the present day. The ‘attitude’ has 
largely become social psychology’s defining concept (Allport, 1967). In spite of its 
popularity, its meaning in the discipline has a chequered history. Attitude has gone 
from a social concept in its origin, to an individual, asocial and apolitical concept 
more recently (Howarth, 2006). The general influence of individualism on the social 
sciences (Graumann, 1986), and the influence of cognitivism on social psychology 
in particular (Farr, 1996), have redefined attitudes as an individual’s valuation of an 
attitude object (see Fishbein, 1967). The purpose it serves in the social sciences is 
that of an independent variable that can be measured efficiently and concisely 
towards predicting behaviour. As an empirical concept, its popularity is largely 
unparalleled. 
 
Nevertheless, this conception of attitudes has attracted much critique over the years 
(see Asch, 1952; Sherif & Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965; Farr, 1990; Billig, 1996; 
Gaskell, 2001; Howarth, 2006) and various theorists have sought to address its 
primary shortcoming of overlooking the ‘social’ in its conceptualisation. As some 
scholars have pointed out (Farr, 1990, 1996; Fraser & Gaskell, 1990; Fraser, 1994; 
Gaskell, 2001), the theory of social representations has come to serve as a 
countervailing force to individualistic theories like ‘attitude’, by foregrounding the 
social rather than the individual. However, most theorists retain that the two 
concepts are incommensurable due to their differing underlying epistemologies 
(Farr, 1994; Howarth, 2006). Whilst attitude is clearly a cognitive attribute of the 
individual even in its aggregate form, that is public opinion, social representations 
are held to be intrinsically social. They are conceptualised as existing across minds 
rather than inside individual minds (Wagner et al., 1999; Wagner & Hayes, 2005; 
Wagner, Mecha & do Rosário Carvalho, 2008). According to such conception, the 
individual extends into the social as a relational unit in a systemic network of social 
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meaning. In this tradition, rather than being two sides of the same coin, the 
individual/social dichotomy is a false dichotomy to begin with, as the individual is 
ontologically part of the social firmament.  
 
The theoretical usage of the concepts, however, cannot escape reification and for this 
reason problems persist in reconciling the dual focus of the social and the individual 
contemporarily. Gaskell (2001) has outlined this as the challenge that can 
reinvigorate the discipline. At present, one either studies the social field as a 
collective by looking at things such as social representations and discourses but 
failing to locate the individual within these wider polemics, or one studies the 
individual’s orientation, possibly even in aggregate, but failing to account for the 
wider social meaning that legitimates individuals’ evaluations1. More worryingly, 
the move from one focus to the other is intransitive2, which is why social 
psychologists are often required to take sides on the debate. Seemingly, what is 
required at this point is not a reformulation of one construct in terms of the other. In 
actuality, both concepts have withstood rigorous critique and both have 
demonstrated empirical utility. Consequently, the heuristic value of both concepts 
cannot be overlooked. Nonetheless, the gap between the two remains a ubiquitous 
challenge. To use the common adage, my proposal in this thesis is to 'mind the gap'. 
In looking more closely at the gap between the individual and the social, one 
inevitably comes to realise that between the cognitive evaluations of attitude objects 
and the larger framework of social knowledge, stands nothing other than the 
individual herself. It is by looking at the individual–not inside the individual, nor 
outside in the social field, but at the individual–that we can potentially further our 
understanding of how human beings, on the basis of their cognitive evaluations 
legitimated by the wider social structures, act socially in the world they inhabit.  
 
This thesis proposes that by developing the concept of point of view, social 
psychology can successfully bridge the persistent gap between the social and the 
                                                
1 see Harré, 1984 
2 see Wagner & Hayes, 2005	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individual; i.e. between social representations and attitudes. Point of view, along 
with the overarching social representation and the underlying attitude (Fig. 1), 
provides a transitive explanation for how human beings are located within a social 
environment, on the basis of which they orientate themselves cognitively and 
affectively to objects they encounter in their environment and in relation to which 
they act in prescriptive ways. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Hierarchical model of point of view construct across different levels of explanation 
(see Wagner & Hayes, 2005). 
 
Our everyday understanding of relating individuals serves as a useful guide in this 
conception. In everyday language we use attitude to mean opinion (how one thinks) 
or orientation (one’s mental posture). What we commonly mean by an attitude is 
one’s mental outlook, rather than the narrower meaning of a cognitive evaluation of 
 14 
an attitude object that reflects that mental outlook. Furthermore, etymologically, 
what we want to capture is not common sense either, i.e. a social representation, but 
a perspective that is rooted in common sense. This makes the postulation of an 
intervening construct immediately plausible. The point of view provides a transitive 
explanation of the social as the context in which a particular opinion is located, 
which opinion is itself socio-cognitive, and which relates to other opinions on the 
basis of its own inherent cognitive and affective structure–attitude being one such 
structural component. 
 
This chapter introduces the conceptualisation of the point of view construct, which 
represents the fundamental project of this thesis. The overarching contribution of 
this, to the social sciences in general and the discipline of social psychology in 
particular, is the formulation of a construct that effectively bridges the gap between 
the social and the psychological. It does this by retaining a dual focus on 
overarching social structures and underlying psychological processes, without being 
prejudicial against either, and by adopting a situational level of explanation. Such a 
construct enables social psychology to gain a fuller understanding of the individual 
in terms of the individual’s social-psychological characteristics, and of human 
relations in their social-psychological complexity. I proceed by looking at the state 
of diversity of beliefs in contemporary societies that position individuals within 
relational encounters marked by difference, to then outline the point of view concept 
and its particular significance for social psychology. I conclude by reviewing the 
central precepts of this inquiry. 
 
The Diversity of Beliefs 
 
Numerous scholars have pointed to potential problems that are inherent to clashes of 
beliefs, and urged social scientists to investigate these matters more seriously 
towards identifying ways to reconcile divergences and promote cooperative relations 
between human beings (see Giddens, 1991; Huntington 1996; Benhabib, 2002; 
Moghaddam, 2008). This concern is not new within social psychology. Authors like 
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Asch (1952) and Sherif and Sherif (1968) were acutely aware of these issues even 
before the advent of modern forms of ICT and the progressive rise of globalisation, 
that are held to lie behind the immediacy of these problems (Giddens, 1991). Sherif 
and Sherif (1968), for example, have argued that these problems “are among the 
most vital and timely in this world of rapid change” (p. 105). Indeed, in their time, 
Sherif and Sherif (1956) claim that “at no time has the problem of intergroup 
relations been more vital than it is today” (p. 280). Their statement applied acutely at 
their time, but does so still today, over half a century later. It is easy to note that the 
problems and issues that concerned Sherif and Sherif are still with us. If anything, 
the rise and management of terrorism today indicates that they have intensified more 
than ever (Moghaddam, 2008).  
 
The problem of clashing beliefs struggling for recognition has been put firmly on the 
social psychology agenda by Moscovici (1967, 1985a, 1985b, 2000). The problem, 
as Moscovici (1985a) articulates it, is to understand how a minority can see things as 
it does and how it can think as it does. In this context of plurality, which 
characterises the contemporary public sphere, intergroup relations are embedded 
within interpersonal relations. In certain parts of the world, human relations more 
routinely take place with others who are not direct members of one’s social group. 
Individuals encounter each other as individuals, but their relations are framed by 
their relative group relations (Sherif & Hovland, 1961). In such circumstances, 
understanding how individuals relate with one another is an imperative concern. 
How do individuals orientate themselves in what appears to be a plurality of 
perspectives? How do they adopt one perspective and not another? And in adopting 
a certain perspective, how do they then treat others who hold a different perspective?  
 
The Contact Hypothesis, proposed by Allport in 1954, stipulates that when 
individuals from different groups interact under conditions of equal status, 
cooperation, opportunities for acquaintance, and supportive institutional norms, 
prejudice and discrimination are reduced and the prognosis for better interpersonal 
contact outcomes improves. Moscovici (1985a) argues, however, that the more 
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discrepant our beliefs are from those of another the more we tend to deprecate the 
views of the other to the extent that they appear crazy and lacking common sense. 
Other social psychological theories make the same predictions. Social Identity 
Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981, 1982) claims that through processes of 
social categorisation and comparison, group members develop an ingroup identity 
that accentuates differences with other groups and deprecates the outgroup on the 
basis of these differences. Social Judgment Theory (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Sherif, 
Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965; Eiser & Stroebe, 1972; Eiser, 1991) claims that the 
perspectives of others’ that differ significantly from our own are rejected 
automatically due to the fact that, by being different, they fall within our latitude of 
rejection. The concept that social psychology has put forth in studying the manner 
by which individuals orientate themselves towards attitude objects, i.e. attitude, 
along with its collective counterpart–public opinion, are ill-placed to address these 
issues. The requirement is to understand individual relations in a way that includes a 
reference to the social framework that validates some perspective over another, and 
that determines which perspectives are acceptable and which, on the other hand, are 
objectionable. Neither attitudes nor public opinion includes such reference. It is such 
a relational formulation that is required in extending the analysis of orientations to 
interpersonal relations. 
 
Points of view 
 
A concept that has been proposed towards such understanding is the ‘point of view’. 
Asch (1952) claimed that individuals act often in terms of their point of view; their 
outlook towards the problems they face. Asch argues that in developing such a 
concept, it is pertinent to call for a specification of the individual’s frame of 
reference and to ask questions concerning the centre of gravity of a person’s outlook, 
i.e. how wide or narrow it might be and what is the place of individual assertions in 
the larger context of an outlook. Asch’s proposal seems to be a valid one. 
Nevertheless, his suggestion has never been taken up in detail. As a construct, the 
point of view remains undeveloped and undefined. However, Asch’s suggestion 
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seems valuable in that this concept comes with the promise of providing an 
understanding into individuals’ perspectives as they relate to those of others on the 
basis of a wider background of intelligibility (Daanen, 2009). Unlike attitude, it is 
not limited to an evaluation of an attitude-object to the exclusion of other matters of 
significance.  
 
The importance of this development lies in the fact that when individuals interrelate, 
they do so on the basis of perspectives that refer at once to themselves as well as to 
those of others (Sherif & Hovland, 1961).  Sherif’s work parallels that of Asch in 
many ways. Both scholars sought a reformulation of attitudes in a way that includes 
a reference to an individual’s social positioning. Their attempts have by and large 
failed to gain prominence in social psychology. However, the problems they 
identified and for which they sought such a conception have not disappeared. Social 
psychology is still faced with these very same concerns. If anything, as outlined 
above, these have become even more pressing.  
 
Conceptualisation 
 
The present thesis follows in the footsteps of Asch and Sherif and draws on their 
distinguished tradition to formulate the concept of the point of view. It does so in the 
context of the most recent developments in social psychology that transpire in the 
works of Moscovici. This formulation is presented in Chapter 2, following a detailed 
review of Asch’s proposal along with the theory of social representations. This 
thesis proposes that the point of view can be conceptualised as the individual’s 
location within a social representation. The social representation serves to provide 
the individual with meaning; a meaning that legitimates her outlook (i.e. point of 
view) and on this basis enables her to achieve adequate social functioning. This 
formulation is undertaken on the basis of other theories, namely Billig’s rhetorical 
analysis (1987, 1991) and Harré’s positioning theory (Harré & Secord 1972, Harré 
& van Langenhöve, 1999), that have adopted a situational level of explanation and 
have thus yielded a benchmark for the exploration of social behaviour at this level. 
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Both of these theories are reviewed in detail in Chapter 3. Additionally, the present 
formulation of the point of view draws on theories of social judgment, in which 
Sherif’s work is situated, that have sought to investigate the socio-cognitive aspects 
of perspectives as these relate to alternative ones. This cognitive characteristic, along 
with the interpersonal aspects of points of view by way of positioning, is considered 
an intrinsic element to points of view in relation. The point of view is a social-cum-
psychological construct involving a socio-cognitive process that manifests in 
discursive practices. The theories of social judgment that have informed this 
formulation are visited in detail in Chapter 3.  
 
Drawing on these traditions, the point of view in this thesis is formulated as both a 
relational and a relative construct. The point of view is relational inasmuch as it is an 
outlook, or view, of something. This involves minimally a percept and a perceiver. It 
is relative inasmuch as this view is a point amongst other points, other outlooks held 
by other subjects. This involves relations between interacting subjects. The point of 
view thus involves a minimal triad of three elements, a perceiving subject in relation 
to another perceiving subject and an object of perception. For this reason, the term 
point of view is herein preferred over similar terms that proliferate the literature such 
as outlooks or perspectives. These latter terms are not afforded, by definition, 
relational as well as relative properties. The point of view triad is similar to Bauer & 
Gaskell’s (1999) formulation of the social representation, and for this reason 
provides a transitive link to social representations. The difference between the two is 
that in the point of view, the other elements are defined from the standpoint of the 
perceiving subject, as opposed to their systemic co-existence in a representational 
field. The point of view in this thesis is thus defined as as an outlook towards a 
social event, expressed as a claim, which can be supported by an argument of 
opinion based on a system of knowledge from which it derives its logic. This 
includes a reference to the perceiving subject’s outlook and its discursive 
manifestation that is legitimated by the argumentative context in which it occurs. 
Chapters 2 and 3 outline in further detail the relevance of these aspects of points of 
view.  
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Aims  
 
In the preface to his volume on Social Psychology, Asch (1952/1987) argues that “If 
there must be principles of scientific method, then surely the first to claim our 
attention is that one should describe phenomena faithfully and allow them to guide 
the choice of problems and procedures” (1987, p.xv). Sherif and Sherif (1968), 
whose works are amongst the most influential in social psychology (Harré, 2006), 
outline that the first step of scientific inquiry is to learn about the phenomenon in 
question, which means learning from the actualities of events in which the 
phenomenon appears.  
 
The first task in this inquiry is thus to describe the nature of the phenomenon that is 
being postulated, as both Asch (1952) and Sherif and Sherif (1968) have 
commended. In the present thesis this is undertaken in an effort to determine 
whether the present conceptualisation of points of view can be supported. The aim of 
identifying the phenomenon and describing its nature is an objective that is taken up 
in the first of three empirical investigations undertaken for the purposes of this 
thesis. These are summarised hereunder. Furthermore, insofar as the point of view is 
formulated as a social-psychological construct, its social as well as psychological 
properties have required exploration. Accordingly, the second empirical inquiry 
adopts the aim of identifying the interpersonal features of points of view, whereas 
the third inquiry focuses on their intrapersonal properties. Identification of these 
properties of points of view lends support to the claim that point of view is wedged 
between attitudes and the social representations, as a construct that bridges the gap 
between the individual and the social and that alongside attitudes and social 
representations serves to provide a multilevel explanation of social behaviour (Harré 
& Secord, 1972). In view of these aims, the overarching objective of the present 
inquiry is to describe the point of view and document its interpersonal and 
intrapersonal characteristics, in an effort to describe its psychological structure and 
social functions. Methodological details of the three studies are presented in Chapter 
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4. To date, no other scholarly investigation has formulated this construct in such 
detail. It has been alluded to, such as in the works of Asch (1952), Harré and Secord 
(1972), Billig (987, 1991) and Clémence (2001). Yet its social-psychological 
characteristics are yet to be charted. It is this lacuna that this thesis aims to address.  
 
Study 1: Describing the phenomenon 
 
The three empirical studies undertaken in this thesis draw on the major approaches 
of situational-level analyses of social behaviour. The first inquiry draws on 
argumentation approaches to investigate a public controversy in an effort to identify 
points of view as phenomena and to describe their nature. This is undertaken in the 
context of a cosmopolitan public sphere that admits not only different perspectives 
but also different worldviews to intermingle in the same public. Encounters between 
different points of view can be based on a similar or different background of 
intelligibility. Encounters can be of four types: (1) similar points of view can be 
articulated that are based on the same background of intelligibility; (2) different 
points of view can be articulated that are based on the same background of 
intelligibility; (3) similar points of view can be articulated that are based on different 
backgrounds of intelligibility; (4) different points of view can be articulated that are 
based on different backgrounds of intelligibility. Whilst many societies adopt 
procedures to police their publics and allow only a limited number of backgrounds 
of intelligibility to co-exist, possibly a single one, other publics are less restricted 
and admit a plurality of perspectives that legitimate what may be incommensurable 
worldviews. Such a cosmopolitan setting, chosen for the first inquiry, enables the 
full range of encounters between points of view to manifest and provides an ideal 
setting for studying points of view in their diversity. Consequently, this study 
addresses the following concerns: is such a thing as a point of view identifiable? 
How can it be described? How does it vary in its manifestations? An answer to these 
questions enables a conceptual definition of the point of view, one that has so far 
been lacking in the social psychological literature.  
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The setting chosen for this study is the Dawkins debate on atheism that took place in 
Britain during the first half of 2006. This debate saw numerous individuals air their 
views over the merits of religion, science and atheism, following Prof Dawkins’ 
claims during a documentary aired on British prime-time television that religion is 
conducive to evil. The findings revealed that the public entertained a plurality of 
points of view in which science and religion, with their relative merits, could co-
exist in the same public sphere. More importantly, individuals not only agreed or 
disagreed with what was being proposed in the documentary or in the press; there 
were instances where individuals agreed when they disagreed and disagreed when 
they agreed. This is to say that individuals at times had the same attitude, however, 
argumentatively, they did so for wholly different reasons that at times may have 
been more fundamentally discrepant. On the other hand, individuals who seemingly 
disagreed may have done so on the basis of a more fundamental agreement.  
 
This polyphonic debate provided an opportunity to discover variances in points of 
view and to describe the characteristic differences between types. The findings 
suggest that three different types are discernible, that vary in their appreciation of an 
alternative perspective. This relative appreciation depends on the legitimacy 
accorded to the rationale of the worldview on which the other’s point of view draws. 
The first type, termed ‘monological’ points of view, hold their own perspective to be 
in the right and refute any other position as faulty and in need of correction. The 
second type, termed ‘dialogical’ points of view, admit that others can have different 
perspectives to their own, but that these need to adhere to some fundamental 
precepts that are unchallengeable and that validate their own position as a rightful 
one. The third type, termed ‘metalogical’ points of view, not only admit that others 
can have different outlooks, they hold that others may be right and that they may be 
wrong; they hold that others are right in their own way just like them. This typology 
of points of view is supported by other findings in the social judgment tradition and 
suggests that different points of view are marked by socio-cognitive differences that 
bear on the interpersonal relations in which they engage. This study is detailed 
further in Chapter 5.  
 22 
Study 2: Interpersonal characteristics 
 
Insofar as the point of view is a social-psychological phenomenon, then different 
types of point of view ought to be marked by characteristic interpersonal differences. 
The second empirical inquiry draws on positioning theory to address this issue 
empirically. Points of view bring people into interpersonal relations, by which 
positioning in a social system is negotiated. A case study of ‘stranger’ points of view 
(Schuetz, 1944) has been adopted for this inquiry. It investigated the positioning 
individuals originating from one cultural setting undertook in an effort to negotiate 
their lives in another cultural setting following migration. The points of view 
towards the host country that legitimated migration on the basis of social 
representations that circulated in the country of origin, are in themselves alien within 
the host country in which a new social reality based on different social 
representations exists. In the case study adopted for this second inquiry, migrants did 
not have an option of resorting to a native community that might have validated their 
original perspectives, as no such native community is established in the host country. 
This meant that the negotiations undertaken by these migrants were 
characteristically interpersonal rather than intergroup, due to the fact that from the 
standpoint of the stranger, such negotiation was necessarily undertaken at the 
individual level given the absence of a native community. This rules out the 
attribution of identified characteristics to community rather than individual 
properties, and fulfils the requisite conditions for inquiring into the interpersonal 
characteristics of points of view in a way that is not confounded by processes of 
social re-presentation (Chryssides et al, 2009). 
 
The setting chosen for this inquiry is the case of Maltese migrants to Britain. 
Maltese migrants to Britain are unable to mediate their interaction through a 
community in negotiating a new life, due to the fact that no such community 
presently exists. This is due to various socio-historic reasons that are detailed in 
Chapter 6. The point of view of Maltese migrants to Britain towards life in Britain is 
originally rooted in Maltese social representations. Once they land on British shores, 
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however, they necessarily come into contact with a new system of social 
representations that exists in Britain and that is very different from the 
Mediterranean, island mentality from which their outlooks originate. In this contact, 
their points of view are required to negotiate a new system of intelligibility. This 
negotiation has direct relational consequences on their ability to settle in Britain, as 
well as on what form their settlement takes. The findings of this inquiry demonstrate 
that different types of points of view relate differently to others. More specifically, 
metalogical points of view have a capacity to position themselves without 
contradiction in two social realities, a characteristic that individuals with dialogical 
and monological points of view lacked. Whilst dialogical points of view related to 
both systems, they positioned themselves functionally within a single setting, and 
could only fit the other with stark reservations. Monological types were exclusive, 
what positioned them in one setting automatically excluded them from the other. 
This second empirical study is detailed further in Chapter 6. 
 
Study 3: Intrapersonal properties 
 
The third empirical inquiry draws on theories of social judgment to investigate the 
intrapersonal properties of points of view. It does so by looking at individuals’ 
judgment of alternative claims that have circulated within a certain public sphere 
with regards to a number of social issues. This procedure enabled the investigation 
of the intrapersonal socio-cognitive properties of points of view, controlling for 
diversity in social representations due to the fact that the study was undertaken with 
an undisputed dominant group in a relatively homogenous country. Consequently, 
emergent characteristics could not be attributed to different cultural practices. The 
study was undertaken with Maltese students at the University of Malta. 
 
A point of view that encounters an alternative point of view, in a condition where 
such encounter does not challenge its underlying logic, can either accept, or reject, 
or remain indifferent to the alternative. These outcomes have been investigated 
widely in Sherif’s various studies on social judgement (see Sherif & Hovland, 1961; 
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Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965; Sherif & Sherif, 1968). They have led to the claim 
that individuals’ orientations are structured by latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and 
non-commitment. The third empirical study thus inquires into whether different 
points of view are characterised by differing latitudes of acceptance, rejection and 
non-commitment that determine their capacity to relate to an alternative perspective. 
The findings of this inquiry revealed statistically significant differences in latitudes 
with regards to given issues. However, the findings also demonstrate that where 
these differences transpire depends on the argumentative context of the issue as it 
circulates in public. At times differences emerged in latitudes of rejection, at other 
times in latitudes of non-commitment. Nevertheless, the findings of this study 
support the claim that socio-cognitive differences mark differences between point of 
view types. The findings of this study are detailed further in Chapter 7. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This brief description of the studies undertaken towards a formulation of the point of 
view, with which this thesis is concerned, is discussed more fully in Chapter 8. 
Nevertheless, it is immediately clear that an appreciation of points of view requires 
sensitivity to the nature of public spheres in which the articulation of points of view 
occurs. Public spheres police the expression of points of view and can support some 
and censor others. Moreover, not every point of view is legitimated in every public 
sphere. Some are deemed sensible; others are relegated as nonsense. Public spheres 
can promote or inhibit the expression or existence of points of view. This inquiry 
demonstrates that the existence of certain points of view constructs certain versions 
of reality that a certain public may desire or disdain. Consequently, the study of 
points of view is necessarily a political concern. Beyond the narrow realm of social 
psychology and the concepts that are more useful for explanations of social 
behaviour, the study of points of view is warranted by more general concerns that 
have to do with the processes of legitimation and recognition of the lives of human 
beings, in conditions of diversity. The formulation and study of points of view thus 
has the potential to contribute to the pragmatics of promoting tolerance and positive 
 25 
relations between different people, by bringing about a certain public sphere and a 
certain social reality that admits of the possibility that things may be seen differently 
and understood differently, and that this need not necessarily mean that either is 
right or wrong, and that different perspectives stand in need of correction by 
persuasion or by force. 
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Introduction 
 
The nature of contemporary social life is such that social happenings belong to the 
circle of events that humans can potentially control, and have their roots in how 
human beings construct social realities (Asch, 1952/1987). The knowledge that 
communities create in the process of social construction serves to interpret and order 
data in the natural and social surroundings. This knowledge enables individuals to 
participate meaningfully in social life, and act meaningfully with and in relation to 
others. As Asch (1987) succinctly claims, “to act in the social field requires a 
knowledge of social facts” (p. 139). Community knowledge constitutes common 
sense (Jovchelovitch, 2007, 2008) that allows individuals to participate in public life, 
orientate themselves to others and to objects in their environment, adopt outlooks 
towards social objects and social events, and act meaningfully on the basis of these 
outlooks in ways that others recognise as legitimate and sensible.  
 
In explicating how individuals orientate themselves to others and to events in their 
social life, social psychology has proposed and developed the concept of the 
‘attitude’ as an evaluation of some happening of concern to the individual. Social 
psychology granted this concept social moment through the measurement of public 
opinion (Bernard, 1930). Yet the formulation of attitude/public opinion fails to 
appreciate the wider, argumentative, social context (Billig, 1987, 1991) in which 
individuals encounter alternative points of view, where in adopting a particular 
perspective they consequently position themselves in relation to others. An 
alternative way for understanding how individuals orientate themselves in social life 
has been proposed by Solomon Asch (1952/1987), in the notion of the point of view. 
Asch postulates the study of the point of view to overcome the limitations he 
identifies in attitude research. Asch, however, neither defines nor conceptualises this 
construct, but leaves it merely as a proposal for further inquiry. This thesis takes up 
Asch’s proposal and seeks to formulate a social-psychological conceptualisation of 
the point of view. This chapter will review Asch’s proposal in detail, to identify and 
legitimate the reasons for this enterprise. It proceeds to model points of view, that in 
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contrast to attitude, takes into account the epistemic dimension in its formulation. In 
this thesis, point of view is defined as an outlook towards a social event, expressed 
as a claim, which can be supported by an argument of opinion based on a system of 
knowledge from which it derives its logic. It describes how individuals orientate 
themselves towards the social happenings they face in their everyday lives, in a 
context of a polyphasia of perspectives that in our contemporary societies may draw 
on altogether different worldviews. This thesis contends that the study of this 
concept, alongside attitudes and social representations, helps towards a fuller 
understanding of human social behaviour in its complexity, across different levels of 
explanation. 
 
This chapter argues that the formulation of the point of view in terms of social 
representations provides a social-psychological conceptualisation for social 
behaviour. The contribution of this formulation lies in its capacity to describe how, 
by virtue of their membership in groups and communities, individuals position 
themselves in relation to others and to social events in ways that enable them to 
participate meaningfully in social life. Moreover, it enables social psychology to 
explain the consequences of the encounters between similar or divergent positions 
that are taken towards social phenomena. These, in turn, may be based on similar or 
divergent worldviews. This chapter firstly outlines how the conditions of modernity 
have changed the relations between individuals such that no one can today adopt a 
position without knowing that its sensibility is relative, as modern publics are 
infused with the awareness that others may be seeing that very same phenomenon in 
some totally different way. It proceeds to review the efforts made within the 
discipline of social psychology to explain individuals’ orientations to social 
phenomena by means of attitudes, and how it has explained social action in terms of 
attitudes through the notion of public opinion. It goes on to argue that this 
formulation fails to consider the wider social context and fails to describe the 
processes and consequences of the encounters between divergent perspectives. This 
shortcoming results from the formulation of attitude as an individual and cognitive 
construct. In its social form however, as proposed by Solomon Asch, it enables a 
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formulation of how individuals may develop an outlook towards some social event 
based on the worldview they hold, by virtue of their membership in some group or 
community. This chapter claims that reconciling Asch’s social attitude with social 
representations theory enables social psychology to overcome the shortcoming of 
foregrounding the individual at the expense of the social. This legitimates Asch’s 
proposal for the study of points of view and enables explication of the social 
behaviour of individuals as it takes place in situ, that is, as individuals adopt 
meaningful points of view that position them in relation to others on some particular 
issue.  
 
The Changes of Modernity 
 
Modernity and late modernity have had a profound influence on the world we live in 
and the nature of our everyday life. Modern institutions differ from preceding ones 
in respect of their dynamism, the degree to which they undercut traditional customs, 
and their global impact. As Giddens (1991) argues, these changes are not merely 
extensional transformations, they radically alter the nature of day-to-day social life 
and affect the most personal aspects of human experience. Not only is the pace of 
social change faster, so is its scope and profoundness, by which it affects pre-
existing social practices and modes of behaviour (Giddens, 1991). One area where 
modernity has brought about radical changes is in the production of knowledge. 
Knowledge, in any form, is bound to the social context of its production and tied to a 
community’s public sphere (Jovchelovitch, 1995, 2001, 2007, 2008). The public 
sphere that a community creates is a place where different perspectives are brought 
together and debated as arguments of opinion, in an effort to establish legitimacy 
and validity for one’s perspective. In the process, a community constructs common 
sense–common knowledge that it establishes as the correct version of reality. 
Modernity has redefined this arena, by changing “the nature of communication 
between human communities, the pace of change and the introduction of novelty 
coming from distant remote others. In this context, traditions cannot remain 
impermeable; they are put under scrutiny, revised or fiercely defended and through 
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this process precisely lose the unshakeable and unquestioned form that defines them 
in the first place” (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 93).  
 
The process of detraditionalisation “blasts open the public sphere of communities to 
practices of contestation, argumentation and debate. […] They become one amongst 
many other forms of knowledge” (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 93). As Giddens (1991) 
claims, “[f]orms of traditional authority become only ‘authorities’ among others, 
part of an indefinite pluralism of expertise” (Giddens, 1991, p. 195). Different 
‘authorities’ co-exist in public spheres characterised by a polyphasia of knowledge 
systems and rationalities. In this context, “which kind of thinking is better depends 
crucially on the sphere of activity within which it occurs” (Cole, 1996, p. 175).  
Modernity has demolished the traditional boundaries of the public sphere, casting 
the public out in the open, exposing community life to a global audience. These 
developments have led to a heightened awareness of diversity and have facilitated 
recognition, but they have also complicated and increased tensions between cultures 
and civilisations. Such tensions take place not only at the borders of nation-states, 
but also within the boundaries of existing liberal democracies (Benhabib, 2002), 
within the pluralistic and diversified public spheres of modern communities. 
 
It is this clash of perspectives, in the form of a multiplicity of knowledges, that 
individuals need to confront and to resolve in participating in social life: “the 
common knowledge of communities, or the lifeworld, provide the points of 
reference, the parameters, the resources against which individuals make sense of the 
world around them, develop the theoretical and practical competencies to deal with 
the everyday and establish the communicative relations that allow for the 
development of bonds of solidarity and cooperation and the experience of 
belonging” (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 79). In adopting a position towards some 
particular social object or event, individuals must orientate themselves amongst this 
discursive polyphasia (Wagner, 2007) of different types of knowledges and 
rationalities that coexist side by side in the same public sphere. Social knowledge 
serves individuals to develop and elaborate their own points of view towards social 
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events, by which they interact with the world and with others in their everyday lives. 
Adopting a particular position towards some social happening has consequences not 
only on the self and the identities that individuals negotiate, but also on the social 
relations and social practices that are enacted collectively in a particular community. 
Furthermore, the outcome of contact between different community points of view 
has obvious implications on the subsequent relations that develop between different 
communities. At the same time, however, due to the changes brought about by 
modernity, no one today can adopt a particular point of view towards a social event 
without knowing at the same time that there are different, alternative, yet equally 
plausible points of view based on different systems of knowledge that are 
themselves equally legitimate and perfectly valid in their own context. This 
fundamental insecurity relates to all orientations, even those based on the most basic 
belief systems: “[n]o one today can but be conscious that living according to the 
precepts of a determined faith is one choice among other possibilities” (Giddens, 
1991, p. 181). Moreover, the conditions of modernity also mean that these are 
transformations from which no one can ‘opt out’ (Giddens, 1991).  
 
The encounter with alternative and competing worldviews requires individuals to 
adopt the perspective of the other in evaluating others’ orientations towards the 
social facts faced by one and all in a given society. This requirement is not a simple, 
value-free, and unproblematic transaction. As Benhabib (2002) argues, reactions 
“can range from total bafflement in the face of another culture’s rituals and practices 
to more mundane and frustrating encounters with others when we simply say, “I just 
don’t get it. What do you really mean?”” (p. 31). The ability to make sense of the 
perspective of the other stems from the underlying ability to understand the logic 
and rationality that sustain the other’s perspective. Whilst our own perspective 
appears to us rational, in terms of a worldview we consider simply common-
sensical, alternative perspectives may or may not share this bedrock of common-
sense. Our ability to thus make sense of an alternative perspective, and thereby our 
willingness to engage in dialogue over divergent perspectives is underpinned by our 
evaluation of the underlying alternative worldview and by the extent to which these 
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divergent worldviews can be reconciled. As Asch (1952/1987) claims, with regards 
to our own society, “[i]ts practices and beliefs appear to us natural, permanent, and 
inevitable, whereas the particular conditions that make them possible often remain 
invisible. To those who live in the United States the social condition of Negroes has 
a quality of normality, but the caste system of Hindu society appears bizarre” (p. 7). 
Our evaluation of alternative worldviews can either enable us to adjoin divergent 
perspectives, or prohibit us from doing so: “there are those with whom we agree, 
who inhabit other cultures and worlds, but whose evaluations we find plausible and 
comprehensible, and still others whose ways of life as well as systems of belief will 
be abhorrent to us” (Benhabib, 2002, p. 42). In these conditions the demarcations 
between us and them, and the consequences of these demarcations become ever 
more complex. 
 
As Jovchelovitch (2007) points out, recognising the diversity of knowledge raises 
some crucial concerns: do all systems of knowledge qualify as knowledge or just 
some of them? Are all systems of knowledge rational or just some of them? What 
defines the rationality of a knowledge system? Jovchelovitch (2007) argues that at 
the heart of knowledge encounters lies the problem of difference in forms of 
knowing and what constitutes human reason. Defining who can pose claims to 
rational knowledge is a political act that carries a string of dilemmas and 
consequences related to the valuation and ranking of different peoples, different 
knowledges, and different ways of life (Benhabib, 2002; Jovchelovitch, 2007). 
Defining who can claim rational knowledge defines in turn who is entitled to hold 
and express an opinion, whose point of view acquires legitimacy, and who emerges 
victorious in the ‘clash of cultures’ (Benhabib, 2002). The transformation of the 
public sphere from a traditional to a detraditional form has led to a transformation of 
the authority structure of knowledge: “arguments of authority have been replaced by 
the authority of arguments” (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 96). Arguments are the 
articulation of the points of view held by individuals and groups. A point of view 
provides a gateway for participation in the public sphere, which participation has 
identity and political consequences for the holder. It is by means of points of view 
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that the claims of culture are advanced in a plural and diversified public sphere. 
Having a point of view means one exercises one’s right to an opinion and on the 
basis of it to participate in the public sphere, wherein legitimacy is granted to some 
perspectives as opposed to others.  
 
The study of how individuals and groups develop and hold points of view ought 
therefore to be an imperative concern in contemporary multicultural societies. This 
requirement is highlighted by the need to legitimate the life and practices of each 
and every cultural group in modern societies. Fascination with, and tolerance of, 
ethnic practices falls far short from granting equality of worldviews. Dialogical 
encounters (Jovchelovitch, 2007) require that on any given issue we need to be able 
to understand the point of view of the other fully, in terms of the knowledge system 
by which it is informed. The ability to understand how different individuals may 
adopt divergent perspectives, and how these perspectives in turn may be sustained 
rationally, is requisite for promoting dialogical encounters.  
 
Divergent perspectives may be articulated at the level of interpersonal relations, 
whereby contrasting opinions may be held by different subjects who share a system 
of knowledge that provides them with a common frame of reference. However, 
divergent perspectives may at times be more appropriately located at the intergroup 
level, whereby different points of view may be drawing in turn on divergent systems 
of knowledge. Furthermore, apparent consensus may also be underlined by divergent 
rationalities, whereby apparently similar outlooks may be sustained by different 
knowledge systems. These contrasting knowledges determine the limits and 
boundaries of agreement. Overlooking the processes of legitimation served by 
systems of knowledge handicaps an adequate explanation of social behaviour, in a 
way that results in failure to recognise differences across different levels of 
explanation. This handicap is characteristic of attitude scaling and has long been 
identified in this tradition, as Thurstone (1967a) notes:  
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“It is quite conceivable that two men may have the same degree or intensity 
of affect favourable toward a psychological object and that their attitudes 
would be described in this sense as identical but that they have arrived at 
their similar attitudes by entirely different routes. It is even possible that 
their factual associations about the psychological object might be entirely 
different and that their overt actions would take quite different forms which 
have one thing in common, namely, that they are about equality favourable 
toward the object” (p.21).  
 
Thurstone goes on to provide the example of an atheist and a pious believer both 
expressing similar attitudes to a statement such as ‘Going to church will not do 
anyone any harm’. According to Likert (1967), whose simple attitude scale has 
arguably enabled the discipline to better measure than define attitudes (Allport, 
1967), and whose widespread use across the social sciences is perpetuous, this state 
of conceptualisation is unsatisfactory as the measure should be in such way that 
“persons with different points of view, so far as the particular attitude is concerned, 
will respond to it differentially” (p. 90). For this reason, Likert (1967) claims that 
attitude scales, like intelligence tests, should be standardised for cultural groups, and 
one devised for one group should not be applicable for another. Likert’s suggestions 
have, however, gone largely unheeded in the measurement of public opinion, as 
noted hereunder.  
 
This thesis postulates the point of view construct as a remedy to this handicap. 
According to Sherif and Sherif (1967), to the extent that the object of an attitude is 
socially relevant, individuals of the same cultural group will share a similar 
orientation to the object that is not unique to the particular individual. Social norms, 
according to Sherif and Sherif, define what are acceptable and unacceptable 
positions in relation to that object. This thesis postulates that the point of view 
enables an understanding of the outlooks individuals adopt in relation to others in 
everyday life, on the basis of the meaning they hold for individuals and groups. Its 
reference to visual perception is more than cursory. The point of view enables an 
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understanding of how individuals and groups perceive social reality. It articulates 
how human beings see things in their everyday life, and comes with the potential to 
address such issues as: how I see what we see; how you see what we see; as well as 
how I see what s/he sees, and how you see what s/he sees as a function of how we 
see what they see.  
 
This articulation requires an appreciation and analysis of interpersonal behaviour as 
a function of intergroup behaviour. One cannot provide a satisfactory account of one 
without an appreciation of the other. The reason for this is that apparent 
disagreement may be underlined by a more fundamental consensus, whilst, on the 
other hand, apparent agreement may be fragile if underlined by a more fundamental 
cleavage. In any case, what is at stake in the encounter between points of view is the 
ability to comprehend the perspective of the other and consequently the ability to 
appreciate difference, to willingly engage in mutual dialogue, and to ultimately settle 
divergent perspectives through collaboration or conflict. Understanding how 
individuals come to take up some position on an issue against another enables a deep 
understanding into “the motives which unite people and bring them into conflict” 
(Asch, 1987, p. 8), that in our contemporary world is a crucial and urgent socio-
political concern. For these reasons, the requirement to study points of view 
embedded within different public spheres is an imperative concern and has informed 
the empirical studies undertaken in this project.  
 
Points of view can draw on a system of knowledge that is legitimated in a public 
sphere, which public sphere may in itself be marked by a multiplicity of knowledge 
systems that co-exist within in. In this state of affairs, typical of cosmopolitan 
publics, encounters between different points of view may represent more 
fundamental encounters between distinct worldviews. Interpersonal relations in 
these publics instantiate intercultural relations. This condition was studied in the first 
empirical inquiry in this project. On the other hand, points of view may draw on 
systems of knowledge that are not legitimated in a given public sphere. Such alien 
points of view present a twofold empirical concern: (1) The requirement to study the 
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alien point of view from the outside, as it seeks to negotiate its version in the context 
of a discrepant system of social representations; (2) The requirement to study the 
reception and encounter with the alien point of view from the inside, as it is received 
by individuals for whom this version is out of the ordinary. These two conditions 
have informed the second and third empirical studies undertaken in this inquiry 
respectively. Clearly, understanding social behaviour on these bases requires a 
deeper appreciation than mere evaluative judgments, as not only dispositions but 
also perceptions and common-sense bear distinctly on social behaviour. 
 
Attitudes and Attitude Change 
 
‘Attitude’ has for a long time served as the primary concept by which social 
psychology has sought an understanding into how individuals orientate themselves 
towards objects and events in their social life. Social psychology as a discipline has 
been defined in terms of its concern with the scientific study of attitudes (Allport, 
1967). Farr (1996), tracing the historical development of attitude in social 
psychology, claims that the understanding of this construct has changed through the 
years, from a sociological understanding found in the origins of the concept in 
Thomas and Znaniecki’s (1918-1920) study of the Polish peasant, through to what 
Graumann (1986) terms ‘the individualisation of the social’ in the social sciences, 
and finally to the cognitive interpretation of the Gestaltists’ work in the US. The 
result of this historical development is a contemporary understanding of attitude as a 
measurable, cognitive characteristic that represents an individual’s evaluation of 
some attitude object (see Thurstone, 1967a, 1967b; Sherif & Sherif, 1967).  
 
In the early years, attitude presented a dual focus on the individual and the social. 
Later developments, however, extracted the individual cognitive system from the 
social context, focusing on cognition as antecedent of action (Gaskell, 2001). The 
underlying premise in contemporary attitude studies is that the measurement of 
attitudes in the individual can be utilised as an independent variable, and thus as a 
predictor of behaviour, i.e. the dependent variable. Farr (1996) goes on to claim that 
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an epistemological contrast developed between two forms of social psychology, 
characterised by the way the two conceptualise the social–that is in turn reflected in 
the way attitude is employed. What separates the two social psychologies, according 
to Farr, is an epistemological incompatibility between the gestalt ‘view of the world’ 
approach, characteristic of sociological forms of social psychology, and the 
behaviourist ‘consistency of response’ approach, characteristic of psychological 
forms of social psychology3. Attitude has been developed as an individual cognitive 
construct predominantly in psychological forms of social psychology, and has 
established itself as a keystone in these forms of the discipline (Allport, 1967).  
 
Across the discipline of social psychology, however, individuals are not held to be 
neutral observers of the world. Individuals are held to be agentic; they have differing 
orientations to things they encounter in social life, and they act in context-rational 
ways in relation to them. Psychological forms of social psychology focus on the fact 
that individuals hold attitudes towards things they encounter, including people, 
objects, and ideas. Simply put, attitudes are evaluations individuals hold towards 
these elements in their environment (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2005). Attitudes are 
held to be made up of three parts: an affective component consisting of emotions, a 
cognitive component consisting of thoughts and beliefs, and a behavioural 
component consisting of actions and behaviours. Their origin has been linked to 
genes (Tesser, 1993), but most studies have focused on the way by which people’s 
attitudes are created through cognitive, affective, and behavioural experiences. 
Attitudes are held to be cognitively based if they are based primarily on relevant 
facts, affectively based if they are based primarily on emotions and values, and 
behaviourally based if they stem from people’s observations of how they behave 
toward an object. Moreover, people’s attitudes may be explicit, in the case of 
attitudes which are consciously endorsed and easily reported, or implicit, that is, 
those attitudes held involuntarily, uncontrollably and unconsciously (Aronson, 
Wilson, & Akert, 2005).  
                                                
3 For a more in-depth exploration of the epistemological differences in the underlying philosophies 
see Marková (1982). 
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The popularity of the attitude concept in social research has been largely based on 
the presumed link between attitudes and behaviour. Insofar as attitudes are held to 
reflect an individual’s evaluation of an attitude object, individuals will presumably 
behave according to their attitudes when in relation with an attitude object.  
Consequently, knowing someone’s attitudes ought to provide an insight into their 
future behaviour. Moreover, changing someone’s attitude is in itself a way to change 
future behaviour. Given the widespread political and commercial interests in 
manipulating individual behaviour, the attitude concept has benefitted extensively 
from such interests. However, the relationship between attitudes and behaviour and 
the characteristic low correlations between the two, has been a problem attitude 
research has had to contend with over the years. Ever since LaPiere’s (1934) study 
on Chinese diners, the presupposition that attitudes have something to do with 
behaviour has been cast in doubt. Attitudes are now held to predict behaviour only in 
certain circumstances (Fazio, 1990). A distinction is drawn between spontaneous 
and deliberative behaviour; attitudes predict spontaneous behaviour only when they 
are highly accessible. On the other hand, according to the theory of planned 
behaviour (Ajzen, 1985; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), when people have time to 
contemplate their behaviour, their attitudes are relevant in conjunction with 
subjective norms and perceived behavioural control, and in predicting behavioural 
intent. It is behavioural intent that is, in turn, the best predictor of actual behaviour. 
The theory of planned behaviour has provided a lifeline to the attitude concept, in 
retaining, if in a weaker form, the link between attitudes and behaviour. This has 
meant that attitudes could be retained as a variable that is subject to manipulation, 
and that is somewhat linked to actual behaviour. Consequently, it remains 
admissible to hold that manipulating attitudes may still result in behavioural change. 
 
Various theories have been proposed to account for attitude change. Festinger’s 
(1957) theory of cognitive dissonance proposes that people experience dissonance 
whenever their behaviours towards a particular stimulus or event do not match their 
previously held attitudes towards the same stimulus, particularly if there is no way 
that the behaviour can be explained as due to external circumstances. In such 
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instances, individuals are motivated to change either their attitudes or their 
behaviours to bring the two into alignment. Hovland and the Yale group (Hovland, 
Janis, & Kelley, 1953) have pioneered research into persuasive communication and 
attitude change, which has served to inform marketers on how to advertise products. 
The Yale attitude change programme suggests that the effectiveness of persuasive 
communication depends on ‘who’ says ‘what’ to ‘whom’: credible, and attractive 
speakers are more likely to be persuasive; people are more persuaded by messages 
that do not seem to be designed to influence them, by two-sided messages which 
refute the arguments on the other side, and by messages delivered to benefit from 
primacy or recency effects; audiences are more likely to be persuaded when they are 
distracted, when the receiver is of low intelligence and moderate or low self-esteem, 
and when the audience consists of people between the ages of 18 to 25 (Aronson, 
Wilson, & Akert, 2005).  
 
The heuristic-systematic model of persuasion (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) and the 
elaboration likelihood model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) have both outlined two 
routes to persuasion: one characterised by elaborate messages to which people listen 
attentively and that they process deeply, such as occurs when the message is highly 
relevant and people are both able and motivated to listen carefully; the other route 
characterised by persuasive messages other than arguments about the facts 
peripheral to the message, such as who is delivering the message, or how one feels 
about it. Inoculation (McGuire, 1964) and forewarning (Cialdini & Petty, 1981) are 
two variables that have been argued to help in resisting persuasive messages. The 
political value of the study of attitudes and attitude change is demonstrable in the 
advocation of soft power as a conflict resolution tactic (Nye, 1990, 2004). 
 
Public Opinion 
 
The popularity of ‘attitude’ in the social sciences stems from the pragmatic value it 
has claimed in the measurement of public opinion. The measurement of attitudes 
using attitude scales, predominantly the Likert scale, administered in the forms of 
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representative surveys, has become the methodology of public opinion sampling or 
polling (Fraser, 1994). Allport (1967) argues that the attitude concept has come to 
mean different things to different people, and that for any further progress to ensue a 
clarification of terminology is a necessary prerequisite. According to Allport, 
attitudes are measured more successfully than they are defined. Similarly, Shamir 
and Shamir (2000) point out that there exists no generally accepted definition of 
public opinion either, and there have even been calls to abandon the concept 
altogether. However, with regards to public opinion, “the concept is being invoked 
as much as ever if not more so” (Shamir & Shamir, 2000, p. 2).  
 
Himmelweit (1990) claims that “[s]ince the late 1930s the systematic measurement 
of public opinion has become a major industry. Some surveys explore issues in 
depth so as to learn what has given rise to, or lies behind, the expression of particular 
views and also how views on different issues relate to one another. Others ask for 
snap judgments by the public concerning preferences for different products, political 
parties or leaders, or about the public’s behavioural intentions” (p. 81). In spite of 
the epistemological and ontological difficulties the attitude concept has had to bear, 
and even if public opinion is taken to be that which public opinion polls measure, the 
measurement of the ‘attitude’ in public opinion polls has proven to be a useful 
exercise for ‘those in the know’ over the years (Himmelweit, 1990). Examples 
include the numerous political surveys which anticipate general elections in Western 
democracies, as well as national surveys measuring social attitudes. The 
Eurobarometer, a famed example of the study of public opinion, is held by some to 
have “made a unique and immensely important contribution to social sciences 
research” (Inglehart & Reif, 1991, p. xv). Hewstone (1986) outlines three reasons for 
its great value: first, that the questions are posed simultaneously to representative 
samples in all member countries of the Union; second, that key questions are 
repeated on several occasions, some in every single survey; and third, that results are 
broken down by various demographic criteria. Public opinion, so measured, is 
considered to be the expression of the many (Himmelweit, 1990).  
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Other theorists have attempted to describe public opinion as more than a distribution 
of individual attitudes. For Shamir and Shamir (2000), “public opinion lies at the 
juncture of society, communication, and the individual; of the public and the private 
domains; of civil society and the state; of citizenry and politics; of masses and elites; 
of social control and rationality; of norms and events” (p. 2). Shamir and Shamir’s 
approach attempts to accommodate public opinion’s diverse manifestations and rests 
on four premises: first, public opinion is a social system that mediates and 
accommodates social integration and social change; second, public opinion is a 
multidimensional phenomenon and cannot be reduced to any single expression; 
third, public opinion can evolve in different dynamic paths; fourth, the nature of the 
information environment is a major factor in determining which dynamic process 
will be set in motion. In many ways, Shamir and Shamir’s approach to public 
opinion attempts to go beyond the limitations of an understanding of public opinion 
as an aggregate distribution of attitudes. However, as Farr (1990a) outlines, a 
conceptualisation of public opinion based on attitude measurement per force retains 
a distributive notion of the social. Whilst this may be useful, it says nothing about 
how public opinion forms and changes but merely states what it is at the time of 
measurement. And in spite of the concerns outlined, both in relation to attitudes and, 
by implication, to public opinion, the bottom-line measure of public opinion change 
is measured by shifts in the mean or in percentage agreement in attitudes 
(Himmelweit, 1990). The Public Opinion Analysis sector of the European 
Commission has adopted the term ‘Eurobarometer’ deliberately because:  
 
“Just as a barometer can be used to measure the atmospheric pressure and thus 
give a short-range weather forecast, this Euro-barometer can be used to observe, 
and to some extent forecast, public attitudes towards the most important current 
events” (Eurobarometer, no. 1, 1974, p. 1). 
 
This definition implies an ability to locate attitudes as objective entities, qualities, or 
characteristics, which may increase or decrease in a collective of individuals in 
measurable quantities. This characteristic of attitudes has proven highly contestable 
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and has led to the postulation of ‘points of view’, that is the object of this thesis, as 
an alternative to understanding, more pertinently, individuals’ orientations to the 
social facts they encounter in their everyday life. 
 
The Fact of Culture and the Social Attitude 
 
The aim to counterbalance the individualisation of ‘attitude’ in social psychology is 
not exclusive to European forms of social psychology. Even before the advent of 
societal forms of social psychology (Himmelweit & Gaskell, 1990), such as social 
representations theory (Moscovici, 1961), social constructionism (Berger & 
Luckman, 1966), and discourse analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), Solomon Asch 
(1952/1987) took issue with ‘attitude’ as a purely individual construct and drawing 
on sociological roots, went on to postulate other concepts with the intent to develop 
a social psychology that in understanding the complexity of whatever is its object of 
study, accounts for the social as much as it does the individual. This objective, as 
well as the social-psychological elaboration of sociological concepts, is 
characteristic of contemporary societal forms of psychology that foreground social 
knowledge (Gaskell, 2001) and attempt to provide an understanding of social and 
cultural conditions in analysing and explicating social behaviour. 
 
Asch (1987) argued that attitude scales “do not provide a knowledge of the way in 
which an individual thinks about an issue, what he feels about it, or on what grounds 
he bases his convictions” (p. 537). Information obtained through a public opinion 
poll provides “the distribution of the number of people who say “yes” or “no”; but 
the rest is interpretation. For interpretation one must rely upon a knowledge of social 
conditions and ideas that the data has neither produced nor is capable of checking” 
(p. 547). According to Asch, measuring attitudes does not provide any insight into 
societal processes, factors, or conditions. This position has more recently been 
reiterated in Farr’s (1991) critique of the conceptualisation of the social in attitude 
measurement and public opinion, and in Billig’s (1987, 1991) critique of the 
argumentative context and its absence in attitude measurement (see Chapter 3).  
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Asch (1952/1987) starts by locating man within a societal framework, rejecting a 
purely individualistic and behaviouristic account of man which social psychology 
was pursuing at his time (see Graumann, 1986; Farr, 1996). He strives to take the 
cultural into account, arguing that social conditions are more than just variables to 
the individual. For Asch there is no man-in-general, but “[w]e always have before us 
a person born into a particular society at a particular level of development” (1987, p. 
364), and that material and social conditions for the individual are far more than 
objects of reflection. This has significant consequences on how individuals go about 
living the life they live in relation to the world they inhabit: “the surroundings do not 
look quite the same to one who believes in reincarnation and to one who has studied 
the principles of genetics. It matters whether the society in which we live is 
predatory or peaceful, cooperative or individualistic, expressive or taciturn” (1987, 
p. 365). For Asch, societal conditions are highly influential: “Cultural conditions 
decide whether people will walk the earth humbly or hunt heads, whether they will 
pray to their dead ancestors or not pray at all, whether they will own their own 
slaves or fight for freedom” (1987, p. 366). Moreover, this fact has clear 
implications for how we conceptualise individuals, for “[h]ead-hunting, polygamy, 
Mohammedanism are not simply traits of individuals like height or color vision. 
They are properties of individuals in so far as the individuals are members of a given 
society” (1987, p. 16). According to Asch, the difference between being a spectator 
in a social scene and being in a group is that the latter means that the individual is 
directly implicated in the actions of others.  
 
Asch draws on Sumner's notion of the mores4, to go back to a more sociological 
understanding of the concepts he develops, rejecting an absolutist position in favour 
of a socially-contingent interpretation of cultural values. In doing this he develops 
what Farr (1996) terms a sociological form of social psychology. Asch argues that 
cultural similarities and differences are a matter of investigation for social 
psychology, as cultural variation is rooted in psychological processes. Additionally, 
                                                
4 Mores are the customs and habitual practices of a community that reflect moral standards that a 
community accepts and follows. 
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in studying culture, cataloguing existing similarities and differences is not enough, 
as cultural variations are facts having historical direction:  
 
“It is not enough to say that some societies observe rules of cleanliness and 
others do not. It would be more consequential to ask whether one can as readily 
teach one group to adopt the habits of cleanliness as another to surrender them; 
whether one can as readily convert an American community to curing illness by 
sorcery as persuade a primitive group to adopt modern medical practices" (1987, 
p. 382).  
 
Asch demonstrably validates and legitimates local practices based on local 
knowledge, rejecting a hierarchical view of knowledge held by different 
communities and arguing that the study of localised views is not a matter for 
sociological investigation alone as these also depend on psychological processes: 
“changes have a direction and that often the direction is irreversible because of the 
sensible character of some psychological processes” (1987, p. 383, emphasis in 
original).  
 
Opinion, Sentiments, and Attitudes 
 
In seeking a social-psychological account for how individuals orientate themselves 
in their everyday life, Asch distinguishes between ‘opinions’, which are peripheral 
belief-action systems that may be socially relevant, and ‘sentiments’, which he 
defines as deep-seated, cognitively and emotionally crucial concerns that act as 
centres of reference for complex and extended actions and themes. Asch postulates 
two types of sentiments: (i) those that have a predominantly personal reference but 
are sociologically peripheral (e.g. falling in love), and (ii) attitudes, sentiments we 
share with many others, (e.g. education, civil liberties, economic and political 
organisation). Attitudes, Asch argues, join central processes in the individual with 
central processes in society. Attitudes orient individuals by ordering the data of 
social surroundings.  
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In differentiating between opinions and attitudes, Asch (1987) rejects a purely 
cognitive notion of attitude as an individual evaluation towards some attitude object. 
He strives to appreciate the argumentative, dialogical, and social context of attitudes, 
arguing that "[t]o be in society is to form views of social facts and relatively 
enduring concerns toward them. By means of these psychological operations we 
participate in the social process; they make possible the coherent interlocking of 
action between individuals and between groups; they define our position as members 
of the social body. Their stability and change seem closely connected with the 
stability and change of the social order" (p. 522). Asch attributes personal-social 
roots to attitudes, claiming that "to be in social relation is to stand on common 
ground with others and to face daily conditions with shared understanding and 
purpose" (p. 576).  
 
Attitudes function to orient individuals in society. Their function "is to be found in 
the effects it exerts upon current experiences and the appraisal of new conditions. 
Generally an attitude functions as an orientation to and context for current events" 
(p. 582). Attitudes do this on the basis of cognitive content. According to Asch, 
attitudes have a cognitive basis and to understand attitudes, one needs to understand 
this cognitive basis. For Asch however, cognitive implied social knowledge or data, 
rather than mental information processing that is characteristic of contemporary 
cognitive psychology. Asch elaborates thus: 
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"Only if the knowledge exists that there are germs and viruses that produce 
disease will it be meaningful to have an attitude about the right of the state to 
compel children to be vaccinated against smallpox regardless of the wishes of 
their parents. If, instead, the available data contain such entities as spirits and 
the belief that they produce illness, medical problems will be solved by 
medicine men and there will be different attitudes towards vaccination and 
hygiene. In order that the burning of witches make sense it is necessary to have 
as part of the intellectual climate the propositions that there are devils and that 
persons can be in league with them. In each of these instances a particular 
factual definition of the given situation is the necessary condition for conviction 
and action" (p. 564). 
 
Asch further proposes that data is a function of sociological conditions, that is, 
historical development controls the content of knowledge whilst existing social 
relations decide what data will become accessible and the emphasis they will 
receive. Asch claims that it is not sufficient for facts to be identical to secure 
agreement amongst social actors, it is equally essential that facts be perceived in the 
same context.  
 
To understand public opinion therefore, it is important to go beyond the mere 
counting of heads and develop an understanding of societal conditions and the forms 
of social knowledge these conditions sustain, and furthermore how individuals draw 
on this knowledge to orient themselves in social life. Asch argues that looking at 
functional uniformities fails to supply "the functional relations between conditions 
and consequences. Between these stands nothing less than the individual himself, 
with his tendencies, capacities, and group relations. Unless we take into account 
what he understands and feels about his situation, we do not understand the sense of 
the given relation in a single instance" (p. 533).  
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Social Attitudes 
 
Attitudes, for Asch, "are social not merely because their objects are social or because 
others have similar attitudes. They are social principally in that they arise in view of 
and in response to perceived conditions of mutual dependence" (p. 576). Asch 
elaborates with an example: that "[t]here cannot be in a society several official 
opinions of what constitutes a crime or what is an object of private property" (p. 
576). Attitudes are thus "not only causally connected with group-conditions, they are 
also part of the mutually shared field. Therefore the investigation of attitudes brings 
us to the center of the person’s social relations and heart of dynamics of group 
processes" (p. 577).  Asch describes the mutually shared field as a phenomenal field 
that for subjects in relation constitutes reality. Asch argues that humans experience 
their surroundings and perceive what goes on within their environment as 
experientially objective situations. Individuals do not experience their perceptions of 
the world as cognitive products of their internal physiological processes, they 
experience objects in terms of properties attributed to objects themselves. 
Consequently, human subjects go on to assume that the objects that lie in front of 
them in some way lie in front of others who share the same experiential space in the 
same way. In this way, the biological basis of human cognition orients human 
subjects to a phenomenal objectivity. Things in the environment possess this 
characteristic of objectivity, by means of which they are held to exist in-themselves, 
independently of human perception. It is this world of objects, taken as a whole, and 
existing independently of any of us, that constitutes for us our shared phenomenal 
reality and that makes up our mutually shared phenomenal field. Consequently, the 
study of human relations is necessarily a study of phenomenal relations, in other 
words, representations of reality that for human subjects constitute the real world 
and according to which they interrelate inter-objectively (Latour, 1996; Sammut, 
Daanen & Sartawi, 2010). It is within this shared phenomenal field that attitudes are 
located. 
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One necessary requirement for studying attitudes is therefore that human actions and 
experiences, being in relations of interdependence, be studied in terms of the units of 
which they form part. The presence of others effects human subjects by bringing 
within their psychological sphere the thoughts, emotions and purposes of others. 
This extends their world vastly beyond their own individual capacities. According to 
Asch, this fact alters the individual’s psychological scene by bringing him into 
relations of mutual dependence. It is not simply that individual action is mutually 
oriented and elicits in another a similarly oriented response. Mutuality is a systemic 
condition that refers to an interpenetration of views that forms the basis of social 
interaction. It allows individuals to presume that others stand in the same relation to 
the environment as they do, and it endows human actions with a mutually intelligible 
character. As Asch explains, humans do not live in their own space, in their own 
time, and in their own systems of cause and effect. They live in a shared space, in 
shared time, and in shared systems of causality. When humans interrelate, they do so 
on the basis of this inter-objective, open field that surrounds them and which stands 
in similar relation to all of them. 
 
Taking context into account in this way leads Asch to postulate certain questions 
which social psychology is still grappling with today: “How do social conditions 
make the most diverse beliefs and convictions part of the individual? To what extent 
do values vary and what may be the limits to this variation?" (p. 367). In outlining a 
potential answer to these questions, Asch calls for a theory of attitudes in which 
techniques grow out of the needs for description and theoretical clarification and, 
according to Asch, when such a framework has been developed:  
 
 “It would then become pertinent to call for a specification of the individual’s 
 frame of reference and to ask questions such as the following: What is the 
 center  of gravity of the individual’s outlook? How wide or narrow is it? Is 
 he considering a given question from a long-range or short-range view? Is he 
 oriented to the present situation, to the future, or to a past that has already 
 disappeared? Does he have an attitude on a given issue or is the problem 
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 remote and without reality? What is the place of his specific assertions in the 
 larger context of his outlook?” (p. 559).  
 
Asch’s proposal for addressing these issues is the postulation of the notion of the 
‘point of view’, as a function of the social attitudes on which it draws. ‘Point of 
view’ constitutes an individual’s perspective towards a social object or event, an 
outlook which individuals adopt and in terms of which they act meaningfully in their 
everyday social relations. It is by means of this operation, Asch argues, that 
alignments and oppositions arise in the social order.  
 
Points of view, according to Asch, allow individuals to engage in psychological 
processes of far-reaching importance. It enables individuals to engage in social 
checks, to verify the nature of their surroundings. It also enables individuals to make 
use of the mutually shared psychological field, drawing the actions of subjects into 
relations of mutual relevance, whereby the surroundings come to include a reference 
to others and happenings cease to have a relation only to oneself: “I am induced to 
take up a particular standpoint, to view my own action as another views it or as the 
action of another person, and, conversely, to view another’s action as my own” (p. 
132). According to Asch:  
 
 “[i]t blunts thinking to speak of the participants in the social scene as 
 “individuals”. Human interaction takes place between persons, each of whom 
has the property of being an “I” to himself and each of whom sees the other 
as a “you”. The meaning of these terms goes far beyond the identification of 
separate individuals. Their content is relational and mutually dependent. To 
be an “I” means that one experiences oneself as a “you” for others and that 
one experiences others as “I’s” to themselves. Often the two protagonists, “I” 
and “you”, speak and refer to themselves as “we”. “We” represents a new 
group formation, different from “you” and “I” taken singly. Further, the 
newly constituted “we” may jointly refer to another character, to a “he” or 
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“she”. Similarly, “we” may  discuss, plan, or plot about “them”, another 
important part of the social firmament” (p. 180).  
 
In this systemic and relational context that is the shared phenomenal field, each 
subject’s point of view is mutually intelligible. A subject is able to adopt a 
perspective and interrelate with others on the basis of it, because others can 
comprehend one’s point of view even if they can disagree with it. As Asch argues, 
social action requires a unique organisation between participants who stand on 
common ground, oriented towards one another and to the same environment, and 
that their acts interpenetrate and regulate each other. In social action each subject 
refers his action within a shared environment to the other, and the other’s actions to 
himself. According to Asch, this requires: (a) the subject to perceive the 
surroundings which include another as well as herself; (b) the subject to perceive 
that the other is also oriented to the surroundings, and similarly perceives herself and 
the subject in the surroundings; (c) the subject to act and note that the other 
responds; (d) the subject to note that the other’s response sets up the expectation that 
the subject will understand the response as an action of the other directed towards 
the subject; and, (e) that the same ordering must exist in the other as well, as a 
subject. On the basis of this social interaction we are able to derive the reasonable 
grounds for divergences, based on differences in perspectives. We realise that 
certain points of view and certain experiences are our own, but we do not maintain 
that we are in singular relation with the environment. We turn to the thought of 
others for confirmation of our relations, because we understand that they can 
illuminate us with some perspective that is inaccessible from our point of view. 
Social relations are enabled by means of the critical capacity of human subjects to 
take the perspective of the other. As Asch argues, I am able to understand my own 
action as it appears to another, and to view the action of another as if it were my 
own. Furthermore, divergences in perspectives are considered as more than brute 
differences. We are able to understand that one perspective may be capable of 
correcting another distorted view by appeal to a deeper-lying unity of shared action, 
feeling, and thought.  
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To sum up Asch’s postulation, the mutual relations in which human subjects engage 
extend and deepen their individual psychological field and form a systemic, 
psychosocial, phenomenal field that enables the interpenetration of views. In a clash 
between divergent views, individuals are induced to take a stand and view their 
actions as others view them, and conversely to view the actions of others as their 
own. In this way, limitations of individual thinking are transcended by including the 
thoughts of others. Individuals become open to more alternatives than their own 
unaided individual cognition makes possible. This knowledge, that our 
understanding can be in disagreement with that of others, is of high significance. 
According to Asch, it makes evident to us the possibility of error as an intellectual 
fact, and prepares the way for entertaining errors in our own view. In consequence, 
individuals become able to deliberately approve one view and dismiss another on the 
basis of a process of social validation, by appeal to a common frame of reference 
that serves to provide ‘logical’ proof for one’s own thinking. And, to go back to the 
previous argument concerning the public sphere, different publics admit different 
logics to co-exist to different degrees, meaning that not all points of view are equally 
valid in a given public. 
 
The notion of the point-of-view remains today, as Asch (1952/1987) already pointed 
out decades ago, ill-defined. The reason for this is that the major specification within 
social psychology for how individuals orient themselves to different aspects of their 
environment has been served by the notion of ‘attitude’ rather than ‘point of view’. 
As noted, ‘attitude’ has been individualised and cognitivised to provide a 
specification of the individual’s cognitive and emotional orientation towards social 
objects, excluding a reference to the thinking of another. In this definition, attitude 
has replaced the notion of point of view, as outlined by Asch. However, the 
contemporary conceptualisation of attitudes fails to provide an account of how 
individual orientations are adopted and sustained in a social context characterised by 
argumentative practices, divergent and competing knowledge systems, and 
discrepant rationalities. Attitudes and public opinion provide a static snapshot of 
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individual evaluations towards an attitude object, but fail to provide an appreciation 
of the cultural aspects by which that orientation is validated. Attitudes and public 
opinion fail to account for how attitudes serve individuals to participate in social life, 
have their own perspectives recognised and legitimated by others, and gain 
respectability on account of their views. Attitudes and public opinion also fail to 
account for how and why public attitudes may change as a function of societal 
conditions, how some public attitudes may be common-sensical in some context but 
non-sensical in another, and for how cultural conditions may shape perspectives and 
allow individuals to make sense of social reality accordingly. The modern 
conceptualisation of attitudes fails to include a specification of the social context that 
Asch intended for it in his theory of social attitudes.  
 
Asch’s calling for a theory of social attitudes has, however, been a core concern for 
societal forms of social psychology (Himmelweit and Gaskell, 1990), and an 
understanding of worldviews in their social form has become the cornerstone of this 
alternative form of the discipline. This is most notably found in the theory of social 
representations. If the theory of social representations adequately meets Asch’s 
calling for a theory of social attitudes, then the conceptualisation of points of view in 
terms of social representations will provide a theoretically plausible specification for 
an individual’s outlook based on a social frame of reference. In this way, the notion 
of point of view can overcome the limitations of the cognitivised attitude and take 
into account the argumentative context of an individual’s orientation that is based on 
a collective, rather than an aggregate, understanding of the social (see Harré, 1984). 
As attitude is to public opinion, so point of view is to social representations. The 
present thesis elaborates a social psychological conceptualisation of ‘point of view’, 
systemically embedded within social representations. This formulation is aimed at 
resolving Gaskell’s (2001) predicament of pushing social psychology to bring both 
the individual and the social into focus contemporarily, and meet the challenge that 
could reinvigorate the discipline.  
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Social Representations 
 
In many Western societies individualism has had a marked influence, not least in the 
formulation of the social sciences as behavioural disciplines and in the 
conceptualisation of the social as a measurable influence on the individual (Farr, 
1996). A primary consequence of the individualisation of the social is the 
individualisation of attitudes, in which the social element has been removed in 
favour of individual, cognitive processes. For historical and geographic reasons, the 
social psychology of social representations has escaped this individualisation. It 
developed into a social psychology that foregrounds social knowledge as it emerges 
in communicative practices, in which the social and the individual are not opposed 
universes but part of the same system of mediation (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999; Gaskell, 
2001). As a result, the social representations approach has provided a counterbalance 
to the predominant forms of social psychology in which the individual is abstracted 
from the social and constitutes, in itself, a universal unit of analysis.  
 
Since Moscovici’s (1961) pioneering study on the social representations of 
psychoanalysis in France, the study of social representations has proceeded along a 
number of different lines. This has been permitted as a result of an eclectic definition 
of social representations. Social Representations have been variously described as a 
concept, a conceptual framework, a theory, and an approach (Allansdottir, 
Jovchelovitch, & Stathopoulou, 1993; Bauer & Gaskell, 1999; Carugati, Selleri, & 
Scappini, 1994; deRosa, 1993). Moreover, a further distinction is applicable to the 
term social representation. Used as a verb, ‘social representation’ refers to a process 
of representing ‘socially’, whilst as a noun, it refers to some product, a 
representation, whose content it is possible to study. Social representations are the 
outcomes of processes of communication that represent reality for a given people, 
and once in existence they constitute social reality sui generis (Moscovici, 2000). 
This is similar to Asch’s (1987) social psychology, where one great consequence of 
psychological interaction is the creation of a realm of social facts: “Interaction 
produces a host of objects, roles, and relations of great permanence that are 
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understandable only in terms of their social setting and function” (p. 178). Asch 
argues that “representations and the actions that they initiate bring group facts into 
existence and produce the phenomenal solidity of group processes” (Asch, 1987, p. 
251-252). For Asch, the form that “interrelated actions take […] is a datum of 
precisely the same kind as any other fact” (1987, p. 252).  
 
The philosophy of studying ‘phenomena’ through ‘representations’ can be traced 
back to Kant, who claimed that a phenomenon is an appearance amenable to sensory 
perception, that is, an observable event. The word 'phenomenon' comes from the 
Greek noun 'phainomenon', which means 'appearance', and is related to the Greek 
verb 'phanein', meaning 'to show'. In Kant’s philosophy, phenomena constitute the 
world as experienced, as opposed to ‘noumena’, that is things-in-themselves, or the 
world as it exists independently of how it is experienced. In Kantian philosophy, we 
cannot ever know things-in-themselves; we can only know the world through our 
experience of it, through the representations we have of the phenomena in our world. 
Kant thus laid the foundations for the distinction between reality and the real. 
Reality consists of the world of things, whilst the real is the particular horizon 
constructed by a particular community or individual, which is lived and acted 
through in the experience of everyday life. According to Jovchelovitch (2007) 
“Representations construct the real but never fully capture the wholeness of reality” 
(p. 37). These 'representations' of the world as experienced, our representations of 
phenomena, according to Kant, serve as the basis for inferring reality.  
 
In his introduction to Being and Nothingness (1943/2003), Sartre resolves the 
Kantian dualism of reality and the real through the very notion of point of view. 
Sartre claims that although an object may manifest itself through a single 
appearance, “the sole fact of there being a subject implies the possibility of 
multiplying the points of view on that Abschattung”, such that, according to Sartre, 
“our theory of the phenomenon has replaced the reality of the thing by the 
objectivity of the phenomenon and that it has based this on an appeal to infinity” 
(2003, p. 3). This conception in terms of objectivity is similar to Moscovici’s claim 
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that social representations constitute social reality sui generis, noted above. The 
opposition of finite and infinite in Sartre replaces that of being and appearance in 
Kant, in that what of the object appears is in fact only an aspect of it. It is this 
relative aspect that is captured in the notion of a point of view. To use Sartre’s own 
example, “The genius of Proust […] is no less equivalent to the infinity of possible 
points of view which one can take on that work and which we will call the 
“inexhaustibility” of Proust’s work” (2003, p. 3). That is to say, the reality of a 
phenomenon exists always and forever relative to the point of view that describes it. 
According to the present thesis, by analogy, the reality of a social phenomenon 
exists always and forever relative to the individual multitude of points of view that 
describe it and that constitute it in the public sphere. 
 
Kant's account of representations and phenomena has been highly influential in 
psychological theories concerning the brain, the mind, the external world, and the 
ways by which these interact. In psychology, mental representations are held to be 
reproductions in the mind, of the world, as experienced by the individual through 
sensory information. The scientific study of these representations has become the 
task of cognitive psychology in particular. Representations have also been studied 
and formulated in other social science disciplines, such as sociology and 
anthropology, with the aim of investigating cultural representations, or those 
representations which exist across individual minds rather than inside individual 
minds (Wagner et al., 1999; Wagner, Mecha, & do Rosário Carvalho, 2008).   The 
very foundations of sociology as a discipline rest fundamentally on Durkheim’s 
(1924) distinction between individual representations and collective representations.  
Whatever the discipline, the study of representations has always proven 
controversial. Jovchelovitch (2007) captures very well the nature of the controversy:  
 
“[m]uch of the dispute over representation can be explained by an underlying 
tendency to focus solely on its epistemic function, that is, the ability of 
representation to produce knowledge about the world. Indeed there is a very 
strong tendency both in psychology and the social sciences to equate the 
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epistemic function of representation with cognition and to erase from the 
representational process its connection with persons and contexts. 
Representation is studied as an accurate depiction of a given state of affairs 
in the world and disconnected from the human and social processes that 
make it possible in the first place. Conceived as the sole basis of cognition 
and knowledge, representation is reduced to a mental epistemic phenomenon, 
ruled by information-processing mechanisms and a modular computational 
system that some psychologists call mind” (p. 11).  
 
Cultural representations are, however, held to be different from mental 
representations in a fundamental way: “[r]epresentations are not a mirror of the 
world outside and are not purely the mental constructions of individual subjects. 
They involve a symbolic labour that springs out of the interrelations between self, 
other and the object-world, and as such have the power to signify, to construct 
meaning, to create reality” (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 11).  The difference between the 
two stems from the relevance of the social: “[i]gnoring the social dimension of 
representation has allowed for the recurrent view of representational processes as 
purely mental cognitive phenomena, detached from the larger societal constrains that 
are integral to their processes of constitution” (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 12). This 
difference locates them at different levels of explanation5. 
 
The nature of the social 
 
Himmelweit (1990) claims that the analysis of social representations requires a 
molar, in contrast to a molecular, approach. The molecular view considers behaviour 
as consisting of discrete units, or responses, which are measurable and which, if 
enough data is available, is assumed to be predictable. The molar view, on the other 
hand, sees behaviour as a temporally extended activity in both space and time 
(Baum, 2004). This distinction, according to Baum (2004), is not merely theoretical 
but paradigmatic. The difference, according to Farr (1996) reflects an 
                                                
5 For a detailed explanation of different levels of analysis see Wagner & Hayes (2005).	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epistemological incompatibility between behaviouristic and gestaltist approaches. 
The key to understanding this paradigmatic difference lies in the conceptualisation 
of the social.  
 
Harré (1984) argues that one of the root ideas of the ‘social’ is that of a plurality, 
which can be a distributive plurality or a collective plurality. A distributive plurality 
is one where each member of the group has some similar attribute to every other. In 
a collective plurality however, “the group, as a supraindividual, has an attribute 
which is not an attribute of any of the members” (p. 930). Certain representations are 
not held in any sense by a single individual but they only emerge and take shape in a 
collectivity, as a gestalt, in the coming together of a group where no individual holds 
the entire representation on their own. According to Breakwell (2001) no one 
individual has access to all social representations in operation, nor to a single social 
representation in its entirety. Asch (1987) similarly claims that there are instances of 
“extended cooperation in which the situation of the group is not perceived or 
understood by all and in which many or most attend to a restricted job that 
contributes to a larger aim, often unknown” (p. 177).  
 
According to Harré (1984), an account of social representations needs to account for 
the social as a structured group not an aggregate of similar individuals: 
“representations, as “something” cognitive, could be located in true social 
collectives rather than multiplied and distributed through an aggregate of people” (p. 
933). Farr (1990b) has utilised these terms to critique public opinion and its reliance 
on the distribution of attitudes. And according to Jovchelovitch: “just as the social is 
more than an aggregation of individuals, social representations are more than an 
aggregation of individual representations” (1995, p. 93). Moreover, according to 
Harré (1984), representations can effectively be understood independently of 
individual cognition. Conversely, definitions of social representations in terms of 
consensus are inadequate: “More than consensual beliefs, social representations are 
therefore organizing principles varied in nature, which do not necessarily consist of 
shared beliefs, as they may result in different or even opposed positions taken by 
 58 
individuals in relation to common reference points” (Doise, Clémence, and Lorenzo-
Cioldi, 1993, p. 4).  
 
In a similar vein Asch (1987) distinguishes between macroscopic and microscopic 
properties. The social in social representations may be accorded macroscopic 
properties and ascribed a sense of a collective system that “does not reside in the 
individuals taken separately, though each individual contributes to it; nor does it 
reside outside them; it is present in the interrelations between the activities of 
individuals” (p. 252). The social representation, according to Wagner, Mecha, & do 
Rosário Carvalho (2008), far from a more traditional understanding of a cognitive 
unit that exists in individual minds, is conceived of as a collective phenomenon 
pertaining to a community. Instead of locating representations within minds, the 
authors argue that it is more adequate to conceptualise them as existing across 
minds. Social representations as phenomena pertain to “a world that, although 
belonging to each of us, transcends all of us. They are a “potential space” of 
common fabrication, where each person goes beyond the realm of individuality to 
enter another-yet fundamentally related-realm: the realm of public life” 
(Jovchelovitch, 1995, p. 94).  
 
In public life, each individual is uniquely positioned in relation to others in the 
process of social representation, on the basis of some point of view that they adopt. 
Whilst individuals within a social group share a holomorphic frame of reference, 
they will not hold the same positioning within the social representation (Clémence, 
2001; Doise, 2001; Wagner & Hayes, 2005). Clémence defines social positioning as 
“the process by which people take up position about a network of significations” 
(2001, p. 83). This is corollary to Asch’s notion of adopting a point of view. 
Divergent positions are expressed by individuals who attempt to define the 
phenomenon from their points of view, as noted by Sartre, using a framework of 
normative rules based on ideas, values, and beliefs characteristic of their group for 
the elaboration of meaning. The frame of reference must be shared by individuals if 
they are to interrelate at all. Whilst positioning may be idiosyncratic (an individual’s 
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point of view may be unique), it cannot be idiomorphic, as others would be unable to 
relate meaningfully to the frame of reference that legitimises the actor’s point of 
view (Wagner & Hayes, 2005). Diversity within the social field means that 
individuals position themselves differently, engaging with the phenomenon from a 
particular point of view relative to other agents, who are similarly engaged in the 
process of social representation (Clémence, 2001; Liu & László, 2007). Social 
positioning in terms of adopting a point of view in social relations is not only the 
expression of an opinion (Thurstone, 1967b), it is a way of processing information in 
order to align our thinking with what society thinks (Clémence, 2001).  
 
Modeling the point of view 
 
Social representations are social insofar as they retain a sense of the collective 
existing across individual minds, and they are representations insofar as they are 
phenomena representing reality6 and constituting the real7. This conception of the 
social representation is found in Bauer and Gaskell’s (1999) toblerone model that 
postulates social representations as elaborated by a collective in an inter-objective 
space. This is similar to Asch’s (1952/1987) conception of the shared phenomenal 
field. For Bauer and Gaskell, representations can be formally characterised as the 
relation between three elements: subjects, or carriers of the representation (S); an 
object that is represented, which may be a concrete entity or an abstract idea (O); 
and a project, or pragmatic context in which the representation is meaningful (P). 
Subjects, object, and project form a system of mutual constitution. This enables an 
understanding of how “in the object, the project of the subjects is represented; or 
how in the subjects the object appears in relation to a project; or how the project 
links the subjects and object” (p. 168). Similarly, Asch claims that “the paramount 
fact about social interaction is that the participants stand on common ground, that 
they turn toward one another, that their acts interpenetrate and therefore regulate 
each other […] It is individuals with this particular capacity to turn toward one 
                                                
6 The noumenon, or object-in-itself. 
7 The phenomenon for a given community.	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another who in concrete action validate and consolidate in each a mutually shared 
field, one that includes both the surroundings and one another’s psychological 
properties as the objective sphere of action” (1987, p. 161-3, italics in original).  
 
Bauer and Gaskell argue that the functions of representation are not mere 
epiphenomena of human activity, but that they constitute the internal environment 
that in conjunction with the external environment of brute facts8, empower and 
constrain individual and collective activity. Social representations, unlike mental 
representations that require a single individual, involve a minimal triad of two 
persons (subject 1 and subject 2) concerned with an object (O), constituting a 
triangle of mediation [S1-O-S2] that is the basic unit for the elaboration of meaning 
across time. This formulation is similar to Heider’s (1946) account of the balance of 
reciprocity in the cognitive organisation of attitudes between three entities. The links 
between any two entities in this formulation represent attitudes, which are balanced 
systemically in their reciprocal relations, or within what may be held to be a social 
representation. In this formulation, the angle that is the subject’s perspective, 
oriented towards another subject and an object, represents an aspect of the 
phenomenon, in Sartre’s terms, that is subject’s point of view. This point of view is 
constitutive of the subject’s attitudes towards the object and the other (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2: Point of view 
 
Bauer and Gaskell argue that a final extension to their model concerns the 
differentiation of social groups. Over time, they argue, various triangles of mediation 
                                                
8 ‘Reality’, or noumena, in contrast to phenomena, as proposed by Kant. 
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emerge and coexist to form a larger social system. This leads to the ‘toblerone pack’ 
model, where O is the linking pin of different representations, their common referent 
being the brute fact. More recently, they have proposed the ‘wind-rose’ model of 
social representations that denotes different representations in different communities 
at different points in time (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008). The surface of each triangle, 
which is a section through the toblerone pack, denotes the different common senses 
that prevail in different social groups at the same time, whilst the elongation of the 
triangles denotes the evolution of common sense in the different groups. The 
toblerone pack model and the wind rose model provide a conceptualisation of a 
structural approach to the coming together of a multitude of social representations in 
relation to a particular social object or event. They also present a formulation of the 
elaboration of points of view based on group membership and shared group 
knowledge, that can model ‘how I and you see what we see; and how we see what 
they see’ (Fig. 3).  
 
Fig. 3: Inter-relating points of view and social representations 
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The extension of the toblerone model to a toblerone pack model or wind rose model 
is required to model divergent points of view pertaining to different social 
representations (i.e. when the object is the linking pin between two different social 
representations [S1-S2-O, O-S3-S4]9, as in Fig. 3) that come into contact in some 
public sphere. In relations between points of view based on different social 
representations10 individuals engage in processes of social re-presentation 
(Chryssides et al., 2009) on the basis of which they seek to comprehend alien 
perspectives and make the unfamiliar familiar. Until a new social representation is 
forged to provide a frame of reference that enables alternative perspectives to be 
understood in their own legitimacy, they will be incomprehensible from any point of 
view of another social representation. In such cases, an individual’s perspective 
would impede one to see the potentiality of another perspective in its legitimacy, or, 
to put it in other words, as a result of the way I see it, I cannot see how it can be seen 
differently. In the event of an encounter with an alternative perspective that draws on 
a different rationality, the alternative point of view may appear bizarre or abhorrent, 
as argued above. 
 
This conceptualisation of social representations is similar to gestalt forms of social 
psychology and draws on the same epistemological roots. Drawing on Durkheim’s 
notion of collective representations, wherein the collective representation as a social 
fact is a collective phenomenon that is not directly reducible to its substrate 
elements, social representations theory adopts a gestalt formulation of reality that is 
conceptualised as existing across individual minds. This conceptualisation is similar 
to Asch’s social psychology and his formulation of sentiments and attitudes, which 
similarly draws on sociological roots to account for reality as part of a mutually 
shared field. It is this collectively enacted reality that individuals draw on to 
orientate and position themselves in social life. The reconciliation of the social 
representations programme with Asch’s social psychology, as an account of social 
                                                
9 Angles of view in different triangles, such as S1 & S3, not only characterise divergent perspectives, 
they represent perspectives which draw on different meanings of the same object. In this case, the 
object is not the same to the two subjects in question, the object is a wholly different phenomenon for 
the two groups S1-S2 & S3-S4. 
10 such as represented by dashed lines in Figure 3 between S1 and S3, or S2 and S4 
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attitudes, opens space for the formulation of how individuals as members of groups 
may develop points of view in terms of social representations that are available to 
them by virtue of their membership of that particular group. Such a conception 
allows for the analysis of the encounters between different points of view based on 
similar or divergent backgrounds of social representations, and the consequences 
that may emerge forthwith. As detailed above, this can occur in a public sphere that 
legitimates different perspectives as well as different systems of knowledge, or in a 
public sphere in which an established system of knowledge encounters a perspective 
from outside.  
 
The point-of-view/social representations formulation allows both individual 
cognitive processes and the social context to play a part in the explanation of human 
social behaviour. It constitutes a figure/ground gestalt of social psychological 
theorising that allows a change in perspectives but which retains the totality of 
understanding without the need to foreground one element at the exclusion of 
another (Gaskell, 2001). It also provides a societal alternative to the contemporary 
attitude/public opinion formulation that retains a collective, gestalt, understanding of 
the social that is: (a) transitive11 in explaining the individual point of view, (b) not 
reducible to its elements, and (c) that retains taxonomic priority12. Consequently, 
inquiry into points of view requires sensitivity to both interpersonal characteristics 
that ensue in interpersonal relations, as well as intrapersonal properties that may 
characterise mental operations involved in adopting a point of view. The studies 
undertaken in this inquiry concern both of these social-psychological processes. 
 
                                                
11 Transitive explanations are those whereby the conceptual components of the explanation of a 
phenomenon, the theory governing the research, and the hypotheses derived are all located within the 
same explanation space (Wagner & Hayes, 2005).  
12 Taxonomic priority means that states, processes, products and structures of lower aggregation 
levels can only be acknowledged and classified from the superordinate level but not the other way 
around, and that a particular state of the higher level must conform with one particular state of the 
lower level but not vice-versa. Several states of the super-ordinate level can conform with the same 
state of the subordinate level (Wagner & Hayes, 2005). 	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Consequences and Conclusion 
 
So what are the consequences of conceptualising social attitudes in this manner? 
Asch suggests that it is necessary to describe their main lines of organisation and 
their degree of structurisation; insofar as attitudes are part of wider systems, they 
cannot be understood on their own terms alone. It is also necessary, according to 
Asch, to understand the directions of individuals’ outlooks, and the cleavages that 
may exist between different outlooks. In this way, we can understand an attitude’s 
place and function in the general scheme of social behaviour, how it takes shape and 
changes in a medium of already functioning views, and how a change in part leads to 
a change in whole. 
 
The assimilation of Asch's conception of attitude within the social psychology of 
attitudes as it stands today is largely impossible due to the individualisation and 
cognitivisation of the concept. This stems largely from discrepant epistemological 
assumptions between the two. Yet, Asch's approach and the social representations 
paradigm share an underlying epistemological base, and their assumptions derive 
largely from common roots (Marková, 1982; Farr, 1996). Reconciling the two, as 
proposed above, in a formulation of points of view based on a background of social 
representations, presents social psychology with new challenges and requires of it 
new explanations, such as: How can we come to understand individuals’ outlooks 
towards the social phenomena they face? How do different individuals adopt 
different points of view when they orientate themselves towards the same social 
phenomenon? How is it that certain different points of view may appear sensible 
whilst others may appear non-sensical? What happens in encounters between 
divergent points of view, when these draw on the same worldview, and when they 
do not? What happens in encounters between similar points of view when these 
draw on similar worldviews, and when they do not? These questions present 
themselves as new and worthy challenges for the social representations programme 
on the one hand, and for social cognition on the other hand, as well as for the 
discipline of social psychology in general. The linking pin between the two concerns 
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is the concept of point of view, which provides a specification for the location of the 
individual within a social representation.  
 
The empirical studies undertaken in this thesis have been carried out with the aim of 
addressing some of these issues. The first study undertaken looks at different points 
of view towards the role of religion in society, in the wake of a documentary 
proposing religion as the source of all evil and the subsequent debate that took place 
around the issue in the British public sphere in 2006. This study characterises 
different points of view and elucidates the process of social positioning involved in 
adopting a point of view in a cosmopolitan public marked by a plurality of 
perspectives legitimated by diverse worldviews. The element of social positioning 
attached to point of view, as outlined by Clémence (2001), is what demarcates the 
notion of point of view from attitude, and the empirical analysis of the data in this 
study makes a contribution towards the discussion of attitudes and their role in social 
psychological theory.  
 
The second study looks at social positioning in further depth, by means of an 
analysis of the points of view of Maltese migrants to Britain. Maltese migrants to 
Britain do not have recourse to a Maltese community in which their perspectives or 
frames of reference are shared. As a result, they are required to negotiate their 
outlooks towards social events with others whose perspectives are legitimated by 
different frames of reference–as their own frames of reference have no currency in 
the absence of a native community. The extent to which they succeed in doing this 
determines the degree to which they are able to position themselves as members of 
the host community, establish ties of solidarity with others in a new social reality, 
and benefit from the resources available in their host society. The analysis of the 
data in this study sheds light on the interpersonal aspects of adopting certain points 
of view.  
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The third study looks at the intrapersonal properties of points of view, in terms of 
their latitudes of acceptance, rejection and non-commitment, as they relate to 
different issue domains. It contributes to an understanding of the extent to which 
different types of point of view are characteristically more or less favourable to other 
perspectives. The findings of this study contribute towards discussions of social 
cognition in intercultural encounters. Taken together, the three empirical studies 
enable a formulation of ‘point of view’ and an understanding of its social-
psychological characteristics. This is considered relevant for one principal reason, 
that is, it helps in elucidating the dynamics involved in intercultural contact and, 
insofar as it helps in understanding the processes that foster successful perspective-
taking across divergent social representations, it promises to further our knowledge 
of how to turn intercultural diversity into added value. 
 
Whilst a detailed conceptualisation of ‘point of view’ has so far eluded social 
psychological theory, certain scholars have elaborated aspects of the concept in 
formulating theories of social behaviour. Most of these have employed the term to 
offer explanations for other phenomena, due to the relational and relative properties 
that points of view signify. Such scholarship is critical in understanding the nature, 
as well as the relevance, of points of view in theories of social behaviour. It is also 
relevant in establishing a blueprint for inquiry into this construct. The following 
chapter reviews the major contributions that have made recourse to this concept in 
their examination of human social behaviour.  
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Introduction 
 
Social psychology, in its various forms, has concerned itself with the explanation of 
social behaviour. Historically however, the discipline has divided itself along 
epistemological lines (see Stephan & Stephan, 1990; Farr, 1996; Harré & 
Moghaddam, 2003), with the result that social psychological explanations of 
behaviour have been proffered according to different levels of explanation (Farr, 
1996; Gaskell, 2001; Wagner & Hayes, 2005). Sociological forms of social 
psychology have provided top-down descriptions of social behaviour through 
macro-reductive descriptions of societal phenomena (Wagner & Hayes, 2005), such 
as discourse and social representations. Such descriptions provide content-rational 
accounts of social behaviour. They do not, however, provide an explanation that fits 
deterministic person-level conceptual models of behaviour. Psychological forms of 
social psychology, on the other hand, have focused on personal-level phenomena, 
predominantly attitudes, with the aim of studying isolated variables in an effort to 
gain an understanding of micro-processes that underpin social behaviour. Such 
explanations are held to provide predictable explanatory accounts of individual 
social behaviour, but exclude a reference to the situational and societal contingencies 
in which behaviour occurs. The meso-level situational study of opinions and views 
has, however, been largely absent from social psychological enquiry. With the 
exception of Billig’s rhetorical analysis and Harré’s positioning theory, it has 
received scant attention and when it did, this was only as a corollary to the 
development of other concepts and theories, predominantly in the study of attitudes 
and public opinion.  
 
Interest in attitudes emerged in the 1920s, and throughout the twentieth century 
became so central that it defined social psychology as the study of attitudes (Allport, 
1967). Whilst interest has waxed and waned over the years (McGuire, 1986), the 
attitude concept has become one of the pillars of the discipline and arguably 
represents the field’s major contribution to society and the social sciences in general. 
Despite its predominance, the attitude as a concept has proven problematic in 
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relation to the way it considered the ‘social’. Farr (1996) traces the historical 
understanding of ‘attitude’, from a sociological one found in Thomas and 
Znaniecki’s (1918-1920) study of the polish peasant, through to what Graumann 
(1986) terms as ‘the individualisation of the social’ in the social sciences, and finally 
to the cognitive interpretation of the Gestaltists’ work in the US. What separates 
them is an epistemological incompatibility between the gestalt ‘view of the world’ 
approach and the behaviourist ‘consistency of response’ approach (Farr, 1994).  
 
As argued in the previous chapter, Asch’s conception of attitudes is closer to social 
representations than it is to what attitude has in our times come to convey. The 
formulation of attitudes today still presents an elaborate way of understanding 
individuals’ orientations towards other elements in their social environment. Its 
function in the explanation of social behaviour has, however, proven contentious. 
There are evident difficulties in locating attitudes outside of the wider social and 
argumentative context. The measurement of public opinion by means of attitude 
scales presents complications which have been long identified within the attitude 
literature, as Asch (1952/1987) aptly notes. Similar critiques have been leveled at 
‘attitude’ by Billig (1987, 1991) and by Harré (Harré & Secord 1972, Harré & van 
Langenhöve, 1999).  
 
This chapter follows on from the previous in presenting an alternative approach to 
the study of social behaviour than the prevalent attitude framework. This proposal 
takes the form of inquiring into points of view. This chapter traces the philosophical 
roots of this construct before reviewing Billig’s and Harré’s approaches, that have 
employed the notion of views in their theories. In both, a concern with attitudes is 
dispelled in favour of a more dynamic, situational explanation of social behaviour 
that considers not merely individuals’ cognitive orientations towards some object, 
but also the social implications of such inclinations. Inasmuch as individuals’ 
perspectives are idiosyncratic, they are also inherently relational. Alongside these 
two theories, the study of points of view has also featured extensively in the social 
judgment literature, which this chapter proceeds to review. Social judgment studies 
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have looked at perspectives, a concept analogous to points of view, in studying the 
socio-cognitive processes involved in individuals’ judgment decisions of 
psychophysical and social-psychological stimuli. Whilst the prevailing concern of 
this research has been largely cognitive, this literature advances the intra-personal 
understanding of points of view, in contrast to Billig’s and Harré’s inter-personal 
concerns. The study of points of view is thus argued to provide a way to overcome 
some of the challenges that the discipline faces in providing an account of social 
behaviour across different levels of explanation (Wagner & Hayes, 2005). This is 
spelled out in more detail towards the end of this chapter. 
 
Philosophical conceptions of the point of view 
 
Whilst social psychology and the social sciences in general, have given points of 
view scant attention over the years, numerous philosophers have been preoccupied 
with what it means to hold a view. Mischel (1969) provides a historical overview of 
this preoccupation in outlining the scientific and philosophical bases of psychology. 
He argues that the behaviors of concept-using beings, i.e. humans, can be affected 
by the conceptual distinctions they are able to make. Consequently, given that the 
objects of psychology are discursive subjects, such concept-relevant behaviours are 
the phenomena that concern psychologists insofar as they are concerned with 
distinctively human behaviour. Drawing on Tolman’s (1932) distinction between 
‘molar’–purposive and cognitive–acts, and ‘molecular’–physiological acts, a 
distinction that has underlined a paradigmatic distinction between sociological or 
societal forms of social psychology and psychological ones, as noted in the previous 
chapter, Mischel goes on to argue that a clearer understanding of the way our 
ordinary psychological concepts work is essential.  
 
In explicating what it means to have a view, Mischel traces this understanding to 
Descartes’ conception of the cogito, arguing that Cartesian introspection establishes 
not only the existence of one’s mind, but also the fact that minds must also be 
attributed to others to explain their behaviours. Whilst Descartes himself put in place 
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the foundations for mechanistic neurological explanations of human behaviour, 
human behaviours that involve subjects conjuring up discursive statements or acting 
from their knowledge, Mischel points out, are, according to Descartes, not amenable 
to physiological explanation. On the other hand, instead of being tied to a particular 
stimulus, such behaviour varies in ways that are appropriate given the 
circumstances. Intelligent speech is not elicited by a stimulus but by “the 
requirements of the situation as understood by the speaker” (Mischel, 1969, p.9). In 
Mischel’s account we thus have a rudimentary formulation of situational points of 
view.  
 
Mischel goes on to explicate how if an individual were always to reply with the 
same phrase to a certain stimulus, his behaviour would appear non-intelligible to the 
extent that one would then focus on a mechanical explanation of that behaviour, as 
one would a parrot’s speech. When human beings converse however, as when 
individuals act from knowledge, behaviour varies intelligently with changing 
circumstances in a way appropriate for achieving intentions. Furthermore, according 
to Descartes, an individual is able to correct mistakes, respond to advice, and guide 
others into how to go about doing this. Such behaviour, which Asch (1952/1987) 
later termed the interpenetration of views, as noted in the previous chapter, is 
incorporeal and can be explained as initiated and directed by the cogito. Descartes 
thus distinguished between physiological and phenomenological aspects of 
psychological behaviour. 
 
Kant’s reaction to Descartes elaborated the notions of phenomena and 
representations, as argued in Chapter 2. Mischel (1969) notes how, to Kant, thought 
itself was something that human beings do, not something that occurred to them. 
Kant moved away from Descartes’ psychology of volitions to a constructivist 
account of experience based on how things appear to us, and the a priori rules we 
have for understanding events. Kant (1798) also distinguished between different 
standpoints from which actors and observers view behaviour, since the 
psychological environment is the situation as it appears to the actor. Human 
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behaviour must therefore be described in terms of consciousness and intention, or 
“what he takes himself to be doing in this situation” (Mischel, 1969, p. 18). Such a 
view of behaviour is closely linked to the Kantian view of will. For Kant, human 
beings have interests that can be stated in rules. Humans act from the conception of 
these rules and from the considerations of the connections and consequences that 
acts have with each other in social life. Human action is therefore mediated by 
meanings. Reason is practical, according to Kant, when it helps the actor decide 
what should be done in a situation given the nature of the agent. This very same 
understanding was famously captured by Lewin (1936) in his formula for human 
behaviour: B = f(P, E), where behaviour is a function of the person and the 
environment. Willing, Kant explains, is acting on a rule of reason. In Mischel’s 
words “an action is willed when it is done intentionally, with some end in view and 
some knowledge of what one is doing and why. Since such actions are guided by the 
agent’s conception of rules, they can be explained in terms of those rules and the 
agent’s construal of the situation” (1969, p.18). In other words, in terms of one’s 
point of view. And as Mischel further argues, by looking at points of view of actors 
we connect human behaviour with a network of concepts and meanings relating to 
actors who have interests and who follow rules in their dealings with other agents.  
 
Kant’s philosophy therefore provides ““pragmatic” explanations of conduct from the 
“standpoint” of agents” (Mischel, 1969, p. 19). This understanding is keenly 
captured by Harré and Secord’s (1972) reformulation of Lewin’s formula in terms of 
conditions: 
 
If C1, C2, C3 … Cn, then B by virtue of PxE 
 
Applying the formula to the experimental situation, Harré and Secord claim that if 
certain conditions, or social rules, are fulfilled, then behaviour follows by virtue of 
the parameters of the person and the experimenter, which may be considered as 
extraneous, or environmental, to the person. This is highly consequential for social 
psychology as,  
 73 
 
“in line with Kant’s suggestion that agents and spectators see behavior from 
different standpoints, one can suggest that there may be different points of 
view from which events can be legitimately viewed, depending on the 
interest we bring to them. A Kantian approach would thus suggest that there 
is no need to insist that only one point of view can reveal what we “really” 
see, that only one class of descriptions can constitute the basic bricks from 
which all knowledge is built. It would suggest that our world contains actions 
as well as movements, and that seeing actions involves no more, and no less, 
interpretation than seeing movements. What we see, whether actions or 
movements, will then depend on the standpoint from which we view the 
behavior, the context that is relevant in light of our interest” (Mischel, 1969, 
p. 31).  
 
This explicit appraisal of what it means to have a point of view in social behaviour is 
highly consequential. It means to say that behaviour takes place in response to 
certain conditions by virtue of how we see things, that is, our individual point of 
view (PoV), which is itself a function of characteristics that are intrinsic to the 
person as well environment contingencies. Accordingly, it would be reasonable to 
reformulate Lewin’s and Harré and Secord’s equation taking into account the 
implications of having a point of view on human behaviour, given certain 
conditions. The equation can be reformulated thus: 
 
If C1, C2, C3 … Cn, then B by virtue of PoV, where PoV = f(P, E) 
 
This characterisation of points of view is supported in physiological research, such 
as demonstrated by Murphy (1947), who provides evidence that we do not really see 
with our eyes but also with our midbrain, with our visual and associative centres, 
and with our systems of incipient behaviour. Segall, Campbell and Herskovits 
(1966), provide further evidence that people originating from different environments 
and having different life histories see differently. It is clear that, as Mischel notes, 
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the behaviour of higher organisms is not a response to stimuli, but to the meaning 
that situations have for perceivers. Human beings “act, for the most part, not under 
the compulsion of forces or even threats, but because they see compelling reasons 
for doing something in a certain social or political situation” (Mischel, 1969, p. 264).  
 
The point of view as explanans 
 
The philosophical conception of point of view outlined by Mischel, as a relational 
term describing the meaningful outlook of an individual towards some social object, 
has been employed in a number of scientific theories and has served in describing 
other physical, social, and psychological processes and phenomena. In the sciences, 
point of view has served as explanans for what is arguably the cornerstone of 
modern science, that is, Einstein’s (1916) theory of relativity. Specifically, 
Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity (STR) rests fully on the conception of 
different positions that exist in physical space, and that the physical reality of that 
space can only ever be described relative to a point of view. Einstein’s STR rests on 
the relational and relative characteristics of points of view, as outlined by Mischel. 
In his opening example, Einstein discusses whether a stone that is dropped by a 
passenger on a train carriage falls in a straight line, as appears to the passenger, or in 
a parabolic curve, as appears to a stationary observer. Einstein’s theory shuns space 
and replaces it with “motion relative to a practically rigid body of reference” 
(1916/2001, p. 11), which practically rigid body of reference occupies a position and 
on the basis of which holds a point of view relative to the object in motion.  Einstein 
goes on to extend these positions to ‘systems of co-ordinates’, concluding that: 
 
The stone traverses a straight line relative to a system of co-ordinates rigidly 
attached to the carriage, but relative to a system of co-ordinates rigidly 
attached to the ground (embankment) it describes a parabola. With the aid of 
this example it is clearly seen that there is no such thing as an independently 
existing trajectory (li. “path-curve”), but only a trajectory relative to a 
particular body of reference (p. 11). 
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In other words, a description of physical reality is always relative to whose point of 
view is being adopted. In his STR, Einstein goes on to establish that simultaneity 
and distance are equally relative to some body of reference or system of coordinates. 
Whilst the theoretical details of Einstein’s STR are clearly beyond the scope of the 
present thesis, it is worth noting that Einstein’s great contribution to science lay in 
conceptualising how divergent points of view determine physical reality. The 
present thesis retains the relative and relational philosophical characterisation of 
points of view and purports that, in like fashion to Einstein’s STR, the nature of 
social reality also depends on whose point of view is being considered. ‘Point of 
view’ characterises how an object is perceived relative to another’s position and the 
object. Furthermore, the regulation of legitimacy of another’s reality is inherent in 
one’s own perspective, as the first empirical study will demonstrate. That is, to use 
Einstein’s example as an analogy, whether it is acceptable to claim that a stone falls 
in a parabola depends on the nature of the system of coordinates that exists relative 
to the passenger on the carriage. If social representations theory, as Bauer and 
Gaskell (2008) argue, is equivalent to a general theory of relativity for social 
psychology, then this thesis purports that the present social psychological conception 
of point of view is it’s ancillary special theory of relativity. 
 
Other than Einstein’s STR, point of view has been utilised in other studies of spatial 
coordination that have concerned themselves with psychological processes. Piaget 
and Inhelder (1948) studied children’s conceptions of space and their coordination 
of spatial perspectives. In their Three Mountain Task experiment, children faced a 
display model of three mountains. A researcher then placed a doll at different 
viewpoints in relation to the display. The child was then required to select a picture 
from a set that represented the mountain display from the doll’s point of view. Piaget 
and Inhelder showed that children around age four did not distinguish between their 
own point of view and that of the doll, but gave as a response their own point of 
view for that of the doll. This was interpreted as evidence of egocentrism, indicative 
of the pre-operational stage, that limited children’s perspective-taking capacities. 
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Perspective-taking and the emergence of self as distinct from others, a theory 
developed by George Herbert Mead, were a product of maturation and a 
characteristic of logical thinking.  
 
In Mead’s social psychology, the self emerges by virtue of the human capacity to 
adopt the perspective of the other, that is, as a function of the human ability to hold a 
point of view towards some object and simultaneously comprehend that different 
points of view are held by others that bear on the very same object. At the point of 
this realisation, according to Mead, the self is able to emerge as an object. Adopting 
the perspective of the other comes with the realisation that, as other is an object to 
the self, so the self is an object to other. At the point of adopting the perspective of 
the other towards self, the self becomes an object unto itself. This explanation is the 
cornerstone of Mead’s theory of the self. In Arendt’s (1958) work, individuals learn 
by engaging in this process of taking the perspective of the other and extending 
themselves beyond the personal sphere. Again, Arendt associates such processes 
with a spatial dimension, what she refers to as ‘the spatial quality of politics’. One 
cannot be a political agent without participating in a public sphere. And this 
participation involves nothing other than relating to others on the basis of one’s own 
point of view with regards to that of others. The public sphere, in Arendt’s 
conception, is a plurality of agents who, from their perspective, judge the quality of 
what is enacted. Furthermore, this plurality involves the fact that human beings are 
both equal and distinct. Agents are sufficiently alike as humans to be able to 
understand one another, but they are also distinct due to the fact that every one of 
them occupies a distinct position in public space based on the uniqueness of their 
biography and their idiosyncratic point of view.  
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More recently, evolutionary psychology has also inquired into individuals’ 
understandings of others’ perspectives. Theory of Mind (ToM) describes the 
maturational human capacity for inferring the mental states of others that may be 
different from one’s own (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Call & Tomasello, 1998). 
On the basis of the reciprocal nature of social interaction, such as in joint attention 
tasks, human beings are able to assume that other human beings have minds like 
themselves, and are able to attribute mental states, including intentions, to others. 
ToM is a theory for human beings inasmuch as the mind or mental states of others 
are not amenable to observation and can only be assumed by analogy with one’s 
own mental activity. ToM enables human beings to infer that others may have 
intentions consonant with their own, personal point of view, and they are thus able to 
regulate their own behaviour with these inferred intentions. Tomasello (Tomasello, 
1999; Tomasello et al., 2005) argues that shared intentionality, that is fundamentally 
based on understanding the point of view of another and incorporating it into one’s 
own mental schema, is what underlies differences between human cognition from 
that of other primates. Such social-psychological processes enable communication 
and cooperation between humans and have maximized fitness and survival in the 
human species. 
 
In all of the above theories, that have greatly advanced scholarship in various 
domains of scientific and human inquiry, the point of view concept is employed as 
explanans of some other concern–physics in Einstein’s STR, logical reasoning in 
Piaget’s theory of cognitive maturation, the self in Mead’s social psychology, the 
public sphere in Arendt’s sociology, and survival of the species and maximization of 
fitness in evolutionary theory. In all these theories, the utility of ‘point of view’ 
stems from its philosophical characterisation as relational and relative. Social 
psychology has been handicapped in its mainstream focus on attitudes, due to 
overlooking both of these characteristics. The social psychologies of Billig and 
Harré reject attitude as a satisfactory account of social behaviour. Both employ 
‘point of view’ in their effort to account for the social character of human behaviour 
as it occurs in real life, amidst debate and controversy over whose point of view 
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presents the rightful version of reality in the public sphere. What marks these 
theories from the preceding ones, along with theories of social judgment, is that in 
these theories point of view is treated not as explanans, but as explanandum, i.e. it is 
treated as an object of inquiry in its own right (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948). Whilst 
the explicit focus in all three theories resides in other aspects of social behaviour–
discursive products or articulations in Billig’s and Harré’s theories, and judgment 
decisions in social judgment studies–these can, to some extent, be considered as 
manifestations or products of having a point of view. The social psychologies of 
Billig and Harré warrant a focus on points of view towards an understanding of 
interpersonal relations. Social judgment theories warrant the study of points of view 
towards an understanding of social cognition. These three approaches thus open up 
inquiry into points of view. They have, in this way, informed the three empirical 
studies undertaken in this project, as detailed hereunder. 
 
Argumentation and rhetoric 
 
Billig (1987, 1991) takes issue with the contemporary understanding of attitudes, 
arguing that an attitude is both something personal that belongs to an individual, as 
well as a position in a wider controversy. Billig argues that: “In indicating our 
attitudes, we do more than express our personal beliefs. We also locate ourselves 
within a public controversy” (1991, p. 43). When people hold attitudes on topics 
such as political, moral, religious, commercial, or other such issues, attitudes held 
“refers to a stance on a matter of public debate and disagreement” (1987, p. 177). 
The social context of attitudes is thus a context of controversy. Billig further argues 
that in this light, attitudes need to be understood as more than mere responses for or 
against a stimulus; attitudes are stances on matters of debate, the possession of 
which indicates agreement or disagreement with some issue, as well as an implicit 
willingness to enter into controversy. As a result, we can expect the holders of 
attitudes “to be able to justify their stances, to criticize competing views, and 
generally to argue about the issues” (1987, p. 177). These criticisms and 
justifications should not be considered as extraneous matters to attitudes. Billig calls 
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for their consideration as an integral part of attitude research, “for, without the 
argumentative context, there would be no attitudes” (1987, p. 178). This treatment of 
the argumentative context is relevant to the understanding of the gap between 
attitudes and behaviour. Rather than being treated as a methodological artifact, the 
inconsistency between attitudes and behaviour should, according to Billig, be 
problematised argumentatively–those facing criticism of inconsistency can be 
expected to be able to give a good account of it. Additionally, people cannot be 
expected to hold a single attitude towards a particular stimulus; people will more 
likely draw on “complex, and frequently contradictory patterns of talk; they will use 
different ‘interpretative repertoires’ to accomplish different functions” (1987, p. 15).  
 
Billig (1987) argues that the persuasion paradigm in attitude research distinguishes 
between the content and form of communication and focuses exclusively on form to 
find ways of delivering poor arguments persuasively. Billig, however, cautions 
against such an approach. Looking at content as a characteristic which arouses 
emotions does not suffice. According to Billig, the novelty of each moment and each 
situation produce uncertainty in general rules: “we can never capture the infinite 
variety of human affairs in a finite system of psychological laws. At any moment the 
finite laws are likely to be embarrassed by unforeseen and unforeseeable events” (p. 
62). For Billig, “[t]he one constant factor to emerge from the research into 
persuasion is that there is little constancy and that laws like “Sx produces Ry” stand 
in need of qualification” (p. 75). That qualification stems from specific content. 
Content cannot be ignored because “it affects form in unpredictable ways, so that a 
particular message may produce unforeseen effects” (p. 74). When the content of 
messages varies, different responses are produced. Billig thus argues that the study 
of persuasion and attitude change cannot disregard content that is rooted in the wider 
context of controversy. The way by which this can be studied is through what Billig 
terms rhetorical analysis. 
 
Billig claims that modern democracies are places of opinion, where citizens are 
expected to hold views on all manners of issues. He argues that in modern 
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democracies there is a culturally shared expectancy of multisubjectivity, that is, that 
everyone will have views of some sort or other. Ordinary life is “filled with the 
sound of chatter, as people philosophize and argue, comparing critically ‘opinion’ 
with ‘opinion’” (1991, p. 11). The holding of views, Billig argues, is a form of 
thinking as well as being a product of thinking. According to Billig, “in holding 
views people are thinking” (1991, p.191). In arguing, members are jointly engaged 
in a process of thinking about the topic in question. Billig (1987, 1991) argues that 
psychologists studying cognitive processes have a tendency to view thinking in 
terms of logic, rather than as a form of rhetorical argumentation, focusing on 
problems to which only one solution exists. Everyday thinking, according to Billig, 
does not always admit a single, successful, problem-solving, logical solution.  
 
Billig’s social psychology thus shares the goal of studying the thinking society with 
social representations theory. For Billig, the link between an orator and an audience 
is some form of a common content:  
 
“If orators are identifying with their audiences, then they are emphasising 
communal links, foremost amongst which are shared values or beliefs. The 
concept of common-sense (sensus communis) might be a helpful one for 
discussing this communal content. The orator, in identifying with the beliefs 
of the audience, will be treating the audience as a community bound together 
by shared opinions…The audience, therefore, will be presumed to possess a 
common-sense, agreeing that certain positions are commonly sensible” 
(1987, p. 196).  
 
Billig (1987, 1991) notes, however, that there is a paradox in common-sense, which 
arises when “we have disputes in which both parties are appealing to the same 
audience, and therefore are identifying with the same common-sense […] The 
paradox is that the two oratorical sides, although appealing to the same common-
sense, will be arguing in diametrically opposed ways. In this way, the same 
common-sense will be the location of arguments which contradict each other” (1987, 
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p. 203). Billig goes on to resolve the paradox by accepting what in social 
representations literature has been termed as the ‘cognitive polyphasia’ of 
knowledge (Moscovici, 1976; Jovchelovitch 2007). Billig argues that “The paradox 
is resolved if we assume that the common-sense of an audience is not unitary, but is 
composed of contrary aspects…Both logoi and anti-logoi are presumed to co-exist 
within the common-sense” (1987, p. 203). In this way “rhetorical disagreements are 
often between two points of view, which are both, to a certain extent, reasonable” 
(Billig, 1987, p. 204). This is similar to Asch’s (1952) arguments regarding 
divergent perspectives. Asch argues that whilst individuals may realise that the 
points of view they hold may be idiosyncratic, they are nevertheless able to draw on 
the perspectives of others to check for confirmation of their relations. The shared 
representational field permits different perspectives to exist and remain intelligible 
to each other to the extent that, according to Asch, these are able to interpenetrate 
and guide human conduct by virtue of the capacity to take the perspective of the 
other, a virtue that has been traced back to Mead.  
 
According to Billig, “As one articulates a point of view, one can be said to be 
developing an argument” (p. 44). The study of argumentation is therefore crucial in 
developing a social psychology of points of view, as “opinions, or individual chains 
of reasoning, clash in the context of social argument” (p. 44). The argument is an 
instance where the individual is directly implicated in the social, and vice-versa. 
According to Billig, there are two ways in which the context of argumentation is 
social. Firstly, “the topics of argumentation can be seen as social issues, whereby 
arguments possess a social context”; secondly, the argumentative context “might 
include the opinions which the speaker is attempting to justify to the audience, but it 
also comprises the counter-opinions which are implicitly or explicitly being 
criticized” (1987, p. 87). Both of these senses by which the argument is social are 
pertinent to a conceptualisation of ‘point of view’. A point-of-view can only be a 
‘point of view’ if another ‘point-of-view’ is possible; a point of view can exist only 
relative to another point. Without an alternative position, a particular point of view 
cannot acquire location; it cannot make manifest its particular angle of view. 
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Therefore, a study of a point of view is always essentially social. It requires locating 
the particular point of view amongst other points. Moreover, points of view may 
change, either by adopting new points, that is, by looking at the same issue from a 
different angle, or as a function of a change in the underlying structure of 
knowledge. As Billig (1987) argues, the rhetorical context of arguments is not fixed; 
should the context change, the expression itself may be altered. Likewise, should the 
wider controversy change, arguments might be expected to change to cope with 
argumentative developments. 
 
Positioning Theory 
 
Harré & Secord’s (1972) commanding volume on the explanation of social 
behaviour provides the rudimentary framework for the development of positioning 
theory. Harré and Secord’s concern is the scientific study of psychological states, 
conditions, and powers that are attributed to individuals in the course of social 
behaviour. From the outset, the authors distinguish their programme from positivist 
methodology that is concerned with the study of variables, characteristic of attitude 
research. Harré and Secord go on to explicitly critique attitude studies in social 
psychology, arguing that such studies adopt a limited focus of human operations as 
represented by attitude scales, without due consideration of the logical properties 
underpinning such operations. The authors argue that evaluation, the operation of 
study in attitude research, plays a role in human life other than ranking objects in an 
ordered fashion. It is rather used for commending things and courses of action to 
other people. For this reason, Harré and Secord claim that the attitude concept in 
itself “is almost useless” (1972, p. 309) in the study of social behaviour as in 
attempts for attitude change. Rather, it is in the structural “meshing and failing to 
mesh of background beliefs” (1972, p. 308) that the conceptual tools for 
understanding social behaviour lie. These evaluative structures, according to the 
authors, only show up when challenged and when justifications have to be provided 
for them. On the basis of this premise the authors put forth their proposal for 
studying accounts. 
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Harré and Secord (1972) claim that through the study of the feelings, plans, 
intentions, and beliefs that transpire in accounts, the meanings of social behaviour 
and the rules underlying it can be discovered. The authors subscribe to a self-
directed model of social behaviour that conforms to the meaning ascribed to the 
situation by social actors. At the heart of the explanation of social behaviour, the 
authors contend, is the structure of meanings underlying it that allows “for 
explanation of behaviour in terms of the actor’s point of view” (p. 10). Such study 
has both a descriptive and an explanatory function. According to Harré and Secord 
“The former is related to the way in which the episode is described from the social 
point of view, and the latter as to how participation in it is accounted for from an 
individual point of view” (p. 14). Social behaviour is thus to be conceived of as 
“actions mediated by meanings, not responses caused by stimuli” (p. 29).  
 
In outlining their theory of social behaviour, Harré and Secord (1972) posit what 
they term the ‘Anthropomorphic Model of Man’ that for scientific purposes aims to 
treat people as if they were human beings. They argue that people alone have the 
meta-cognitive powers of self-monitoring and self-commentary. These powers 
depend upon the commentator having a standpoint outside the field of commentary, 
and, one may add, a realisation of such a standpoint relative to other standpoints. 
The authors refer to the metaphor of the eye and the eye’s visual field to explain 
such perspective. No other theory in the social sciences comes closer to articulating 
‘point of view’.  
 
Harré and Secord go on to argue that human beings adopt a point of view in social 
space that enables them to act upon things that are perceived as different from 
themselves but nevertheless as part of the same system of reference. According to 
the authors, human beings’ meta-cognitive powers enable them not only to monitor 
their own performances but also to become aware of their own monitoring and to be 
able to provide accounts of their performances as well. In other words, human 
beings are able to have a point of view and describe it in a way that justifies their 
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position. Drawing on Hampshire, Harré and Secord claim that a necessary condition 
for considering an entity as typically human is that “it has a point of view, that is 
occupies a place and knows that it does so, so that it understands itself as viewing 
the world from that place and acting upon things from there” (1972, p. 96).  
 
Harré and Secord (1972) go on to explain that occupancy of place is a necessary 
condition for agency due to the fact that agency requires an ability to act upon things 
and things have a place. The actions of an agent thus take place at certain places. 
Furthermore, having a place is also a necessary condition for perception, as this 
requires the agent to note that the object is different from oneself, such that it 
occupies a place different from that occupied by the perceiver. Finally, to refer to 
something also means to identify the place where it is positioned relative to the 
speaker. This requires the speaker to occupy a position within the same system of 
space as the referent. It is this positioning that grants an actor a point of view in 
social space. This conception does for social reality what Einstein’s STR does for 
physical reality. 
 
Harré and Secord’s description of social positioning is synonymous with Asch’s 
(1952) description of the representational field (see Chapter 2). According to Asch, 
the understanding that we are positioned with others in a common representational 
field enables us to navigate the world with others. It also enables humans to engage 
in the social check and correct errors in their own thinking. Similarly, Harré and 
Secord (1972) argue that we are able to change the meanings of situations for others, 
as happens when we try to persuade others to attend to different aspects of the 
situation. We try to change their point of view, to persuade them to see things 
differently. By implication, this also means that it is possible for others to counter-
persuade us and change our own point of view. This is also similar to Billig’s claims 
on the content of persuasive communications, as well as on the dilemmatic nature of 
common-sense. Harré and Secord go on to argue that in order to discover meaning 
relations that exist between social agents, accounts must be collected and studied. 
These accounts provide an insight into conventions and rules that serve to determine 
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which actions are required in the performance of an act. The identification of rules in 
episodes in the form of act-action structures becomes Harré and Secord’s primary 
focus. Whilst their concern is with the identification of role-rule models, as they 
themselves argue, the crucial aspect of the study of social behaviour is the 
explanation of it “from the point of view of the actors themselves” (1972, p. 152). 
 
Harré’s further developments of his theory of social behaviour have culminated in 
the postulation of positioning theory (Harré & van Langenhöve, 1999; Harré & 
Moghaddam, 2003; Moghaddam, Harré & Lee, 2007). Positioning theory retains a 
concern with declarations in which the social actor provides an account of things as 
they appear from his or her own point of view. Points of view refer both to the 
speaker’s locus in time and space as well as his or her character. In positioning 
theory, the social realm is held to consist of three processes: conversations, 
institutional practices, and societal rhetorics. Positioning is a discursive practice 
undertaken by several individuals at a time. In the social realm, a position is a 
reference to the person’s moral and personal attributes as a speaker. An individual 
can undertake several varieties of positioning. Furthermore, there exist variations in 
positioning across individuals. Individuals differ in their capacity to use positioning 
techniques in positioning themselves and others. They also differ in their willingness 
to position and to be positioned, and in their power to achieve positioning acts. 
Consequently, the matter of individual differences emerges as a primary concern, as 
the matter of variations in the extent to which different ways of positioning are 
related for, or in, an individual (Harré & van Langenhöve, 1999). Once an individual 
takes up a particular position, he or she “inevitably sees the world from the vantage 
point of that position and in terms of the particular images, metaphors, storylines and 
concepts which are made relevant within the particular discursive practice in which 
they are positioned” (Davies & Harré, 1999). Positioning analysis is the analysis of 
such discursive practices.  
 
In Harré’s theories, an account may be considered as the discursive product of an 
individual’s articulation of his or her own point of view. This discursive product is 
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the object of study in positioning theory. However, one could further argue that an 
individual has a point of view even when this has not been expressed in an account, 
just like individuals are held to have attitudes even when these have not been 
expressed in responding to an attitude scale. For this reason, it is worth noting that 
the phenomenon under consideration in Harré’s theories is none other than the point 
of view of subjects. Harré and Secord’s (1972), as well as positioning theory’s, 
proposal to inquire into accounts is a, more or less, indirect proposal to study points 
of view. This thesis aims at conceptualising this phenomenon more explicitly in 
terms of its social-psychological characteristics.  
 
If we are to understand variation and individual differences in positioning, it is 
necessary to understand variation and individual differences in points of view 
themselves. This requires the study of both interpersonal characteristics as well as 
intrapersonal properties of points of view alongside the study of discursive products. 
It is with this undertaking that this thesis is concerned. Conceptualising the point of 
view proper may open up new lines of inquiry that extend Harré’s proposal beyond 
the product of the individual’s psychological operations in the social realm, into the 
psychological constitution of the social individual. As Billig argues, “As ordinary 
people claim to ‘hold views’ […] so social psychologists should study what is going 
on when such claims are made in ordinary life. There is thus a need to investigate 
what it means to ‘hold a view’” (1991, p. 169). One could argue that this extends 
beyond what holding a view achieves in the social realm by way of positioning. 
Theories of social judgment have extended such inquiry in a different line to that 
adopted by both Billig and Harré. Social judgment theories have inquired into the 
intrapersonal properties of points of view, to which this chapter turns next. 
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Social Judgment  
 
A number of theories in the social judgment research programme have grappled with 
the nature of individuals’ orientations to stimuli and have gone a step further to not 
only conceptualise, but also operationalise points of view. The large part of this 
research has concentrated on the judgment of psychophysical stimuli. Even so, an 
individual’s perspective has been demonstrated to play an explanatory role in social 
judgment. As Upshaw (1965) argues, the width of a judge’s perspective, that is, 
whether one’s perspective is broad or narrow, has significant implications on the 
consequent social judgment of stimuli. Upshaw’s variable series model contends that 
judges with a broad view make less fine distinctions among elements than judges 
with a narrow view. The issue of the breadth of perspectives was noted by Asch 
(1952) in his postulation of point of view. Asch argued that a formulation of points 
of view would legitimate inquiry into how wide or narrow these may be and what 
their centre of gravity might be. Pettigrew (1959) sought to measure the category 
width of subjects’ judgments through his C-W (category-width) scale. He revealed 
that subjects tended to be consistently broad, medium, or narrow in their category 
widths.  
 
Pettigrew’s scale, which was devised for psychophysical judgments, was adapted to 
social stimuli by Detweiler (1980) and applied to intercultural situations. According 
to Detweiler, intercultural interaction is a situation in which others’ behaviour may 
be categorised in an inaccurate or inappropriate way due to unfamiliar cues, where 
expected things may not happen and unexpected things might. This leads to obvious 
difficulties in intercultural relations. Since individuals vary in their category width, 
their categorisation (which comes as a function of the category width of their 
perspectives) has direct implications on the nature of their social behaviour. 
According to Detweiler, narrow categorisers categorise others’ behaviour more 
narrowly by using their own cultural values as a standard for judging that behaviour. 
Such individuals are unaccepting of the idea that behaviour can have different 
meanings and consequently serve to make negative inferences about the other. In 
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contrast, broad categorisers categorise behaviour in a more general way and are 
more accepting that behaviour may have multiple meanings. As a result, negative 
inferences are less common amongst these individuals.  
 
The application of social judgment to social psychological stimuli has its origin in 
Rokeach’s (1951a, 1951b) studies of narrow-mindedness. Rokeach’s starting point is 
also a critique of ‘attitude’. He observes that both liberals and left-wingers can be 
equally militant and dogmatic in their ideological outlook, and that there is no reason 
to believe that it is easier to change the attitudes of one than it is to change the 
attitudes of the other. Rokeach (1951a) argues that the intensity and resistance of 
attitude change is a function of the underlying cognitive structure that he describes 
as narrow-mindedness. Rokeach’s approach is fashioned on the cognitive maps 
proposed by Tolman (1948) that like Pettigrew’s findings vary from narrow to 
broad. Rokeach draws further on Krech’s (1949) dynamic systems model that 
proposes that dynamic systems differ from each other with respect to the degree and 
kind of interaction they demonstrate with other dynamic systems. This characteristic, 
according to Krech, describes their manner of ‘Isolation’. And as Pettigrew 
subsequently claimed, Rokeach (1951b) argues that three degrees of cognitive 
organisation are discernible in perspectives, ranging from comprehensive, to 
isolated, to narrow. A subject’s organisation was comprehensive if it was broad and 
integrated in relating a series of concepts. If a subject’s cognitive map was broken 
down into substructures, this was deemed as isolated. On the other hand, narrow 
organisers were unable to relate the entire series of concepts. Whilst, according to 
Rokeach, these cognitive organisations seemed to order themselves along a 
continuum, he argues that differences between cognitive organisations were in 
themselves qualitative ones.  
 
A more recent development in social psychological theory that provides a 
framework for the study of closed mindedness is that developed by Kruglanski 
(1989; 2004). Kruglanski’s approach is based on a lay epistemic framework of 
knowledge, where different cultures are held to subscribe to different belief systems 
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that validate different perspectives. This, at face value, is not dissimilar to Billig’s 
claims as well as the present conception of points of view. According to Kruglanski 
(1989), the plurality of knowledge means that what different persons ‘know for a 
fact’ can be widely diverse. Knowledge is considered to consist of propositions in 
which individuals have confidence. Knowledge is developed through the generation 
of hypotheses about some new event, and through the testing of these hypotheses 
against some logical framework. The logical element of knowledge determines 
whether beliefs are proven or disproven on the basis of relevant evidence.  
 
What is relevant for a particular social milieu is a matter of social construction. 
Nevertheless, according to Kruglanski, the plurality of systems of knowledge also 
means that the capacity for mental disjunction and cognitive inconsistency are high 
and potentially overwhelming for the individual, who faced with such diversity, is 
required to process an infinite amount of alternative perspectives. This is where the 
issue of open and closed mindedness becomes relevant. According to Kruglanski 
(2004), individuals are motivated by a need for closure that enables them to truncate 
information processing and fix their perspectives. This process, which is held to be 
at the interface between cognitive and social processes, may prompt individuals to 
seize on some notion that provides closure, or freeze upon an extant closure. The 
social, in Kruglanski’s theory13, is relevant in two-ways, that is, either in view of the 
fact that others are often targets of the individual’s beliefs, or in view of the fact that 
they may be sources of information. Kruglanski thus operationalises closed 
mindedness in terms of the cognitive, individual need for closure. Kruglanski 
himself admits that this operationalisation may not be entirely satisfactory, claiming 
that “the road leading from need for closure to close mindedness isn’t a 
straightforward one” (2004, p. 17). Moreover, as Kruglanski notes, the crux of the 
matter in closed mindedness “is the failure to consider rival alternatives to one’s 
initial conception” (2004, p. 164). Whilst this principle is intrinsic to Rokeach’s 
formulation of closed mindedness, in Kruglanski’s need for closure this mutuality 
                                                13	  The conceptualisation of the social here is typical of the cognitivisation of the social in social 
psychology and is the same conception that has cognitivised and individualised the attitude, making it 
unsuitable for the study of societal phenomena (see Farr, 1996).	  
 90 
has been relegated. Further studies on empathic concern have demonstrated that the 
effects of need for closure are themselves mediated by perspective-taking (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986).  
 
Crucially, the social judgment studies demonstrate that perspectives are not merely 
individual orientations, like attitudes, but that they vary in their relations with 
another perspective. Points of view can, to different degrees, accommodate an 
alternative perspective in their own judgment. Moreover, such degree of 
accommodation is a function of the underlying cognitive structure that results, 
moreover, in manifest outcomes in social behaviour. Sherif’s theory of social 
judgment (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965; Sherif & 
Sherif, 1968) postulates that this is a function of latitudes of acceptance, rejection, 
and noncommitment inherent in individuals’ points of view. And whilst the former 
theories of argumentation and positioning outlined by Billig and Harré and the social 
judgment theories are seemingly at odds in various respects, these approaches are 
reconcilable in their treatment of points of view as explanandum. 
 
The missing link 
 
It should be clear by now that the points of view individuals demonstrate have 
pragmatic consequences on social behaviour. Whilst the social is necessarily 
implicated in human behaviour, the explanation of individual behaviour is 
necessarily located at the level of the person. This is also saying that, as Moscovici 
(1984) and Wagner (1993) have noted, knowledge of the social realm in itself does 
not suffice for an explanation of social behaviour. Moscovici (1984) explicates how 
social representations are not causal stimuli for individual behaviour. He 
reformulates the behavioural conceit as one in which social representations 
determine the character of the stimulus and the response it elicits, as well as 
determining which is which in a particular situation. Wagner (1993) explicates this 
further by arguing that social representations provide illustrative or descriptive 
accounts of individual behaviour, in contrast to explanatory ones. According to 
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Wagner, knowing that an individual shares a specific representation simply means 
that he or she is inclined to act in a particular way when in a given situation, as 
implied by the representation. A knowledge of social representations tells us about 
what behaviour may be expected as rational behaviour for a particular group of 
people in a given situation. This is captured in Wagner’s equation: {P(R: SB)}, 
where P is a group of people holding representation R that commends behaviour B 
as epi-rational in situation S. However, this also means that social representations 
cannot be considered as independent variables causing particular behaviours as 
dependent variables.  
 
The above account also means that social representations theory is unable to displace 
micro-level theories of social behaviour that aim at direct causal explanation, such as 
‘attitude’. This reason lies behind the chequered explanations that have been 
advanced for the relations between attitudes and social representations. Attitudes, 
unlike social representations, have been utilised extensively, and more or less 
successfully, as independent variables in an effort to determine and predict 
behaviour as dependent variable. The problem with this approach, as Billig (1987, 
1991) and Harré and Secord (1972) have noted, is that at this level of explanation, 
there is no consideration of the particular situation. Attitudes provide the individual 
with an evaluation that may predispose action, but the concept fails to explain when 
and why individuals act according to their attitudes and, conversely, when they do 
not. LaPiere’s (1934) epic study has made this all too clear and time has not 
detracted the significance of his findings. The reasons for such decisions to act are, 
as has been noted, situational.  
 
The cause of behaviour, therefore, as Moscovici (1984) argues, lies with the 
individual’s interpretation of things in a particular situation, in which individual 
perception is mediated by a social representation that describes how things are and 
prescribes what behaviours ought to follow. Whether the individual follows through, 
or otherwise, is a function of the individual as well as extraneous influences in his or 
her environment. The two come together in an individual’s point of view: his or her 
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actual perception of the event in a given situation and given the individual’s own 
inclinations and environmental factors, as per the reformulation of Lewin’s 
behavioural equation above. Behaviour follows by virtue of the point of view, in 
response to certain conditions or events that occur to the individual. Causality, as 
outlined in Moscovici’s model, is still located in the interplay between a stimulus 
and a response, but resides at the situational level of explanation.  
 
At this point, we are therefore in a position to outline a nested model of social 
behaviour that includes attitudes, points of view, and social representations in the 
explanation of social behaviour (Figure 4). The model is nested due to the fact that 
underlying concepts are necessarily implicated in overarching ones, that is, attitudes 
are necessarily implicated in points of view–in terms of the person’s characteristics; 
and points of view are necessarily implicated in social representations–in terms of 
social positioning. Neither social representations theory nor attitudes on their own 
provide a situational explanation of social behaviour. Social representations theory 
provides a societal-level explanation. It describes societal prescriptions that bear on 
the way people interpret events and what they will hold to be legitimate courses of 
action. Attitudes, on the other hand, provide a personal-level explanation of social 
behaviour, outlining the individual’s evaluation of an attitude object that bears on 
their inclination to act in a particular way. Whether, in a given situation, individuals 
do act in a given way depends on their point of view at the time and in the situation, 
given the conditions that they find themselves in, as per the behavioural equation. 
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Fig. 4: A nested model of social behaviour: social representations, points of view, and attitudes 
(adapted from Bauer & Gaskell, 1999 and based on Heider’s (1946) balance of reciprocity in the 
cognitive organization of attitudes). 
 
To illustrate, the culture of honour prevailing in certain societies provides a suitable 
hypothetical example. Whether two individuals to whom the same dishonourable 
event happens, for example a daughter falling pregnant out of wedlock, behave in 
the same way may be due to different attitudes they may hold towards the attitude 
object. For example, one might evaluate the event more harshly than another. Such 
would be a characteristic explanation of behaviour as a function of attitudes. Yet two 
individuals may hold the same evaluation of the attitude object that is dishonourable 
but still act differently. They may be equally appalled by the event, and equally 
inclined to punish whom they regard as the perpetrator. In such a situation therefore, 
the attitude variable is constant. Their actual behaviours may differ due to the fact 
that different societal prescriptions bear on the interpretation of the event and the 
legitimacy of the ensuing behaviour. In one group, for instance, it might be 
reasonable to attack the perpetrator whereas in another it may only be reasonable to 
request maintenance payments. Such would be a characteristic social representations 
explanation. However, behaviour differs even more widely than this. Two 
individuals, with similar attitudes and in the same social setting, may nevertheless 
opt to do very different things when faced with the same event. One might opt to 
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save face and lose the offspring, whereas another may opt to lose face and save the 
offspring. This is because whilst the experience and interpretation of the event may 
be similar to both, the way the two see the event may differ. One might adopt a 
certain point of view in relation to the event and the community, whereas another 
might take a different standpoint. If we are to truly understand social behaviour, then 
aside from knowing what social representations prescribe and what evaluations 
people may hold, we also need a situational-level explanation that accounts for the 
individual’s situational reality given certain events. The concept of point of view, as 
formulated in this thesis, provides such an explanation.  
 
Given such myriad explanations of social behaviour, it seems wise to heed 
Durkheim’s advice that “Our first task then must be to determine the order of facts 
to be studied” (Durkheim, 1952/1987, p. xl). With reference to Wagner & Hayes’ 
(2005) levels of explanation in social psychology, it is clear that the present 
conceptualisation of points of view provides the missing link at the situational level 
of explanation (see Figure 1). Attitudes are useful in understanding social behaviour 
at the intra-personal level; an attitude is a personal characteristic that predisposes an 
individual to relate in a certain way. Social representations are useful in 
understanding social behaviour at the societal level; a social representation is a 
description, or knowledge-content, that prescribes social behaviour according to the 
precepts of the representation. Yet between the two is a gap, and point of view fills 
this gap by linking the intra-personal to the societal. By also considering points of 
view in explanations of social behaviour, we are able to explain how an individual 
with a particular predisposition relates in a certain way in given social 
circumstances.  
 
‘Point of view’ thus provides the missing link at the situational level of explanation 
(see Fig. 1). At each level, however, one needs to pay due consideration to 
characteristics particular to that level as well as adopt an epistemology suitable to 
that same level. The manner by which we can come to understand attitudes may be 
different from the manner by which we can come to understand points of view, 
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which might be different in turn from the manner by which we can come to 
understand social representations. The analogy with water is apt in this case. Water 
may be understood at the molecular level: H2O. That understanding however is 
different from the way we understand masses of water, such as seas and oceans. 
Neither however is sufficient for the understanding of tides and currents. Whilst the 
latter are implicated in the existence of oceans, and whilst physically the molecular 
structure is none other than H2O, at each level a different understanding of water is 
required despite the fact that the phenomenon in its materiality remains the same.  
 
Consequences and conclusion 
 
This chapter, along with the previous one, has articulated a social psychological 
formulation of point of view as a situational-level concept that can provide an 
account of social behaviour that neither attitudes as a personal-level attribute nor the 
social representation as a societal-level structure can. This conceptualisation is based 
on the social psychological theories of positioning and argumentation analysis. 
These two have described the products and processes of points of view, as accounts 
and argumentation respectively. Neither has, however, identified and conceptualised 
the social-psychological phenomenon implicated in the production of accounts and 
argumentation. This thesis proclaims that this phenomenon is the point of view. 
‘Point of view’ provides an explanation of social behaviour in which the individual’s 
own inclinations are necessarily implicated, and which is also influenced by 
prevailing societal prescriptions. It is in conceptualising and studying points of view, 
alongside both attitudes and social representations, that a holistic account of human 
behaviour can be developed and that can describe social behaviour in its manifold 
complexity as it takes place in situ. In this way, ‘point of view’ provides a social-
psychological account of human behaviour that alongside attitudes and social 
representations provides a true ‘cognition and culture’ perspective on human 
behaviour. 
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The present inquiry follows in the footsteps of the theories outlined above that have 
theorised and studied points of view as explanandum (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948). 
Whilst none of these three theories may have provided an explicit formulation of the 
point of view as a social psychological phenomenon, the social psychologies of 
Billig and Harré have looked at the discursive manifestation of points of view in 
argumentation and positioning, and have thus opened inquiry into the interpersonal 
characteristics of holding some perspective and relating to others on the basis of it. 
Social judgment theories have looked at the manifestation of points of view in 
judgment decisions, and have further opened inquiry into the socio-cognitive 
structure of perspectives as these bear on judgment decisions in the face of new 
alternatives. The present inquiry explicitly concerns itself with the point of view 
phenomenon, rather than the products and processes that may accrue from having a 
point of view. It considers the various aspects of points of view that have been 
studied in the social psychological literature and that have been drawn together in 
this chapter. This present thesis thus undertakes a series of empirical studies to 
inquire into points of view’s (a) variable differences, (b) their interpersonal 
characteristics, and (c) their intrapersonal properties.  
 
The first empirical study in this series adopts a method of argumentation in an effort 
to identify instances of variance in points of view to investigate whether these could 
be identified as characteristically different types, as the social judgment literature 
suggests. Insofar as the point of view is itself a phenomenon, then individual 
differences in its characterisation should transpire under investigation. The second 
empirical study inquires into the interpersonal characteristics of points of view by 
studying the social positioning of immigrants with regards to their host country and 
their country of origin. The third empirical inquiry looks at the intrapersonal 
properties of points of view, by studying the variable socio-cognitive latitude 
structure inherent to points of view. Taken together, these three studies make a first 
attempt at conceptualising points of view as a social-cum-psychological construct 
(Harré & Secord, 1972), in terms of its inter- and intra-personal variable properties.  
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Introduction 
 
The critiques of attitudes reviewed in the previous chapters reacted primarily to the 
measurement of attitudes in terms of responses on a psychological scale, rather than 
to attitudes as a concept per se. It is the operationalisation of attitudes in terms of a 
range of points on a scale that has proven problematic for the attitude concept, rather 
than its social psychological conception. Asch’s (1952/1987) objections to such an 
operationalisation of attitudes led him to propose that social researchers should take 
the bull by the horns and replace the superficial measurement of attitudes by 
methods that approximate genuine conversations. His views are echoed in Harré and 
Secord’s (1972) advocation of accounts, in Billig’s (1987, 1991) call for the study of 
argumentation, as well as in Farr’s (1984) proposal of the ‘inter-view’. Both Harré 
and Secord, and Billig have devised their approaches on different epistemological 
grounds than that of attitudes. Both sought a situational conception rather than a 
personal one, as outlined in the previous chapter. This chapter will review the 
epistemological basis of Harré and Secord’s approach that is considered to be 
foundational for a situational-level methodology that aims to study the concept of 
point of view, and that is based on one key principle: that of social behaviour as 
agentic and volitional. It will go on to review Billig’s and Farr’s contributions that 
serve to outline an appropriate methodological approach to the study of points of 
view as an argumentative and relational concept. Finally, it will detail the methods 
adopted for each of the three empirical studies that have been undertaken to 
investigate this concept in the present inquiry.  
 
A situational epistemology 
 
Harré and Secord’s (1972) central tenet is that social psychology has been studied 
without reference to what are its major phenomena, that is, social meanings, and 
without considering fully its main behaviour generating features, namely individual 
agency. Billig (1987, 1991) similarly notes that psychologists studying attitudes 
mostly view thinking in terms of logic rather than as a form of rhetorical 
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argumentation. They thus tend to focus on problems to which only one solution 
exists. Everyday thinking, according to Billig, does not always admit a single, 
successful, problem-solving, logical solution. Social behaviour thus needs to be 
conceived of in terms of actions mediated by meanings, carried out by agentic 
people, rather than mechanistic responses caused by stimuli (Harré and Secord, 
1972).  
 
Within the attitude paradigm, Harré and Secord argue, phenomena are analysed in 
terms of the relations between dependent and independent variables. Investigation 
consists in the manipulation of independent variables and the observation of 
subsequent changes in the dependent variable. Attitudes are characteristically 
considered an independent variable to the dependent variable of individual 
behaviour. Accordingly, social psychology has been prone to conceive of individuals 
as complex information-processing machines, whose behaviour can be fully 
explained in terms of the causal influence of a series of variables. This has led to a 
social psychology that looks for influence either from within the individual, as in 
emotional states or neurological processes, or from without, as in cultural conditions 
or social representations. Such reductionism has characterised research on 
perspectives and narrow-mindedness, as noted in Chapter 3, and has reduced these to 
a cognitive need for closure that, after all is said and done, is itself demonstrated to 
depend on the very variable it was originally meant to be studying, i.e. perspective-
taking (see Kruglanski, 2004; Baron & Kenny, 1986). In the process, social 
psychology has overlooked what takes place at the level of inter-acting individuals. 
Harré and Secord argue that individuals are not merely information-processors, but 
also information-seekers and information-generators. And yet, social psychology, in 
the attitude programme, has sought to eliminate individual justifications as well as 
consensual outlooks (Fraser, 1994), with the result that studies of attitudes have 
changed the very character of the phenomena that are being observed into ones that 
fit neatly into an artifactual operationalisation of the concept.  
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Harré and Secord’s critique has arguably aged. The present state of the discipline 
suggests that some of these limitations have been rectified with the rise of qualitative 
methodologies. On the other hand, if one considers the impact of these techniques on 
the entire breadth of the discipline, it is clear that Harré and Secord’s critique 
remains pertinent today, as the concern for predicting behaviour, or the calculation 
of Y´ in regression methods, remains mainstream. According to Harré and Secord, 
whilst such an approach may be appropriate in those circumstances that investigate 
things that happen to a person, much of social behaviour does not have such a 
character. Instead, it consists of actions that people have made happen for a reason. 
Consequently, it is important to realise that the individual herself is the cause of her 
own actions. Action of this kind, according to Harré and Secord, has both 
significance and meaning and it occurs in a social context. This means that if social 
psychology considers people as agents, it must connect their behaviour to concepts 
that describe “self-controlled actions in a world of agents who have interests and 
who follow rules and plans in their dealings with other agents” (1972, p. 38). This is 
a foundational epistemology for the conceptualisation of points of view.  
 
According to Harré and Secord, in many contexts an individual’s actions are 
adequately explained by reference to the individual’s reasons for acting so. The 
present conceptualisation of point of view agrees with Harré and Secord’s position 
that “Rules of behaviour do not have the status of laws of nature since they can be 
ignored, defied, or changed, and because adherence to them is not necessarily a 
reflection of the presence of identical or even very similar physiological states and 
mechanisms in the entities involved” (1972, p. 243). Lay explanations of behaviour 
thus provide the best model for psychological theory. They provide an explanation 
of action that is volitional and purposive. Social psychology as a discipline is called 
upon to extend what can be known by common observation, and to critically check 
the authenticity of what is thought to be known by application of the scientific 
methods of exploration and experimentation. Exploration aims at discerning non-
random patterns concerning the phenomena investigated. Experimentation aims at 
formulating and generating relevant theories that describe their nature. What is 
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wanted beyond critical description, according to Harré and Secord, is an explanation 
for why patterns occur, that is, why and by what mechanism in those circumstances 
something has produced something else.  
 
The empirical inquiries into points of view undertaken in the present investigation 
follow such a methodological procedure. The first study aims at establishing the 
former postulate for points of view, that is, of an exploration of the phenomenon that 
aims at discerning patterns of variability. The second and third studies, as outlined 
hereunder, aim to describe its nature in terms of interpersonal and intrapersonal 
characteristics respectively.  
 
The Inter-view   
 
Harré and Secord (1972) argue that the mechanisms responsible for social behaviour 
involve inter-relations of meanings perceived by interactors. The structure of 
meaning relations, as has been documented in the previous chapter, can be 
discovered in the study of justificatory accounts. The first and second empirical 
enquiries in this investigation adopt such a method. According to Harré and Secord, 
a social researcher becomes an engaged spectator in the process of research, rather 
than a detached observer. Consequently, she becomes herself able to provide a 
meaningful account for that episode. The procedure by which this occurs is that of a 
negotiation of viewpoints between researcher and respondent.  
 
In similar vein, Billig (1987) suggests that an enquiry into points of view requires an 
argumentative methodological procedure. According to Billig, “Instead of asking 
someone whether they agree or disagree with a particular position, the researcher 
might probe in depth the occasions when a respondent might consider disagreeing 
with a chosen position” (1987, p. 253). Billig thus argues for further probing, or 
cross-examination, in contrast to attitude measurement, suggesting that the in-depth 
interview is more suitable to this sort of enquiry. In such a method, the interviewer 
does not need to feel constrained by establishing a complete common-ground 
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between themselves and the respondents, “In consequence, the interview would take 
the form of an argument, or discussion, rather than a one-sided succession of formal 
questions followed by brief responses” (1987, p. 253).  
 
Billig’s proposal is keenly formulated in Farr’s (1984) notion of the inter-view, a 
methodological concept that is highly pertinent to the present inquiry. Farr’s claims 
are made in light of the interview as a method, but his approach can be described as 
a methodology that seeks the study of relative perspectives, the principles of which 
apply equally to quantitative and qualitative techniques. Farr describes the interview 
as “a technique or method for establishing or discovering that there are perspectives 
or viewpoints on events other than those of the person initiating the interview” (p. 
182). An interview is, according to Farr, a peculiar conversation that is a co-
operative venture between interviewer and interviewee and that elicits self-reports of 
divergences in perspective: “When O speaks, a perspective other than that of P is 
revealed. P and O engage in conversation while the unique perspective of each is 
retained. This difference in perspective between them helps to produce an inter-view 
in the literal sense of the term” (p. 184).  
 
During an interview, each of the interactants becomes able to adopt the position of 
actor as well as observer, and positions shift during the course of the procedure. Farr 
basis his method on Mead’s (1934) notion of taking the perspective of the other. For 
Mead, Farr notes, these perspectives are relative in that they represent points in 
space/time from which one could view events. According to Mead, it was entirely 
possible to change one’s position in space/time. During the course of an interview, 
the asking of questions by interactants helps to establish the existence of 
perspectives other than that of the investigator who has initiated the study. It is this 
that enables the undertaking of an inter-view. 
 
Farr (1984) further argues that if Harré & Secord’s plea were heeded by the social 
sciences, then the interview would become the privileged mode of research. As a 
method, the inter-view is more defensible from a scientific point of view, according 
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to Farr, as it highlights the fact that the perspectives of researcher and interviewee 
are different. This sensitises researchers to the possible consequences that might 
ensue from this divergence in perspectives. Harré & Secord (1972) themselves note 
that the perspective of the interviewer is always different from that of the 
interviewee, and that this divergence in perspectives is an adequate basis on which to 
negotiate accounts. Farr further notes that Harré & Secord’s proposal is in line with 
the influence of Gestalt psychology, from which Asch’s social psychology derives, 
wherein a reliance on self-reports was customary given the Gestaltists’ interest in 
how people perceived the world. The best way to discover this is undoubtedly to 
elicit an account of the perception directly from the perceiver.  
 
It is thus reasonable to adopt Harré & Secord’s epistemology for the study of points 
of view. Moreover, it is also reasonable to adopt the principles of argumentation and 
the procedures of the inter-view as methods for inquiring into points of view. These 
procedures put an emphasis on the negotiation of divergences in perspectives, which 
is an essential requirement considering that points of view are necessarily relative.  
For this reason, the methodology adopted herein puts a value on the argumentative 
and justificatory context that marks the understanding of situational-level 
manifestations of social behaviour. Argumentation and inter-viewing are deemed 
suitable methods for the study of points of view, as these provide interactants with 
the conditions to establish a common ground that retains divergences in 
perspectives.  
 
Research Design 
 
This thesis, in light of the aims outlined in Chapter 1 that involve the 
conceptualisation of point of view as a social-psychological phenomenon, adopts a 
three-pronged inquiry for empirical investigation. Insofar as the point of view is a 
phenomenon worthy of explanation in itself (i.e. explanandum), then its 
manifestation and instances of its variation should be observable under investigation. 
Furthermore, insofar as the point of view is a social-cum-
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argued in Chapter 3, then certain features of it should transpire under investigation 
that pertain to its social nature. Points of view should thus be marked by certain 
interpersonal characteristics. And, again, insofar as the point of view is a social-
cum-psychological construct, then certain other features of it should transpire under 
investigation that pertain to its psychological nature. It ought thus to be also marked 
by certain other intrapersonal, or socio-cognitive, features. Consequently, the 
research design adopted for the purposes of this exploration involves an effort to 
investigate: (a) the manifestation of the phenomenon and document instances of its 
variance, (b) the phenomenon in terms of its interpersonal characteristics, and (c) the 
phenomenon in terms of its intrapersonal properties.  
 
Three separate studies were thus undertaken to deal with these aims respectively, 
sensitive to certain conditions of public spheres. As argued in Chapter 2, the 
ontology of points of view is intrinsically bound to the public sphere in which they 
occur. Public spheres can legitimate certain points of view, as opposed to others. Not 
all points of view are recognised in all publics. Furthermore, public spheres 
constrain not only individual perspectives, they also legitimate certain worldviews, 
possibly a single one, as opposed to others. Consequently, the manifestation of 
different types of points of view can be of four types, determined by two orthogonal 
axes, that is, either similar or different perspectives in relation to some other point of 
view, where both perspectives are legitimated by the same worldview (X-axis), and 
similar or different perspectives in relation to some other point of view, where the 
two perspectives are legitimated by different worldviews (Y-axis). Not all publics 
admit the four different conditions. Moreover, focusing on either interpersonal 
features or intrapersonal features of points of view necessitates control of certain 
conditions, as detailed hereunder. The three empirical studies undertaken for the 
purposes of this thesis have been designed according to these characteristic 
conditions of points of view embedded within public spheres. 
 
The first study undertaken is a qualitative inquiry that maps instantiations of points 
of view based on methods of argumentation. The second is another qualitative 
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inquiry that explores and describes the interpersonal characteristics that emanate 
from points of view as these relate to another with regard to a different background 
of intelligibility. The third is a quantitative inquiry that looks at differences in the 
socio-cognitive structure of points of view across a number of respondents that share 
a common frame of reference. The methodological features of these studies are 
detailed hereunder. Findings and their discussion are presented in subsequent 
chapters. Taken together, these three studies document instantiations of the point of 
view in its various manifestations (i.e. from within and from without a similar 
background of intelligibility) and explore its manifold social-psychological 
properties.  
 
The sensitivity of points of view to the character of public spheres, as argued in 
Chapter 2, prohibited an integrated study of the three aims of this thesis in a single 
public with regards to a single issue. The description of the nature of points of view 
was best undertaken in a cosmopolitan public sphere that brought together 
perspectives originating in different worldviews. This same condition, however, 
precluded an effective study of the interpersonal characteristics of points of view, 
due to the fact that in the event of the co-existence of different legitimating 
communities, observed behaviour could have been interpretable at both the 
intergroup level as well as the interpersonal. A case study of interpersonal relations 
controlling for community relations was thus a requirement for such an 
investigation, something that could not be served by a cosmopolitan public where 
different community worldviews co-exist. Similarly, inquiring into the intrapersonal 
properties of points of view required first and foremost controlling for heterogeneity. 
In heterogeneous conditions, as in cosmopolitan publics, characteristic differences in 
the treatment of alternative claims may be attributable to different cultural practices 
prescribed by different social representations pertaining to the different cultural 
groups. Once again, this condition could not have been served by either a 
cosmopolitan public, as applied to the first inquiry, nor an unlegitimated one, as 
applied to the second. It required, on the other hand, an investigation of a relatively 
hegemonic public that is made to entertain alternative views. 
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The fulfilment of these research aims validates the claim that the point of view is a 
social-cum-psychological phenomenon, rather than a singularly discursive 
epiphenomenon or a mere cognitive process. Insofar as these research aims are 
supported, then the postulation of points of view at the situational level of 
explanation–that links psychological processes that take place in cognition at the 
level of the individual with social processes that manifest in the collective–will 
prove to be a demonstrably legitimate enterprise. It establishes points of view as a 
construct in need of inquiry in its own right that serves towards providing a fuller 
explanation of social behaviour, one that overcomes the limitations of the 
malleability and temporality of attitudes according to the situation on the one hand, 
and the incapacity for understanding circumspect social behaviour through social 
representations on the other. The point of view, insofar as its interpersonal and 
intrapersonal properties are understood, could help provide an explanation of social 
behaviour at the interpersonal level as it takes place in situ. The research design 
adopted for this inquiry thus investigates these three concerns in detail in an effort to 
piece together the bigger picture of describing the point of view’s nature in its 
manifold social-psychological manifestations.  
 
Study 1: The Root of all Evil? 
 
The first study adopted a qualitative approach in studying a public controversy that 
took place in Britain early in 2006 over beliefs in a supernatural faith and the role of 
science in society. This controversy brought together in debate numerous believers 
of a multitude of faiths as well as representatives from the media, scientists, atheists, 
and agnostics, all of whom sought to proclaim their own point of view regarding the 
nature of these widespread beliefs and their consequences. For the purposes of this 
first study, that sought to document the various manifestations of points of view, 
qualitative interviews were undertaken with a total of ten respondents, residents of 
London, with five respondents selected to represent each side of the dichotomy of 
belief/non-belief in a supernatural faith. The inclusion/exclusion criterion along 
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which respondents were classified along each side of the dichotomy was an 
expressed belief in the dictates of an organised faith. Those who professed a faith in 
a religious code and institution and participated in the rituals of that faith were 
classed as religious. Those who expressed no particular faith in an organised religion 
and did not participate in any organised religious rituals were classed as non-
religious. Table 1 outlines select demographic data of the respondents. 
 
Participant Sex Nationality Y.O.B. Ethnicity Education Non/Religious 
1 Female British 1956 Black Tertiary Non-Religious 
2 Female South 
African 
1978 Black Tertiary Religious 
3 Female Ghanaian 1970 Black Tertiary Religious 
4 Female British 1958 Black Tertiary Religious 
5 Female Jamaican 1961 Black Secondary Religious 
6 Male British 1979 White Secondary Non-Religious 
7 Male Finnish 1977 White Tertiary Non-Religious 
8 Male British 1981 White Tertiary Non-Religious 
9 Female British 1966 Black Tertiary Non-Religious 
10 Male Maltese 1976 White Secondary Religious 
Table 1: Demographic data of interview respondents 
 
The interviews were conducted during the month of July 2006, at various locations 
in London. An interview guide was drawn up (Appendix I), consisting of a short 
introduction intended to provide respondents with background information about the 
study and to create a setting for conversation. A few preliminary questions were 
asked initially, that were intended to guide the conversation into the core of the 
topic. Subsequently, selected quotations from some arguments that circulated in the 
public sphere on the controversy over whether religion is a source of evil–an idea 
propagated by Prof. Richard Dawkins during a two-part documentary during prime-
time British television–and which captured the flavour of the controversy that 
ensued, were presented to the respondents. This was done in an effort to undertake 
an argumentative interview, rather than a mere recital of opinions, guided by Farr’s 
(1984) notion of the inter-view outlined above. The topic guide further outlined a 
number of questions intended to explore interviewees’ reactions to divergent 
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opinions about the claims proposed during the controversy concerning ‘The Root of 
all Evil?’14 in the British public. 
 
The interviews explored participants’ perspectives towards religion, science, and 
moral behaviour. They also explored opinions around the claims proposed in 
Dawkins’ documentary. The duration of the interviews ranged from thirty minutes to 
one hour thirty-five minutes. The interviews were audio-recorded and fully 
transcribed by the researcher. The transcribed interviews constituted text data for 
subsequent analysis. The data was content analysed using Atlas.ti qualitative 
analysis software, to categorise respondents’ points of view and to identify 
respondents’ social positioning, that is in relation to whom respondents’ arguments 
were being formulated. For the purpose of this present investigation, selective 
coding of the Type Family of Coding Families (Glaser, 1978) was undertaken on the 
coded data. Type Family codes that were deemed to describe the nature of the 
perspective being studied were categorised, compared and described for the purpose 
of this investigation. The findings of this analysis are presented in Chapter 5. 
 
Study 2: The Maltese in Britain  
 
The second study was undertaken during the latter quarter of 2008 and early 2009. 
For the purposes of this study, qualitative interviews were undertaken with a number 
of Maltese people who moved to London and other areas in Britain. A number of 
interviews were also undertaken with Maltese migrants who moved back to Malta 
after a stay in Britain. The Maltese in Britain are represented by the Maltese High 
Commission. The Commission, however, does not hold records of the number or 
location of Maltese migrants. Similarly, a small number of cultural organisations 
have been set up in Britain, namely the Maltese Culture Movement and the 
Maltesers in London group. These have been able to attract the participation of 
fellow Maltese migrants at their organised events. However, attendance at these 
events is neither limited to Maltese migrants alone nor to Maltese people in general, 
                                                
14 The title of Prof. Richard Dawkins’ documentary 
 109 
in that both Maltese tourists to Britain as well as foreigners are known to attend 
these events. Furthermore, numerous Maltese living in Britain do not participate in 
these events and have never sought membership. For this reason, respondents for 
this study were selected through snowballing. 
 
A total of thirty interviews involving forty respondents were undertaken. 
Respondents were interviewed either alone or jointly with their partners in case of 
family migration. The latter group consisted of a total of ten couples, one of which 
returned to Malta. Respondents’ stay in Britain ranged from less than a year to fifty 
years, and their ages ranged from twenty-five to seventy. A number of respondents 
were actively working, others were studying, others were homemakers and one was 
retired. Their purpose for moving to Britain was equally varied. Some were in 
Britain to study, some moved to study and stayed, others moved to work, and others 
moved or stayed following a tourist visit. Selected demographic data are presented 
in table 2 hereunder, ordered by the chronological undertaking of the interviews.  
 
Respondents were interviewed at a convenient location suitable for purpose. An 
interview guide was drawn up for the purposes of the interview. This provided a 
description of the study and outlined a number of relevant questions to guide the 
interviewer (Appendix II). Interviews followed a semi-structured, conversational 
format, guided by the researcher’s own understandings of Maltese and British 
mentalities, as well as the settling down process in Britain. This was undertaken in 
Farr’s (1984) spirit of the inter-view, requiring respondents to justify their decisions 
to move to one country or another in view of the circumstances in both countries, 
with which the researcher was himself familiar. Kuhn and McPartland’s (1954) 
Twenty Statements Test was also administered to respondents prior to the interview, 
to check whether responses provided during the interview were characterised by 
differences in social identities (Deschamps, 1982). The interviews lasted between 
forty-five and a hundred and ten minutes. All interviews were audio-recorded, 
transcribed, and translated for analyses.  
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Participant 
No. 
Place of 
residence 
Years 
in UK 
Single/ 
Family Age Gender 
Marital 
Status 
Work 
Status 
        
1 London 1 S 25 F Single Education 
2 London 3 S 31 F Married Working 
3 Essex 21 F 61 M Married Working 
4 Essex 21 F 61 F Married Working 
5 Surrey 3 S 30 F Single Education 
6 Surrey 6 F 37 M Married Working 
7 Surrey 6 F 33 F Married Homemaker 
8 London 2 S 28 M Single Working 
9 London 2 F 29 M Married Working 
10 London 2 F 28 F Married Education 
11 London 4 S 32 M Single Working 
12 London 3 F 31 M Married Working 
13 London 3 F 28 F Married Working 
14 London 2 F 30 M Single Working 
15 London 2 F 27 F Single Working 
16 Essex 36 F 58 M Married Working 
17 Essex 25 F 49 F Married Working 
18 London 3 S 29 M Single Working 
19 London 3 S 26 M Single Working 
20 London 5 S 34 F Single Working 
21 Middlesex 2 F 28 M Married Working 
22 Middlesex 2 F 28 F Married Working 
23 Essex 5 F 35 M Married Working 
24 Essex 5 F 32 F Married Working 
25 Surrey 1 F 42 M Married Working 
26 Surrey 1 F 39 F Married Education 
27 Berkshire 50 S 70 M Divorced Retired 
28 London 2 S 32 F Single Working 
29 Surrey 12 S 40 M Married Working 
30 Oxfordshire 7 S 32 M Single Working 
31 Middlesex 2 S 33 F Married Working 
32 London 8 S 31 M Married Working 
33 Malta < 1 S 32 M Single Working 
34 Malta < 1 S 26 F Married Homemaker 
35 Malta 2 S 31 F Single Working 
36 Malta 6 S 28 F Married Homemaker 
37 Malta 6 S 37 F Married Working 
38 Malta 4 S 28 M Married Working 
39 Malta < 1 F 30 F Married Working 
40 Malta < 1 F 32 M Married Working 
Table 2: Demographic data of interview respondents 
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Data analysis for the interviews followed Flick’s (2006) Thematic Coding protocol 
for comparative studies, based on Strauss’s (1987) grounded theory procedure. In 
this method, groups under study are defined a priori. For the purposes of this study, 
the groups consisted of those respondents who demonstrated either a monological 
point of view, or a dialogical point of view, or a metalogical point of view. These 
were the point of view types unearthed in the first study (see Chapter 5). Data 
analysis, according to Flick’s protocol, involves a comparative exploration of case 
studies that enables comparisons across groups to be undertaken on respondents’ 
perspectives with regard to certain relevant issues. The first step in Flick’s protocol 
is to draw up a short description of each case. This is followed by a deepening 
analysis of single cases. Such a procedure enables the researcher to develop a system 
of categories through open coding and selective coding that is put together in a 
thematic structure reflecting a coding structure across all cases. The overarching 
thematic structure serves the purposes of comparability. The final output is a 
demonstration of coding themes that are found to differ across groups with regards 
to relevant issues. 
 
The case descriptions drawn up for each respondent were used to classify 
respondents as monological, dialogical, or metalogical. For the purposes of this 
classification, the following operational definitions of points of view were utilised, 
guided by the findings of the first study and complimenting Rokeach’s (1951b) 
description of different types of cognitive organisation: 
 
Monological  A point of view that is closed to relations with an alternative social 
reality.  
 
Dialogical A point of view that considers the legitimacy of more than one social 
reality, but where functional relations with the other social reality are 
bounded. 
 
Metalogical A point of view that is open to relations with different social realities. 
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The operationalisation of points of view in terms of functional relations within 
different contexts stems from the prior conceptualisation of points of view in terms 
of their propensity to engage with alternative realities, in line with the findings of the 
first study. Consequently, in practical terms, subjects with different points of view 
were expected to relate in different ways to the encounter with some alternative 
reality on the basis of their comprehension of the logos, or sensibility, of that 
different social reality. An encounter with an alternative reality is given in the 
migration experience. This rationale served to operationalise points of view in terms 
of functional relations. 
 
The categorisation was undertaken by two independent raters. The inter-rater 
reliability measured by Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (2-tailed) for the 
final classification demonstrated high convergence between raters (rs = 0.905, p = 
<0.01). Due to the high likelihood of identifiability of respondents, real case 
descriptions are not presented. These are replaced by a description of the typical 
characteristics of the accounts given by respondents in each category: 
 
 
Monological Settlement into British culture is seamless. They claim that they felt 
they never fit into Maltese culture even though they originated from 
there. They describe their situation in Malta as that of a ‘fish out of 
the water’, whereas no such feelings accompany their settlement in 
Britain. They claim not to have lost anything and not to feel 
homesick, and the adjustment they required was to a better life. 
Their experience did not change them; they were always closer to 
the British in character than they were to their compatriots. They 
do not entertain the idea of going back because they do not fit 
there. 
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Dialogical They left Malta to seek out new experiences and to get away from 
the limitations. They required some adjustment to fit into British 
society, but they persevered and managed, and have now come out 
the other end much stronger. They define themselves as Maltese 
living in Britain; Maltese adapted to British life. They function well 
and are proud of their achievements. They look favourably at 
Malta, but from a distance. They claim that there are certain things 
in Malta that prevent them from going back, and that it will take a 
while for Malta to catch up with the mentality in Britain that they 
now share. They can see how certain people can have a good life in 
Malta, and they would entertain going back were situations to 
change, but they do not see this as a possibility and they do not 
mind this because they are nevertheless happy. In spite of their 
favourable attitudes to Malta, they do not envy the Maltese as they 
feel that migrating to Britain has opened their minds and made 
them grow. As a result, they cannot now fit back into the more 
restricted island-mentality of Malta. Malta for them is a good 
holiday destination where they go to have some fun and visit 
family. 
 
Metalogical They demonstrate a dual appreciation of both Malta and the UK. 
They cite situational reasons for being in the UK. They are proud 
of who they are and where they come from. They also appreciate 
Britain and the fact that they were able to fit in to British culture 
and that British society actually made this possible. They feel for 
Britain and for what they have gained from moving there, but they 
still feel they fit in Malta and were situational conditions to lead 
them there again they wouldn’t mind moving back, although they 
wouldn’t mind staying in Britain either. They feel that the two 
systems are different, but each system has its advantages and 
disadvantages. Where they take up residence depends on what 
circumstances matters at a given point in their lives. They feel as 
much at home in Malta as they do in Britain, and will stand up for 
both countries if others were making disparaging comments. 
 
 114 
Out of the 40 respondents interviewed in this study, 11 were classified as 
monological, 17 as dialogical, and 12 as metalogical (Table 3). 
 
Frequencies 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Monological 11 27.5 27.5 27.5 
Dialogical 17 42.5 42.5 70.0 
Metalogical 12 30.0 30.0 100.0 
Valid 
Total 40 100.0 100.0  
Table 3: Classification of cases into point of view types 
 
 
Data analysis of single cases was undertaken on the transcribed texts of each 
respondent using Nvivo8. Coding was structured in Tree Codes that yielded a 
Thematic Structure of case analyses as per Flick’s (2006) protocol. The Thematic 
Structure served for running queries in Nvivo8 regarding relevant themes 
categorised by point of view types. A systematic comparative procedure on the 
output of queries was undertaken in an effort to identify instances of variance 
between types. Findings are presented in detail and discussed in Chapter 6. The 
findings of the thematic coding comparison are summarised hereunder in Table 4. 
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1. Expectations and Impressions 5. Settling down 
2. Migration/Repatriation a. Difficulties 
3. Life in Malta b. Fitting in 
a. Quality of Life c. Adaptation 
b. Lifestyle d. Networking 
c. Mentality e. Support 
d. Living & Working conditions f. Staying in touch 
e. Social Network g. What do they miss? 
f. Feeling for Malta 6. Identity 
g. Visiting a. Britishness 
4. Life in Britain b. European 
a. Country c. Mediterranean 
b. Lifestyle d. Perspective 
c. Mentality 7. Settlement 
d. Living and Working conditions a. Home 
e. Social Network b. Going back 
f. Being a Foreigner c. Fitting in 
g. Feeling for Britain d. Settling down 
h. Malta 
i. Maltese community 
j. Multiculturalism 
k. Personal consequences 
 
Table 4: Thematic Structure of case analysis 
 
The classification of respondents according to point of view types served for the 
analysis of the interview data as well as data from the Twenty Statements Test 
(TST). Responses given for the TST were first coded into categories that described 
the definition respondents used to characterise themselves. Out of the total number 
of respondents, personality/character descriptions featured most highly, followed by 
relationships and interests, profession, nationality, age, migration, life 
circumstances, gender, faith, physical features, name, others’ descriptions, 
aspirations, sexual orientation and residence, as detailed in Table 5. 
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Descriptor n appearances in data 
€ 
X  per respondent* 
Personality/Character 37 7.08 
Relationships 36 2.08 
Interests 36 4.61 
Profession 30 1.97 
Nationality 23 1.52 
Age 20 1.1 
Migration 17 1 
Life circumstances 15 1.73 
Gender 13 1 
Faith 12 1.08 
Physical features 10 1.5 
Name 9 1 
Others’ descriptions 3 1.67 
Aspirations 2 1 
Sexual orientation 1 1 
Residence 1 1 
* excluding respondents where descriptor was not mentioned 
Table 5: Categorisation of TST data 
 
One-way ANOVAs were conducted for each of these categories as dependent 
variable with point of view type as independent variable, to test whether the null 
hypothesis of no statistically significant differences between means of each category 
across point of view types could be rejected. There were no statistically significant 
differences between mean scores across point of view types, meaning that the null 
hypothesis could not be rejected. No evidence was therefore found that any 
differences between point of view types identified during the analysis of the 
interview data is a function of differences in the structure of social identity.  
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Study 3: Social Issues in a hegemonic public 
 
The third study aimed to discover whether intrapersonal socio-cognitive differences 
marked different point of view types, according to the conceptualisation of points of 
view postulated in this thesis. The study aimed at comparing subjects’ latitudes of 
acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment across point of view types. Three issues 
were presented to subjects for this purpose. The first concerned a range of statements 
made in public with regard to the revision of the student stipend system at the 
University of Malta. The second presented a similar number of statements made 
with regard to the rights of Muslims to pray in public in Malta. The third concerned 
the issue of voting rights of Maltese citizens who leave the country temporarily or 
permanently.  
 
The study was undertaken in Malta with Maltese students at the University of Malta. 
This was done with the aim of fulfilling the condition of a relatively hegemonic 
public required for this study, as argued above. Given that Malta has only recently 
opened its borders to European nations, that is, upon joining the EU in 2004, and 
that only at around that time it experienced any notable immigration from North 
Africa and Europe, Maltese mentality is deemed to be sufficiently insular to permit 
the undertaking of this study. Whilst, arguably, Maltese mentality has forever been 
under Western influence due to tourism, colonial heritage and the mass media, 
nevertheless, a characteristic Maltese culture prevails on the island by which the 
Maltese regulate their daily affairs in line with the views of the dominant majority of 
Maltese living on the island. The demographics of the country are by far 
disproportionately Maltese and Roman Catholic. Moreover, due to the small size of 
the island and the size of the population, no perspective from within is justifiably 
alien, and whilst certain sub-groups in the population could be discerned, no social 
group is sufficiently impermeable to warrant classification as a sub-culture. This 
means that the views debated by this population and any differences that may 
transpire between them are not attributable to different community representations, 
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considering that these are all based within a general Maltese culture that permeates 
the island. 
 
The survey undertaken for the purposes of this third inquiry was administered 
between December 2009 and February 2010. A questionnaire was drawn up by the 
researcher and administered to students at the University of Malta. The survey was 
piloted twice prior to administration with a convenience sample of university 
students using techniques of cognitive interviewing to ensure that the right meaning 
was being conveyed and that the right responses were being elicited for the various 
questions. A noteworthy outcome of piloting was the rating of latitude statements on 
a five-point scale ranging from -2 to +2, in favour of options to accept, reject, or 
non-commit to the statement. The survey was administered online through the Office 
of the Registrar of the University of Malta to a representative random sample of 
1000 students, stratified by faculty. The study was sent to undisclosed recipients to 
maintain anonymity and protection of personal data. Details of the sample to whom 
the questionnaire was addressed are presented in Table 6. 
 
Faculty/Institute/Centre Count Percentage 
Centre for Communication Technology 25 2.50% 
Centre for Labour Studies 18 1.80% 
Conservation and Management of Cultural Heritage 2 0.20% 
European Documentation and Research Centre 28 2.80% 
Faculty for the Built Environment 37 3.70% 
Faculty of Arts 149 14.90% 
Faculty of Dental Surgery 19 1.90% 
Faculty of Economics, Management and Accountancy 122 12.20% 
Faculty of Education 110 11.00% 
Faculty of Engineering 70 7.00% 
Faculty of Information & Communication Technology 101 10.10% 
Faculty of Laws 62 6.20% 
Faculty of Medicine and Surgery 48 4.80% 
Faculty of Science 34 3.40% 
Faculty of Theology 20 2.00% 
Institute of Agriculture 20 2.00% 
Institute of Criminology 33 3.30% 
Institute of Health Care 99 9.90% 
Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies 3 0.30% 
Total 1000 100.00% 
Table 6: Sample characteristics 
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The survey was initially emailed on the 9th of December 2009. Email reminders 
were subsequently sent by the Office of the Registrar to the same sample on the 17th 
of December, the 5th of January 2010, the 18th of January 2010, and the 5th of 
February 2010. The survey was closed on the 21st February 2010. A hundred euro 
voucher draw from a leading retail outlet was used as an incentive. At the time of 
closure of the survey, a total of 272 responses had been received. These were 
reduced to 247 after data filtering, excluding all cases that returned responses in the 
form of long strings of similar responses, even to contradictory statements. The 
survey thus attracted an effective response rate of 25%, which is deemed adequate 
for an online survey. Moreover, the faculty demographic of respondents largely 
mirrored that of the entire sample, as outlined in Table 7. 
 
Faculty Count Percentage 
Agriculture 2 .8 
Arts 49 19.8 
Built Environment 10 4.0 
CCT 4 1.6 
Criminology 2 .8 
Dental Surgery 1 .4 
EDRC 7 2.8 
Education 35 14.2 
Engineering 17 6.9 
FEMA 30 12.1 
I & C T 23 9.3 
IHC 13 5.3 
Labour Studies 2 .8 
Laws 18 7.3 
Medicine & Surgery 10 4.0 
Other (unspecified) 2 .8 
Science 17 6.9 
Theology 5 2.0 
Total 247 100.0 
Table 7: Faculty demographic of respondents 
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The questionnaire (Appendix IV) was presented to respondents online over a series 
of five pages. The first page presented respondents with a series of arguments 
concerning three issues, namely the right of university students to receive stipends 
from the state, the right of Muslims to pray publicly in Malta, and the right of 
Maltese migrants to vote in national general elections. These three issues were 
debated and contested in the Maltese public at various times throughout the year 
preceding the study. Arguments were selected by the researcher to represent the 
various views that circulated in the media, following an analysis of articles 
published in the Times of Malta concerning these issues. Arguments were selected 
according to their underlying point of view type characteristic. Respondents were 
thus presented with five arguments per issue on the first page, that is a total of 
fifteen arguments. A monological statement in favour of the issue, a monological 
statement against the issue, a dialogical statement in favour of the issue, a dialogical 
statement against the issue, and a metalogical statement on the issue, were presented 
to respondents about each issue. As per the conceptual definitions of point of view 
types following the first study of this inquiry, the monological statements presented 
an exclusive and unilinear argument, the dialogical statements presented two 
perspectives but selected one over the other, whereas the metalogical statements 
presented both arguments without favouring one over the other.  
 
Respondents were asked to identify the extent to which they agreed or disagreed 
with each statement in the first instance, and subsequently to select the one they 
identified as coming closest to their own view. This method has been well utilised in 
other studies that dealt with similar intercultural issues (see Georgas & 
Papastylianou, 1996). In this study therefore, respondents self-classified their points 
of view according to pre-defined point of view types. For every issue, respondents 
who selected either the first or second statements were thus automatically classified 
as monological, respondents who selected the third or fourth statements were 
classified as dialogical, whilst respondents who selected the fifth statement as 
coming closer to their own views were classified as metalogical. The second page of 
the questionnaire proceeded to request respondents to provide a rating for how 
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strongly they felt the issue applied to them. This measure of ego-relatedness has 
been associated with variances in latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and non-
commitment in the works of Sherif (see Chapter 7).  
 
The third page of the questionnaire presented respondents with short statements that 
had been made in the press concerning each issue. A list of nine statements per issue 
was presented, requesting respondents to indicate the extent to which they found 
each statement acceptable or unacceptable on a scale of -2 to +2, with 0 indicating 
the middle point. These lists of nine statements served for the measurement of the 
latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and non-commitment. Acceptance was measured 
by a positive response to a statement, rejection by a negative response, whereas a 
neutral response indicated non-commitment. In this way, the extent to which each 
respondent found varying arguments acceptable, objectionable, or neutral was 
measured in a way that enabled a computation of latitudes. The number of 
acceptances, rejections, and non-commitment responses was computed for each 
respondent, providing a direct measure of the latitudes of acceptance, rejection and 
non-commitment for every issue.  
 
The fifth page proceeded to present respondents with Berry’s (1984) multicultural 
ideology scale. This scale measures the extent to which individuals are open to the 
encounter and co-habitation with different cultures. Given the similarity of definition 
between point of view types and multicultural ideology, as well as the fact that one 
issue selected for investigation concerned the worship rights of a culturally different 
non-dominant group in Malta, multicultural ideology was included in the 
questionnaire as a measure of construct validity. The scale was originally devised by 
Berry for the purposes of studying multicultural relations in Canada, and has been 
employed in acculturation studies since. The version of the scale adopted for this 
study is the one adopted in Berry’s Mutual Intercultural Relations in Plural Societies 
(MIRIPS) international survey that measures, amongst other things, multicultural 
ideology, acculturation expectations, and cultural identity. The scale was expected to 
correlate with respondents’ points of view with regards to multicultural relations, 
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and thus provide a measure of construct validity. The scale was demonstrated to 
have good reliability (Cronbach’s α=0.81). The fifth and last page of the 
questionnaire gathered demographic data about participants, namely gender, age, 
year of study, faculty of study, religious beliefs, place of residence and marital 
status. Thereafter respondents could proceed to enter the incentive lottery. 
 
Following closure of the survey, data was transferred into the PASW 18 software 
programme for quantitative statistical analysis. Descriptive statistics and frequencies 
were generated and analysed for patterns in the data. A total of twenty-five 
questionnaires were eliminated during the filtering process for returning responses in 
the form of long strings of similar answers, even to contradictory statements. These 
were deemed to have replied to the questionnaire for the purposes of entering the 
draw. Following the filtering procedure, various statistical analyses were undertaken 
on the data to check for a number of relationships and associations between the 
variables under study.  
 
The distributions of points of view were analysed visually and using descriptive 
statistics to determine whether responses for the point of view statements were 
normally distributed. The relationships between points of view on different issues 
was analysed using Kendall’s tau-b correlation coefficient, testing the null 
hypothesis that there is no significant relationship between individuals’ points of 
view on one issue and their point of view on another issue. The ego-relatedness 
relationships were analysed using the Pearson correlation coefficient, testing the null 
hypothesis that there are no significant relationships between individuals’ levels of 
ego-relatedness on an issue and their level of ego-relatedness on other issues. 
Subsequently, the relationship between point of view types and ego-relatedness was 
tested, using the Pearson correlation coefficient, testing the null hypothesis that there 
is no significant relationship between individuals’ point of view type and their ego-
relatedness measure for the same issue. The relationship between point of view type 
regarding Muslims’ rights of worship and the computed Multicultural Ideology score 
was tested using the Pearson correlation coefficient testing the null hypothesis that 
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there is no relationship between the two. Subsequently, a one-way ANOVA was 
undertaken to determine whether there were differences between point of view types 
and their respective measure for Multicultural Ideology, testing the null hypothesis 
that there are no differences between the means of the various point of view types on 
this measure.  
 
Further one-way ANOVAs were undertaken to test for differences between point of 
view types and the computed measures for latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and 
non-commitment. These analyses tested null hypotheses stating that there were no 
differences between the means of the various point of view types in their latitudes of 
acceptance, rejection, and non-commitment respectively. Further analysis was 
undertaken for the voting rights issue, to identify whether there were differences 
between the various types of points of view in their expression for or against the 
issue, and the latitudes of acceptance, rejection and non-commitment. Five groups 
were thus utilised for this analysis (monological-for; monological-against; 
dialogical-for; dialogical-against; metalogical) in contrast to the usual three 
(monological; dialogical; metalogical). For this purpose, a number of t-tests were 
undertaken to determine whether there were any differences between the means of 
some particular type of point of view and its latitude of rejection compared to 
another type, testing the null hypothesis that there were no differences between the 
means of the various point of view type groups, with for-the-issue and against-the-
issue treated as separate groups, and their respective latitudes of rejection.  
 
Further statistical analysis was undertaken to determine whether point of view types 
varied with demographic criteria. The null hypotheses that there are no differences 
in the mean point of view types between different gender, age, faculty, year of study, 
father’s employment background (as an indicator of social class), religious belief, 
and place of residence criteria were tested. The difference in mean scores for 
multicultural ideology was also tested between males and females, testing the null 
hypothesis that there are no significant differences in the means of males and 
females in their measure of multicultural ideology. Finally, a series of logistic 
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regressions were carried out for the three point of view types as dependent variables, 
testing the main effects of demographic data as predictor variables. This tested the 
null hypotheses that demographic variables have no predictive effect on the 
dependent variable. The logistic regression was adopted in lieu of the fact that the 
type of point of view demonstrated by respondents could be treated as a categorical 
independent variable with three categories for monological, dialogical, and 
metalogical respectively. The findings of these statistical analyses are presented and 
discussed in chapter 7. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The theorists reviewed in this chapter concur in advocating the investigation of 
points of view in terms of argumentative inquiry rather than a passive recital of 
beliefs or the ticking of responses on questionnaires. Points of view are elaborated in 
the course of argumentation and a social-psychological inquiry into points of view 
needs to take this into consideration. Moreover, it is only through argumentation that 
the intricacies of a point of view are made manifest. Argumentation offers the 
possibility of insight into how and why a point of view is held to be legitimate and 
valid in the first instance, as well as superior to alternative points of view in the 
second. Argumentative enquiry also allows the elaboration of a point of view with 
reference to the lay background knowledge, or common sense, that provides points 
of view with justification. It is this process which opens the gateway into inquiry, 
not only of personal beliefs, but equally into the social representations at play in and 
across individual minds (Wagner et al., 1999). The present formulation of point of 
view in view of its epistemological underpinnings, and the methodological 
procedure that it warrants, are in line with Habermas’ claim that “any account of 
communicative action needs to include an adequate theory of argumentation” (1991, 
p. 206). The present formulation of point of view, based on the three empirical 
studies undertaken in this thesis that document its variable manifestation in terms of 
its interpersonal and intrapersonal properties, provides such a theory for 
understanding social behaviour as it takes place in situ.  
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Introduction 
 
Tyler (2008) claims that at the root of the contemporary challenge that 
multiculturalism is posing to modern societies is the capacity for humans “to tolerate 
views and lifestyles inconsistent with their own” (p. x). The problem of discrepant 
views underlines the dark side of intercultural contact. Understanding the other 
requires an ability to view the world from the other’s perspective (Marková, 2003a). 
How can we empathise with another whose perspective we do not understand? 
Numerous theorists have pointed to this potential impasse. Herder argued that to 
appreciate other cultures one needs to adopt the other culture’s own perspective, and 
he acknowledged the enormity of the task to empathise with other nations (Marková, 
2003b). Asch (1952/1987) claimed that whilst our own society’s practices and 
beliefs appear to us natural, permanent and inevitable, those of other societies appear 
bizarre. Bateson (1972) agrees that the patterns of thought of individuals in a given 
society “are so standardised that their behaviour appears to them logical” (p. 66, 
italics in original). And Benhabib (2002) similarly claims that: “there are those with 
whom we agree, who inhabit other cultures and worlds, but whose evaluations we 
find plausible and comprehensible, and still others whose ways of life as well as 
systems of belief will be abhorrent to us” (p. 42). 
 
Clearly, the ability to take the perspective of the other fully, and understand it on its 
own terms is a necessary condition in successful contact outcomes. The problem in 
intercultural relations is the clash of cultures, which takes the form of encounters 
between different knowledge systems and ways of making sense of the world, 
whereby having a particular worldview may preclude understanding of another’s 
perspective. Successful contact outcomes are desirable, but all too often, intergroup 
contact degenerates into outright hostility and intolerance. Seemingly, even when 
conflict is avoided, outcomes may still take the form of segregation, integration, 
assimilation, or marginalisation. Contact in itself does not resolve the political 
problem of acculturation (Berry, 1980; Berry & Sam, 1997).  
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The theory of social representations (Moscovici, 1961/1976; 2000) may well provide 
the potential for a way forward into furthering our understanding of diversity. Social 
representations theory allows a conceptualisation of individual perspectives within a 
social system of knowledge that constitutes a social reality sui generis (Moscovici, 
2000; Wagner & Hayes, 2005; Moghaddam, 2008). Social representations provide a 
frame of reference that is common to social actors, who interact meaningfully and 
legitimately in everyday social life by adopting points of view that are intelligible to 
others by virtue of being located within a social representation. The point of view 
constitutes a social actor’s outlook towards some object or event relative to others 
within the social field. It provides a theory of social positioning that accounts for 
diversity encounters between social actors, and the prospective potential for positive 
relations between them. This potential, as the findings of this study demonstrate, is 
based on the extent to which one’s perspective is able to appreciate and 
accommodate the relative logic of one’s own point of view as well as that of another.  
 
A point of view is herein defined as an outlook towards a social event, group, or 
issue, expressed as a claim, which can be supported by an argument of opinion based 
on a system of knowledge from which it derives its logic. A point of view articulates 
how a social actor sees things in the social field, relative to others. Figuratively, it 
describes how I see what you see, how I see what s/he sees, and how we see what 
they see. This chapter presents findings from a study undertaken in 2006 concerning 
the nature of religion and its relation with science. The study was undertaken in the 
wake of a public controversy that took place in the British press following a 
televised documentary that proposed religion as a source of evil. The findings 
demonstrate how a particular point of view may be closed to dialogue with another 
position. Alternatively, points of view may acknowledge the legitimate existence of 
another position but retain its logic as of a superior form. Finally, a point of view 
may be open in considering the other point of view on the terms of the other’s 
logicality, rather than one’s own. In this way, point of view is isomorphic to social 
representations in the extent to which it is open or otherwise, with regards to another 
system of understanding.  
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Background 
 
In January 2006, Prof. Richard Dawkins presented a two-part documentary on 
British prime-time television (Channel 4) entitled ‘The Root of all Evil?’. In his 
documentary, Prof. Dawkins argued that the world would be better off without 
religion. In the first episode, entitled ‘The God Delusion’, Dawkins argued that 
science is opposed to the “process of non-thinking called faith”, and that it should 
replace faith in society because the latter is divisive and dangerous. In the second 
episode, entitled ‘The Virus of Faith’, Dawkins likened faith to a virus which is 
transmitted inter-generationally to children, and which may lead to a warped 
morality. Ultimately, Dawkins claimed, religious education can be considered 
abusive. 
 
Dawkins’ documentary generated considerable controversy and debate in the British 
public sphere. A lot of arguments circulated in the media from various domains, 
such as religion, the media itself, and science. Some agreed with Dawkins, some 
only partly agreed, and some radically opposed his claims. Voluminous reactions 
were posted on Channel 4’s website and various others were printed in national 
newspapers. The debate on science and religion raged on in the public sphere long 
after the documentary was aired, as individuals sought to present their ideas as 
rightful and consequential to British society.  
 
The suggestion that scientific thinking ought to displace religious belief is centuries 
old. Yet Dawkins’ documentary stirred public interest in this debate anew. One 
reason for this renewed interest was the political context in Britain at the time, in 
which context this study was undertaken. At the time, religion and its consequences 
were high on the public agenda. Dawkins’ documentary aired a mere six months 
following the 7th July bombings in London by British Islamic fundamentalist 
terrorists. Only two weeks later, on the 21st July 2005, another four failed bomb 
attacks were carried out by another terrorist cell. During the aftermath of the 
bombings, London police were involved in two shootings related to terror raids, both 
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of which turned out to be unfounded and one of which resulted in a fatality. de 
Menezes was killed by police on the 22nd July 2005 after being mistaken for a 
terrorist. Less than a year later, on the 2nd June 2006, Mohammed Abdul Kahar was 
shot by police during a raid at his home in London. The Terrorism Act, drafted in the 
aftermath of the bombings, was introduced on the 12th October 2005 and made law 
on 30th March 2006. Moreover, the Israel-Hezbollah conflict of 2006, which 
commenced on the 12th of July, provided a backdrop for the interviews undertaken 
in this study, and was referred to by participants in almost all interviews. 
Furthermore, on the 10th August 2006, flights at British airports were disrupted by a 
large-scale police operation acting to prevent terrorist attacks, allegedly planned by 
Islamic fundamentalists in Britain, that subsequently led to a worldwide ban on 
liquids brought into the cabin by airline passengers. These events provided the 
political context in which this study was undertaken and around which the points of 
view analysed in this study were developed.  
 
The political context was the central context for this study but the religious context 
of British society is equally pertinent to the findings of this research. The religious 
context in Britain has been contradictory long before these events took place. Davie 
(1994) argues that the majority of British people persists in believing in God, but 
expresses their religious sentiments by staying away from their places of worship 
rather than attending churches and conglomerating to collectively express their faith. 
On the other hand, relatively few have opted out of religion altogether. Atheists in 
Britain remain in the minority. On the other hand, the Churches remain 
disproportionately elderly, female, and Conservative. Whilst people seem to retain 
some form of personal religious belief, religious orthodoxy displays an undeniable 
degree of secularisation. Nevertheless, despite the supposedly declining church 
membership, the Churches in Britain have retained a persistently high public profile 
(Davie, 1994). 
 
The backdrop of this study is thus one of a highly contested and cosmopolitan public 
sphere, in which different perspectives and different systems of understandings co-
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exist and are brought to bear on any given issue. In this context, points of view and 
social representations intermingle as individuals seek to make sense of social events 
and position themselves meaningfully in relation to both similar and different others, 
with regard to politically charged public issues. 
 
Findings 
 
It is important to note that some respondents, whilst claiming a belief, or lack 
thereof, in religion at the start of the interview, failed to position themselves 
consistently throughout the interview and articulate a consolidated point of view. 
Two respondents in the study (Respondent 5, Respondent 8) alternated between 
different positions, and in both cases categorised themselves variably as believers 
and non-believers during the course of the interview, failing to articulate a firm 
opinion on the matters explored. One of the respondents claimed a belief in a 
religious faith (Respondent 5) at the start of the interview, whereas the other 
respondent (Respondent 8) denied such belief, however, both shifted their positions 
back and forth during the interview. This suggests that whilst people who engage in 
public debate do so on the basis of some position, the articulation of a point of view 
for some may be a work in progress. This in itself is quite a significant finding as it 
implies that in studying public opinion, one needs primarily to discover who holds 
any opinion at all. It cannot be assumed that all individuals have an opinion on all 
matters at any time. Clearly, the contemporary expectation of multisubjectivity 
(Billig, 1991; see Chapter 3) is not warranted by the findings of this study.  
 
Respondent 5 positioned herself as a non-practicing believer originally, but her 
positioning changed as different topics were discussed during the course of the 
interview. Initially, when asked about the importance of religious beliefs in today’s 
world, she replied in the affirmative with regards to faith:  
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“I’m not practicing although I believe, […], but that’s not saying that I don’t believe 
in something, I suppose that thing I got from a child is still there, spiritual thing, and 
I can call on it at times, especially when in trouble, yeah” 
(Respondent 5, believer) 
 
Later however, she claimed she can understand how people become atheists, and 
whilst she proclaims herself a believer, she questions her faith to the extent that in 
the conflict she perceives between science and religion, she is more inclined towards 
the former: 
 
“I know there’s always been conflict between the 2, if you are a believer you say 
that God created the Earth, the scientists say no, they can prove the Big Bang or 
whatever, so there’s conflict, I’m more to go with the scientist, but deep down, I 
also go back to when I was, when I was in Church talking about the Earth created in 
5 days, so there’s conflict for me […], I believe & not believe, sometimes there’s 
conflict when I think about the evidence, […], I think, I wouldn’t say I believe […] 
I’d rather go on what science finds, yeah, there’s areas of conflict there, but also, 
conflict between I suppose my upbringing, what I was taught, & now as an adult 
thinking and questioning” 
(Respondent 5, believer) 
 
Nevertheless, she claimed that there is place for both science and religion in society, 
that science can not ever displace religion, and she herself draws on her spiritual 
faith at times: 
 
“I think, there’s a place for both of them, […], you can’t live with one without the 
other, ehm, as I said you’ll never get rid of religion, there’s always people who 
believe & there’s always who’ll be challenging & looking to discredit […] Religion 
is something that is there in a spiritual form, all I know, is that it’s there, in a form, 
if I’m in trouble I’ll say ‘God help me!’, I call on something, you know, it’s always 
there” 
(Respondent 5, believer) 
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Respondent 5’s positioning shifts between believer and non-believer throughout the 
interview. Similarly, her views on the value and merits of religion alternate between 
appreciating religious faith and opposing it during the same interview. Whilst she 
claimed that religion may be damaging to children as it can result in children 
missing out on their childhood, and whilst she further claimed that religion can be 
damaging to children as they are growing up, by pulling them to the faith when they 
encounter other people, she also claimed that religious education has a place in the 
transmission of values and that evil is attributable to the use of religion when it is 
used to justify wrongdoing. 
 
Similarly, Respondent 8, who claimed to be non-religious at the start of the 
interview, argued for religious diversity and religious education. He expressed a 
fascination with religions and an appreciation of religious faiths and what these can 
do for human beings. Respondent 8 claimed morality exists independently from 
religion or science, and that religion is often wrongfully invoked in assigning blame: 
 
“religion is often looked at as a means of scapegoating, and blame can be, sort of, 
put upon religion, […] religion is blown out of proportion, really” 
(Respondent 8, non-believer) 
 
However, people are quick to jump to conclusions and faith is: 
 
“massively more complex than most people think” 
(Respondent 8, non-believer) 
 
Respondent 8 claimed that evil is at times seemingly related to religion, but that to 
understand the meanings of certain acts, a cultural appreciation is required as 
people’s ideas of religion are very different. However, when asked about the value 
of religious education, he claimed that religion can lead to a pseudo-morality and 
that religious education is useful insofar as it is a way to teach cultural heritage. In 
terms of beliefs themselves, Respondent 8 claimed that religious belief should be a 
matter of personal choice: 
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“Religion should be something that, you should be, it’s like a convenience stores, a 
corner shop, you can have everything on a shelf and you should be able to read the 
back of the packet and go ok, ooh, oh, I like the idea, oh this is the ingredients that 
goes into this religion, ok, put it back and have a look at another one, oh ok, ehm, 
the taste, yeah it smells quite good, or this one is quite right, I don’t know, you can 
have that choice.  You should, but why not, why can’t you” 
(Respondent 8, non-believer) 
 
Respondent 8’s position was that he was himself atheist, fascinated by religion, who 
was in no position to have a specific point of view on the topic: 
 
“I would say I’m an atheist but I like the idea of this tradition of meeting and 
greeting, ehm, generally, it’s quite a beautiful thing isn’t it, if you see a wedding, in 
Japan, or something like that, it’s, it’s nice […] I’ve never read the Bible all the way 
through, how could I possibly have a correct, not necessarily a correct but, a 
different point of view, an opinion, or something, that I hardly understand” 
(Respondent 8, non-believer) 
 
Other respondents however, presented their convictions in well-articulated points of 
view, as detailed hereunder. Some of these points of view were held as clear 
convictions and were relatively closed to alternative points of view that others may 
hold. Other points of view appreciated the right to have a different opinion, but this 
appreciation was restricted. Other perspectives could be recognised as long as 
certain fundamental precepts were adhered to. Finally, another point of view was 
open to a different way of seeing things. This point of view expressed an 
appreciation of alternative perspectives according to their own system of rationality. 
 
Monological points of view 
 
Three respondents presented a point of view that was closed to alternative 
perspectives. These points of view are termed monological, as they held their 
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rationality as the only logical and rightful version. These respondents failed to grant 
any legitimacy to alternative points of view, and dismissed alternative perspectives 
as wrong or bad. 
 
Respondent 3 claimed a belief in God and that children should be taught religious 
education because it helps them become good people. She claimed that she accepts a 
diversity of beliefs and that she thought everyone should believe in something. In 
discussing good and bad and the role of religious faith, she positioned herself as a 
believer of the right faith, that betters people. Others however, may be led to evil by 
wrong faiths: 
 
“I think depending on the religious beliefs that you hold it could make you evil, let 
me put it that way” 
(Respondent 3, believer) 
 
According to Respondent 3, religion can lead to a warped morality “only if it hasn’t 
been explained properly” (Respondent 3), and that those who use religion but 
commit evil acts do so on the basis of  “wrong explanations or interpretations” 
(Respondent 3). When asked her views on people who believe different things from 
her, she held that if people were doing evil acts [by her standards], then they adhered 
to a wrong faith. If they believed the right things, they wouldn’t be doing evil: 
 
“I: What are your views on other people who believe different things from you? 
R: Ehm, I think maybe they’ve been taught wrongly, they have been taught the 
wrong things. Some of the ideas are evil. I don’t think it’s everything that is in 
religion is evil, but I think some of the beliefs are evil. If they are evil how can they 
have faith in God? 
I: So you don’t think that some people who believe in God are still evil? 
R: I think so yeah, I mean, people who are evil do not believe the same thing as the 
people who are good, it’s not the same faith they have, they believe in something 
else, they may believe in it & think they are doing the right thing but they are not 
doing the right thing in society 
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I: So in other words, if you have a good faith, that makes you a better person 
R: Of course 
(Respondent 3, believer) 
 
Respondent 3’s perspective on science was similarly closed to the consideration of 
an alternative perspective. She claimed that science and religion are two different 
things entirely, and that one cannot replace the other because science cannot give 
what religion can give. Moreover, science has no jurisdiction over religious affairs: 
 
 “I: What do you think is the relationship between science and religion? 
R: Scientists try to have explanations for everything and they try to create human 
beings, they don’t believe in God, they don’t believe in religion, and they try to 
create but they haven’t succeeded, but with technology these days, but no, I don’t 
think so, they cannot create the human being 
I: Do you think that science should replace religion? 
R: No, they are two separate things, everything a religion gives me science cannot 
give, I don’t think, it’s two different things, to me 
I: So how are they different? 
R: Well, I mean, scientists they do the aeroplanes, do things, but that’s not God, 
protecting me, looking after me while I’m sleeping, looking after my children. 
Religion gives me someone to look over my shoulder, I mean, that’s my religion, to 
me they’re two different things, and it’s God who gave scientists their brains 
anyway, so it can’t replace it, but that’s my view 
I: Do you think that science should investigate religion? 
R: What part of religion can science investigate? No, I don’t think so, apart from 
creating the world and all that, then maybe scientists can work out how it’s done but 
apart from that, I don’t think, they can’t do any spiritual healing and all those things 
that come with religion that we believe in 
I: Do you think they should try to look at things like spiritual healing? 
R: No, I don’t think so 
(Respondent 3, believer) 
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Respondent 9 denied belief in a religious faith and positioned herself as an agnostic 
in relation to people who believe in an organised faith. According to her, 
agnosticism was the rational position: 
 
“Ehm, because of the uncertainties, I don’t know if I describe myself as an atheist, 
but I’m an agnostic, that’s what I’d see myself as, because I, I know that there’s got 
to be a greater being to have created all of this, I know that much, but I can’t say 
exactly, whether that is Allah, or whether that is, you see, I don’t know, that’s were 
I’m at. That’s what I believe is a rational alternative.” 
(Respondent 9, non-believer) 
 
She thought that science should replace religion: 
 
“I do think that science should replace religion, we need to be going on what’s 
actually there, what’s to be able to make sense or what’s actually happening” 
(Respondent 9, non-believer) 
 
With regards to issues of morality, whilst science cannot answer what’s right or 
wrong, people should look more critically at what’s being affirmed by religious 
believers. Moreover, science needs to investigate religious matters to shed some 
light on certain beliefs, as there is a lot of contradictory information around. Whilst 
she claimed that religion has something to do with morality and learning right from 
wrong, growing up in a religious faith is no prerequisite for good morals. On the 
other hand, faith can lead to intolerance and violence, as the example of the Middle 
East makes clear. According to Respondent 9, this was an example of two sides 
warring in the name of good and for this reason teaching religion fosters a “distorted 
attitude of people before you actually know people” (Respondent 9). According to 
Respondent 9, religion: 
 
“can affect the way that you, that people perceive you, or how they view other 
people if you’re not like them” 
(Respondent 9, non-believer) 
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Respondent 7 similarly claimed to be a non-believer, and positioned himself as an 
atheist during the interview, against religious believers. When asked what beliefs are 
important to foster in children today he replied: 
 
“well Santa Claus maybe, I mean there’s always, I mean children are thinking till 
when they are 7 or 8, they are thinking magical still so I think some beliefs are nice 
like Santa Claus, or little monsters, I guess it’s part of their upbringing I guess, but 
personally I don’t think religious things should be taught to children anymore” 
(Respondent 7, non-believer) 
 
According to Respondent 7, the more we study the world, the more humanity can rid 
itself of religious belief, to the extent that in our age religious faiths are 
entertainment rather than something to be taken seriously. Religious beliefs are 
important to people, but this is because these people are weak and they need some 
precious comfort from an imaginary world. Also, for some people it has become a 
cultural habit, something that they do because of who they are rather than because of 
what they sincerely believe. In any case, religion is something else than facts. Facts 
are the province of science, and whilst science is in no battle with religion, as, 
according to Respondent 7, scientists would lower themselves if they devoted their 
studies to religious matters, nevertheless, facts are replacing religious beliefs with 
time. The only reason science will not replace religious belief is that it is too hard for 
humankind to deal with our harsh reality, so we still entertain supernatural beliefs. 
For this reason, “there has to be a little Peter Pan in everybody” (Respondent 7). 
 
In all these instances, whilst the positions adopted by the three respondents are 
different (believer, agnostic, atheist), their points of view similarly denigrate those 
against whom they have positioned themselves. All three points of view present a 
stereotypical view of the other’s perspectives that is wrong and against whom they 
stand in opposition. 
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Dialogical points of view  
 
Four respondents held a different type of point of view. These respondents 
acknowledged diversity and found it enriching. They held that it is fair to hold 
different perspectives and that these do not have to conflict as people can live 
together harmoniously. However, this can only happen insofar as some fundamental 
precepts (the ones they themselves espoused) are adhered to. These points of view 
are termed dialogical. They are open to dialogue with another point of view, but this 
dialogue is bounded by the logic of their own perspective.  
 
Respondent 1 positioned herself as a non-believer, as someone who had lost her 
faith, in relation to people who believe in a supernatural faith. Moreover, she thought 
that religion has been a cause for a lot of conflicts, and that as far as she’s concerned 
it should be banned from schools and replaced by a scientific atheism as religion has 
done nothing but mess with people’s heads. Insofar as morality is concerned, 
Respondent 1 held that good and evil transcend religion, and they are utilised by 
religions to advance their own agendas. This in itself makes organised religious 
movements bad. However, for the individual, their faith might be important: 
 
“it’s their god, so how do you describe that my god is not a good god. My god could 
be a fairy, […] the Buddhists, they, you know, a god, they call it a different name, 
but it’s a god. The Muslims worship Allah, and it’s their god. So that is how they 
feel comfort, you know, in paying respect to him. As anybody, perhaps in, the USA, 
worshipping what they see as god, you know, so who are they to judge me, that my 
god is not a good god or a lesser being, because my god is not the same as their god, 
[…] even if it is a stone, and, you know, that’s my god, I get comfort, peace, and it’s 
a big stone, or a rock, or whatever, you know, who is the other person to say to me 
that I’m crazy, I’m foolish, because I’m worshipping a stone” 
(Respondent 1, non-believer) 
 
What is important, according to Respondent 1, is that people are treated as with 
respect. According to her: 
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“religion is like politics, you know, not because I belong to the Conservative party 
that I am evil, foolish person” 
(Respondent 1, non-believer) 
 
Everyone should be treated as equals, with justice and with respect, whatever their 
colour, political orientation, or creed. Similarly, Respondent 4 claimed that respect is 
the core value that must be fostered in children today. Whilst she claimed a 
conviction in the Catholic faith, she argued that: 
 
“now for you in your religion your God might be Allah, but it’s just, that’s the name 
my God has, your God might have a different name, ehm, but because a different 
culture believes in a different God, I’m not going to say I’m better or worse than 
you, that is your belief, as long as your belief isn’t injuring, isn’t harmful, ehm, I’m 
not going to say I’m better or worse than you, that’s your belief and as long you are 
a good person, and do your best, you know, you can only ever do, the best that you 
can, I’m not gonna denigrate, anybody for believing in Thor and Odin, and Valhalla, 
that’s their belief or Ra or Aphrodite, that’s their strong belief has been made for 
centuries and millennia, I’m, you know, who am I, I don’t, again its about respect, I 
respect the fact that that’s my religion, I respect the fact you have a different 
religion, and once people have respect, you know” 
(Respondent 4, believer) 
 
She explained how respect is at the apex of every religion that seeks to better the 
human spirit, and for this reason diverse beliefs are not problematic: 
  
“I’m not gonna say that believing in Thor or Odin or Loki, is wrong, no, I don’t 
believe that, I think they are reconcilable, because at the apex of any religion there 
is always an omnipotent being, and coming down from that omnipotent being there 
are, what we call helpers, just use that word helpers, God had Jesus, you know, to 
sort of, make us feel a bit closer to him, then you have your angels, and you have 
the hierarchy of angels, they’re all helpers, the same with Odin, then you have his 
sons Thor, then you have Loki, so it’s all about how the human spirit gets to better 
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itself, and if you can better yourself and you can be respectful and share that respect, 
I don’t believe it matters really which religion you’re doing that in, it just happens, I 
was born into a Catholic family therefore the religion I was given was Catholic, and 
I, if it had been another one may be the same thing, but I was thought respect, so I 
will always respect, other people who have other faiths and yes they are reconcilable 
and I think it’s when men start to look at material things, that’s when the religious 
part takes on a very dark spin, ehm, because people then start to use their religion, 
no religion says it’s right to kill anybody” 
(Respondent 4, believer) 
 
Nevertheless, Respondent 4 subtly disapproved of other faiths where equal respect 
was not forthcoming from her perspective: 
 
“I don’t like using religions I don’t believe in, but I could pick bits out and say, 
that’s not very, that’s not gonna help the women in your society, or that’s not gonna 
help the children, that’s gonna keep some people down” 
(Respondent 4, believer) 
 
According to Respondent 4, such faults do not pertain to her own creed: 
 
“I know there are some faiths that don’t believe that, but I know in the Catholic 
faith, nobody was, ehm, looked on any worse if they didn’t believe” 
(Respondent 4, believer) 
 
Respondent 10 positioned himself similar to Respondent 4, that is, as a believer in 
relation to believers of different faiths, and he claimed a similar conviction: 
 
 “I think the Christian religion is the most thought through religion in the world” 
 (Respondent 10, believer) 
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However, like Respondent 1 and Respondent 4, Respondent 10 similarly claimed 
that religious pluralism in itself is not a problem, and that religious faith should be a 
matter of personal choice: 
 
“Yeah, if you say to someone this is the religion that you have to learn eh, and this 
is going to be your religion till the end of your life, it’s not correct yeah, as we were 
taught when we were young yeah, we were taught that Christianity is the right 
religion for us, but then when you start growing up you start to realise that there are 
other religions, like the Buddhas, the Muslims and everything, everyone thinks that 
his religion is the right one, everyone says yeah, well, there is nothing that is written 
that says Christian is number 1, Muslim is number 2, bla bla bla, so, in a way, if 
religion is taught in a certain way to say well, this is the religion that we know 
about, you have to have faith in God, you have to believe in such things, but then, 
it’s up to you if you want to do such things” 
(Respondent 10, believer) 
 
Respondent 10 further argued that whilst he would like his children to learn about 
his own convictions, he will leave their faith up to them and he will respect their 
choice: 
 
“I was taught religion and as I said before, I want my children to learn about 
religion, to know everything about religion, but I’m not gonna say to my children 
this is the right religion, and you have to do this, and this and this, you know, if they 
don’t believe you know, I’ll let them know about religion, and what I used to 
believe in, then it’s up to them, to make their choice, to have their choice, to say 
well, you know, I believe in this, this, and this God” 
(Respondent 10, believer) 
 
Respondent 10 claimed that it is dogmatic religious teaching that is wrong because it 
can affect us the wrong way: 
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“R: […] you know sometimes, just, we put so much pressure about religion onto 
kids, that sometimes they start realising, do I have to do this, if I do this what 
happens then, and if I do this instead of this, what does that mean yeah, because, 
you know, when you have children and you’re teaching them, you cannot swear, 
you cannot do this, you cannot do this, they do it, so, when we are teaching our 
religion, especially the Christian religion, Christianity. 
I: So you think when religion is taught in a dogmatic way? 
R: It can be, it can affect us in the wrong way 
(Respondent 10, believer) 
 
Similarly, Respondent 2, who positioned herself as a believer, disapproved of 
dogmatic religious convictions in relation to practicing believers: 
 
“in some ways I suppose faith would make you better, in some instances, but not in 
others, because sometimes with people who can be so much into faith, going to 
Church everyday and they like pray every day, they have a tendency to stereotype 
other people, they see them as, if you don’t go to Church that means you’re not a 
good person, you know […] I’m not gonna sit here and preach to you about God 
and you should be doing that or God will be upset with you because you didn’t do 
that, but people will see it as, […], that means you’re not a Christian, because you 
don’t spend time talking about God, so, that tendency for people who have too much 
faith, to stereotype other people that don’t have faith, so in a way, it could make 
those other people that don’t go to Church, they’re being blamed for not doing 
something, which, they shouldn’t be blamed for it, because you can never know 
what’s inside a person’s heart until you actually, only God can know, whether that 
person believes in Him or not, you can preach it and say, I believe, I believe, but 
your heart might say something completely different” 
(Respondent 2, believer) 
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In positioning herself as a believer in relation to scientists, whom she regarded as 
atheists, Respondent 2 argued that it is very well for science to concern itself with 
investigating religious claims. She granted that religious belief raises certain 
questions, and for this reason she is sympathetic with those who question religion 
and put religious doctrine under scientific scrutiny. She held that if people believe in 
science, then they have equal rights to further their individual conviction. Moreover, 
that might mean that in future we might be living according to facts not to faith:  
 
“It should, it should, I don’t see why not, because we can’t all be the same, we can’t 
all believe in God, and there will always be people who are different from us, it 
should, ehm, because who knows maybe in the future we’ll be living according to 
facts not according to faith, so if that’s what science views as the best way forward 
for themselves, they need to do that, I don’t see why not, it’s just about, it’s an 
individual choice” 
(Respondent 2, believer) 
  
Respondent 2 claimed that she thought science should not replace religious belief, 
although it probably would the way things are going. She personally held that 
believing in science is believing in something that can break, but that believing in 
science is easier than believing in religion as science provides tangible evidence. She 
could therefore understand how atheism could seem as the rational alternative to 
certain people. Nevertheless, she held that: 
 
“if you believe in God you will continue to believe in God whether or not what has 
been proven by scientists is right or wrong” 
(Respondent 2, believer) 
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She claimed that science cannot ever grasp the personal meaning of religion: 
 
“it’s that feeling you have inside of you, you can’t go out there and say, I’ve seen 
that and that’s God. And how do you prove that, if you can’t see it […] you can’t go 
inside somebody’s heart and pop inside thinking that you will understand how 
they’re feeling, you can’t, you know, you can do as much research as you want to 
do about it but you can never see it, or touch it […] how do I believe in religion 
when I don’t know where it started, is it, you have to believe something that you can 
see and touch and sometimes you just think, if I believe in this thing, I don’t know 
what it is about, chances are, well, I’m never gonna meet God, you’re not gonna 
meet angels or whatever, but you continue to believe in it, if that’s something to 
believe in” 
(Respondent 2, believer) 
 
The points of view articulated by these four respondents are similar in as much as 
they all accept the fact that other people who hold different points of view have an 
equal right to their views as much as they. Whether their own points of view are of 
believers in relation to non-believers, or believers in relation to atheists or scientists, 
or non-believers in relation to believers, they all grant others a personal right to 
individual choice and equal recognition in society. These points of view are 
dialogical inasmuch as they are open to interrelation with other perspectives. 
However, their openness is bounded. They are restricted by the requirement that 
points of view must adhere to criteria for reciprocal recognition. The fundamental 
criteria for equal recognition must be adhered by all. Everyone has a right to their 
opinion as long as they respect everyone else’s. Respect and recognition for the right 
of alternative perspectives to exist overrules any claims to verity. Other points of 
view can only be legitimated insofar as they conform to the principle of equal 
recognition. What these points of view do, in granting other perspectives a right to 
exist, is they apportion for themselves that very same right and as a result retain their 
relative verity in the face of counter-perspectives. Consequently, the possibility of 
the other’s points of view being right and of one’s point of view being wrong need 
not be entertained. Believers will continue to believe, but they will let others not 
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believe if they so desire. Non-believers will not believe, but they will allow others to 
believe in whatever it is they want to believe, for whatever reason. In both cases, the 
freedom for others to be wrong holds insofar as it does not restrict one’s right to be 
right. 
 
Metalogical Points of View 
 
In marked contrast to the two points of view above, one respondent, who declared 
himself a non-believer, articulated a point of view that was manifestly different from 
any other in the study. This point of view doubted the certainty of its own position 
relative to other perspectives, and granted that others may actually be right, although 
the respondent believed it not to be so. Nevertheless, this basic doubt in relation to 
his own position enabled him to question his own belief system and entertain the 
possibility of error in his own beliefs that required examination of ‘eco-logical’ 
proof (Gigerenzer, 2002). This third category of points of view can be described as 
metalogical. Bateson (1972/2000) defines a metalogue as a conversation that not 
only discusses the problem, but also attends to the structure of the conversation as a 
whole. In mathematical and computational logic, metalogical frameworks are those 
that represent other logics and are able to reason about their metalogical properties 
(Basin et al., 2004). A point of view that questions its own veracity, considers the 
possibility of error of one’s own belief system, and entertains the logicality of 
another belief system, can thus be deemed to demonstrate metalogical properties. 
This respondent positioned himself as a non-believer, but considered religious 
beliefs important. Furthermore, he considered that it is important to learn not just 
what other people believe, that is the contents of faith, but more importantly why 
they believe what they believe, that is the rationale that justifies the content of the 
belief: 
 
“They’re important because a lot of people have religious beliefs and therefore it’s 
important to understand them, ehm, and it’s important for individuals and therefore 
it should be important to some extent, for everybody to understand what everyone 
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else is thinking, or, not what they’re thinking but, you know, some comprehensions 
of what they believe and why they believe it, it’s very important to help you 
understand other people around you, ehm, yeah” 
(respondent 6, non-believer) 
 
He maintained that what is good to one person may be bad to another, depending on 
underlying belief systems, and crucially, the meaning of good and bad depends on 
what point of view an individual adopts: 
 
“if somebody, thought what they’re doing is right then they’re gonna believe it’s 
right whatever its in the eyes of the majority or other people that think it’s wrong 
and evil as it says, ehm and therefore yeah religion can certainly play a good big 
part in that bit, but things which aren’t religion as well. As far as I am concerned, 
killing people is wrong but people join the army in this country or any other army, 
and will go out and they will do things that are incredibly wrong, and they think 
they’re doing good and they might never think otherwise, and it might never get 
questioned but in actual facts, if a soldier from this country is blowing up a house 
with children in it, well I think that’s evil, that’s pretty evil, […], I think evil is 
incredibly difficult to define that or what’s bad and what’s good cause it is always in 
the eyes of the perception, ehm” 
(respondent 6, non-believer) 
 
 Asked whether he thinks there is such a thing as objective good and bad, he replied 
that there is a clear pattern for him but that this might not translate to other people’s 
situations: 
 
“There is in my head but that does not cross over to other people, so I have to accept 
that, though I think that my way, my belief system works, what’s right and wrong, 
there’s a clear pattern. I don’t necessarily follow it, but there is a clear pattern of 
what’s right and wrong, without being involved too much, I think, but, not for other 
people, obviously cause they have different views as what’s right and wrong” 
(respondent 6, non-believer) 
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This relative rationality applied to himself as much as it did to others. According to 
Respondent 6, his own anti-religious stance was sensible only from his own point of 
view: 
 “I see religion as causing completely wrong priorities from my point of view” 
 (respondent 6, non-believer) 
 
He also acknowledges that whilst he is not a believer and has never been a Christian, 
his own morality is very similar to Christianity as a result of his socialisation and the 
influence Christianity has had on his own society. He maintains that a religious 
upbringing might have a negative impact on children, but crucially, he goes on to 
make the following claim: 
 
“R: But, I could be wrong, one of these religions could be right and therefore if I 
brought up children without religion, or without the true one, then I would be doing 
them a disservice, it’s not what I believe but it could be the case” 
(respondent 6, non-believer) 
 
This point of view presents an opinion that whilst claiming a veridical subjective 
reality, is permeated by self-doubt, and excludes neither the legitimacy of alternative 
opinions, nor, more crucially, their underlying logicality. The certainty of knowledge 
is doubted, and the point of view is open to alternative truths. It extends others, not 
simply the right to be wrong, but also the right to be right. As Marková (2003b) 
argues, knowledge, certainty and truth all go together as knowledge must have a 
degree of certainty otherwise it would not be knowledge. The metalogical point of 
view embodies the idea of relative certainty, in contrast to absolute certainty (Latour, 
1999).  Latour demonstrated how this same principle of doubt is at work in Pasteur’s 
yeast studies. Pasteur’s point of view is also a metalogical point of view in that it 
considers the possibility of being wrong, and leaves itself open to the possibility of 
refutation according to some other reasoning. This method of Cartesian doubt has 
become the hallmark of the knowledge ‘fabricated15’ by modern science 
                                                
15 In the Latourian sense refers to the cumulative production of knowledge. See Latour (1999). 
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(Jovchelovitch, 2007). Transposed to a point of view, this method of self-doubt is 
what characterises a metalogical position.  
 
The metalogical point of view is an agnostic point of view (Latour, 1999). It doubts 
not the content of belief, but as Latour postulates, it doubts the doubting of beliefs. A 
metalogical point of view considers any point of view to be a product of the situation 
and circumstances, and as such, considers that itself has no power to correct any 
belief if that belief is reasonable given the conditions of its production. This is the 
position assumed by Respondent 6 in relation to others who espouse a belief. It does 
not question the veracity of a belief, but questions the belief that others simply 
believe (i.e. naïve content). The metalogical point of view considers knowledge as a 
matter of fact, which contexts make a matter of course16. Knowledge that acquires 
the status of ‘of course knowledge’ is what a community holds as common-sense. At 
that point, the veracity of the original fact need no longer be questioned, it can be 
taken for granted. What is crucial about this process is that the metalogical point of 
view comes with an awareness that one’s point of view is as fabricated as any other, 
and conversely. In this way, it is therefore in a position to consider alternative 
viewpoints at par, even those based on a different frame of reference. A metalogical 
point of view, in its agnosticism, is the only perspective that has the potential to 
bridge the chasm between divergent points of view based on differently fabricated 
social realities.  
 
Discussion 
 
The degree of openness to alternatives is an underlying factor in the point of view 
typology identified in this study. This is similar to Krech’s (1949) findings that 
systems vary in their propensity to relate to other systems, as well as to Rokeach’s 
three-fold distinction in the cognitive organisation of narrow-mindedness (see 
Chapter 3). This basis for categorisation is, moreover, isomorphic to the 
                                                
16 Given a particular context, one is able to see how a particular fabricated version of reality is 
established as a fact, and how in relation to this fabrication it is wholly reasonable that this point of 
view is able to arise in due course.	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categorisation of social representations, communication patterns, and behavioural 
orientations (Table 8). Moscovici (1988) distinguishes between three types of 
representations: hegemonic representations, those shared by all members of a highly 
structured group; emancipated representations, characteristic of subgroups who in 
close contact with others create their own version of reality; and polemical 
representations, those created in circumstances of controversy and not shared by all. 
These are in themselves isomorphic to the distinctions made by Moscovici 
(1961/1976) with regard to communication styles for different social groups, namely 
propaganda, propagation, and diffusion (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999).  
 
The degree of openness is by definition low in hegemonic representations, and 
similarly in monological points of view. Propaganda promotes one strict version of 
reality, perpetuated by stereotypes. On the other hand, emancipated representations 
consider divergent positions to an extent. Engagement with divergent positions is 
limited in propagation, and aimed at shaping attitudes. Similarly, the dialogical point 
of view engages with another perspective only insofar as some basic premises are 
met. Metalogical points of view, however, are open not only to other perspectives 
but also to their methods of validation. Alternatives are considered as legitimate 
opinions. Communication aims at providing information. The representational field 
is polemical as divergent perspectives are allowed to take a standpoint.  
 
 
 Representations Communication  Point of view 
Closed Hegemonic Propaganda Monological 
Bounded Emancipated Propagation Dialogical 
Open Polemical Diffusion Metalogical 
Table 8: Isomorphic categorisations 
 
 
Since the mid-20th century, the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954) has provided the 
primary strategy for analysing intergroup contact (Dovidio et al., 2005). The contact 
hypothesis, in its simplest form, proposes that bringing together individuals from 
different groups under optimal conditions reduces prejudice and improves intergroup 
relations (Hewstone et al., 2005). Allport (1954) outlines four prerequisite 
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conditions for positive contact: equal status between groups, cooperative interaction, 
opportunities for intergroup acquaintance, and supportive institutional norms 
(Dovidio et al. 2005). Under these conditions, intergroup contact improves tolerance, 
and reduces prejudice and conflict. The contact hypothesis has gathered meta-
analytic support (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000). More significantly, Hewstone and his 
colleagues (Hewstone et al., 2005) found evidence for perspective taking as a 
mediator of contact. Their findings suggest that contact is associated with a greater 
willingness to take the other community’s perspective on the conflict and that this 
makes a unique contribution in the prediction of prejudice, trust, and forgiveness. 
Differences in perspective are significant in shaping perceptions of contact and 
reactions to it (Islam & Hewstone, 1993; Dovidio, et al., 2005). On a practical level, 
these may mitigate interventions and lead to failure in bringing about long-lasting 
societal changes (Hewstone, 1996).  
 
The preconditions set out in the contact hypothesis appeal to the open system. 
According to the hypothesis, positive contact outcomes are achieved in conditions of 
equal status, cooperation, acquaintance, and supportive institutional norms. These 
conditions are an instance of intercultural relations characterised by open dynamics. 
Where open systems allow perspective taking and thereby positive intergroup 
outcomes, bounded systems limit perspective taking and lead to instances of 
problematic relations. Closed systems prohibit perspective taking and are 
characterised by conflictual relations. For contact to produce positive outcomes, 
systems need to move from closed or bounded to open.  
 
One could further extend the above table to include different forms of intercultural 
relations, arguing that isomorphic processes underlie intercultural relations. Whilst 
the contact hypothesis specifies but one instance of intercultural relations, in this 
meta-perspective it can be applied to the problem of acculturation. A closed system 
will lead to coercive relations, where a particular worldview is imposed on others. 
This is typified in a monological point of view that does not grant alternative points 
of view the right to exist. The political movements of nazism, fascism, and 
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communism have borne all the characteristics of a closed system. A bounded system 
leads to efforts at influence. Small concessions may be made in the realisation that 
something may also be gained from dialogue, but the substance of one’s perspective 
is retained and efforts to influence the other to adopt it characterise relations. This is 
typified in a dialogical point of view where the right to hold a different point of view 
is granted, but the possibility of the other point of view to be right is not entertained. 
The other point of view is extended the right to be wrong. One could argue that the 
export of democracy by Western powers worldwide is such an instance. It assumes 
unquestioningly that democracy is the best form of government for one and all, and 
justifies efforts to influence other nations, implicitly and explicitly, to adopt such a 
political system. Lastly, an open system leads to symmetrical discussion and genuine 
perspective taking. It is the social system that leads to positive contact outcomes by 
fulfilling the preconditions of the contact hypothesis. The various parties involved in 
intercultural relations are open to each other’s perspectives and each other’s reality. 
Interaction is not guided by any effort to prevail, but simply by an effort to 
understand the other and by striving to find a pragmatic solution for some common 
problem. This is typified in a metalogical point of view that not only legitimates 
another point of view’s right to exist and to be wrong, it also grants it the right to be 
right.  
 
The extension of the categorisation model to intercultural relations suggests that the 
reason why dialogue in intercultural relations often fails is that parties retain the 
right to attempt to influence each other, either in an effort to achieve recognition in 
the case of a minority, or in an effort to achieve solidarity in the case of a majority. 
This violates the condition of equal status between groups prescribed by the contact 
hypothesis. Attempts at influence may preclude the possibility to engage in mutually 
open discussion. If dialogue is to be truly open, influence must be cast aside and 
replaced by a reflexivity of the fabrication of perspectives that characterises a 
metalogical point of view. Mutual and reciprocal agnosticism, grounded in relative 
certainty, is the hallmark of true dialogue.  
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Conclusion 
 
Understanding the relation between the individual and the social requires the 
understanding of points of view (Liu & László, 2007). In this concept, social 
psychology can move to an analysis of the openness, and thereby compatibility and 
reconciliatory potential, of different points of view based on different backgrounds 
of intelligibility. In different cultural contexts, different worldviews are fabricated 
that serve individuals with knowledge that provides certainty, assumed as objective 
reality (Moghaddam, 2003).  
 
This study has demonstrated that individuals can express similar attitudes that are 
however based on different points of view. Individuals with different points of view 
were similarly inclined towards religion or science in the present study. Moreover, 
similar points of view towards religion or science were at times based on different 
social representations of religion or science. Individuals could, for example, agree 
that religion ought to be replaced by science, but they could provide different 
rationales for this. On the other hand, this study also demonstrated how similar 
social representations could nevertheless lead to individuals holding different points 
of view in relation to the same object. Individuals originating from similar social 
groups and espousing the same worldview could nevertheless themselves be either 
atheists or believers. These findings legitimate the claim that the point of view is in 
itself a distinct analytical construct than either attitudes or social representations.  
 
This study further revealed that points of view can be typified according to the 
extent to which they concede another perspective the possibility of being right in 
terms of their own system of logicality. Kruglanski (1989) draws attention to the 
characteristic of logicality in his theory of lay epistemics. In this vein, a point of 
view can be monological, where it is closed to another point of view altogether. 
Points of view can be dialogical, where they are open to the existence of another 
point of view but where they do not entertain the possibility of the other point of 
view being right. Finally, a point of view can be metalogical, where it is open not 
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only to the possibility of other people having a different point of view, but 
additionally the point of view is open to the other point of view’s rationale. A 
metalogical point of view therefore entertains the possibility for one’s own point of 
view to be wrong, and for it to stand to be corrected by an alternative point of view. 
It is in this case that the requirements for the interpenetration of views, outlined by 
Asch (1952/1987), can be fulfilled, even in conditions where this interpenetration of 
views is required to bridge the chasm between distinct worldviews. In this condition, 
another’s point of view can still serve as auxiliary to one’s own, even though it 
might be legitimated by an incommensurable logic. In such circumstances, humans 
can face their objective reality with joint purpose.  
 
The chasm which intercultural contact is required to bridge is that between different 
objective realities. Understanding the other requires an ability to comprehend 
objectifications of the world that are different from one’s own (Moghaddam, 2003). 
Adopting an open point of view of reciprocal agnosticism and relative certainty is a 
requirement for bridging this divide. On the face of it, to the parties concerned in 
dialogue, this position may appear as illogical cross-fertilisation. The other’s 
position, based on a different frame of reference, appears objectively false, 
unreasonable, and blatantly illogical. If this position is maintained however, the only 
reasonable outcomes possible remain influence, or in a worst-case scenario, conflict, 
as Benhabib (2002) rightly claims. The only way forward is to relinquish absolute 
certainty and adopt a metalogical position that is open to understand the other on the 
other’s terms, in the context of the other’s own objective reality. The great 
significance of a metalogical position is that it opens the path to interobjectivity 
(Moghaddam, 2003).  
 
The negotiation of points of view with a different frame of reference is the topic of 
the second empirical study in this inquiry. The case study of Maltese migrants to the 
United Kingdom provides an opportunity for analysing how individuals negotiate 
points of view acquired in their country of origin in a different society where a 
different frame of reference operates. Such dynamics of the public sphere are 
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different in their nature from the cosmopolitan one that characterised this study, in 
which different perspectives encountered each other based on different worldviews. 
In the conditions adopted for the next study, however, an alien point of view remains 
illegitimate inasmuch as the social representations that legitimate it originally have 
no currency in a foreign public sphere in which there is no native community 
representing one’s native worldview. Different perspectives, in this case, are not 
instances of disagreements based on a similar frame of reference.  
 
The following case thus presents a singular opportunity to study points of view as 
they encounter other points of view based on a different background of 
intelligibility. Such characteristics of the public sphere are requisite for the study of 
interpersonal characteristics of points of view that are not present in either 
cosmopolitan publics (as in Study 1) or hegemonic ones (as in Study 3), in both of 
which the underlying worldview has legitimacy. In such cases, the study of points of 
view in relation is confounded by that of social representations in relation. The 
following study, however, aims to shed light on the interpersonal outcomes of 
holding certain points of view. The negotiation of points of view is a requirement for 
these immigrants if their perspectives are to be sensible and meaningful in their new 
conditions, in the absence of a community that validates their original common-
sense. The interpersonal effects and outcomes of such negotiation are the topic of the 
next study. 
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 Introduction 
 
The Maltese community in Britain, particularly in London, has been the subject of a 
detailed investigation by Dench (1975). Dench has documented the erosion of ethnic 
consciousness in the Maltese community and its eventual demise in Britain. His 
motive for studying the Maltese community in Britain was that, in his words: “The 
Maltese community in Britain has a number of peculiarities which make its 
problems rather different from those of most minorities. Because of these odd 
features it may seem that their case holds little of general interest. But in fact just 
because it is unusual, this case-study is able to show up certain aspects of the 
minority situation in a particularly conspicuous form, and helps to highlight the 
existence of forces […] whose operation is in ordinary circumstances overlooked. 
Hence it is in fact a most instructive case, and by virtue of its very singularity raises 
important questions […] which might otherwise be more difficult to formulate” 
(1975, p. 7-8). 
 
The same conditions that made the study of the Maltese community in Britain 
pertinent to Dench’s investigation remain today, and for similar reasons are 
considered also pertinent to the present study. The Maltese community remains 
fragmented, to the extent that it is difficult to talk about its very existence. In these 
conditions, Maltese migrants to Britain are required to negotiate their migration and 
settlement on their own account. Upon migration, they are unable to draw on 
community resources and their lifestyle of origin to negotiate the challenges of a 
new social reality. The resources they are required to draw on are their own 
individual resources; they do not have access to community social capital (Bourdieu, 
1986; Putnam, 1995). In these conditions, any conflicting perspectives that they may 
hold in relation to their settlement communities require negotiation on the basis of a 
different background of intelligibility than the one that informs their own. Maltese 
social representations do not have currency in Britain in the absence of a Maltese 
community, and any points of view that are informed by these social representations 
are more or less discrepant with British mentality. The resolution of this discrepancy 
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requires the negotiation of points of view according to an alternative form of 
understanding, that is, British mentality.  
 
Different types of point of view are more or less open to different mentalities, as the 
previous study has documented (see Chapter 5). An encounter with a different 
mentality puts a strain on the individual whose now alien point of view is not 
conversant with, or open to, that new mentality. An encounter with a new mentality 
does not only question a point of view. The challenge it poses goes down to its very 
roots; a new mentality can challenge the veracity of a point of view as well as its 
sensibility and legitimacy. For the individual, what would have previously been the 
order of the day is questioned, challenged, and potentially derogated by the new 
mentality. An individual, whose perspectives and ways of living served to navigate 
social life comfortably, suddenly finds herself and her ways of living at odds with 
the new framework. What was previously held as natural becomes odd and 
inappropriate (Schuetz, 1944; Asch, 1952; Benhabib, 2002; Chryssochoou, 2004).  
 
In his essay on the social psychology of the ‘cultural’ stranger, Schuetz (1944) 
claims that the approaching stranger does not have the recipe for standardised social 
reality prevalent in the host community and consequently, the stranger must place 
into question what seems unquestionable to the community. This dislocates the 
stranger’s point of view, based as it is on a different but habitual system of 
reference, and requires its modification to a new framework of social practices. In 
the absence of a diasporic community that can provide shelter from this epistemic 
challenge, posed by the encounter with a new social reality, the individual is 
required to negotiate discrepancies in perspective or fail to integrate (Berry, 1970, 
1974, 1980). The case of the Maltese in Britain presents a fortuitous occasion to 
study the interpersonal aspects of points of view when these relate with others. 
Points of view in relation can be based on a similar or different bedrock of common-
sense. An empirical inquiry into points of view requires sensitivity to this condition, 
and the case of the Maltese in Britain affords a singular opportunity to study this 
negotiation from the point of view of the stranger.  
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The interviews conducted in this study constituted an interaction between two 
strangers’ points of view, to use Schuetz’s term, that between them shared a 
common framework of understanding, i.e. the Maltese framework shared between 
the respondent and the researcher, with regard to a different system of social 
representations, i.e. that of life in Britain. This allowed a focused study of the 
interpersonal characteristics of points of view, due to the fact that the relations under 
study (i.e. that of the respondent in relation to a different social framework) could be 
directly attributed to points of view rather than to processes that pertain to the 
encounter of social representations. This is because the relations of a stranger’s point 
of view with an alien system of social representations are characteristically 
interpersonal and not intergroup in the condition of an absence of a legitimating 
native community. Had the study been undertaken in the presence of a legitimating 
native community, the observed characteristics could have been attributable to 
intergroup rather than interpersonal relations. For example, in the case of difficulty 
in achieving integration, the failure may have been on the part of the community 
itself rather than any particular point of view within it. In fact, even if certain points 
of view in such a situation may have been conducive to successful integration, the 
mediation of a community as a collective may have prevented it. In the absence of a 
legitimating community, no such mediation takes place such that the success or 
failure of certain individuals to relate is directly attributable to them rather than any 
intercession on the part of the communities in which they are embedded. This 
critical condition, unlike the first inquiry that sought to discover the myriad 
instantiations of points of view that transpire under different relational conditions 
(i.e. both within and outside a system of social representations), required exclusion 
for a focused study of the interpersonal characteristics of points of view that is not 
confounded by intergroup processes of social re-presentation (Chryssides et al., 
2009). The characteristics observable in this second empirical inquiry are thus 
attributable to points of view, and document the interpersonal characteristics of the 
various point of view types identified in the first study.  
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On the other hand, this study could have equally been undertaken in a condition 
where the point of view does not traverse the chasm between different social 
realities. Interpersonal relations between different points of view that are both rooted 
in the same framework of understanding would have fulfilled the same conditions, 
but would have not extended as far. The discrepancy between the various positions 
is essentially less than that in positions that bridge different social representations. 
The former is nested within the latter. This is due to the fact that the interpersonal 
relations between points of view can be of four types: a. between similar points of 
view that are based in similar social representations; b. between different points of 
view that are based in similar social representations; c. between similar points of 
view that are based in different social representations; d. between different points of 
view that are based in different social representations.  
 
Whilst it is obvious that these different conditions are hardly amenable to 
experimental manipulation, the study of the points of view of Maltese migrants to 
London presents an opportunity to inquire into the relational aspects of points of 
view when they succeed in negotiating a different frame of reference and adopt 
some position within it, as well as when they do not and remain firmly rooted in an 
alien frame of reference. This means that the instance of points of view relating to 
others on the basis of a common frame of reference is still present in this inquiry for 
those that have successfully negotiated a position within the new framework. These 
may then have retained or relinquished their positions in the other frame of 
reference. Which means to say that the plethora of interpersonal relations that may 
characterise points of view are presumed to be represented in this case, and the four 
types of interpersonal relations between points of view present within the relations 
that take place with regard to a different frame of reference. This accrues from the 
two-dimensional nature of inquiry undertaken in this study, i.e. looking at 
interpersonal relations of points of view as they relate to a new social reality as well 
as their original frame of reference.  
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Background 
 
On the 1st of May 2004 Malta, along with nine other countries, joined the European 
Union in the bloc’s largest enlargement to date. With their accession, new member 
states were extended the Four Freedoms, a set of treaty provisions between member 
states that allow for the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people within 
the internal market of the European Union. Due to concerns over mass migration, 
however, the free movement of people from the new states to the old EU15 was 
transitionally restricted until 2011. Malta was exempted such restrictions. 
Consequently, a number of Maltese citizens moved to other European countries to 
enjoy the newly acquired home status benefits for work and study. Due to the long-
standing affinity between Malta and Britain, a number of Maltese headed to the 
United Kingdom. 
 
Malta’s relations with Great Britain are long-standing. In the late 18th century the 
British backed a military uprising by the Maltese against the ruling French. 
Following surrender by the French in 1800 the island was presented by Maltese 
leaders to British Admiral Sir Alexander Ball for dominion. In 1814 Malta officially 
became a part of the British Empire. British rule remained throughout the two world 
wars until independence in 1964. In 1974 Malta became a republic within the British 
Commonwealth. Five years later, in 1979, British forces pulled out fully and 
terminated their longstanding stay in Malta.  
 
At the end of WWII, Maltese were among the first colonial citizens to embark on 
large-scale migration to Britain, and they are assumed to have set up a sizeable 
community there (Dench, 1975). Until the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, 
the Maltese could travel freely to Britain. For those who did, Britain provided a 
convenient exile from religious sanctions. Dench reports that “As the stronghold of 
personal liberties and the free society, Britain has been a particularly attractive 
destination for Maltese seeking refuge from religious oppression” (1975, p. 25). 
London became the natural hub of Maltese communal life in Britain. However, the 
 161 
Maltese community in London displayed little organisation or cohesion at the time 
of Dench’s study and this fact became the central problem of his enquiry.  
 
Dench noted how the Maltese that were attracted to Britain displayed strong 
individualistic tendencies and had minimal interest in cultivating a local Maltese 
community. Most of them were single, young men whose motives consisted of a 
mixture of religious escapism, economic pursuit, and adventure. The casual, 
disorganised nature of migration to Britain, compared to other Maltese settlement 
countries, offered these individuals greater liberation to the extent that, rather than 
being prepared to go a little out of their way to meet their fellow countrymen, Dench 
noted that most of them went to some trouble not to. The majority of them had 
sufficient knowledge of English to enable them to gain employment with non-
Maltese and this enabled their quick adaptation to British society. Additionally, most 
of them did not aspire to settle permanently in Britain, but saw their stay away from 
Malta as temporary and had plans to go back once their objectives had been met.  
 
Nevertheless, an extension of the British heritage in Malta took shape by migrants in 
London. One of the main services provided by the Maltese to the British garrison in 
Malta was culinary, in the form of numerous cafés and eating houses catering for 
sailors and servicemen in the dock area. This servicing role was exported to London, 
not surprisingly concentrated in the Docklands area in East London, particularly 
Stepney. These small Maltese cafés grow also out of indigenous Maltese life. In 
small villages in Malta, local cafés served as the only real social centres not run or 
dominated by the Catholic Church. Consequently, as Dench noted, they served as a 
natural alternative of community life for migrants who rejected the church and the 
family-centred culture of straight Maltese life. A café society sprung up amongst 
Maltese in London that provided a niche for recent migrants, and that retained the 
same secular characteristics of café life in Malta.  
 
Other than culinary services, the cafés around the Grand Harbour in Malta provided 
yet other services to the British garrison, namely those of a sexual nature. The 
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replacement of the Knights by the British garrison created demand for sexual 
services and increased possibilities for honourable marriages between servicemen 
and well-born mistresses. A number of families’ livelihood in the Grand Harbour 
area thus came to depend exclusively on the sexual economy. However, young 
Maltese men in Malta were not spared the Catholic moral sanctioning. Their sexual 
desires were inflamed by the restraints imposed on them by religious and public 
opinion. According to Dench, this frustration may have been a veritable cause for 
emigration for Maltese individuals who did not share the moral righteousness of 
Maltese society at large.  
 
Upon emigration, Maltese migrants lapsed from their country’s religious code. The 
café society of Maltese in Britain became an expression of a secular counter-culture, 
a promised land where sexual behaviour was uncluttered by moral prohibitions. In 
London, their rebellious sentiments exploded in rampant selfishness and 
individualism, and found gainful expression in the organisation of the provision of 
sex services in the Docklands. Seasoned criminals were selectively drawn to London 
to serve in the pimping trade. Maltese café society became an organised vice 
network run by Maltese criminals. Dench estimated that at the time of his study a 
quarter of Maltese settlers had served or were serving prison sentences, and possibly 
up to one half had been sentenced on some criminal charge in London. The 
completed criminality rate, that is, the chance of being convicted at some time 
during settlement, would have been higher yet. The net effect of this activity was 
that “Among a community with a generally bad reputation, the Maltese had a 
specifically bad name” (p. 71).  
 
Public opinion in Britain considered these activities as particularly loathsome and 
despicable, and consequently the Maltese were subjected to a lot of hostile press and 
negative stereotypes. This further compounded the lack of cohesion within the 
Maltese community in London and led to further erosion of ethnic consciousness, as 
Maltese migrants sought to disassociate themselves from the stereotype of the 
Maltese ponce. The outcome of these historical events was the breakdown of the 
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entire community of Maltese in Britain (Dench, 1975). Following Malta’s 
independence from Great Britain, immigration was significantly curbed, which 
meant that the renewal of a Maltese community was no longer sustainable.  
 
More than three decades later, these events have been largely forgotten by 
Londoners as well as the British population at large. However, traces of collective 
remembering (Bartlett, 1932) remain for the Maltese in Malta that may impede or 
deter the formation of a new community in Britain following renewed migration due 
to Malta’s accession into the EU. Due to the community breakdown of the sixties, 
Maltese migrants to the UK are no longer able to initiate their settlement through the 
mediation of a native community in their host country. With the exception of 
individuals who have Maltese relatives who settled in Britain at the time of the 
above-mentioned events, recent Maltese migrants to Britain have had to negotiate 
their migration on their own.  
 
Aside from all other implications, the central problem of this investigation is how 
these recent migrants have negotiated their perspectives towards their new life once 
they arrived in Britain. Their points of view towards this new life have necessarily 
been forged in the context of a Maltese mentality that legitimated their move to 
Britain. In Britain, however, their perspectives need adjustment to a different frame 
of reference. In spite of their long-standing affinity, Britain and Malta are very 
different countries. Maltese mentality is imbued in traditions of religiosity, family 
solidarity, Eurocentrism, and a Mediterranean lifestyle. In Britain these socio-
political values have little currency. The reasons for which the migrants’ move to the 
UK may have been sensible given a Maltese mentality, may be totally discrepant 
with British mentality. Consequently, their outlooks require adjustment to a new, 
unmediated reality. There is for them no option of resorting to a local community 
that can provide a safe intercultural haven. There is no possibility to do things right 
according to a Maltese mentality, in the UK. Their outlooks are required to fit and 
make sense within a different frame of reference. These historical circumstances 
provided the socio-political context for the present study.  
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Findings 
 
The present inquiry involved a series of interviews undertaken with Maltese 
migrants to Britain that sought to study respondents’ points of view towards Britain 
and Malta. Data analysis revealed some characteristic differences in the 
interpersonal relations enacted between different types of points of view. Individuals 
with monological points of view were found to fit in a single culture that they called 
home. Their social networks consisted of fellow members of that culture with whom 
they fit, and this fit marked their social identities–what made them belong to one 
group also excluded them from another group. Individuals with dialogical points of 
view were able to relate to both cultures, although they overvalued one and 
undervalued another. They fit better in one culture that to them was more homely 
than the other, into which they fit much less naturally. They were open to relations 
with both communities, although one of them came with reservations. Their 
identities were dual, but stood in opposition to others with a single identity. 
Individuals with metalogical points of view, on the other hand, fit as well in one 
culture as they did in the other, identified equally with both cultures, felt at home in 
both, and were open to equal relations with both.  
 
Whilst individuals with monological points of view were therefore able to position 
themselves within a single culture, which positioning prevented their ability to 
position themselves in relation with another simultaneously, for individuals with 
dialogical points of view this positioning was curtailed but not prevented, whilst for 
those with metalogical points of view this was unrestricted. Individuals with 
metalogical points of view were able to position themselves in both settings without 
contradiction. Consequently, by virtue of their encounter with an alternative 
mentality, individuals holding metalogical points of view claimed that they had 
broadened their perspectives but that this did not preclude their ability to relate back 
to their former mentality, whereas for those with dialogical points of view, this 
broadening hindered their ability to relate back to their original framework. For 
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individuals with monological points of view, there was no difference in perspective 
as these were fully preserved through the sacrifice of fitting. The main differences 
between types that emerged from this inquiry are presented in Table 9 and detailed 
hereunder. 
  
 Monological Dialogical Metalogical 
Fitting In Fit in 1 culture Fit well in culture 1; not 
well in culture 2 
Fit in both 
Social 
network 
Exclusively 1 
type 
2 types 
(Preferential/Conditional/ 
Restricted) 
2 types 
Identity Exclusive Dual 
(Oppositional) 
Dual 
(Non-oppositional) 
Home One home One is more home than 
the other 
Two homes 
Perspective No change Change, with 
consequences on fitting 
Change, with no 
consequences on fitting 
Table 9: Comparative thematic coding results 
 
This study also demonstrated that there were no differences between individuals 
who held characteristic types of point of view in their preference for intercultural 
relations. All respondents expressed a preference for the assimilation acculturation 
strategy over other forms of relations (Berry, 2001). However, whilst they expressed 
preferences for assimilation, the fact that individuals with certain points of view 
retained relations with the two cultures simultaneously to varying degrees also 
meant that there were differences between types in the social capital they fostered 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Putnam, 1995). Not everyone was equally capable of investing in 
bonding as well as bridging social capital  (Gittel & Vidal, 1998). Consequently, the 
outcome in acculturation was markedly different between types. Only individuals 
displaying metalogical points of view demonstrated a capacity for integration. 
Finally, this study also demonstrated that when points of view enter relations with 
other points of view that may not comprehend their logic, they stand to make an 
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attribution of ignorance to the other to preserve their original position. These 
findings, along with the characteristic differences in interpersonal relations between 
types, are detailed further hereunder. 
 
Fitting In 
 
A central difference between point of view types was in their holders’ ability to fit in 
to British culture. Respondents with a monological point of view claimed that they 
fit seamlessly in one culture and not very well at all in the other, even though they 
may have spent the large portion of their life in their country of origin: 
 
 I feel more at home here than I used to there; I fit so much better here; I am 
definitely more home here than I ever was in Maltese culture; I feel I never fitted 
with that culture, and I used to feel I was a misfit  
(Respondent 26, Monological) 
	  
They claimed that if there was any adjustment required, it was to good things in 
British culture because they were so unused to things working out well. By contrast, 
in Malta they would feel out of place given who they are, as if they were “a fish out 
of the water” (Respondent 34, Monological). A clue as to the underlying causes is 
provided by Respondent 12, who claims: 
 
 The difficulties I had in Malta were matters of principle rather than practicalities 
that could be sorted; I couldn't get used to the fact that my boss was unqualified and 
he was there because he had the right links; these things define me as a person so 
there can be no compromise over them, whilst going to the pub is not a principle, it's 
a practicality 
(Respondent 12, Monological) 
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Even in practical matters, respondents claimed that these presented no difficulty and 
that they were able to take to British culture with ease, to the extent that matters that 
might have been an issue for them in Malta were no longer such in Britain: “here I 
mind the rain but there I didn't” (Respondent 34, Monological [returned to Malta 
temporarily]). The same pattern of fit is also noticeable in respondents with a 
monological perspective that favours Malta. They claimed they faced difficulties in 
settling in Britain because they weren’t cut out for that kind of life: 
 
 I couldn't settle and I didn't want to settle; I came, but not happily; I hated Britain, I 
hated the British; everything here was silly, I didn't like the course, I didn't like my 
place; I didn't make an effort because I wasn't cut out for here and I’d decided that 
on the last day of the course I’d head back 
(Respondent 1, Monological)  
 
you survive there if you're into pub culture, but we didn't adopt the British way of 
life  
(Respondent 37, Monological) 
	  
 
And even after an extended stay in Britain these respondents find no problem in 
fitting back in Malta. They claim that no adjustment was required on their part to fit 
back into Maltese culture: 
 
 didn't need adjustment; you need to get used to a few things […] we didn't have 
problems […] the kids did not need any adjustment at all  
(Respondent 37, Monological) 
 
By contrast, respondents with dialogical points of view claimed that their move from 
one country to the other required some adjustment due to a new social reality they 
encountered: 
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 I personally just wasn't ready for it initially, I needed adjustment  
(Respondent 7, Dialogical) 
 
 at the end of the day I'm still Maltese, so these are not things I look forward to  
(Respondent 19, Dialogical) 
 
However, these respondents were able to adapt their character to the new 
environment: 
 
 here there's a culture of going to the pub, you make the effort  
(Respondent 3, Dialogical) 
 
 those who do not persevere fail; it's a test for character 
(Respondent 20, Dialogical) 
	  
In talking about their ability to fit in British culture, respondents with a dialogical 
point of view demonstrate, however, that their adaptation may also have had 
repercussions on their perspective towards Malta and their capacity to function 
there: 
	  
 it's nice to go back but if you live there - there are people watching over you, not 
because they want but because that's what things are like  
(Respondent 31, Dialogical) 
 
Respondents with metalogical points of view claimed that whilst they faced the same 
conditions as their fellow compatriots, they were able to adjust and fit in to British 
culture just like dialogical types: 
 
 it took me a while to get used to going to the pub but once you get to know your 
friends it's ok, I used to avoid it but now I look forward to it; I wouldn't do it in 
Malta, but here it's fine 
(Respondent 10, Metalogical) 
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 at the end of the day I never had a problem with integration; I managed my goals; I 
was a foreigner doing assessments on British wealthy families, but I was accepted 
and clients trusted me and my boss drilled into me that I was an agent of the state 
(Respondent 33, Metalogical) 
	  
Their adaptation however did not come at the cost of their ability to function in 
Malta. Respondent 33 returned to Malta after a brief stay in Britain. Whilst he 
recognises that his experience changed him and that he became more liberal as a 
result of his move to Britain, he also claims that: 
 
 I don’t say those around me are idiots and I'm the only sensible one around; I can 
still voice my perspectives; there's liberal and conservative ideas, and I can't say I 
couldn't adjust 
(Respondent 33, Metalogical) 
 
Respondents with metalogical points of view incur no cost to their functioning in 
Malta from acquiring an ability to function in Britain. Respondent 27, who has 
resided in Britain for fifty years, remains an avid supporter of a local Maltese 
football club to the extent that he occasionally flies over to watch his club play even 
though in the grand scheme of major league football, and unlike the team he 
supports in Britain, his local Maltese team is very much insignificant. Nevertheless, 
respondents with a metalogical point of view, in spite of their functional adaptation 
to British life do not, in the words of Respondent 8: “do a clean break from Malta”. 
 
Assimilation 
 
Whilst there are differences between point of view types in their functional capacity 
to fit in to British life upon migration, there is no evidence of differences across 
point of view types with regards to what form fitting in should take. This is rather 
surprising given the differences in the way monological, dialogical and metalogical 
points of view relate to their country of origin and their host country. Given these 
differences, one would have reasonably expected individuals with metalogical points 
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of view to strive for integration and those with monological points of view to opt for 
assimilation, with dialogical views somewhere in between17. However, all seem to 
equally favour assimilation with the dominant culture once they are in Britain. 
Respondent 18 claims that: 
 
 I don't impose Maltese culture on others, insofar as I'm here I try to integrate here 
(Respondent 18, Monological) 
 
Even for those who faced hardships in adapting and who favour Maltese ways, the 
acculturation strategy they favoured was that of assimilation: 
 
 what it took was adaptation, doing different things to ameliorate your condition  
(Respondent 23, Monological) 
 
The goal of respondents, irrespective of their point of view type, was that of 
assimilation through adaptation. Respondent 5 articulates what this process involves, 
describing it as ‘moulding’: 
 
 moulding is when I adapt to fit; not I'm a circle fitting into a square; I change 
slightly but not totally, I remain distinct and different and not fully amalgamated; 
but not totally alien 
(Respondent 5, Metalogical) 
 
With regards to making links with a Maltese community respondents similarly 
replied that they were not after associating with other Maltese, irrespective of what 
point of view they held. They claimed that had they wanted the fellowship of other 
Maltese, they would have stayed in Malta. For this reason they did not actively seek 
out other Maltese people during their stay in Britain.  Whereas for a lot of 
immigrants, native communities are a source of support in a foreign land, 
                                                
17 Respondents’ use of terms does not correspond to the scholarly terms used in referring to 
acculturation strategies. What respondents refer to as integration commonly refers to the assimilation 
acculturation strategy in Berry’s terms. 
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respondents chose to do away with such support and relied only on their own 
resources: 
 
 it was just us, no one really helped 
(Respondent 7, Dialogical) 
 
 we didn't search for support, no one ever saw me in the worst of times 
(Respondent 7, Dialogical) 
 
Respondent 12 provides a clue as to why this might be the case: 
 
 the primary source of support is mostly ourselves; we're not the type to seek support 
outside of our nucleus; we're an independent type; no one helped us to settle, we 
knew people but we wanted to do it ourselves; the only help we got were services 
that we paid for, we didn't seek support  […] it wasn't easy but I'd rather do it like 
that; otherwise you get obliged and I don't like to be in that situation  
(Respondent 12, Monological) 
 
The desire to make it on their own and to avoid community relations seems to have 
underlined respondents’ desire for assimilation irrespective of their point of view. 
Both of these findings are in line with those outlined by Dench (1975) and may be 
particular to the Maltese community in Britain. Respondent 27, who has direct 
experience in view of the length of his stay in Britain, claimed that he’d often meet 
other Maltese people and find out they were up to no good so he’d steer clear of 
them. He further argued that: 
 
 I didn't like the Maltese here, it seemed like they didn't change, they lived like they 
did in Malta and I didn't like that, I wanted to integrate; for example they'd speak 
Maltese when there were English people present, I don't know, it's me, I'm not 
saying it's wrong, but I didn't like it; I made some Maltese friends after a couple of 
years, I joined the Maltese club; we used to go dancing, used to organise things and 
get together, but now I'm cut off; everyone went their separate ways; most went 
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back to Malta; it's a shame we don't have community here; but the ones I described 
they stayed Maltese, whereas I talk to everybody 
(Respondent 27, Metalogical) 
 
This goal of assimilation, which respondent 27 has articulated as a desire for 
integration, as well as the scepticism directed towards fellow countrymen, was 
reiterated across points of view: 
 
there are Maltese people here but I don't seek them out; maybe because I know 
they're not my type 
(Respondent 32, Dialogical) 
 
Whilst the conditions for this may be due to stereotypes that the Maltese hold of the 
Maltese in Britain and the communities that existed in Britain at the time of Dench’s 
investigation that are lodged in collective remembering of the Maltese, it seems that 
the scepticism respondents had for a Maltese community ran deeper than that. 
Respondents claimed that in spite of the support a community can confer newly 
arrived migrants, having no community was effectively an advantage as it forced 
migrants to assimilate: 
 
 the fact that there is no community is an advantage because it forces us to integrate 
much quicker; others who have these big communities tend to cluster together and 
do not integrate as readily 
(Respondent 34, Monological) 
 
I'd like to make contact with people who've been through the same experience; but 
then it depends on what they're like; I know Maltese who have been here but didn't 
integrate; we want to integrate now that we're here, we want to be part of this 
community now, that's why we came here 
(Respondent 25, Dialogical) 
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These findings are rather surprising given the different ways different types of point 
of view acquire the ability to fit in. For example, respondent 1 stated that her life in 
Britain has improved markedly ever since a few other Maltese acquaintances of hers 
also moved to Britain, as these have now come to constitute her social network. 
Respondent 37 claimed that for her family, fellow Maltese in Britain were her 
‘extended family’. And respondent 35 argued that whilst she does not fit in with the 
Maltese in Malta, the Maltese in Britain are different from the Maltese in Malta. One 
would therefore expect similar differences in the acculturation objectives of point of 
view types, but no evidence for this has emerged in the course of this inquiry.  
 
On the other hand, and equally surprisingly, there is also no evidence for significant 
culture loss amongst the respondents, irrespective of their point of view type and 
their common desire to assimilate. Respondents retained their ability to converse in 
the Maltese language, identified themselves as Maltese, displayed Maltese artifacts 
in their homes, and stayed in touch with Maltese affairs and Maltese networks, 
particularly their families, irrespective of their point of view type. Even the 
staunchest monological point of view respondents made it a point to keep contact 
with their families and to remember events such as the birthdays of friends and 
relatives. Furthermore, respondents maintained that they retained a preference for a 
Mediterranean way of life. This characteristic of Mediterranean ways was highly 
significant in that it seemed to bridge some of the cultural distance between the two 
countries, and marked other differences between different types of point of view. 
 
Social Network 
 
Whereas all respondents claimed to still be in touch with their social networks in 
Malta, there were differences in the way respondents with different points of view 
built up a social network. Respondents with a monological point of view had mostly 
exclusive networks, that is, their friends were either almost exclusively foreign or 
almost exclusively Maltese. Respondent 18 claims that: “admittedly I like to make 
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foreign friends” (Respondent 18, Monological). Respondent 26 claimed that in just 
over a year, she had: 
 
 a network of friends like I had in Malta […] I do have close friends, not Maltese, 
British, our social network is predominantly British  
(Respondent 26, Monological) 
 
Asked about associating with fellow Maltese, Respondent 26 stated that she is: 
“comfortable with a Maltese community over the net” (Respondent 26, 
Monological). 
 
Respondents with a monological point of view favouring Malta replied similarly, 
although the constitution of their network was diametrically opposed: 
 
 The only friends we made were foreigners; it's not that easy to integrate […] but you 
make Maltese friends who are there […] Our social network was mostly Maltese in 
England 
(Respondent 37, Monological) 
 
Respondent 37 claimed that: 
 
 it was very important for us to connect with fellow Maltese, they were our extended 
family, we felt the lack of community there so we went of our way and worked hard 
to network 
(Respondent 37, Monological) 
 
For these respondents, a social network of fellow Maltese went some way in filling 
the void of cultural distance between the two countries. Respondent 1 stated that: 
 
 my social network is made up of Maltese who live here; […] I was happy when 
other Maltese I knew were coming here, as I could fill that void somewhat that 
couldn't be filled with a pub; but at least there's a certain bond, they're not coming 
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from pub culture; even the language, I don't have to make an effort; with other 
Maltese around, that void can be filled somewhat; but before it wasn't and I didn't 
want to fill it this way; now it's a support network that I didn't have  
(Respondent 1, Monological) 
 
Recounting her experiences before the arrival of other Maltese acquaintances, she 
underlines how hard it was for her to be in Britain without a support network: 
 
 before it was boring, lonely, and depressing; I sat with my computer all the time, 
awaiting contact from Malta; I felt I'd got out of their life and that they'll move on 
and leave me behind; rather than I moved on by coming here; so I strived to keep in 
touch, send cards in birthdays and all that  
(Respondent 1, Monological) 
 
For this reason, Respondent 1 kept her social network in Malta as her primary 
network for social capital. She’d make the effort to stay in touch as well as visit 
regularly to keep her network alive: 
 
I’ve been to Malta very often, I'd need to go hook up with my network; I made 
surprises to make them remember me  
(Respondent 1, Monological) 
 
Respondents with a dialogical point of view described their networks in more open 
terms. They were open to foreigners as well as fellow Maltese within their networks. 
However, their networks were fragmented, in contrast to their social networks in 
Malta, and were organised around what they described as different cliques: 
 
different from Malta were friends are always the same since ever; here you have 
different friends in different networks, some Maltese, some of one work, some 
friends of friends  
 (Respondent 15, Dialogical) 
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Respondent 19 claims that most Maltese in his network in Britain were people he 
was acquainted with in Malta but who weren’t in his network there to the extent they 
are in Britain. Some respondents made friends online then hooked up with their 
virtual friends in real life and extended their social networks this way. These do not 
exclude Maltese associations, but unlike Malta, these are typically kept separate. 
Respondent 35 outlines the benefits of such a network: 
 
my network was made up of different cliques; so if I felt like doing one thing I'd 
hook up with one clique, if another, another clique  
 (Respondent 35, Dialogical) 
 
These respondents also expended different effort in the different cliques they had, 
due to their vested interests in such cliques. With the exception of respondent 28, 
those who intended to return to Malta worked at keeping their Maltese networks 
alive, knowing they would eventually be calling on them. They knew that their 
foreign networks would eventually wither once they headed back. On the other hand, 
those who intended to stay vested much more effort into building good networks in 
Britain, knowing that these will be serving socialising purposes for the long-term. 
The ties they established with fellow Maltese were conditional–they would need to 
be their type, that is, Maltese-British as opposed to just Maltese. Respondent 28, in 
typical dialogical fashion, simply accepted the fact that the vibrant and mostly 
foreign network she developed in Britain would have to be sacrificed for a higher 
ideal that was taking her back to Malta–she dismissed the possibility of developing 
an intimate relationship in Britain.  
 
Respondents with metalogical points of view expressed similar openness to native 
and foreign association, but they were far less preferential or conditional in their 
networks, such that they would call on either in times of need. Respondent 27 
describes his early years in Britain and how he was able to draw on the network he 
got going when he moved to Britain: 
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I got friends, not many many, mostly British; I make friends straight away; I can 
walk in anywhere and make friends […] English people helped me in the first few 
years, they used to take me places, I was given space, I found them very nice people, 
they respect you  
 (Respondent 27, Metalogical) 
 
Similarly, respondent 36 stated that she got support from a foreign family with 
whom she shared a house, and their friendship has remained in spite of her moving 
back to Malta. She also described, however, how she’d also made an effort during 
her stay in Britain to associate with fellow Maltese in Britain: 
 
the family we shared with made life easy, they helped us out, they became part of 
our network […] we're still friends […] I didn't actually look out for Maltese 
friends; I made a couple of friends but they were my friends only because they were 
Maltese, they weren't the type who'd be my friends here; we made an effort to meet 
up with them 
 (Respondent 36, Metalogical) 
 
Respondent 33 outlines how both Maltese and foreigners in one’s network may be 
able to provide support: 
 
in case of need I'd call my mates at the hostel, in other big matters I'd call the 
Maltese mates  
 (Respondent 33, Metalogical) 
 
And respondent 8, who claims to have many more foreigners in his social network in 
Britain due to the fact that his partner is also British, still retains an affinity for 
Maltese association: 
 
I feel the Maltese community bond, I spent 25 years there, if I meet a Maltese 
person I strike a bond very quickly, I talk to the Maltese I meet; there's something in 
common between us 
 (Respondent 8, Metalogical) 
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For respondents with metalogical points of view however, this affinity is not 
restrictive and does not limit the potential for trans-cultural association: 
 
but these friendships are more interesting in a way because these people are 
different from us so we're curious about each other; it takes a while to get used to 
each other, but then it becomes an interesting relationship 
 (Respondent 10, Metalogical) 
 
Identity 
 
Different types of point of view also marked differences in identity dynamics. Like 
their social networks, respondents with monological points of view expressed 
similarly exclusive identities. They either defined themselves exclusively by their 
newly established status, or fully in terms of their place of origin. Respondent 18 
argues, for example, how he has no inferiority complex for being Maltese, however, 
he does not define himself as Maltese: 
 
 I am Maltese and I don't hide it; I have no inferiority complex for being Maltese, but 
I don't define myself as Maltese […] I am grouped with British by some at work, 
maybe because I am more fluent in English 
	   (Respondent 18, Monological)	  
 
Respondent 18 is proud of the success of his adaptation to British ways. He prides 
himself in his Sunday morning paper and British radio preferences. Respondent 18 
claims that he feels he is a Londoner now that he knows how to use buses. Similarly, 
respondent 32 claims that he is a Londoner as, according to the dictum he cites, if 
you have an Oystercard you are a Londoner. He goes on saying that he is a foreigner 
but not an outsider and that he always felt at ease as a foreigner. Respondent 12 
argues that even though he lacks a native identity in Britain, he does not feel out of 
his element: “I don't feel British but I don't feel a fish out of the water” (Respondent 
12, Monological). Similarly, respondent 32 maintains that: “I feel foreigner only 
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because I have a foreign passport; I feel a Londoner” (Respondent 32, Monological). 
For respondent 26, her identity is now simply that of a resident of the United 
Kingdom. 
 
In contrast, whilst most respondents claimed that in Britain, and in London in 
particular, being a foreigner does not equate with being an outsider, respondent 23 
asserted that: 
 
 I'm reminded every day that I’m a foreigner; I was accepted, I'm not disadvantaged 
because I'm a foreigner; I don't feel more or less than them, but I do feel different 
[…] I feel Maltese, a bit Londoner, I'm a Maltese living in London; I think like a 
Maltese I see things like a Maltese, not like a Londoner 
 (Respondent 23, Monological) 
 
Respondents with a dialogical perspective did not express such an exclusive identity. 
They replied that they felt they were Maltese-Londoners or Maltese living in Britain, 
that they felt part of Britain even though they were not British, and that the fact they 
were of foreign origin did not exclude them socially: “feeling a foreigner wasn't 
foreign because everyone's foreign” (Respondent 30, Dialogical). They also claimed 
that they identify themselves as Maltese even more strongly since they moved here, 
and they’ve become more patriotic. Respondent 30 explains what it’s like for him to 
be Maltese and different from the locals: “I feel Maltese because I approach life 
differently, for example the boundary of what's acceptable or not in humour, of 
having a laugh at others” (Respondent 30, Dialogical). 
 
However, for respondents with a dialogical perspective, their identities are still 
oppositional and defined relative to each country. Respondent 30, who favours 
settling in Malta, elaborates further: 
 
I always tell my partner that my people are there; there's certain things like the 
language, things like, to understand how a Maltese would write 'Have you seen 
enough?' on the back of their car, if you're British you don't understand that, there's 
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something Maltese about that; I understand that, I feel I belong there, but to live 
there, some things bug me  
 (Respondent 30, Dialogical) 
 
For other respondents with a dialogical point of view, their identity as a Maltese in 
Britain is defined in opposition to a strictly and solely Maltese identity. They retain 
that their experience has changed them and has led them to grow and mature: 
 
I feel a Maltese adapted to British culture; I have absorbed a different culture, of 
people I meet; and I've become a better person, more mature; it would be a mistake 
to change completely though 
 (Respondent 19, Dialogical) 
 
However, these respondents retain that their experience has had irrevocable 
consequences on their identity and that Maltese who lack an awareness and 
influence like theirs are unlike them, to the extent that they now have trouble fitting 
back.  
 
Respondents with a metalogical point of view lack such an oppositional identity. 
They are able to define themselves as ‘half and half’. Respondent 17, who has been 
in Britain for over 25 years, elaborates thus: 
 
 I still consider myself Maltese because people remind me due to my accent, which I 
still have; in the beginning it was an issue because I was the only foreigner at work, 
but now there's such a proliferation that I'm no longer different because of this […] 
but not an outsider; I consider myself a local, until they comment about foreigner 
then I'd stand up for foreigners; but I don't consider myself a foreigner 
 (Respondent 17, Metalogical) 
 
Respondents with a metalogical point of view do not feel that their identities stand in 
opposition. As respondent 27 argued: 
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I’ve been here 50 years, I speak the language, I meet British people, I like British 
things, football, but only because I'm here; if I were in Malta I'd be into Maltese 
things  
 (Respondent 27, Metalogical) 
 
Other respondents with a metalogical point of view elaborated a different identity 
that transcends cultural differences. Respondent 11 stated that he feels part of 
London because London is individualistic, so that you don’t have to belong to any 
specific group to belong, so, he claims, you end up feeling you belong. He then goes 
on to claim that: 
 
I don't feel I belong anywhere; I'm an island, I'm an individual, I drift; I feel I 
belong to Malta, I feel close to my culture, but it's not a sense of pride; I belong to 
myself  
(Respondent 11, Metalogical) 
 
Respondent 29 expressed a similarly transcendental identity. He claims he feels at 
home both in Malta and in Britain as well as in a number of other countries. He 
claims that: 
 
ultimately I feel Maltese; when I'm in Malta I don't feel Maltese; the way I approach 
things is not Maltese, I'm more Anglo-Saxon 
 (Respondent 29, Metalogical) 
 
And then, at the same time, he claimed that: 
 
when it comes to family I think Britain lacks community, so in those respects I'm 
more Maltese; but  I don't feel Maltese professionally, my head is business 
(Respondent 29, Metalogical) 
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The identities elaborated by respondents differ in terms of the manner by which the 
dual element of Maltese-British is incorporated into their own identity. Respondents 
with a monological point of view adopt one element exclusively. Respondents with a 
dialogical point of view seemingly reconcile the two, but by virtue of this 
reconciliation they identify themselves differently from others. Respondents with 
metalogical perspectives have what seems to be a dual-boot identity, or a master-
identity, that enables them to be Maltese in Malta and British in Britain. These 
differences translate into differences as to where they feel at home and where they 
fit. Respondents with a monological perspective argue that it is either in Malta or in 
Britain where they feel at home. Respondents with a dialogical perspective argue 
that whereas they feel somewhat at home in both places, either one place is: “a bit 
like home but not quite home” (Respondent 15, Dialogical), or one is more home 
than the other: “both are home, but Malta is home sweet home” (Respondent 28, 
Dialogical). On the other hand, respondents with a metalogical open point of view 
feel at home in both countries: 
 
two countries - two homes; so I stayed here because I had a good living […] I feel at 
home in both countries; don't know how to answer the question of where I belong 
 (Respondent 27, Metalogical) 
 
at this point, both countries are somewhat home […] my character is more England, 
but my family home is Malta; in England I have an alternative home but still a 
home; it's an alternative because even my character is different in Malta 
(Respondent 5, Metalogical) 
 
The last comment articulated by Respondent 5 is highly significant as it provides a 
clue as to what masks the differences between points of view that enable some 
respondents to keep an open perspective that enables them to function adequately in 
both cultures, whereas others seem to lose this capacity or indeed, never to have had 
it. Respondent 5 claims to have a different character in Malta than the one she has in 
Britain. It is this capacity to change perspectives between the two countries that 
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underlies the functional implications of adopting one type of point of view against 
another. 
 
Perspectives 
 
In contrast to metalogical and dialogical points of view, monological points of view 
are held to be unable to accommodate an alternative perspective in their own 
constitution. And in contrast to metalogical perspectives, dialogical perspectives will 
retain their own logic as the right and truthful version. Metalogical points of view 
are marked by their ability to accommodate the possibility of alternative 
perspectives other than their own, and the possibility of them also being in the right 
as much as one’s own. Maltese migrants to Britain necessarily faced a new social 
reality in which they were required to immerse themselves. Respondents claimed 
that this experience led to them opening their minds, and that they became able to 
see things from a different perspective. They decried their experience abroad as an 
eye-opener; an experience that led to personal growth and that has come to define 
them. Not all respondents, however, were equally open to relate their newfound 
perspectives to their preceding ones. Respondents with monological points of view 
became unable to relate back to a Maltese mentality. They shed one system of social 
representations to fit into another. Their new perspective has broadened to the extent 
that it prevents their positioning themselves within the former mentality: 
 
 I don't think I'd fit going back; my mentality changed too much; after I've lived in an 
open multicultural place, everything else is going to be more closed; not just Malta 
but anywhere else; the difference between here and Malta is too big 
 (Respondent 32, Monological) 
 
Respondents with a dialogical perspective acknowledge their ties with one 
framework whilst expressing a preference for another in a way that binds them more 
firmly to the latter than the former. They argue that the experience of migration has 
helped them open their minds, but, for those who now favor British ways, this has 
come at a cost: 
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you think everything by a Maltese mind; here you get a different perspective; if 
Maltese were to come here they'd change their perspectives but the fact that they're 
there they think like Maltese 
 (Respondent 31, Dialogical) 
 
my life here is different from the culture in Malta; the mentality is different, it's 
more open-minded; I adapt a lot, I adapted here and made lots of friends; I don't 
belong in Malta 
 (Respondent 19, Dialogical) 
 
I feel I'm coming home when I come here; I wouldn't go back to Malta, I don't 
belong; I might stay here, or I might go somewhere else but not to Malta; you have 
adapted and you have a different mentality now 
 (Respondent 19, Dialogical) 
 
Respondents with a dialogical perspective that favors Malta also hold their 
perspectives are now different and broadened as compared to other Maltese, even 
though they are intent on settling permanently in Malta, as do respondents with 
metalogical perspectives, who also retained their experience has broadened their 
perspectives and led them to open their minds:  
 
I became much more independent, an adult; even in relation to my parents; I've got 
my own experiences now; even the way I think about myself is different, even my 
perspective towards my values; the values haven't changed but I see things 
differently; even in religion, I try to make a Sunday mass, and I still go daily in 
Malta, but I see things differently 
 (Respondent 5, Metalogical) 
 
The consequences that accrue from broadening their perspectives bear directly on 
respondents’ ability to fit into the two systems. Respondents with a monological 
point of view are unable to fit in one context due to their perspective that conforms 
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to another context. Respondent 34, who returned to Malta prematurely after a brief 
stay in Britain and is intent on going back, states that: 
 
here I feel as if I'm still struggling to adapt, as if I lived somewhere, came here and 
struggling to adapt […] even though I've been here double the time I was there as I 
can't fit in here, I was comfortable there 
 (Respondent 34, Monological) 
 
Respondent 26, who has moved to Britain for just over a year, was also adamant that 
she wouldn’t be able to fit back, and faced similar problems even whilst holidaying 
there: 
 
I wouldn't fit in Malta; when I went there for a weekend I was scared I would talk 
with an English accent 
 (Respondent 26, Monological) 
 
By contrast, respondent 37, who also returned to Malta after a much longer stay in 
Britain, faced no such hardships and presents a diametrically opposed view: 
 
after a couple of days I got back into the Maltese life as if I had never had left; I fit 
right back; I got involved into the kids’ school; no adaptation; the transition was 
from class to class not country to country 
 (Respondent 37, Monological) 
 
Respondents with a dialogical point of view that want to settle in Britain held an 
appreciation for certain Maltese things. Whilst claiming that they were settled in 
Britain and that they’ve made it their home, they also claimed that they miss their 
own kind and longed for certain things. However, they expressed stark reservations 
as to their ability to fit back: 
 
 I belong but I don't want to go there; I don't want to make a compromise  
 (Respondent 31, Dialogical) 
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 we'd fit but we'd only survive 
 (Respondent 25, Dialogical) 
 
Respondent 24 could fall back on her own experience in providing an answer: 
 
I tried it, I found it very hard; I didn't show it, because I didn't want my parents to 
think they'd done something wrong but I found it very difficult 
 (Respondent 24, Dialogical) 
 
On the other hand, respondents with a dialogical point of view favoring Malta 
claimed that in spite of all that Britain had to offer, they knew they couldn’t stay 
long-term: 
 
I don't want to stay here for a long time because I miss family, friends, the easy life 
we had, even if here I earn more money; I don't think it's a good place to bring up 
your kids 
(Respondent 9, Dialogical) 
 
we always said we didn't want to settle here, we were here to do a masters, and now 
that I'm doing this I'll go back in June. Eventually I'll try to settle in Malta 
(Respondent 14, Dialogical) 
 
Respondents who expressed metalogical perspectives, and who also claimed they’d 
opened their minds as a result of their experience, nevertheless sustained that they 
were able to fit back into Maltese society and that their perspectives wouldn’t deter 
their functioning: 
 
I would fit, 100%; only thing stopping me is grandchildren; I go there it's like I 
never left, I still feel at home; Malta is beautiful, I don't know bad people; friends 
and neighbors, are more respectful, they're good people […] if my daughter goes I'll 
pack up and go right now 
 (Respondent 27, Metalogical) 
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Respondent 36, who has returned to Malta after a stay in Britain, claimed that she fit 
in Britain to the extent she felt she belonged. She believes she was naïve and 
ignorant before she went there and that her experience has opened her mind. 
Nevertheless, she still feels she belongs in Malta: 
 
now there's a good mismatch that wouldn't have been there before; I still fit in, in 
spite of the ignorance; we have good friends like us; I would say I feel like a local 
with the added benefits of having a past 
 (Respondent 36, Metalogical) 
 
Respondent 16, who describes himself as half British and half Maltese and who has 
lived for extended periods in both countries, claims that he appreciates differences 
between the two systems, and that he functions well in both in spite of their relative 
inconsistencies: 
 
I like both systems; I find the system here as very rigid, too controlled, I like to go 
where it's more relaxed, I need a break from this but I don't want to stay too long 
because I have a system here that works too, I know everything's in place; the two 
complement each other; and I'm at ease in both 
 (Respondent 16, Metalogical) 
 
An appreciation for the relative logics underlying both systems is the hallmark of a 
metalogical point of view that has no need to claim one system as superior to 
another. For this reason, respondents with a metalogical position can attach 
themselves equally to each cultural system. Respondent 8 demonstrates this well 
when asked if he’s still in touch with Malta, after having voiced his intent to settle in 
Britain permanently and seek dual citizenship. His response was that for him staying 
in touch goes beyond reading the news or communicating with friends and relatives. 
Whilst he enjoys his life in Britain thoroughly, he retained that his attachment to 
Malta means that he still has a ‘presence’ there even though he is away, and that this 
attachment runs very deep: 
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not only in touch but I have a presence there; I'm here to stay here, but I'll still stay 
in touch with Malta  
 (Respondent 8, Metalogical) 
 
Malta I'm passionate and I take it personal; Malta is beautiful and can't be replaced  
 (Respondent 8, Metalogical) 
 
In spite of this commitment towards his country of origin, respondent 8 asserted that 
he would be seeking dual citizenship in the near future due to his intent to settle in 
Britain on a permanent basis. He would like to feel a part of the nation to the extent 
that he can claim he is also British, and the passport can grant him this symbolic 
capital. On the other hand, he is adamant not to give up his Maltese citizenship; he 
claims he couldn’t ever do that. 
 
Ignorance 
 
Respondents holding different types of point of view related in very different ways 
to Maltese mentality as a function of their point of view. Whereas monological 
points of view either fully embraced or fully rejected Maltese mentality, dialogical 
points of view favoring Britain were able to show some appreciation from a 
distance, whilst metalogical points of view were not deterred by differences between 
the two systems. However, respondents across point of view types retained that 
Maltese mentality was ignorant and backwards and that there was a lot of room for it 
to improve and catch up with more open-minded mentalities like the British one. 
This finding was surprising, in that one would have expected such claims to not 
originate across types, but to be confined within the range of monological points of 
view favoring Britain. It seems however, that the social representation of Maltese 
mentality characterised by ignorance is pervasive amongst respondents. Maltese 
mentality is described as backwards and ignorant in the way it overly-concerns itself 
with petty issues. Respondent 38 for example claims that: 
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you also see how Maltese mentality is limited and wastes too much effort on petty 
issues; it is more closed; due to people who do not get out other than holiday, never 
have experience of living abroad; they see that things start here and finish here 
(Respondent 38, Metalogical) 
 
Respondent 40, who is in Malta, elaborates thus: 
when I have a bad day at work, with ignorant people, I say how backwards this 
place is […] here it's a small place so you come across it; for example people smoke 
when no smoking is allowed; park in the middle of the road and expect to be served 
earlier, queues do not exist; there it's more organised, more civilized 
 (Respondent 40, Dialogical) 
 
Respondent 9 argues that this has to do with the habits of seeking information and 
knowledge that the Maltese generally lack: 
 
there's a lot of ignorance I'm afraid to say […] if you compare newspapers here and 
Malta, you realise why there's much more ignorance in Malta; the Maltese need to 
read more, become more cultured […] in general there is more ignorance in Malta, 
not in terms of IQ or textbook knowledge; but here the man in the street […] they 
read papers and stay in touch […] in Malta when people read people look at them 
strangely 
 (Respondent 9, Dialogical) 
 
This finding is worthy of further study into the social representation of ignorance in 
Malta. It is curious how this seems to be shared by one and all, even by those who 
have very strong ties with Malta and who intend to settle there. Indeed, breaking out 
of it is an oft-cited reason for migration, as it is for the motive to avoid Maltese 
community. Yet aside from the social representation of ignorance, and more 
pertinent to the present inquiry, respondents described another aspect of ignorance 
that has to do with perspectives in relation. A number of respondents attributed 
ignorance to the Maltese not at the sociogenetic level of a social representation, but 
at the microgenetic level of communicative interaction (Lloyd & Duveen, 1990). 
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More specifically, the attribution of ignorance was made by individuals, who 
considered themselves to have broadened their perspective as a result of their stay in 
Britain and who in some way act according to this open perspective, to others (i.e. 
Maltese) who disapprove of their acts on the basis of a more limited perspective. 
Respondent 36 for example, who claimed that before going to the UK she herself 
was ignorant but that she opened her mind, was asked whether the Maltese in Malta 
are still ignorant. Her response illustrates well the attribution of ignorance: 
 
 I: do you think Maltese people are still ignorant?  
R: completely, completely […] the older generation, the older really piss me off 
cause they're really ignorant; they're ignorant because they're not exposed, they don't 
know any better; they don't know that a Muslim girl is as sweet and nice as their 
daughter is; they don't know she's not extremist and that she only believes in God 
like they do; they don't know, all they see is Muslim equals suicide bomber, Jew 
equals child rapist; it bothers me because I'm married to a non-catholic, a non-
practicing Muslim, sometimes it embarrasses you, the way people talk, absolute 
bullshit 
 (Respondent 36, Metalogical) 
 
She goes on to argue how she shed her ignorance as a result of her experience 
abroad, and that this broadened her mind, but that those who have not acquired the 
capacity to see things in a different way, like she has, remain ignorant: 
 
what it made me do is accept everyone, rather than not giving them a chance 
because they're black; my family are like that, this is why they're ignorant, because 
they don't know and they don't want to know; all I tell them is that you can't judge 
because you haven't done it 
 (Respondent 36, Metalogical) 
 
Respondent 31 articulates very succinctly how: “people there don't appreciate how 
things are here, because they don't know it” (Respondent 31, Dialogical). And 
Respondent 11 claims that for the Maltese in Malta: 
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ignorance is bliss; if you haven't experienced anything outside the box it's fine but 
once you've experienced it it becomes difficult to adapt back to that 
 (Respondent 11, Metalogical) 
 
Aside from a general social representation of the Maltese nation, ignorance is thus 
seemingly an attribution made by one point of view to another when the former 
perceives that the latter is failing to grasp its logic. Kruglanski (1989) has noted the 
role of logicality in attribution, claiming that attribution is itself an ‘if-then’ logical 
clause. Axial coding undertaken on the coded text models the attribution of 
ignorance as a product of a perspective that identifies the subject in a cultural 
context relative to another, and that has implications on the individual’s ability to fit 
(Figure 5). Whereas all points of view, irrespective of type, may attribute ignorance 
to another point of view, not all points of view are able to relate equally well with 
others in lieu of such attribution.  
 
Causes:	  Repatriation;	  Going	  Back	  
Strategies:	  Identity	  
Context	  &	  Intervening	  Conditions:	  Life	  In	  Malta:	  Mentality;	  Life	  in	  Britain:	  Multiculturalism	  	  
Phenomenon:	  Perspective	  
Consequences:	  Fitting	  In	  
	  
Figure 5: The attribution of ignorance 
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Acculturation 
 
The ability of points of view to relate to alternative points of view characterises their 
type and determines their acculturation outcome. Not all points of view are able to 
relate to alternative points of view to the same degree. Faced by a context that 
presents them with a new reality, all points of view experience acculturative stress 
except for monological points of view who claim that they never fit in the previous 
context and that they found they were at home in the new one. For other points of 
view, acculturative stress pushes them to adopt coping strategies that bring about 
adaptation, or ‘moulding’. An effect of this adaptation is that it broadens one’s 
perspective. As a result one acquires the capacity to see things differently, in line 
with the requirements of the new social reality, as noted by Schuetz (1944). 
Achieving this outcome is tantamount to successful moulding. This adaptation 
however, leads to structural changes in one’s point of view that in all but metalogical 
types prevent one from fitting back into the culture of origin. Axial coding 
undertaken on the coded text provides a model for this acculturation process (Figure 
6). 
 
Causes:	  Migration 
Strategies:	  Identity	  
Context	  &	  Intervening	  Conditions:	  Life	  in	  Malta:	  Lifestyle,	  Mentality;	  Life	  in	  Britain:	  Lifestyle,	  
Mentality,	  Multiculturalism	  
Phenomenon:	  Settling	  down:	  Difficulties,	  Fitting	  in,	  Adaptation	  
Consequences:	  Perspective;	  Settlement	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Figure 6: Acculturation 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Duveen & Lloyd (1986) claim that social identities are themselves a function of 
social representations. Duveen (2001) argues that identities are positions within the 
symbolic field of culture that provide a way of organising meanings to sustain a 
sense of stability. Insofar as social identities are themselves a function of social 
representations, and insofar as respondents in this study originate from a reasonably 
homogenous population (i.e. Malta prior to EU accession) in which social 
representations are understood to be shared by all, the findings of the TST that 
respondents elaborated their social identities in the same way irrespective of what 
point of view type they held was a significant finding (see chapter 4). Its 
significance lies in the non-significance of the statistical tests undertaken on the data 
that provide no reason to believe that the differences discovered to exist between 
points of view in the course of this study pertain rather to structural differences in 
social identities or the social representations that respondents were drawing on. Such 
hypotheses can be excluded, as were the differences discovered existing in either 
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social identities or social representations, this would have transpired in statistically 
significant differences in the analysis of the TST data (see Deschamps, 1986). This 
finding is an important one and in line with the aims of the study and the choice of 
the Maltese in Britain as a case. Consequently, the differences unearthed in this 
study are attributable to the interpersonal aspects of points of view as opposed to 
social identities or social representations. 
 
The case study of the Maltese in Britain enabled the exploratory study of 
interpersonal differences between points of view to be undertaken with respondents 
for whom social representations were constant and amongst whom homogeneity, or 
more accurately a holomorphic frame of reference (Wagner & Hayes, 2005), can 
therefore be reasonably assumed. No doubt, due to the socio-political changes the 
country is undergoing, the system of social representations that collectively makes 
up Maltese mentality is undergoing considerable change as Malta moves towards 
becoming a culturally plural society, due to the country opening up its borders to 
Europe and due to the influx of North African immigrants. This study could not have 
been undertaken with this population at some other point in the future, as differences 
between points of view will need to be considered in light of heterogeneity in social 
representations. And if Duveen & Lloyd’s (1986) propositions are correct, in light 
also of heterogeneity in the structure of social identities. Moreover, due to the 
present conditions of global trade, migration and global influence, homogeneity in 
representations and identities is sparse and few countries present an opportunity for 
studying points of view under the conditions that the case study of Maltese migrants 
to Britain afforded. The study of Maltese migrants to Britain is thus deemed to be a 
valid case for the study of points of view, controlling for the context in which these 
arise. 
 
This study has demonstrated how different types of point of view are marked by 
varying interpersonal characteristics in seeing and understanding things differently 
in different contexts. Monological points of view seem to be unidimensional, and 
vary only in which extreme position they hold in relation to their own kind and 
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towards another social group. For a monological type, preference for one’s culture 
and for another culture varies along a single axis; preference for one type 
automatically excludes the other type. Dialogical and metalogical points of view 
differ in their positioning when locating themselves in a two-dimensional system 
involving preferences for one’s own group and another group. Whereas it seems 
therefore that dialogical and metalogical points of view are distinguishable from 
monological points of view on the basis that the latter are unable to negotiate a 
pluralistic social reality in which alternatives exist, metalogical points of view are 
nevertheless functionally distinguishable from dialogical types. Metalogical points 
of view are able to retain a preference for both cultures, whereas for dialogical 
points of view a preference for one comes at a cost for the other (Figure 7). This 
finding contradicts the measurement of perspectives in social judgment studies along 
a single axis (Rokeach, 1951a, 1951b; Pettigrew, 1959; Detweiler, 1980), and 
supports rather Rokeach’s (1951b) claim that the differences between perspectives 
are qualitative rather than merely quantitative. 
 
 
Figure 7: Cultural preference & engagement 
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Acculturation strategies 
 
In Berry’s (2001) intercultural relations model, these two dimensions, based on 
orientations towards one’s group and towards other groups, define acculturation 
strategies in ethnocultural groups. The first dimension, what Berry et al. (2002) label 
as ‘Issue 1’, refers to the relative preference for maintaining one’s culture. The 
second, ‘Issue 2’, refers to one’s relative preference for contact with the wider 
society.  
 
According to Berry (2001) orientations can vary along dimensions to define four 
strategies of intercultural relations. Assimilation is defined by a desire to adopt the 
host culture, whilst shedding one’s own cultural identity. When individuals value 
their own culture and avoid interaction with the host culture, the acculturation 
strategy adopted is that of separation. When there is an interest in maintaining both 
one’s culture as well as adopting that of the host country, the strategy is integration. 
In contrast, marginalisation refers to instances where individuals lose their own 
native culture, but make no effort to interact with the host culture (Berry, 1970; 
Sommerlad & Berry, 1970). Berry et al. (2002) argue that integration has been 
shown to lead to the most positive outcomes and is thus the preferred acculturation 
strategy.  
 
Whilst the respondents in this study expressed a desire for assimilation, that is, 
merging with the host community, it is clear that the resultant acculturation strategy 
that ensued contact in the case of the respondents had much to do with the point of 
view they held. Whilst there was no instance of marginalisation, respondents with 
monological points of view opted either for separation or assimilation exclusively. 
This was also the case for dialogical types, albeit to a lesser degree depending on 
whether their preference was for the ways of life of the culture they came from or 
that in which they were now embedded. In contrast, respondents with metalogical 
points of view were able to successfully achieve integration, as they were the only to 
be able to amalgamate with the host country without losing the bonds of solidarity 
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that tied them to fellow compatriots. The adaptation of dialogical types came at this 
cost.  
 
Social Capital 
 
The understanding of interpersonal differences between metalogical points of view 
and dialogical and monological points of view is best located within the social 
capital literature, to which the present case study lends itself. Three major theories of 
social capital have been proposed in the literature (see Baum, 1999; Morrow, 1999; 
Schuller, Baron, & Field, 2000). According to Bourdieu (1986), capital can present 
itself in four ways: economic (money and property), cultural (cultural goods and 
services, such as educational credentials), social (acquaintances and networks), and 
symbolic (legitimation). Social capital is the aggregate of actual or potential 
resources linked to the possession of a durable network of institutionalised 
relationships characterised by mutual acquaintance and recognition. These networks 
provide members with the backing of collectively owned capital. Social capital is 
not reducible to, nor independent of, the other forms of capital, but may serve 
members to gain access to other forms. And just like economic capital, social capital 
is not evenly distributed within a society. According to Coleman (1988) social 
capital exists in the relations among persons, and describes the way in which 
families and communities are able to support each other. Social capital takes the 
form of obligations, expectations, the trustworthiness of social structures, norms and 
sanctions, and the potential for acquisition of information. Putnam (1995) adopts a 
succinct definition of social capital. For Putnam, social capital refers to those 
features of social life, such as networks, norms, and social trust, that enable 
participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives. Putnam’s 
approach has become associated with the definition and measurement of social 
capital as the norms and networks of civic engagement. 
 
Woolcock & Narayan argue that the definition of social capital is captured in the 
common aphorism of “It’s not what you know, it’s who you know” (2000, p. 225). 
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Social capital is underlined by an instantiated informal norm that promotes 
cooperation between members of a community (Fukuyama, 1999). At a societal 
level, social capital translates into an expectation of health and well-being because 
members of these communities “are able to find and keep good jobs, initiate projects 
serving public interest, costlessly monitor one another’s behavior, enforce 
contractual agreements, use existing resources more efficiently, resolve disputes 
amicably, and respond to citizens’ concerns more promptly” (Woolcock, 1998, p. 
155). However, social capital also has a downside, termed negative social capital or 
anti-social capital (Portes & Landolt, 1996), where the bonds of trust, obligations 
and commitment making up a civic community are stifling and by nature exclusive 
rather than inclusive. In the present study, a number of respondents expressed a 
desire to negotiate migration on their own lest they incur obligations with their own 
kin–an instance of avoiding anti-social capital. More importantly however, this leads 
to a distinction between intra-community ties and extra-community networks 
(Woolcock, 1998), what Gittell and Vidal (1998) have termed ‘bonding’ and 
‘bridging’ social capital. Bonding social capital refers to ties amongst like-minded 
people. It has the potential of building strong ties but it can also serve to erect higher 
walls excluding those who do not qualify for membership. Bridging social capital, in 
contrast, refers to connections between heterogeneous groups (Foley & Edwards, 
1999). This is likely to be more fragile but essentially is what enables or prevents 
social cohesion at the level of the nation-state.  
 
Different types of point of view seem to foster different types of social capital. It is 
this, in turn, that leads to the acculturation strategy adopted by individuals in their 
inter-, and intra-, cultural relations. Respondents with monological points of view 
seem to forge exclusive ties with those of their own kind, not necessarily where they 
originate from but where they claim they fit. They will avoid association with others 
who are not of their type because they do not feel at home amongst them. They will 
therefore create either bonding social capital or bridging, exclusively. Respondents 
with dialogical points of view, although open to an alternative perspective, retain a 
clear preference for one kind and whilst somewhat open to alternatives, will 
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nevertheless put their own efforts towards building up either bonding or bridging 
social capital. If they are sojourners (Berry et al., 2002), they will not waste too 
much effort on bridging social capital as they will not have much chance to redeem 
it. If they intend to naturalise, they will not waste too much effort on bonding social 
capital for fear it would mount up to antisocial capital. For both monological and 
dialogical types, a bias towards one or the other of bonding or bridging social capital 
translates into pursuing either assimilation or segregation acculturation strategies. In 
contrast, respondents with metalogical perspectives, being open to both systems, do 
not renounce capital be it bonding or bridging. They are able to appreciate both 
forms of capital for what they are, and they have the capacity to value both types of 
capital as such. Even if they choose not to make recourse to either one or the other 
forms of social capital, unlike dialogical and monological types, they are 
nevertheless capable of appreciating its value. Dialogical types undervalue one form 
of social capital, whereas monological types devalue it. The metalogical type’s 
openness to bonding and bridging social capital at the same time enables them to 
achieve integration, without sacrificing one form of solidarity at the cost of the 
other. This formulation is represented in figure 8, which tentatively models the inter-
relational functions of types of points of view in terms of acculturation strategies and 
social capital. Berry et al. (2002) argue that the course of change resulting from 
acculturation is highly variable and depends on many characteristics of the dominant 
and non-dominant groups. This study suggests that one such characteristic may be 
the type of point of view individuals hold at the time of intercultural relations.  
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Figure 8: Inter-relational functions of points of view (adapted from Berry, 2001) 
 
Identities 
 
Deschamps (1982) argues that social identities can vary fundamentally as a function 
of the material and symbolic capital that is owned by the individual. Presumably, 
identities can also vary as a function of social capital, particularly considering that 
through social capital individuals develop ties of solidarity with others and 
consequently come to belong with some and not with others. Duveen (2001) argues 
that identities are as much a system of exclusion as of inclusion. The findings of this 
study support such a claim. Duveen identifies variations in social identities, namely 
that characterised by a bipolar opposition that offers a degree of clarity and 
simplicity, and that of a union of bipolar opposites masking an implied hierarchy in 
which one group is overvalued and another undervalued. Both of these variations 
were also discovered in this study.  
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In spite of the fact that the structure by which respondents elaborated their identities 
did not differ between point of view types, substantive differences were discovered 
with regards to the content by which those identities were elaborated. The former of 
Duveen’s variations was characteristic of the identity elaborated by monological 
types, who developed an exclusive identity that by virtue of positioning them within 
one group excluded them entirely from another. If one is Maltese, then one is not 
British, and vice-versa. The latter of Duveen’s variations was characteristic of the 
identities elaborated by dialogical types that elaborated a value-added to their 
identities by virtue of reconciling bipolar opposites. One could therefore be a 
Maltese in London, as opposed to just Maltese. Moreover, due to this value-added, 
the former is superior to the latter because it comes with an open mind.  
 
This study, however, also suggests a third variation, that is one where the bipolar 
opposites are not in opposition, and they can be reconciled in a non-conflictual and 
non-hierarchical manner. One can therefore be both Maltese and British at the same 
time, and be equally Maltese and British–being a Maltese-British makes one no less 
of a Maltese and no more of a British than a Maltese or a British alone. In this 
variation, characteristic of respondents with metalogical points of view, the dual 
identity is not summative–two does not add up to more than one. Rather, this 
identity positions oneself at par with Maltese and British at the same time, and 
within Maltese and British systems at the same time. In doing this, it becomes the 
hallmark of true integration. Metalogical types are able to contract a social identity 
to join a social group (Lloyd & Duveen, 1990), without having to pay the price of 
giving up their former social identity. Individuals with this characteristic ‘dual-boot’ 
identity are able to draw on either, depending on what circumstances warrant.  
 
Perspectives 
 
Whilst the above identity differences were discovered to exist between different 
types of points of view in this study, these differences were not rooted in structural 
differences in social identities, as the TST data made clear. Structural differences 
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between points of view are seemingly located elsewhere. This study suggests that 
these may be inherent to perspectives themselves, rather than in some other 
phenomenon. The respondents’ claims that the experience of encountering 
alternative perspectives opened their minds, broadened their perspectives, and led to 
them seeing things differently, are more than cursory and are indicative of 
intrapersonal structural differences. This, however, requires further investigation that 
is taken up in the third empirical inquiry. The attribution of ignorance to other points 
of view provides further indication. The idea is that the experience of encountering 
alternative perspectives leads to socio-cognitive structural differences in one’s 
perspective that enable one to fit with the alternative. In an encounter between two 
points of view that are structurally different, one point of view will come to the 
realisation that the other point of view is unable to see things from its own 
perspective and will, henceforth, make an attribution of ignorance to the other 
perspective, dismissing it on grounds of a lack of understanding. The same 
attribution patterns have been discovered in development studies, where the 
scientific community has often attributed ignorance to indigenous populations whose 
practices differed from those propagated by experts (see Hobart, 1993).  
 
These types of attribution have, however, largely escaped the attention of social 
psychologists. Whilst social psychology has developed a voluminous body of 
knowledge on attribution theory (see Jaspars, Fincham, & Hewstone, 1983; Harvey 
& Weary, 1984; Hewstone & Jaspars, 1987; Hewstone, 1989; Försterling, 2001), 
this has by and large concerned itself with causal attributions. Yet the meaning of 
the term attribution is not limited to causal mechanisms. It can also refer to the 
attribution of characteristics or features, as when we say: “ancient societies 
attributed magical properties to stones”, or “flexibility is a key attribute of this 
army”. When a point of view attributes ignorance to another point of view, it is not 
making a causal claim but one that refers to a characteristic or feature of another 
point of view. Buss’s (1978) conceptual critique of attribution theory has criticised 
the idea that attributions are solely causal. Buss argues for the need to distinguish 
between reason explanations and causal explanations. Harré and Secord (1972) also 
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make this same distinction. The finding of the attribution of ignorance in the present 
investigation clearly fits the former explanation more than it does the latter, as the 
interlocutor would suggest that the reason why a point of view is in disagreement 
with one’s own is because the other is ignorant. It therefore provides a reason 
explanation for the point of view rather than a causal one. This finding in the present 
study thus provides fortuitous support for Buss’s distinction that may be worthy of 
further social psychological exploration.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This study has provided evidence that points of view bear on interrelational 
processes and contact outcomes. The findings are in line with the aim of this study to 
explore the interpersonal characteristics of different types of points of view. The 
type of point of view one holds has implications on one’s capacity to negotiate a 
position that fits social reality and that locates the holder functionally within the 
social system. Not all points of view are capable of fitting in to the same extent. 
Monological points of view, by virtue of their exclusive nature, may stubbornly 
close down any opportunity for positive interrelations that enable them to fit in. This 
holds both with regards to an individual’s place of origin as well as with regards to a 
new social system following migration. Points of view bear on one’s ability to fit in 
a new social system as to one’s ability to fit back into a previous one, on the basis of 
the extent to which one’s point of view is open or closed in relation to both systems.  
 
Metalogical points of view are marked by an ability to negotiate differences 
functionally, in a way that enables individuals to position themselves without 
conflict in both systems. They can function according to different backgrounds of 
intelligibility (see Daanen, 2009). Dialogical points of view are marked by conflict 
when negotiating an alternative system to the one they retain they fit. They privately 
subscribe to a background of intelligibility whilst knowing that a different one may 
be at work in another setting. Monological points of view are marked by their 
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inability to negotiate an alternative. They admit a sole background of intelligibility 
to which they conform.  
 
Consequently, this study suggests that different types of points of view can be more 
or less open to social relations, both with regards to social networks with individuals 
from other communities as well as those with individuals from one’s own 
community. Furthermore, whilst the structural organisation of an individual’s social 
identity may remain unchanged when transported into a new social setting, different 
points of view enable individuals to construct different identities that vary in the 
extent of exclusion or inclusion of difference. Whilst three individuals may all claim 
the same identity (e.g. Maltese in London), the one with a monological perspective 
will hold this in an exclusive way, the one with a dialogical perspective will hold it 
in a hierarchical way, and the one with a metalogical perspective will hold it in an 
inclusive way. All these functional differences between types are underlined by the 
extent to which one’s point of view is open or closed to an alternative. The reference 
to the degree of openness and closure in points of view, as noted above, is more than 
mere cursory. Respondents maintained that their experience has ‘opened’ their mind, 
and enabled them to ‘see’ things differently.  
 
This inquiry has thus far established a typology of points of view characterised by a 
degree of openness to alternative perspectives. This study has further suggested that 
the interpersonal functions served by different types of points of view have to do 
with individuals’ capacities for positive interrelations with different others. It has 
shown that metalogical points of view are able to transcend differences in 
interpersonal relations to an extent that neither dialogical nor monological types can. 
The structural foundations of these differences are yet to be established. This study 
suggests that these may be inherent to perspectives themselves, as social judgment 
theorists have argued (see Chapter 3). Respondents have claimed that the experience 
of migration has broadened their perspectives such that they are now able to see 
things differently. This suggests that different types of points of view are not only 
characteristically, but also structurally, dissimilar. This question has guided the third 
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empirical investigation in this inquiry. The third study looks at the intrapersonal 
properties of points of view in an effort to determine whether socio-cognitive 
structural differences mark different types of point of view, in a way that transpires 
in interpersonal relational differences. More specifically, considering that what 
seemingly varies between different types of point of view is their judgment of an 
alternative and whether this can be accommodated in one’s own perspective, or 
otherwise, the third study seeks to investigate whether structural differences can be 
identified in terms of the points of view’s latitude structure, as suggested by Sherif’s 
theory of social judgment (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 
1965; Sherif & Sherif, 1968). 
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Chapter 7:  
Intrapersonal Characteristics 
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Introduction 
 
A central issue that has emerged in the study of Maltese migrants to Britain (Chapter 
5) has been that of the broadening of perspectives when these encounter an 
alternative. Respondents claimed that in coming to understand another mentality, 
they broadened their perspectives to accommodate new ways of seeing things. The 
issue of the broadening or narrowing of perspectives has been the focus of Upshaw’s 
(1965, 1969) variable perspective theory of social judgment. According to Upshaw, 
experimental subjects judging statement categorisation do so on the basis of the 
range of their own perspectives. Upshaw argues that in a judging task, subjects will 
anchor the end-points of their rating scale to the end-points of their own perspective. 
Consequently, subjects with a wider perspective use a wider scale for judging 
statements. Upshaw argues that subjects with a wider perspective show less 
polarised ratings than subjects with a narrower perspective. This focus is beyond the 
scope of the present inquiry, yet Upshaw also claimed that subjects’ perspectives are 
widened whenever experimental stimuli were presented amongst which the judge’s 
own opinion was out-of-range. If the judge’s own position was amongst the range of 
statements presented in the experimental condition, then the condition would be 
described as in-range. In an out-of-range condition, that is, when the subject’s own 
position lay outside the range of statements presented to her for judgment during the 
experimental condition, the subject would adopt a wider perspective in which the 
end-point of their rating scale would not be anchored to the extremes of the 
presented stimulus range, but one of which would be anchored to the individual’s 
own subjective position.  
 
The idea that a particular position may be in-range or out-of-range of a particular 
perspective, and that the assimilation of such positions leads to the broadening of 
perspectives, certainly corresponds with the findings of the second inquiry. 
Respondents who came across an alternative perspective and opened themselves up 
to it claimed they developed a broader perspective. In real-life social issues, in 
contrast to the social judgment of statements according to an experimentally 
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superimposed classification, an in-range position is one that would fall within the 
individual’s range of acceptable propositions based on familiarity by virtue of a 
shared background of intelligibility, whereas an out-of-range position falls outside of 
that range. An individual who accepts and assimilates the alternative encountered 
broadens, or widens, their point of view, unlike someone who rejects it. One who 
rejects the encountered alternative sticks with a restricted range in which the 
alternative is out-of-range, and remains with a narrower point of view compared to 
the one who accepts it and broadens their range. The respondents in the second study 
who migrated to Britain and accepted and assimilated British ways claim to have 
broadened their perspectives and that they have become able to see things 
differently. Framed in this way, it would therefore be feasible to claim that the 
degree of openness and closure of a perspective depends on how wide or narrow the 
range of acceptable alternatives is.  
 
In another theory of social judgment, put forth by Sherif and Hovland (1961), this 
range is termed the latitude of acceptance. According to Sherif and Hovland, 
whether a given statement is assimilated or contrasted depends on whether it falls 
within the judge’s latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment. These 
terms refer to the respective ranges which the judges find acceptable, unacceptable, 
or about which they do not have a position for or against. Presented alternatives that 
fall within an individual’s latitude of acceptance will be assimilated, those falling 
within the latitude of rejection will be contrasted. Others that fall within the latitude 
of noncommitment receive a neutral response.  
 
Considering that any encounter with an alternative point of view can only ever be 
accepted, rejected, or treated with indifference, it becomes feasible to operationalise 
the openness or closure of perspectives in terms of their latitudes of acceptance, 
rejection and noncommitment, and how wide or narrow these latitudes may be. Even 
though Sherif’s theory and Upshaw’s theory are contrasting theories in the narrow 
domain of the social judgment of experimentally superimposed classifications in a 
laboratory, the concepts they draw on can still be profitably employed, especially 
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taking into account that social judgment is essentially a process of judging 
encountered alternatives according to subjective standards (Eiser, 1990). Social 
judgment is a comparative process that is at work every time individuals encounter 
an alternative position and bring their own points of view to bear on it.  
 
In social judgment, individuals engage in a process of categorical classification of 
items they are presented with as a function of class membership. The accentuation 
theory of social judgment (Eiser & Stroebe, 1972, Eiser, 1990) extends Sherif & 
Hovland’s assimilation-contrast theory by replacing their hypothesised role of 
anchoring with that of interclass accentuation (Eiser, 1990). Accentuation theory 
incorporates the principles of interclass accentuation described by Tajfel, whilst 
emphasising the individual’s use of subjective categories. Both of these are in line 
with the formulation of points of view being undertaken in this inquiry. Points of 
view have been found to play a role in the social identification of the Maltese in 
Britain. Moreover, the judging of alternatives relative to the social subject’s own 
position is implicated in the classification of point of view types by definition (see 
Figure 6, Chapter 5). As Eiser (1990) notes, awareness of the relativity of one’s own 
system of values in social judgment is difficult to achieve. Eiser’s example is telling 
and pertinent to the present inquiry: 
 
“Armed resistance movements are seen as really ‘terrorists’, ‘freedom-
fighters’ or whatever, not merely as ‘resistance movements of whom I 
personally happen to disapprove or approve’. Supporters of nuclear power 
are seen as really ‘complacent’ or ‘pragmatic’, and opponents are really 
‘alarmist’ or ‘concerned’, not merely as ‘making calculations of risk with 
which I happen to agree or disagree’” (Eiser, 1990, p. 98). 
 
Whilst social judgment research has been primarily driven by psychophysical 
experiments and the understanding of how people judge attitudinal statements, 
following Thurstone’s scaling methods (Eiser, 1990), social judgment in itself is 
clearly a socio-cognitive process that is involved in the interrelations of points of 
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view and that underlies many of the interpersonal characteristics of points of view 
observed in the previous study. Evidently, the references to perspectives, how wide 
or narrow categories of judgment are, and categorical classification in social 
judgment theories, are not merely coincidental and are considered pertinent to the 
present inquiry. One wonders whether differences in the latitude architecture exist 
for different types of points of view, such that a person who identifies herself 
exclusively with one group ends up with a narrow perspective and narrower latitude 
of acceptance of alternative, out-of-range positions. Presumably, and according to 
the typology of points of view observed in the first study, she would. This 
investigation, the third in this inquiry into the social psychological nature of points 
of view, aims to address this question empirically. It aims to discover whether 
different point of view types are marked by differences in their socio-cognitive 
latitude architecture and their proclivity towards alternative perspectives.   
 
For the purposes of this study, a survey was undertaken with students at the 
University of Malta that operationalised and measured points of view by way of 
vignettes, as well as latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and non-commitment 
regarding statements made in public in relation to three social issues that circulated 
in the Maltese public at the time of the investigation. The first of these concerned 
students directly and related to the stipends issue that was raised towards the end of 
the previous academic year. The second and third issues concerned citizen rights. 
The second issue was concerned with the worship rights of foreigners, to study an 
alternative from without. The third issue was concerned with Maltese migrants 
voting rights, to study an issue emerging from within. 
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Background 
 
Issue 1: The Stipends Issue 
 
The stipends issue re-emerged in the Maltese public following a recommendation by 
the University Rector to revisit the stipend system. The University of Malta, which 
is the only university in Malta and a state university, pays undergraduate students 
stipends throughout the duration of their studies. The stipend was introduced in the 
wake of independence, in an effort to provide an incentive for promising individuals 
to pursue tertiary education and help build a knowledge-society. Tertiary education 
became a goal for many, and student numbers at the University of Malta have 
increased considerably over the years. Consequently, so has the welfare burden to 
provide a stipend. The issue was put on the agenda by the Labour administration of 
1996 and attracted stiff opposition from students and the public alike.  
 
The matter was put to rest by a premature change in government in 1998. It was 
resurrected in 2009 by the Rector of the University who, in the context of a reform 
in tertiary education, proposed that the stipend system be revised and for the funds to 
be utilised towards further investment in the sector. Rector’s suggestions were this 
time endorsed by other high-ranking public officials, but once again attracted stiff 
opposition. This time, however, the debate was less one-sided, with a poll conducted 
by the students’ council suggesting that certain students were also wanting the 
removal of stipends. The proposal received further endorsement from a portion of 
the general public who expressed frustration at their imposed taxation burden for 
financing others’ studies. On the other hand, others suggested that stipends remained 
an investment towards achieving a knowledge-society and useful in helping those 
who lack financial means to pursue tertiary education. 
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Issue 2: Muslims’ right of public worship 
 
The Roman Catholic religion in Malta is by far the dominant religion in the country. 
It is inscribed in the constitution as the official religion of Malta, although equal 
rights and recognition are granted to other non-denominated religions. Numerous 
Roman Catholic churches are to be found in every village in the country, and the 
church’s calendar is intertwined with the national calendar with respect to feasts and 
public holidays. Several saintly feasts are observed as national holidays. During the 
summer months, villages vividly celebrate feasts dedicated to their patron saints by 
way of street processions, band marches, fireworks, and other festive celebrations. 
Other religions, being in a very small minority, enjoy no such exposure. Muslims in 
Malta claim a single mosque in Paola.  
 
During the spring of 2009, a group of Muslim worshippers became the subject of a 
public controversy. They had been gathering in an apartment on a prominent 
promenade that they rented for the purposes of meeting and praying together. After 
several complaints the authorities evicted the tenants, citing as reason for the 
eviction the fact that the apartment was not licensed as a public place of worship. 
The worshippers who used to gather in this apartment took their protest to the 
streets, and after getting all necessary permits from the authorities for a public 
protest, gathered and started worshipping in public on the promenade. Their protest 
concerned the fact that, unlike other fellow Maltese citizens, they were unable to 
practice their religion in their locality. This attracted opposition as well as hostile 
reactions from the public, some of whom felt that their rights of access to the 
promenade had been violated, that Muslim worship was against the norms of the 
country and detrimental to the tourist industry, that foreigners were making Malta 
their own and hijacking its culture, and that Muslim worship in Malta, being a 
minority conviction, should be restricted to the private sphere. Such was the reaction 
that after the second public gathering, the police authorities rejected subsequent 
applications for peaceful protests citing the fact that this was inciting and could 
threaten public order. Others, on the other hand, were sympathetic to the protesters. 
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They distinguished between believers and citizens and claimed that Malta did not 
belong to the Catholics, and whilst the Catholic traditions are part of Maltese culture 
these should not be imposed on everyone else regardless.  
 
Issue 3: Expatriate voting rights 
 
The Maltese general election of 2008, the first since Malta’s accession into the 
European Union, was narrowly won by the Nationalist Party. Malta was one of 
fifteen new member states that joined the European Union in 2004.  In the general 
election of 2008, the Nationalist Party, who championed the European agenda in 
Malta, claimed 49.33% of the votes cast against 48.9% that went to the Labour 
Party, a margin of 1580 votes. Various reports claimed that over 3000 Maltese 
persons living abroad were eligible to vote, and special flights were commissioned 
by the government to fly in these voters for the election. Maltese electoral law states 
that for Maltese people to be eligible to vote in a general election, they would have 
had to be resident in Malta for a continuous period of six months in the eighteen 
months prior to the election. Such restrictions, however, often go unpoliced, 
particularly in view of the newly acquired freedom of the Maltese to work and study 
in other European countries that many exploited.  
 
In its post-election report, published in the party’s newspaper on the 25th of May 
2008, the Labour party claimed that one reason it had lost the election was that the 
Nationalist government had benefitted unduly from votes cast by Maltese citizens 
living abroad and who should not have been eligible to vote (Malta Labour Party 
Electoral Commission, 2008). The issue is contentious in Malta as some have 
claimed that the ruling party does not enjoy the confidence of the majority of 
Maltese who effectively reside in Malta. Others argue, on the other hand, that no one 
can know who anyone voted for, be they Maltese residents or Maltese citizens who 
flew in from abroad, and that the latter could have voted either party. Moreover, 
many contend that Maltese who travel abroad for one reason or another are not, and 
should not, be considered as second-class citizens and should thus retain their full 
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voting rights considering that an outcome of a general election may have direct 
implications with regards to their homeland and their wishes and opportunities to 
reside there or elsewhere. 
 
Findings 
 
The study of the distribution of points of view on the three issues revealed that 
points of view were normally distributed across types for every issue. Out of the 
total of 247 respondents, there were 51 monological points of view, 135 dialogical 
points of view, and 61 metalogical points of view regarding the stipends issue. 
Regarding the Muslim rights of prayer issue, there were 58 monological points of 
view, 109 dialogical points of view, and 80 metalogical points of view. Regarding 
the voting rights issue, there were 41 monological points of view, 117 dialogical 
points of view, and 89 metalogical points of view. Such approximately normal 
distributions suggest a relationship between types of point of view across issues, 
meaning that someone who held, for example, a monological point of view on one 
issue would also be expected to hold a monological point of view on another issue. 
In this case, a correlation between point of view types would be expected across 
issues. This hypothesis was tested using Kendall’s tau_b correlation coefficient, with 
the null hypotheses that there was no relationship between: (a) stipend points of 
view and Muslim rights points of view, (b) Muslim rights points of view and voting 
rights points of view, and (c) stipends points of view and voting rights points of 
view. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 10. 
 
Variable 1 Variable 2 Correlation Significance N 
Stipends POV Muslim Prayers POV .075 .192 247 
Muslim Prayers POV Voting Rights POV .251 <.001 247 
Stipends POV Voting Rights POV -.028 .624 247 
Table 10: Kendall’s tau_b correlations between point of view types across issues 
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The analysis of correlations demonstrates that the null hypothesis of a relationship 
between points of view on the stipends issue and points of view on both the Muslim 
public worship issue and the voting rights issue could not be rejected. On the other 
hand, points of view regarding the Muslim rights issue and the voting rights issue 
were weakly but significantly correlated at the p<0.01 level. This analysis suggested 
that the stipends issue was substantively different from the other issues for the 
respondents. In fact, a deeper analysis of frequencies of the responses given to the 
point of view statements, agreement or disagreement with which was scaled on a 
five-point Likert scale, revealed that whilst the types of points of view regarding the 
issue were largely normally distributed, the levels of agreement with the individual 
statements were highly skewed against the removal of stipends in four out of five 
statements. Out of 247 respondents, 122 strongly disagreed with the first statement, 
113 strongly agreed with the second statement, 172 strongly agreed with the fourth 
statement, and 114 strongly agreed with the fifth statement. Only responses for the 
third statement were normally distributed. No such swings were evident for the 
responses to the Muslim rights individual statements and the voting rights individual 
statements, which were mostly normally distributed (see Appendix V). 
 
The swing in responses in the stipends issue suggested that respondents, in spite of 
the fact that their points of view on the issue were normally distributed, felt more 
strongly on this issue than they did about the other issues, and that this in turn might 
be associated with their point of view, thus resulting in no correlation between their 
point of view on this issue and their points of view on other issues. The analysis of 
descriptive statistics supported this hypothesis, in that it demonstrated that the mean 
value for ego-relatedness on the stipends issue ( = 8.37) was higher than the mean 
value for ego-relatedness on the Muslim worship rights issue ( = 5.85) and the 
mean value for the voting rights issue ( = 6.18). Correlational analyses were 
undertaken using Pearson’s correlation coefficient to test the hypotheses that ego-
relatedness was related to point of view type across issues. The null hypotheses 
tested were that: (a) there was no relationship between the point of view type and 
ego-relatedness for the stipends issue, (b) there was no relationship between the 
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point of view type and ego-relatedness for the Muslim worship rights issue, and (c) 
there was no relationship between the point of view type and ego-relatedness for the 
voting rights issue. Contrary to expectations, in this study and across all issues, ego-
relatedness was not correlated to point of view type, failing to reject null hypotheses 
in any of the three issues. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 11. 
 
Variable 1 Variable 2 Correlation Significance N 
Stipends POV Stipends Issue -.043 .506 247 
Muslims POV Muslim Prayers 
Issue 
-.070 .274 247 
Voting POV Voting Rights 
Issue 
-.072 .259 2147 
Table 11: Pearson’s correlational analysis between points of view and ego-relatedness 
 
A measure of construct validity was adopted in this survey by way of the 
Multicultural Ideology Scale (Berry, 1984; see Chapter 4). Reliability for this scale 
was measured using Cronbach’s α, which demonstrated good reliability at 0.81. The 
Multicultural Ideology Scale measures the degree of openness towards another 
culture. This is similar in principle to the conceptual definition of points of view 
adopted in this thesis. One would therefore expect that points of view regarding 
other cultures would be related to multicultural ideology. To test this hypothesis, a 
correlational analysis was undertaken on the points of view regarding Muslim 
worship rights and multicultural ideology. Out of the three social issues investigated, 
the right of Muslims to practice their religion in Malta was the only multicultural 
issue. Pearson’s correlation coefficient was used to test the null hypothesis that there 
was no relationship between these two variables. Results are presented in Table 12. 
 
Variable 1 Variable 2 Correlation Significance N 
Muslims POV Multicultural Ideology .238 <.001 247 
Table 12: Pearson’s correlational analysis between Muslim rights point of view and multicultural 
ideology 
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A significant correlation (p<0.01) was found between the two variables by which the 
null hypothesis of no relationship could be rejected. Further analysis was undertaken 
to explore the nature of this relationship, particularly in view of the fact that the 
relationship was not very strong. Descriptive statistics were analysed for point of 
view types. This indicated that the mean values on multicultural ideology varied 
between point of view types. The mean multicultural ideology value for monological 
types (  = 31.22) did not differ from that of dialogical types (  = 31.11). The 
mean multicultural ideology value for metalogical types did however differ from the 
other types ( = 35.38).  
 
Further analysis was undertaken by means of a one-way ANOVA to test the null 
hypothesis that the difference between means was not significant. The test score 
(F(2, 233)=10.14) revealed that the difference between means of point of view types 
and their respective multicultural ideology value was statistically significant at the 
p<0.01 level. Given, however, the difference in orientation between the two 
monological types (for and against the issue) and similarly the two dialogical types, 
and the fact that the multicultural ideology score for both types was averaged 
between the two for the purposes of classification, further analysis was pursued 
using the five point of view types rather than three (i.e. monological for, 
monological against, dialogical for, dialogical against, and metalogical). Statistically 
significant differences were found in the differences between the means of 
monological types against and those of monological types for, dialogical types 
against, dialogical types for, and metalogical types. Moreover, statistically 
significant differences were also found between the differences in the means of 
dialogical types against and those of monological types for, dialogical types for, and 
metalogical types. On the other hand, no statistically significant differences were 
found between monological types and dialogical types favouring Muslim rights, 
monological types favouring Muslim rights and metalogical types, and dialogical 
types favouring Muslim rights and metalogical types (Table 13). 
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Variables t  N p 
Monological against*Monological for 6.21 51 <0.01 
Monological against*Dialogical against -2.91 109 <0.01 
Monological against*Dialogical for 4.88 41 <0.01 
Monological for*Dialogical against 4.56 41 <0.01 
Monological for*Dialogical for 0.89 43 0.38 
Monological against*Metalogical -6.94 50 <0.01 
Monological for*Metalogical 0.86 42 0.39 
Dialogical against*Dialogical for -3.09 30 <0.01 
Dialogical against*Metalogical -5.35 158 <0.01 
Dialogical for*Metalogical -2.76 31 0.78 
Table 13: t-test results for multicultural ideology by point of view types 
 
A central element of this inquiry was the investigation of the latitudes of acceptance, 
rejection, and non-commitment associated with particular types of point of view. 
The latitudes of acceptance, rejection and non-commitment were computed by 
adding the respective number of statements accepted, rejected, or neutral from a list 
of nine statements that were presented to respondents per issue. This enabled the 
analysis of mean number of statements accepted, rejected, and non-committed to be 
analysed. Subsequent analysis tested whether there were significant differences in 
these latitudes across points of view for every issue, that is, whether the latitudes of 
acceptance, rejection, and non-commitment varied significantly depending on what 
type of point of view was held.  
 
One-way ANOVAs were conducted to test the null hypothesis that there were no 
differences between point of view types in their mean numbers of statements 
accepted, rejected, and non-committed. No statistically significant differences were 
found between means of responses for the three latitudes on the stipends issue, thus 
failing to reject the null hypothesis.  
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For the Muslim rights issue, however, differences between point of view types 
emerged in their latitudes of rejection (F(2, 239)=6.99), significant at the p<0.01 
level. Further analysis was undertaken to explore the precise nature of this difference 
in means. t-tests were conducted pair-wise across the point of view types to 
determine which point of view types differed significantly from others in their 
latitude of rejection. This analysis was also undertaken for latitudes of acceptance 
and non-commitment, given the curiously low probability levels at which the null 
hypothesis could be rejected for these latitudes (see Appendix V). The difference 
between the two monological types and the two dialogical types were tested prior to 
this analysis to determine whether those for or against the issue, be they monological 
or dialogical, differed significantly from each other. There were no statistically 
significant differences between the two monological types and the two dialogical 
types in their latitudes of acceptance, rejection and non-commitment.  There were, 
however, statistically significant differences between monological types and 
dialogical types in their latitudes of acceptance (t(104)=-2.02, p<0.05) and rejection 
(t(161)=3.79, p<0.01)18. There were further differences between monological types 
and metalogical types in their latitudes of rejection (t(104)=2.18, p<0.05). No 
differences were found in their latitudes of acceptance and non-commitment. On the 
other hand, there were no statistically significant differences at all between 
dialogical and metalogical types in any of their latitudes. 
 
For the voting rights issue, no statistically significant differences were immediately 
discernible between point of view types in their latitudes of acceptance, rejection, 
and non-commitment (Appendix V), thus failing to reject the null hypothesis of no 
differences between the latitudes of the various point of view types. However, 
further analysis using t-tests was undertaken in view of the curiously low probability 
value at which the null hypothesis of no differences in the latitudes of acceptance 
between point of view types could be rejected (p<0.8). Subsequent analysis revealed 
that there were differences between the two monological types in their latitudes of 
                                                18	  Levene’s test for equality of variance was significant at the p<0.01 level (see Appendix 
V)	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non-commitment (t(26)=2.057) and rejection (t(27)=-2.4) that were statistically 
significant at or under the 0.05 level of significance. No such differences were found 
between the two dialogical types, however, the distinction between the two 
monological types was retained in further analyses and the means of the two were 
analysed differently.  
 
The first monological type [1] expressed itself against granting Maltese abroad the 
right to vote, whereas the second monological type [2] adopted a more liberal 
approach and expressed itself in favour of granting Maltese abroad equal voting 
rights. Subsequent analysis using t-tests to test for statistical differences in latitudes 
between the various point of view types, with a null hypothesis of no differences, 
revealed a statistically significant difference in the latitudes of acceptance between 
the first monological type and the first dialogical type (in favour of some 
restrictions) (t(54)=2.09, p<0.05), and in the latitudes of rejection between the first 
monological type and metalogical types (t(38)=-2.353, p<0.05). Curiously, no 
statistically significant differences were evident between first monological types (in 
favour of restrictions), and second dialogical types (against restrictions). Further 
differences were discovered in the latitudes of non-commitment between the second 
monological types and the first dialogical types (t(26)=-2.72, p<0.05) as well as the 
second dialogical types (t(22)=-2.34, p<0.05). No differences between the second 
monological types and the metalogical types were discovered. There were no 
statistically significant differences between either of the dialogical types and the 
metalogical types.  
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Subsequent statistical analysis sought to identify differences in points of view along 
varying demographic data. Chi-Square tests were undertaken to determine whether 
types of point of view were associated with demographic variables. Analysis 
revealed that gender was not associated with points of view regarding the stipends 
issue and the voting rights issue, but was associated with the Muslim rights issue 
(χ2(2, N=247)=6.48, p<0.05). Table 14 presents the cross-tabulation of these 
variables. 
 
Table 14: Cross-tabulation gender and Muslim rights point of view 
 
Further to these differences between males and females, additional analysis was 
undertaken on the associated variable of multicultural ideology, to test the null 
hypothesis that the means of the two groups on this variable did not differ between 
the groups. Given that multicultural ideology had previously been found to be 
correlated with points of view regarding the rights of Muslims to worship, a 
statistically significant difference was expected. The t-test undertaken revealed a 
statistically significant difference between the means of males and females on their 
mean multicultural ideology values (t(142)=-4.40, p<0.01), rejecting the null 
hypothesis.  
 
Gender * Muslim Rights POV Crosstabulation 
Muslims POV 
 
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
Count 32 67 60 159 Female 
% within Gender 20.1% 42.1% 37.7% 100.0% 
Count 26 42 20 88 
Gender 
Male 
% within Gender 29.5% 47.7% 22.7% 100.0% 
Count 58 109 80 247 Total 
% within Gender 23.5% 44.1% 32.4% 100.0% 
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In contrast to gender, neither age, nor religious beliefs, nor place of residence, nor 
class19 were associated with any point of view. Other than gender, the variable of 
faculty was associated with certain points of view. The faculty variable was recoded 
into two values representing the Arts and the Sciences. Due to low cell frequency, it 
was not possible to conduct any analysis with the original faculty distinctions. 
Recoded into Arts/Sciences, the faculty variable was not associated with the Muslim 
rights of worship point of view, but its association with the stipends issue point of 
view was only just not significant (χ2 (2, N=245) =5.93, p=0.051), whilst its 
association with the voting rights point of view was statistically significant (χ2 (2, 
N=245)=9.79, p<0.01). The cross-tabulation of Faculty by point of view type on the 
voting issue is presented in Table 15. 
 
Faculty * Voting POV Crosstabulation 
Voting POV 
 
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
Count 7 53 33 93 Sciences 
% within Faculty 7.5% 57.0% 35.5% 100.0% 
Count 33 64 55 152 
Faculty 
Arts 
% within Faculty 21.7% 42.1% 36.2% 100.0% 
Count 40 117 88 245 Total 
% within Faculty 16.3% 47.8% 35.9% 100.0% 
Table 15: Cross-tabulation faculty and voting rights point of view 
 
                                                
19 measured through father’s employment 
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Another demographic associated with certain point of view types was the year of 
study. The association between year of study and Muslim rights of worship point of 
view was statistically significant (χ2 (6, N=246)=17.75, p<0.01), rejecting the null 
hypothesis of no association between the variables. Table 16 hereunder presents the 
cross-tabulation between year of study and Muslim rights point of view. 
 
Yr of Study * Muslims POV Crosstabulation 
Muslims POV 
 
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
Count 23 37 40 100 Year 1 
% within Yr of 
Study 
23.0% 37.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
Count 17 25 19 61 Year 2 
% within Yr of 
Study 
27.9% 41.0% 31.1% 100.0% 
Count 8 28 19 55 Year 3 
% within Yr of 
Study 
14.5% 50.9% 34.5% 100.0% 
Count 10 19 1 30 
Yr of 
Study 
Years 4/5 
% within Yr of 
Study 
33.3% 63.3% 3.3% 100.0% 
Count 58 109 79 246 Total 
% within Yr of 
Study 
23.6% 44.3% 32.1% 100.0% 
Table 16: Cross-tabulation year of study and Muslim rights of worship point of view 
 
The association between year of study and points of view on the stipends issue was 
not statistically significant. The association between year of study and points of view 
on the voting rights issue was not statistically significant, but only just (χ2 (6, 
246)=12.16, p=0.058). The same pattern of differences amongst the various years of 
study in points of view regarding voting rights was discernible as in points of view 
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regarding Muslim rights of worship. The cross-tabulation of year of study with 
voting rights point of view is presented in Table 17. Further to the Chi-Square 
analysis above in relation to Muslim rights of worship, a one-way ANOVA was 
conducted to determine whether there were differences in the mean scores on 
multicultural ideology between the various years of study, given that multicultural 
ideology had previously been found to be associated with the point of view on 
Muslim rights of worship, testing the null hypothesis of no differences in mean 
scores between the groups. Contrary to expectations, the difference in means was not 
significant (F(3, 231)=1.33, p=0.27), failing to reject the null hypothesis. 
 
Yr of Study * Voting POV Crosstabulation 
Voting POV 
 
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
Count 17 39 44 100 Year 1 
% within Yr of 
Study 
17.0% 39.0% 44.0% 100.0% 
Count 14 31 16 61 Year 2 
% within Yr of 
Study 
23.0% 50.8% 26.2% 100.0% 
Count 4 30 21 55 Year 3 
% within Yr of 
Study 
7.3% 54.5% 38.2% 100.0% 
Count 6 17 7 30 
Yr of 
Study 
Years 4/5 
% within Yr of 
Study 
20.0% 56.7% 23.3% 100.0% 
Count 41 117 88 246 Total 
% within Yr of 
Study 
16.7% 47.6% 35.8% 100.0% 
Table 17: Cross-tabulation year of study and voting rights point of view 
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Further analysis was undertaken with demographic variables to test whether any of 
these could serve as predictors for point of view types. To this end, three logistic 
regressions were undertaken with stipends point of view type, Muslim rights point of 
view type, and voting rights point of view type as independent variables 
respectively. The regression analyses tested for main effects of the demographic 
variables, in an effort to identify which of the demographic variables could predict 
point of view type. Given that the correlational findings between points of view 
demonstrated little consistency in point of view types across issues, it was expected 
that any predictors for one point of view type need not necessarily have any 
predictive power for a respondent’s point of view type for another issue. The 
monological category was treated as the baseline category for the comparative 
purposes of regression. 
 
None of the demographic variables proved to be significant predictors for points of 
view on the stipends issue (see Appendix V). This finding is not surprising given 
that for this issue, points of view were not associated with any other variables and 
responses to the various items were heavily skewed. The stipends issue in this study 
presented itself as a singular issue that was substantively different from the other 
issues as it applied very strongly to all respondents regardless of any demographic 
differences between them.  
 
The logistic regression for the points of view regarding the Muslim rights of worship 
issue included the Multicultural Ideology Scale as an additional predictor variable to 
the demographic data. This was included in view of the fact that points of view 
regarding this issue were found to be correlated with multicultural ideology scores. 
The regression demonstrated that Multicultural Ideology was in fact a significant 
predictor for point of view type regarding the Muslim rights issue (χ2 (2, 
N=245)=20.58, p<0.01). This confirms construct validity for the point of view as 
conceptualised in the present inquiry. It was, moreover, found to be the only 
significant predictor of point of view types on this issue. Respondents with higher 
multicultural ideology scores were found to more likely be dialogical (χ2 (1, 
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N=245)=4.438, p<0.05) and even more likely to be metalogical (χ2 (1, 
N=245)=15.89, p<0.01) than monological (Table 18). None of the other 
demographic data proved to be significant predictors of point of view type, meaning 
that demographic differences amongst students were not predictive of their points of 
view on this issue. This regression model significantly fit the data (χ2 (38)=71.44, 
p<0.01). 
 
  B Std Error Exp(B) 
Constant -2.38 2.17  Dialogical 
Multicultural Ideology 0.09* 0.04 1.09 
Constant -7.739 2.67  Metalogical 
Multicultural Ideology 0.195** 0.049 1.22 
*   p<0.05 ** p<0.01 
Table 18: Parameter estimates for Muslims POV Logistic Regression 
 
The logistic regression for points of view regarding the voting rights issue was 
undertaken with the demographic variables as predictors. Unlike the other two 
issues, certain demographic variables proved to be significant predictors for the type 
of point of view adopted. Both year of study (χ2 (6, N=245)=15.26, df=6, p<0.05) 
and faculty type (χ2 (2, N=245)=9.29, p<0.01) proved to be significant predictors. 
Religious beliefs narrowly failed to reach significance. None of the other variables 
was found to be a significant predictor of point of view types regarding this issue. 
This model significantly fit the data (χ2 (36)=58.33, p<0.05). Respondents in their 
third years were found to be over nine times more likely to be dialogical (χ2 (1, 
N=245)=5.45, p<0.05) and twenty-six times more likely to be metalogical (χ2 (1, 
N=245)=8.41, p<0.01) than monological, compared to fourth/fifth year students. 
Moreover, first year students were found to be over twelve times more likely to be 
metalogical (χ2 (1, N=245)=5.83, p<0.05) than monological, compared to 
fourth/fifth year students. With regards to the programme of study, science students 
were found to be almost six times more likely to be dialogical (χ2 (1, N=245)=7.91, 
p<0.01) and four times more likely to be metalogical (χ2 (1, N=245)=4.63, p<0.05) 
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than monological, compared to arts students (Table 19). Detailed statistical output 
for all variables is presented in Appendix V. 
 
  B Std Error Exp(B) 
Constant 1.59 2.07  
Year of Study 3 2.25* 0.96 9.49 
Dialogical 
Sciences 1.74** 0.62 5.68 
Constant -7.739 2.67  
Year of Study 1 2.53* 1.05 12.53 
Year of Study 3 3.26** 1.13 26.10 
Metalogical 
Sciences 1.40* 0.65 4.06 
*   p<0.05 ** p<0.01 
Table 19: Parameter estimates for Voting POV Logistic Regression 
 
Finally, as noted, respondents were required to indicate the extent to which they 
found a statement acceptable on a scale from -2 to +2. Positive values indicated 
acceptance, negative values rejection, and a neutral value non-commitment. These 
were used to measure the latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and non-commitment for 
the various statements. Due to the fact that a 5-point scale was used for these 
purposes, it was possible to recode responses along the lines of the common Likert-
scale, ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. This procedure was 
undertaken to analyse the relevance of a measure of points of view for better 
understanding attitudes.  The following analysis is illustrative in this regard. 
 
Coding the responses in such fashion for a particular statement that expressed an 
attitude towards reciprocal intolerance, the range of responses indicates that whilst 
an absolute majority agrees that intolerance should not be reciprocated, a quarter of 
the sample disagrees with this premiss. In fact, counting the non-committal ones, 
almost forty percent are in fact not in outright agreement that the country should not 
reciprocate intolerance. The attitude distribution is presented in Table 20. This could 
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be a worrying concern for stakeholders seeking to promote tolerance and cultural 
diversity in Malta, particularly coming as it does from the tertiary sector. 
 
Issue 2: Muslim Prayers [The fact that certain Muslim countries are intolerant does not 
mean we should ourselves become intolerant] 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Disagree 32 13.0 13.0 13.0 
Strongly Disagree 27 11.0 11.0 24.0 
Agree 61 24.8 24.8 48.8 
Strongly Agree 87 35.4 35.4 84.1 
Neither Agree Nor 
Disagree 
39 15.9 15.9 100.0 
Valid 
Total 246 100.0 100.0  
Table 20: Attitude measurement for statement no. 2 of Muslim worship rights issue 
 
The cross-tabulation of this attitude measurement with the point of view (Table 21), 
however, reveals a critical finding. In fact, out of the quarter of the sample who are 
inclined towards reciprocal intolerance, 6 respondents (i.e. two and a half percent of 
the sample) are metalogical and thus demonstrably able to see both sides of the coin 
in spite of their manifest evaluation of this statement. A substantial thirty 
respondents, i.e. half of the quarter that express a preference for reciprocal 
intolerance, are in fact dialogical, that is, they ascribe legitimacy to an alternative 
perspective that they believe is wrong. This would also mean that these, along with 
the metalogical ones, stand to be convinced otherwise with regards to this particular 
statement. Only twenty-two respondents express themselves in a monological way. 
This translates as less than nine percent of the sample who advocate reciprocal 
intolerance and who, being monological, are themselves fundamentalist in their own 
views. The relationship between these two variables in this case is statistically 
significant (χ2=39.19, df=8, p<0.01). 
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Crosstab 
Count 
MtypePOV 
 
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
Disagree 7 19 5 31 
Strongly Disagree 15 11 1 27 
Agree 12 28 21 61 
Strongly Agree 17 27 43 87 
Issue 2: Muslim Prayers 
[The fact that certain 
Muslim countries are 
intolerant does not mean we 
should ourselves become 
intolerant] 
Neither Agree Nor 
Disagree 
6 23 10 39 
Total 57 108 80 245 
Table 21: Cross-tabulation of point of view with attitude statement 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The starting point of any scientific inquiry is an explanation of the nature of the 
phenomenon under investigation (Asch, 1952/1987; Sherif & Sherif, 1968). 
Consequently, an analysis of points of view as social-psychological phenomena, 
which has been the central preoccupation of this thesis, necessarily faces the 
question of explicating the precise nature of this phenomenon. The fact that people 
can hold consistent views in relation to certain issues that have a bearing on their 
interrelations with others (as demonstrated in the second study, see Chapter 6) does 
not in itself define the nature of these views. Whilst the debate over whether 
cognition is a generative mechanism or whether it is a discursive feature (Edwards & 
Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1998) is beyond the scope of the present inquiry, 
the socio-cognitive nature of points of view requires determination. Insofar as points 
of view are rooted in socio-cognitive processes, then differences in the cognitive 
structure should transpire in a comparison of types. The present inquiry sought an 
answer to this question through a study of the latitude structure of points of view. 
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The results demonstrate that the cognitive structure does indeed differ between point 
of view types. This provides evidence that points of view are not merely a discursive 
epiphenomenon, but that they are marked by characteristic intrapersonal differences 
in the socio-cognitive architecture. 
 
Cognitive style 
 
Insofar as points of view are cognitively structured, then an expectation of cognitive 
consistency, and by extension cognitive style (Sternberg & Zhang, 2001) is 
reasonable. If points of view serve individuals to orientate themselves amidst a 
plurality of views, then individuals ought to be inclined to organise their feelings, 
attitudes, and beliefs into internally consistent structures, and when they encounter 
incompatible views they ought to be inclined to resolve the apparent contradiction 
(Eiser & Stroebe, 1972). This inclination describes cognitive consistency. By 
extension, individuals ought to do so according to their preferred mode of thinking 
and information processing, that is, their cognitive style. Consequently, it would be 
reasonable to expect individuals who have a certain type of point of view in relation 
to one issue to have a similar type of point of view in relation to other issues. The 
theories of cognitive consistency and cognitive style therefore warrant the 
expectation of coherence across issues in point of view types, for example, that 
someone with a monological point of view with regards to worship rights would 
have a similarly monological point of view with regards to voting rights. The social 
judgment theories of perspectives and narrow-mindedness assumed the relative 
stability of perspectives in individuals (Rokeach, 1951a, 1951b; Kruglanski, 2004). 
Conversely, individuals may arguably be expected to perceive differences and 
nuances between different social issues and tailor their point of view accordingly.  
 
The findings of this inquiry support this latter theory of cognitive complexity (Bieri, 
1961; Burleson & Caplan, 1998). Whilst the fact that different points of view are 
similarly rooted in the cognitive structure and demonstrate some degree of 
correlation, points of view do differ markedly with regards to different issues. In the 
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present inquiry, the points of view adopted with regard to the stipends issue were 
totally uncorrelated with other points of view regarding other issues. This 
demonstrates that individuals will adopt a particular type of point of view depending 
on the characteristics of the issue rather than some intrinsic cognitive style. On the 
other hand, whilst the correlation was weak, it was nevertheless significant in the 
two issues that were more closely related and almost equally distant to the 
immediate interests of respondents (in terms of ego-relatedness), to the extent that 
knowing an individual’s point of view type on one issue explains over six percent of 
the variance in the point of view type regarding the other issue. It would thus be 
reasonable to conclude that whilst individuals may have a preferred cognitive style, 
they are equally capable of appreciating each issue on its own merits, and to 
orientate themselves accordingly in adopting a particular type of point of view 
towards it. Such a conclusion rules out the hypothesis that a cognitive style is hard-
wired into an underlying neural module or a stable personality type, as these would 
not afford the flexibility demonstrated in this study. In contrast, the findings of this 
study demonstrate that cognitive style is not deterministic, and whilst knowing 
someone’s point of view on one issue does go some way towards knowing their 
point of view on another issue, this is by no means a determined conclusion.  
 
Latitudes architecture 
 
The central issue investigated in this third inquiry is whether, and to what extent, do 
latitudes of acceptance, rejection and noncommitment vary with point of view type. 
A point of view that is relatively more closed than another point of view (i.e. a 
monological point of view as compared to a dialogical one, or a dialogical one as 
compared to a metalogical one) would be expected to have a narrower latitude of 
acceptance with little leeway in terms of entertaining different perspectives. It would 
also be expected to have a wider latitude of rejection, as alternative perspectives are 
negated or rejected if they do not match with the one the individual upholds. 
Conversely, more open perspectives would be expected to reject alternatives less 
outrightly, and that this would be reflected in narrower latitudes of rejection and 
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wider latitudes of acceptance. The findings of this inquiry certainly do not support 
such clear-cut expectations.  
 
In this study, no differences in latitudes were found to exist between point of view 
types with regards to the stipends issue, whereas differences between point of view 
types emerged with regards to the other two issues. In a sense, the stipends issue was 
substantively different from the other issues, in that its implications were directly 
and materially applicable to the population being studied in a way that neither of the 
other two issues was. The higher levels of ego-relatedness with regards to this issue 
as compared to the others, as well as the skewed distributions in response to the 
individual point of view statements, are testament to this. Given the human ability 
for cognitive complexity, supported above, it is therefore reasonable to expect a 
different cognitive structure with regards to this issue than that which characterises 
the other two. 
 
The nature of the differences in latitudes, however, varied somewhat in relation to 
the Muslim worship rights issue and the voting rights issue. Differences between 
point of view types in the Muslim rights issue were clear and straightforward. 
Monological types differed from both dialogical types and metalogical types in their 
latitudes of rejection. Monological types also differed from dialogical types in their 
latitudes of acceptance. With regards to the voting rights issue, differences again 
emerged between certain monological types and other monological types as well as 
metalogical types in their latitudes of rejection. Further differences emerged between 
other monological types and dialogical types in their latitudes of noncommitment. 
And similar to the Muslim rights issue, there were also some differences in the 
latitudes of acceptance between certain monological types and certain dialogical 
types.  
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The most robust conclusion that accrues from these findings is that the differences 
that exist in the cognitive structure between point of view types lie not so much with 
the latitudes of acceptance in themselves, although there do seem to be differences 
between monological and dialogical types here. However, differences are more clear 
when it comes to appraising an alternative that is not readily acceptable. More 
consistent differences have thus emerged in the latitudes of rejection between point 
of view types, particularly between monological types and metalogical types. And 
whilst in the voting rights issue, these differences did not transpire into latitudes of 
rejection, they did however emerge in the latitude of non-commitment. It seems 
therefore, that the latitude of acceptance may be relatively stable across points of 
view. This may be given by the holomorphic social representations (Wagner & 
Hayes, 2005) that a particular society may endorse, and that regulate norms and, as 
argued in this thesis, serve to inform individuals’ points of view. Views in line with 
these norms are thus accepted, although as noted, there are also some noteworthy 
differences between monological and dialogical types here. On the other hand, 
treatment of a new alternative varies across point of view types, more specifically 
between monological types and the other two. These findings are in line with 
Upshaw’s variable series model and the width of perspectives in the social judgment 
of in-range and out-of-range stimuli. 
 
This evidence also demonstrates clearly that intrapersonal differences exist between 
point of view types and that these are rooted in their respective cognitive structure. 
This finding addresses the core concern of this third empirical inquiry and provides 
clear evidence that points of view are in their nature psychological phenomena, as 
well as social (as the second study demonstrated), marked by differences in social 
cognition across types. This lends support to Sherif’s theory of social judgment. The 
fact that differences in latitudes varied across issues is not entirely surprising, and 
highlights the fact that these differences are not merely cognitive, but socio-
cognitive in nature. It is difficult to provide a definitive answer as to whether some 
perspectives are wider or narrower than others, as Upshaw suggested. However, this 
is fully understandable when taking into consideration the argumentative context of 
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the issues investigated. These played no part in Upshaw’s studies but are 
immediately relevant to the present inquiry. In a sense, had this study investigated a 
single issue, one would have been inclined to conclude, for example, that differences 
between points of view lay exclusively in their latitudes of rejection, had the Muslim 
rights issue been chosen for a case study, or that no differences at all existed, had the 
stipends issue been the selected case. However, as this investigation demonstrates, 
where the intrapersonal differences between points of view lie depends on the issue 
being considered and how it is framed argumentatively.  
 
The contextual and argumentative factor plays a determinate role in the socio-
cognitive structure of points of view. For example, in contrasting the Muslim 
worship rights issue with the voting rights issue, being open on the voting rights 
issue would translate into being more liberal, hence rejecting more of the restrictive 
statements than ‘labour-oriented’ monological types. In this way, we are justified in 
saying that metalogical types are more openly predisposed towards alternatives, in 
line with Upshaw’s theory, but this may not literally translate into having a narrower 
latitude of rejection compared to a monological type. This would depend on the 
argumentative and contextual aspects of the issue. This finding lends support to 
Billig’s critique of attitudes and the relevance of the argumentative context (see 
Chapter 3). 
 
Construct validity 
 
The second study in this inquiry into points of view documented differences in the 
way different types were able to relate to an alternative culture. In light of this, 
differences were therefore expected between point of view types in multicultural 
ideology. This variable additionally afforded a measure of construct validity, in that, 
insofar as points of view were more or less open to an alternative cultural 
perspective, this ought also to transpire in the extent to which the same individual is 
predisposed towards interacting with another culture. A significant correlation was 
therefore expected between point of view types and multicultural ideology, and this 
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was indeed borne out in the findings of this study. Furthermore, the fact that the 
correlation is not high supports the conclusion that a point of view on 
multiculturalism is not the same as multicultural ideology, but significantly related 
to it. This correlation therefore supports the construct validity of the point of view as 
a phenomenon that has relational functions with regards to alternative perspectives. 
 
A further key finding to emerge from the correlational analysis of this variable is in 
the difference between dialogical types and metalogical types as argued in Chapter 6 
and Figure 8. Such differences did not transpire in the latitudes of acceptance, 
rejection, and noncommitment. Both dialogical and metalogical types differed 
significantly from monological types in certain latitudes, but these differences did 
not transpire between dialogical types and metalogical types themselves, leading to 
the conclusion that there might be no real or substantive differences between the 
two. This, in fact, is not the case. Whilst, as Figure 8 outlined in the previous 
chapter, dialogical types and metalogical types are distinguished from monological 
types in terms of the dimensions taken into account in the appraisal of a perspective, 
differences between point of view types in their respective measures of multicultural 
ideology conform to the pattern set out in Figure 8.  
 
Metalogical types score as highly on the multicultural ideology measure as 
monological types that are all out for multiculturalism, and dialogical types that 
value this type of relation. In relating with another culture, metalogical types relate 
as well as monological or dialogical types that favour assimilation. This is 
represented as ‘Issue 2’ in Figure 8. And as a prediction based on this model would 
forecast, the differences between metalogical types, dialogical types and 
monological types favouring multiculturalism, and other points of view that do not 
favour multiculturalism, are all statistically significant, whilst the differences 
amongst them are not. In essence therefore, metalogical types are, on this measure, 
distinguishable from some dialogical types [type 1 against multiculturalism]. It was 
not possible in this study to test the converse hypothesis whether metalogical types 
differed from type 2 dialogical types [that favour another culture] with regard to 
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their own native culture. This is a predictive hypothesis that emerges from the 
conceptualisation of intercultural relations described in Figure 8, that is represented 
in ‘Issue 1’ and that should transpire between metalogical types and dialogical 2 
types, but that could not be tested in the present study. In all other ways, the testable 
hypotheses emerging from the conceptualization of points of view described in 
Figures 7 and 8 that emerged from the second empirical inquiry were borne out in 
the present study. Furthermore, as the regression analysis demonstrated, respondents 
who scored highly on multicultural ideology were more likely to be dialogical and 
even more likely to be metalogical, than monological. This finding lends further 
support to the construct validity of the typology of points of view formulated in this 
inquiry.  
 
The implications of these findings extend beyond the immediate concerns of 
conceptualising the point of view, in that this finding demonstrates the value of 
promoting multiculturalism. If the promotion of multiculturalism as a policy can 
increase individuals’ openness to other cultures as indicated by their multicultural 
ideology scores, then this is demonstrably valuable inasmuch as such increases are 
predictive of an increased likelihood of adopting dialogical and metalogical points of 
view over monological ones. And due to the fact that monological points of view are 
demonstrably divisive, they remain potentially more conflictual than either 
dialogical or metalogical points of view even when their preferred acculturation 
strategy is that of assimilation, as documented in the second study of this thesis. 
Therefore, insofar as the relation between these two variables can be assumed to be 
causal and flowing in the direction of multicultural ideology to changes in 
individuals’ point of view types, then promoting multiculturalism is clearly a 
desirable pursuit. This point of discussion will be revisited hereunder in discussing 
the potential for changing and promoting certain types of points of view. 
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Ego-relatedness 
 
The measure of ego-relatedness yielded some surprising findings. Given the swings 
in agreeing or disagreeing with point of view statements for the stipends issue, and 
that this consequently resulted in the stipends issue being appraised differently than 
the other issues, the hypothesis that point of view types vary with ego-relatedness 
was reasonable. This however proved not to be the case. In essence, how strongly 
people feel with regards to some issue has no bearing on their ability for cognitive 
complexity. Feeling strongly with regards to something does not, in and of itself, 
short-circuit cognition to adopting a monological point of view. Some individuals 
who felt strongly with regards to some issue were still able to adopt a metalogical 
perspective, just like other individuals who did not feel strongly about some other 
issue still adopted monological ones.  
 
Demographics 
 
This study has demonstrated that certain social demographics may indeed be 
associated with certain types of point of view with regards to certain issues. For 
example, in this study, both gender and year of study, as well as faculty of study, 
have been found to be significantly associated with particular points of view with 
regards to specific issues. Whilst a full explanation of the reasons for these 
variations in points of view according to demographic characteristics is beyond the 
scope of the present inquiry, the fact that these have been found to be significantly 
associated with points of view demonstrates that particular issues may be processed 
differently by different individuals, to the extent that demographic criteria may at 
times reflect some underlying reality. What this finding demonstrates is the 
circumscription of context when it comes to expressing oneself on some particular 
issue. In certain issues, it matters whether one is male or female, a scientist or a 
philosopher, an undergraduate or a postgraduate, in the types of point of view one 
adopts with regards to the issue and, by implication, with regards to how one 
negotiates a position in the social sphere. 
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Furthermore, demographic differences have been found to be predictive of types of 
point of view individuals may hold. Differences in points of view are seemingly not 
based in gender differences. Gender is associated with particular points of view on 
particular issues, but in and of itself it does not have predictive power in determining 
point of view type and its association varies depending on the issue under study. The 
same can be said for individual differences in personality, further to the discussion 
on cognitive style above. However, certain correlates of points of view and 
personality differences, such as intelligence, require further exploration. With 
regards to specific issues however, differences in demographic characteristics may 
be indicative of differences in points of view. The regression findings regarding the 
voting rights issue demonstrate that third year students and science students are more 
likely to be metalogical and dialogical in turn, than monological, as compared to 
their fellow arts students. The ramifications of these findings are very important.  
 
Whilst an argument could be made that students with metalogical perspectives on 
certain issues could be drawn to the sciences whilst their monological counterparts 
could be drawn to the arts, the same argument cannot be made for year of study. 
Year of study was found to be significantly associated with points of view for the 
Muslim rights issue, and was found to be a significant predictor for points of view 
on the voting rights issue. Since the argument that students with particular points of 
view are attracted to particular years of study does not hold, as this is a temporal 
matter in following a programme of studies, this finding suggests that points of view 
are amenable to education. Moreover, the disciplines coded as sciences and those 
coded as arts are in themselves widely disparate, and it is hard to justify the 
argument that similar points of view could have motivated some to agriculture as 
much as others to dental surgery, which were both coded as sciences. It is reasonable 
to conclude, therefore, that as students undergo years of education and indoctrination 
in particular disciplines, they acquire the capacity to adopt certain types of points of 
view against others, with regards to certain issues. Broadly speaking, it seems that 
indoctrination in scientific principles fosters metalogical thinking amongst students 
at the University of Malta, but that progress through tertiary education leads to 
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monological thinking. Both of these claims are plausible enough, in that the 
sciences, based on principles of refutation, teach that alternative explanations that 
may not be immediately apparent may still play a role in whatever phenomena one is 
observing. Similarly, obtaining a tertiary qualification seems to come with a self-
assurance that one’s own perspective, based on institutionalised standards of 
knowledge, provides the sole and correct interpretation of worldly events.  
 
Whilst identification of the specific conditions of this influence, i.e. between 
demographic variables and points of view, requires further investigation, this finding 
suggests that particular points of view are amenable to change through influence. To 
go back to the earlier discussion of multiculturalism, it seems reasonable to suggest, 
therefore, that certain forms of intervention can foster dialogical or metalogical 
thinking with regards to certain issues, and that the demographic characteristic of 
point of view type in a given population is not beyond manipulation. This is a 
critical finding that demonstrates the heuristic value of the study of points of view. 
For the study of certain issues, it becomes certainly worth knowing the distribution 
of points of view and discovering how certain points of view could be fostered over 
others.  
 
The relevance of studying points of view pertains to the study and measurement of 
social behaviour that is relational and relative, as argued in this thesis. Unlike other 
forms of measurement that have been proposed through the years (see Fishbein, 
1967), that falter for the reason of overlooking the contingencies of the situation and 
standardising the argumentative context, the study of points of view is able to 
provide a similar account of individual orientations towards some social object that 
is circumscribed by the argumentative and discursive characteristics of the social 
representations in which it is located. Consequently, the study of points of view not 
only contributes to knowing how many are for against some issue of interest. Indeed, 
there is no distinct advantage of studying points of views over using the common 
Likert-scale for this purpose. What the study of points of view adds, and what is 
perhaps its critical pragmatic advantage over other measures, is an understanding as 
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to how many of these are, in themselves, open to discussion and negotiation with an 
alternative perspective.  
 
In quantifying the relative proportions of monological, dialogical, and metalogical 
points of view, the use of the point of view concept provides an additional 
understanding of the nature of the characteristic agreement or disagreement that 
exists with regards to some issue. It provides a clear understanding of why opinion 
polls alone do not suffice in making accurate predictions of social behaviour. If a 
substantial proportion of a given population is open to negotiation, in spite of their 
manifest agreement or disagreement with regards to the issue, then these same are 
open to last minute persuasion that may result in violent swings of opinion at some 
critical moment. This is the classical critique of the unreliability of attitudes over 
time (see Zaller & Feldman, 1992). It is illustrated in the intolerance attitude 
example above, which demonstrates that the measurement of points of view greatly 
illuminates our understanding of the situation. Whilst there may nevertheless be 
plenty of cause for concern, there is also plenty of scope to promote another agenda, 
should this be desirable. Rather than passively accepting a dissident minority that is 
alarmingly numerous, as the Likert-scale measure would suggest, this example 
shows that the hypothetical policymaker has plenty of scope and should actively 
engage with the population to promote tolerance and convince skeptics that the 
‘other’ view of cultural tolerance is legitimate, and moreover, reasonable. 
 
Framed in this way, it would appear that the point of view is a concept the relevance 
of which lies in its quantitative operationalisation. Yet it is worth bearing in mind 
that the point of view, other than being a socio-cognitive concept, is also manifest in 
discourse. The discursive study of points of view is a necessary prerequisite to its 
operationalisation for quantitative purposes. The study of points of view requires 
sensitivity to the characteristics of a social issue as it exists for a particular people. It 
is for this reason that differences in its cognitive structure cannot be boiled down to 
specific latitudes, or why the claim that a point of view is necessarily broader or 
 241 
more open than another is not justified. Unlike the Likert scale, there seems to be no 
short-cut to the standardisation of points of view. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study has presented evidence that demonstrates structural differences between 
points of view, that are functional in their interrelational aspects and that are socio-
cognitive in nature. Points of view can be described as social-psychological 
phenomena that vary in the extent to which they relate to an alternative perspective. 
This variance is rooted in a varying socio-cognitive architecture that characterises 
the extent to which points of view open themselves to the alternative proposal. This 
study has also demonstrated that these differences do not reside in specific latitudes 
or in a specific direction, although the latitudes of rejection and noncommitment 
seem to play a more significant role in appreciating an alternative than the latitude of 
acceptance. This is perhaps because the latitude of acceptance is normative given the 
prevailing social representations in which points of view are embedded. However, 
even the differences identified in the latitudes of rejection and noncommitment do 
vary with the issue. This demonstrates that, as with social representations, with 
regards to points of view, content is circumscribed by context. This is an aspect that 
the attitude programme has overlooked, as is made clear in chapter 3. By contrast, 
points of view are, by implication, bound to their argumentative context in view of 
the fact that they are by definition relational and relative. This study demonstrates 
therefore that the point of view, as a social-psychological construct, may be better 
suited to capture the relational and relative nature of social behaviour than either 
attitudes or the social representations can do on their own.  
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Chapter 8:  
Discussion & Conclusion 
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Introduction 
 
The present thesis has proposed and advanced the social psychological 
conceptualisation of ‘point of view’. The study of points of view was proposed by 
Asch (1952/1987) as a way for studying the manner by which individuals orientate 
themselves in social reality, as an extension to his conception of social attitudes. 
Similarly, Harré and Secord (1972) advocate the study of points of view in providing 
an explanation of individual positioning in social behaviour. The conceptualisation 
of points of view in the present thesis rests fundamentally on a conception of social 
representations that circulate in the public sphere, in which subjects are systemically 
engaged and on the basis of which they act in context-rational ways. Subjects 
position themselves in relation to others in their social environment, adopting a 
particular outlook towards an object or issue in their social life that is meaningful in 
view of a social representation that renders it legitimate. Through their point of 
view, individuals relate to others and to the object in question. A point of view is 
necessarily relational, being oriented towards other subjects and objects in the social 
environment, as Bauer & Gaskell’s (1999) model for social representations 
postulates. Furthermore, a point of view is necessarily relative, being one point of 
view amongst others. Points of view describe social reality as it exists for 
individuals, relative to others.  
 
This thesis contends that social reality is, like physical reality (Einstein, 1916; see 
Chapter 3), contingent on the perceiver’s point of view. Social reality is phenomenal 
rather than objective, that is, it appears to the observer depending on a background 
of intelligibility that serves the function of interpretation (i.e. a social 
representation). This interpretative nature of social reality is the great paradigm shift 
precipitated by social constructionism (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). This thesis 
postulates that, in addition to collective processes of social construction, whether an 
alternative description of social reality is admitted or bears influence depends not so 
much on the characterisation of that view and whether it has, effectively, some point 
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to make. Rather, admitting an alternative description depends on the characteristic 
features of the appraiser’s own point of view.  
 
Points of view are fundamentally rooted in the public sphere and are implicated in its 
very nature. Public spheres can be more or less conducive to open dialogue and the 
negotiation of alternative views, and through the exercise of power can legitimate 
some and censor others. Which views are accepted, rejected, or treated with 
indifference transpires at the personal level in the social-psychological features of 
points of view. The point of view is a social phenomenon inasmuch as it is a view 
that incorporates other entities, and it is psychological inasmuch as it is an 
individual’s point, or position, that relates to others. Both of these features have been 
empirically explored in the present thesis. The empirical studies undertaken in this 
inquiry have documented three types of point of view that differ in their treatment of 
alternative rationales for contrasting points of view. These differences are based on 
intrapersonal socio-cognitive properties inherent to points of view that serve to 
structure interpersonal relations. These findings are revisited and elaborated 
hereunder, along with an appraisal of the contribution the study of this construct 
makes to social theory and the understanding of social behaviour. 
 
The explanation of social behaviour 
 
Social psychology has for a long time relied on ‘attitude’ to explain how individuals 
orientate themselves to objects in their surroundings. ‘Attitude’ arguably represents 
social psychology’s greatest contribution to the social sciences. At its most basic 
attitudes represent an individual’s evaluation of an attitude object (Thurstone, 1967a, 
1967b; Sherif & Sherif, 1967; Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2005). Alongside its 
aggregate counterpart, public opinion, attitude measurement continues to dominate 
the social sciences at large, as evidenced by the widespread use of Likert scales. The 
Likert scale, as an attitude measure, serves to combine variables into statistical 
scales, factors, or indexes that are routinely held to explain as well as predict 
behaviour.  
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Social psychology has itself been defined as the discipline concerned with the study 
of attitudes (Allport, 1967; McGuire, 1985), and since its inception has been 
immensely concerned with the measurement of this construct (Fishbein, 1967). Yet, 
the utility of attitudes has not proven unproblematic. One aspect of the problem lies 
in its presumed link to behaviour. Attitudes are held to represent predispositions 
towards stimuli in the individual’s environment that serve as inclinations towards 
behaviour. This presumption has been put into contestation ever since LaPiere’s 
(1934) study on Chinese diners demonstrated that individuals who expressed racist 
attitudes did not behave in straightforwardly racist ways as expected. The attitude’s 
link to behaviour has been addressed in manifold ways, from outlining intervening 
variables, such as intentions (Ajzen, 1985; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), to addressing 
its element of temporality (Zaller & Feldman, 1992), such as in the undertaking of 
polls of polls.  
 
Other theorists, however, have taken issue with the conceptualisation of attitudes 
and have questioned what it is that evaluation scales really measure. Allport has 
famously argued that attitudes in social psychology are better measured than defined 
(Allport, 1967). Most critiques of attitudes have centred on the way in which 
attitudes consider the social (Farr, 1996). In its early formulations, attitude was held 
to be an individual counterpart to wider societal processes, that is, social values 
(Thomas & Znaniecki, 1918-1920). In its later formulations, attitude was 
individualised and cognitivised such that the social came to represent a measurable 
variable of influence on the individual’s own inclinations (Graumann, 1986). This 
conception of attitudes has proven problematic due to its overlooking of the 
argumentative context in which social behaviour takes place (Billig, 1987, 1991), 
and gave rise to counter-formulations of social psychological constructs that retained 
concern with these wider societal processes.  
 
The study of social representations, alongside social constructionism (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966; Gergen, 1985) and discourse analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), 
has sought to counterbalance the focus on individualised social cognition in favour 
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of explicating the cultural backgrounds of intelligibility (Daanen, 2009) in which a 
given stimulus may elicit, amongst other alternatives, a context-rational response 
(Wagner, 1993). These approaches, however, have precipitated a seemingly 
irreconcilable divide between the individual on the one hand, and the social on the 
other. This divide is routinely traced back to Descartes’ (1637, 1644) postulation of 
the cogito, that is, the independent thinking mind–that the cognitive sciences, 
including certain forms of social psychology, have taken up as their object of 
inquiry. Whilst some have sought a more systemic formulation of social 
representations that exist across rather than inside individual minds (Harré, 1984; 
Wagner et al., 1999; Wagner & Hayes, 2005; Wagner, Mecha & do Rosário 
Carvalho, 2008), the chasm between the two has become a defining challenge for the 
discipline of social psychology (Gaskell, 2001) and for any explanation of social 
behaviour (Harré & Secord, 1972).  
 
The divide between the social and the individual is ontological as much as it is 
epistemological and involves different levels of explanation (Wagner & Hayes, 
2005). The social pertains to the collective life of human beings and applies to 
processes that take shape at this collective level, such as ideologies and discourse. 
The individual pertains to the human being as a single specimen and applies to 
processes that take place at this level such as cognition and perception. The gap 
between the two is well explicated by Harré (1984) in his distinction of aggregates 
from collectives. Whilst aggregates bring together individual specimens, collectives 
exist independently of individual cognition. Social behaviour, however, retains 
elements of both. Insofar as it involves an element of positioning relative to other, 
equally agentic, beings, then such behaviour can be deemed social. And insofar as 
such interpersonal relations involve an element of perception and interpretation, then 
such behaviour can be deemed personal and cognitive.  
 
This characteristic duality of social behaviour has confounded explanations on either 
side of the dichotomy. Attitude thus serves to understand an individual’s inclination 
towards some social object on the basis of characteristics of that individual, 
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including affect, behavioural tendencies, cognition, and external influences. It does 
not, however, provide an explanation for why individuals resort to certain courses of 
action given a certain stimulus. For instance, two individuals may be equally 
appalled by some event, but their individual responses may vary as a function of 
different cultural conditions in which they are embedded. Social representations, on 
the other hand, describe context-rational behaviour that is deemed reasonable in 
certain circumstances. They describe how for a certain social group, a particular 
course of action is reasonable given certain conditions. Social representations do not, 
however, explain why such context-rational behaviour may be adopted by some 
individuals but not by similar others facing the same circumstances. Not all 
individuals react in the same way to similar events. In other words, neither attitudes 
nor social representations are useful for a situational explanation of social behaviour, 
that is, for an explanation of why a certain individual acts in a certain way at a 
certain point in time. This explanation requires a focus on the individual, meaning 
that the level of explanation required is not outside the individual, on collectives in 
which the individual is systemically embedded and that legitimate individual 
behaviour, nor inside the individual, on neuro-cognitive processes that take place in 
the mind/brain. It requires looking at the individual and keeping into focus the 
individual’s inclinations relative to others contemporarily.  
 
This thesis follows in the footsteps of Solomon Asch (1952) to advance a 
conceptualisation of the point of view as a construct that bridges this divide and that 
provides a social-cum-psychological explanation of social behaviour. Asch took 
issue with attitudes as an individual cognitive construct, arguing that attitude 
measures could not realistically be regarded as scales, as they provide no 
information with regard to the frame of reference by which individuals can be held 
to mean the same thing when they reply to an attitude statement in the same way. 
Such an exclusion of the contextual character of human action precluded any 
legitimate explanation of social behaviour. According to Asch, the starting point of 
any social psychological explanation is to recognise that human beings are 
embedded in social contexts that serve to order their social surroundings in 
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meaningful ways and that legitimate their outlooks towards objects in their 
environment. Moreover, this meaning serves to bring about a communal life in 
which individuals relate with others to enact a certain social reality that serves them. 
Consequently, according to Asch, it is more meaningful to enquire into the outlooks 
individuals adopt towards some aspect of social life, on the basis of which they 
engage in mutual relations with others.  
 
Asch argues that the ability to adopt an outlook and to relate to others on the basis of 
it, with the realisation that others also have their own idiosyncratic outlooks that may 
effectively differ from one’s own, serves as a foundational characteristic for the 
enactment of communal life. According to Asch, this ability enables the 
interpenetration of views, by which individuals can adopt the perspective of the 
other and comprehend how some object can appear differently from the other’s 
perspective.  This capacity enables individuals to engage in the social check, by 
which, in taking the perspective of the other, individuals check the accuracy of their 
own perceptions with others and are thus able to make corrections to their own 
outlooks to match a socially determined reality. Asch goes on to postulate that social 
psychology needs to concern itself with social attitudes, first and foremost, and upon 
acquiring an understanding of these it would then become legitimate to inquire into 
individuals’ points of view, to understand their outlook towards a given topic. This 
provides a situational explanation of social behaviour based on an individual’s 
outlook, as this exists relative to others. 
 
This characterisation of points of view has a long tradition in philosophical thinking, 
dating back to Kant. According to Kant (1798), agents and spectators see behaviour 
from different standpoints. Consequently, different points of view may be equally 
legitimate, and no single point of view can reveal the reality of a phenomenon. What 
we see depends on the standpoint we adopt in relation to the phenomenon (Mischel, 
1969). This same characteristic of points of view enabled Sartre to resolve the 
dualism between reality and the real through the notion of infinity. Sartre claimed 
that what appears of the object is only ever an aspect of it, and that objects are 
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inexhaustible by virtue of the infinite possibility of points of view that may be taken 
on them. The point of view, in philosophical terms, is thus a relational as well as a 
relative construct. It is relational in that it implies a phenomenal perception of an 
object by a subject, and it is relative in that the appearance of the object is relative to 
whoever is acting as subject.  
 
This conception of the point of view has enabled its utility in other theories that have 
used the term as explanans for corollary social psychological phenomena (Hempel 
& Oppenheim, 1948). It transpires in the works of G.H. Mead (1934), who argues 
that human beings have the capacity to take the perspective of the other and that by 
virtue of this capacity, the self emerges in human actors. Mead argues that when a 
subject adopts the perspective of the other towards herself, the self emerges as an 
object unto itself. In Piaget’s developmental psychology, the capacity to take the 
perspective of the other emerges as a product of maturation and is a characteristic of 
logical operations. Prior to this level, human infants’ thinking is marked by 
egocentrism, which prevents the child to take the perspective of the other in relation 
to some object (Piaget & Inhelder, 1948). In Arendt’s (1958) political sociology, 
perspective taking is accorded a spatial dimension, the spatial quality of politics, by 
which human subjects participate in the public sphere. The public sphere, according 
to Arendt, constitutes a multitude of agents who judge what is enacted from their 
perspective. And similar to Asch’s (1952) claims on the interpenetration of views, 
Arendt contends that human beings are sufficiently alike to be able to understand 
one another and dispute their outlooks in spite of their idiosyncrasies. More recently, 
evolutionary psychologists have argued that shared intentionality, that is, the human 
capacity to understand the intentions of others (Theory of Mind) and on this basis to 
engage in joint attention tasks, again similar to the interpenetration of views, is the 
hallmark of human cognition. Finally, the point of view has featured as an 
explanatory construct in what is arguably the cornerstone of modern science, that is, 
Einstein’s (1916) theory of relativity. In his special theory of relativity, Einstein 
argues that the nature of physical reality depends on whose point of view is adopted. 
Einstein’s example states that a stone falls in a straight line relative to a moving 
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carriage from which it drops, but traverses a parabolic curve relative to the 
embankment.  
 
In all of these theories, ‘point of view’ has served as an explanatory device. 
However, in itself, the point of view remains largely under-defined and under-
investigated. Three social psychological theories have advanced our understanding 
of points of view. Billig’s (1987, 1991) rhetorical analysis argues that an 
understanding of social behaviour requires an understanding of the argumentative 
context in which individuals’ points of view are embedded. In adopting a certain 
point of view, individuals position themselves in favour of some and against some 
others, and that this behaviour is an argumentative one that is justifiable according to 
some common-sense. Billig’s reference to the point of view is made in lieu of his 
call to attend to this wider context of argumentation in the study of social behaviour. 
Similarly, Harré calls for a focus on the positions individuals negotiate in the course 
of social relations. In Harré’s positioning theory (Harré & Secord 1972, Harré & van 
Langenhöve, 1999) a focus on accounts is advocated towards an understanding of 
how individuals assume certain positions in social relations, relative to others. Both 
of these theories make a more or less indirect proposal to study points of view as 
these are articulated in discursive practices. Theories of social judgment, on the 
other hand, have inquired into the socio-cognitive properties of points of view more 
directly. Upshaw (1965, 1969) has furthered the study of perspectives and how these 
can be broadened through the presentation of in-range or out-of-range stimuli. In a 
similar vein, Rokeach (1951a, 1951b) and Pettigrew (1959) have inquired into the 
categorisation of alternative perspectives and have documented variances in types 
according to this dimension of judgment. Finally, Sherif (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; 
Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965; Sherif & Sherif, 1968) proposed that social 
judgment is a function of a perspective’s latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and 
noncommitment.  
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This thesis contends that these contributions can be furthered by problematising the 
point of view more directly as a social-psychological construct, rather than studying 
it solely in terms of its discursive manifestations or its functions in social judgment. 
Drawing on the philosophical and social psychological conceptions of the point of 
view, this thesis postulates a definition of ‘point of view’ as an outlook towards a 
social event, expressed as a claim, which can be supported by an argument of 
opinion based on a system of knowledge from which it derives its logic. And 
drawing on the three social psychological theories that have advanced the study of 
points of view to date, i.e. argumentation, positioning, and social judgment, it has 
undertaken three empirical inquiries that sought to describe the social-psychological 
nature of ‘point of view’ in terms of its interpersonal characteristics and its 
intrapersonal properties. 
 
Empirical studies 
 
In formulating the social psychological conceptualisation of the point of view, three 
empirical studies were undertaken in this thesis. The first study sought to identify 
instantiations of points of view in an effort to describe their nature. Insofar as a point 
of view is a phenomenon in itself then it ought to, by definition, be amenable to 
observation, and instantiations of it should be discernible under scrutiny. The first 
study was thus undertaken in a cosmopolitan public, due to the fact that such a 
public affords the presumed range of instantiations of points of view. Points of view 
are rooted in systems of knowledge that provide them with an inherent rationale. 
Points of view on a given issue are thus rooted in social representations of the issue 
that are particular to certain communities. Cosmopolitan publics bring together a 
diversity of individuals from a diversity of communities. Consequently, on a given 
issue, they bring together a diversity of points of view legitimated a diversity of 
social representations. A restricted public, on the other hand, censors some social 
representations and by implication some points of view, in an effort to preserve the 
prevailing common sense. The first study was undertaken in London following a 
controversy that arose in public over the relative merits of science and religion, and 
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whether certain belief systems are harmful to humankind. The debate was stirred by 
a documentary that aired Prof Richard Dawkins’ views over atheism, evolution, and 
religion. The controversy that ensued saw numerous individuals taking sides on the 
debate for a variety of reasons. Ten individuals were interviewed at length about 
their views on the issues debated, in an effort to identify instantiations of points of 
view. 
 
The second empirical inquiry sought to describe the interpersonal characteristics of 
points of view. Insofar as points of view are characteristically social-psychological, 
they should be marked by certain interpersonal features. The second study thus 
sought to investigate the encounter of points of view with others, relative to a 
different framework of understanding. These ‘stranger’ (Schuetz, 1944) points of 
view provide an opportunity to study social relations at the interpersonal level rather 
than at the intergroup level. In a case where a given point of view, rooted in some 
community-sense, encounters an alternative rooted in a different community-sense, 
then relations between the two could be characteristically described as intergroup 
rather than interpersonal. On the other hand, the encounter between two points of 
view that are both rooted within the same community-sense offers no possibility to 
study interpersonal relations relative to a different framework of understanding. A 
case of ‘stranger’ points of view, however, offers the possibility to investigate 
interpersonal relations both in relation to one’s community of origin as well as an 
alien community, without the confounding intergroup relations level. The case of 
Maltese migrants to Britain, who at present are deprived of a native community in 
Britain that validates their original perspectives, was identified as a case that fulfils 
these requirements.  
 
The third empirical study sought to describe the intrapersonal properties of points of 
view. Insofar as points of view are characteristically social-psychological, they 
should also be marked by certain intrapersonal features. The third inquiry 
investigated the socio-cognitive structure of points of view when they encounter a 
presented alternative, in terms of latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and 
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noncommitment. In contrast to the first study therefore, a relatively hegemonic 
public was required if emergent properties were to be attributable to points of view 
themselves rather than to the effect of social representations. The Maltese public 
sphere was selected for the purposes of this inquiry, in view of the fact that Malta 
has only recently opened up its borders to immigration following EU accession, and 
the fact that in spite of a history of colonialism and tourism, it remains relatively 
homogenous both culturally and demographically. In this case, emergent findings 
are thus directly attributable to points of view, rather than to different practices 
prescribed by different social representations that co-exist in the same public, given 
that no such plurality is evident with regards to the latter in Maltese society. 
 
This overview of the three studies undertaken in this thesis, that are further detailed 
hereunder, highlights the fact that inquiring into points of view requires sensitivity to 
the characteristics of the public sphere in which they are studied. Public spheres 
differ in the extent to which they permit different social representations and different 
points of view to exist and intermingle. They will promote and validate some, and 
censor and de-legitimate others. The study of points of view is thus a political 
enterprise, in that certain political conditions require fulfillment for certain points of 
view to exist in the first place, and to lend themselves to empirical inquiry in the 
second, as detailed above. The fulfillment of these conditions thus prevented a single 
overarching inquiry that investigated a single issue-domain within a single public, 
and that addressed all of the aims outlined above contemporarily.  
 
Study 1: The Root of all Evil? 
 
This first study, detailed in Chapter 5, looked at points of view regarding religious 
faith amongst a number of residents of London. The issue was polemicised in early 
2006 following a two-part documentary aired on British prime-time television 
entitled ‘The Root of all Evil?’. The presenter, Prof. Richard Dawkins, made a case 
for atheism, for the irrationality of religious beliefs in today’s world, and for the 
displacement of these beliefs with science. The documentary attracted much 
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criticism and generated much debate in public, as people took sides on the debate 
and voiced their views online, in newspapers, on air, and in everyday discussion. 
The study interviewed ten residents of London regarding their views on religion, 
science, and good and evil, as presented in the documentary and discussed in the 
media. Respondents reacted to a number of claims that took different positions on 
the debate and elaborated their views during the course of the interview. Their 
arguments were studied in depth in an effort to identify instantiations of points of 
view. 
 
Three types of points of view were identified in the course of this study, similar to 
Rokeach’s (1951a, 1951b) and Pettigrew’s (1959) findings, who both studied 
perspectives in terms of their width and who similarly identified three broad 
categories. Moreover, the point of view types identified in this study varied in the 
manner by which they related to an alternative perspective on the issue. This 
corroborates Rokeach’s categories that draw on Krech’s (1949) degree of ‘Isolation’. 
Krech claims that systems vary in their propensity to relate to other systems. 
According to Rokeach, perspectives could be comprehensive, isolated, or narrow. 
Similarly, Pettigrew claims that perspectives can be broad, medium, or narrow. For 
the purposes of this inquiry, the first type are termed monological points of view and 
correspond to narrow perspectives, the second type are termed dialogical and 
correspond to isolated/medium perspectives, and the third type are termed 
metalogical and correspond to comprehensive/broad perspectives. This is due to the 
fact that these three types of point of view seemingly vary in the manner by which 
they appraise another perspective in terms of its inherent logos, or sensibility, and 
whether they grant that rationale legitimacy. Different types of points of view thus 
admit different ways of looking at the issue that can be more or less reasonable in 
their own way.  
 
Respondents with monological points of view, whether they positioned themselves 
as atheists/agnostics in relation to believers, or believers in relation to sceptics, 
retained their position as the only right and legitimate position, and held that any 
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other perspectives that deviated from this were unacceptable. Respondents with 
dialogical points of view, on the other hand, conceded that others might have 
different perspectives from their own and that it was right and fair for them to have 
them. They admitted that everyone could believe or not believe as they pleased, 
without having to answer to anybody else for that. However, this acceptance of 
alternative points of view was conditional. Others had the right to believe only if 
they adhered themselves to some fundamental precepts, such as mutual recognition, 
that were in themselves unchallengeable. These points of view, whilst recognising 
other perspectives, never entertained the issue of veracity and the possibility that 
others may be right. They allowed others to hold whatever, in their opinion 
erroneous, beliefs they wanted. In so doing, they apportioned for themselves the 
same right. They thus extended others the right to be wrong, but not the right to be 
right. Moreover, alternative points of view were wrong because they were not seeing 
things properly, although they had every right to do so. By contrast, respondents 
holding the third type of points of view identified, termed metalogical points of 
view, appreciated that their own point of view was as relative as any other, and its 
reasonableness as context-dependent as any other. Those taking metalogical points 
of view argued that whilst they believed their points of view were right, they 
understood that so did others, and that they therefore could themselves be wrong, as 
could others. 
 
These characteristic types of point of view were retained for further analysis. A 
second study was undertaken with the aim of investigating the interpersonal features, 
and a third with the aim of investigating the intrapersonal features, of these different 
types of points of view.  
 
Study 2: The Maltese in Britain 
 
The second empirical inquiry was undertaken with a number of Maltese migrants to 
Britain, in an effort to explore the interpersonal characteristics of holding the 
particular types of points of view identified in the first inquiry. Maltese migrants to 
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Britain are deprived of a native community, and must hence negotiate a social reality 
to which they are strangers, and in which their original perspectives are alien. In 
such a setting, the ‘stranger’ points of view (Schuetz, 1944) subjects hold are not 
legitimated by the social representations from whence they originate, but can only be 
legitimated by alien social representations in which they need to fit. Following 
Malta’s accession to the EU in 2004, a number of Maltese citizens migrated to other 
European countries to enjoy their newly gained home-status as European citizens. 
This home-status entitled them to new work and study opportunities that were not 
available prior to accession. A number of these migrants headed to Britain, a move 
legitimated by their perspectives of British life and the social representations of 
Britain that circulate in Malta. In Britain, however, their perspectives are essentially 
alien as Malta does not have a sizeable community to which migrants could flock 
and which could mediate intercultural relations20. Maltese migrants are thus required 
to negotiate their new life on their own, and to fit into British ways of life or fail to 
establish any functional relations at all. And whilst a degree of familiarity with 
British ways exists due to colonialism and mutual tourism over the years, both the 
ways of life as well as institutional practices are sufficiently different in the two 
countries to be deemed distinct.  
 
For the purposes of this inquiry, qualitative interviews were undertaken with forty 
migrants, some of whom returned to their native country. Respondents were asked 
about their views of Britain and their new life, and whether this matched their 
original expectations. They were also asked about their views of life in Malta and 
how they relate to it given their immigrant status. This provided a fortuitous 
occasion to investigate the interpersonal features of points of view as they relate 
both to other perspectives originating from their country of origin, and with whose 
framework of understanding they are essentially familiar, as well as with another 
framework of understanding with which they were required to negotiate their 
individual views. Consequently, as noted above, this study was able to single out the 
interpersonal characteristics of points of view without the confounding element of 
                                                20	  The reasons for this lack of community are historical and are reviewed in Chapter 6.	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intergroup relations, in such case that a native community mediates the migration 
experience.  
 
This second investigation, detailed in chapter 6, demonstrated that points of view 
serve subjects to position themselves in a social system, and to benefit from such 
positioning accordingly. The findings of this inquiry correspond with those of 
Detweiler (1980), whose application of Pettigrew’s C-W (Category-Width) scale 
revealed that perspectives are implicated in intercultural relational outcomes on the 
basis of their classification of alternatives depending on the category width of their 
own perspectives.  
 
In this study, monological points of view served subjects to position themselves 
exclusively within one social system, be it Maltese or British, and to forge strong 
ties with others within that social system. This positioning enabled their social 
functioning in this system, however, their positioning in one system led to their 
exclusion from the other. For those with dialogical points of view positioning was 
not straightforwardly exclusive. Dialogical types were able to retain relations with 
the two systems and to position themselves somewhat in relation to both, as their 
needs determined. However, dialogical types still valued one system over another, 
and their hierarchical positioning in the preferred system came at a cost to their 
positioning in the other. Social categories, for dialogical types, were not oppositional 
but were nevertheless hierarchical. Respondents having metalogical points of view, 
on the other hand, were able to position themselves equally successfully and without 
contradiction in both systems. Their positioning in one system did not come at a cost 
of positioning within the other. Metalogical types could be equally Maltese with the 
Maltese as they could be British with the British, and their positioning in both social 
systems did not make them any more or less Maltese, or any more or less British, 
than the Maltese or British alone.  
 
Whilst these findings are similar to Detweiler’s (1980), this study suggests that 
dialogical and metalogical types are different from monological types in their 
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appraisal of an alternative along distinct dimensions. Whilst monological types may 
be better conceptualised as linear and unidimensional, dialogical and metalogical 
types, by comparison, are able to entertain two dimensions. This is similar to Berry 
et al.’s (2002) model of acculturation along two dimensions that appraises the host 
country on the one hand and the country of origin on the other, contemporarily. It 
also corresponds with Rokeach’s (1951b) claims that the cognitive differences 
between different perspectives are qualitative in nature. The present inquiry suggests 
that this two-dimensional aspect represents such qualitative differences. This 
contrasts with Rokeach’s model, as well as Pettigrew’s C-W scale, which, in spite of 
admitting qualitative differences have relied on a one-dimensional scale for 
measuring perspectives along a single continuum. The interpersonal characteristics 
of points of view documented in this study are such that certain points of view, but 
not all, are able to orient themselves simultaneously to different social systems, and 
they can value such systems distinctly in turn. Metalogical points of view value both 
systems, whereas dialogical points of view overvalue one and undervalue the other. 
Monological points of view are the only unidimensional points of view. Their 
valuing of social systems ranges on a single continuum, from valuing one to 
devaluing the other. 
 
An interesting finding that emerged from this inquiry was that regardless of point of 
view types, Maltese migrants to Britain favoured assimilation as an acculturation 
strategy, and were wary of association with fellow Maltese. This finding is possibly 
characteristic of the Maltese community and may be somewhat related to historical 
circumstances as well as social representations of migration in Malta, which mark 
successful migration by adaptation to foreign ways and individual adjustment to the 
practices of the host society. Another non-difference across types was the claim that 
migration served respondents to broaden their perspectives, ‘open their minds’, and 
‘see’ things differently. This suggested that the situation of migration might have 
brought about structural changes to the points of view respondents held originally. 
This finding was in line with the aim to explore the intrapersonal characteristics of 
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points of view, inspired by the social judgment literature, in an effort to investigate 
their socio-cognitive architecture.  
 
Study 3: Stipends, Muslims, and Voting Rights in Malta 
 
Complementing the approaches taken in the first and second studies, the third study 
looked at the variant socio-cognitive structure of points of view. The third empirical 
study, detailed in Chapter 7, was undertaken with a sample of students at the 
University of Malta who responded, in a survey, to a series of questions in which 
they evaluated different claims made with regard to three issue domains, salient in 
the Maltese public at the time of inquiry.  
 
The first concerned students at the University of Malta themselves and pertained to 
the stipends issue. Students at the University of Malta whose parents are taxpayers in 
Malta are entitled to receive stipends, in addition to free education, for the duration 
of their undergraduate studies. Calls have been made to revise the system and 
increase investment in the sector, which received endorsement by some and 
opposition by others.  
 
The second issue pertained to the rights of Muslims for public worship. Malta is 
deemed a Roman Catholic country by the Maltese. Numerous churches and chapels 
are scattered across the island and in every village, over the summer months, 
parishioners celebrate public feasts in honour of the parish’s patron saint. Other 
religions enjoy no such public exposure. The Islamic faith claims a single mosque in 
Paola. During the summer of 2009, a group of Muslims mounted a public protest in 
lieu of their incapacity to observe their faith in their own towns like Catholics. An 
apartment they had rented for this purpose had been closed down by the authorities 
for lack of a permit, and the affected Muslims gathered on a prominent promenade 
to worship in public as a sign of protest, after acquiring all necessary permits for a 
public protest. Their protest attracted sympathy from some and opposition from 
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others, and further permits for the protest were declined by the authorities for the 
sake of maintaining public order. 
 
The third issue pertained to the rights of Maltese migrants to vote. Since Malta 
joined the European Union, a number of Maltese citizens have moved abroad to 
other European countries for the purposes of work and study. A single general 
election was held in Malta since accession, which saw the Nationalist Party winning 
by a margin of just over 1500 votes. Estimates put at double that figure the number 
of voters who flew in for the purposes of the election from other European countries. 
The opposition party claimed that these voters were amongst the reasons for its 
having lost the election. The issue became a matter of debate in view of the rights of 
expatriates to vote and determine affairs in their country of origin when they no 
longer reside there.  
 
Whilst these three issues are in themselves unrelated, they all pertain to the Maltese 
public and the rights enjoyed by the Maltese by virtue of their citizenship. Free 
education is inscribed in the country’s laws and has been provided to the Maltese by 
the state following establishment of the republic towards building a knowledge-
society. Maltese families hold that they have a right to educate their children 
regardless of class or status, and that student stipends are part of this right. Similarly, 
the Catholic faith is inscribed in the country’s constitutional laws as the official 
religion of the nation. Consequently, Maltese citizens believe that the rights they 
have to practice their Catholic faith should not be extended to foreigners, as these 
are not part of the Maltese way of life. Finally, Maltese citizens eligible to vote in 
Malta are meant to be resident in Malta for six out of the eighteen months prior to 
the election. This condition has, on the one hand, been difficult to police given the 
proximity of the countries to which the Maltese moved following EU accession, and 
their frequent visitations. It has, on the other hand, been resisted by emigrants who 
claim that what takes place in Malta has immanent consequences on their migration 
decisions and that many nevertheless retain some presence on the island. These three 
issues thus afforded the possibility to investigate the socio-cognitive structure of 
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points of view, without this being attributable to other practices prescribed by 
different social representations, in view of the fact that these issues were 
investigated amongst the Maltese and pertain to the Maltese and their ways of life in 
Malta.  
 
The study revealed that the socio-cognitive architecture of points of view varies 
across types, in terms of the latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and non-commitment 
inherent to points of view. This corresponds with Sherif’s various findings. Different 
points of view were found to relate differently to alternative perspectives, most 
significantly by the rejection of, or non-commitment for, an alternative perspective 
than other types. The degree of rejection or non-commitment depended on the way 
in which the issue was framed for respondents. This corresponds with Billig’s 
argumentation approach and contrasts with the individual differences approach that 
locates such variability within immutable personalities.  
 
Additionally, point of view types were correlated between them on some issues but 
not on others, and were uncorrelated with ego-relatedness. This contrasts with the 
cognitive style approach and makes a case for cognitive complexity. This study 
demonstrated that individuals can reason differently depending on the issues at 
stake, and that their characteristic point of view with regards to some issue did not 
translate into a corresponding point of view type with regards to other issues. 
Moreover, respondents could reason deeply even though the issue might have 
applied to them quite strongly. Finally, certain demographic characteristics of the 
sample were found to be significant predictors for point of view types regarding 
certain issues. This suggests that, on the one hand, one’s background does matter 
when adopting a point of view towards some issue. Additionally, points of view 
emerged as amenable rather than fixed, in that both faculty of study and duration of 
education were found to be predictors of point of view types on certain issues. This 
indicates that points of view are not determined but can change as a function of 
certain circumstances, and that contextual factors may play a part in what types of 
point of view are manifest by certain individuals. This finding is all the more 
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intriguing in view of its crosstabulation with a computed attitude measure 
representing the standard 5-point Likert scale, that proved to be significantly 
associated with point of view type. This association demonstrates that attitudes play 
a part in the points of view that are adopted by certain individuals. It also 
demonstrated that strongly held attitudes do not preclude the ability of human 
subjects to relate to an alternative perspective. In the cross-tabulation of points of 
view with attitudes, individuals who expressed the same attitude nevertheless varied 
in their point of view types. For every attitude expression, for instance strongly 
disagree, some respondents were monological, some were dialogical, and some 
others were metalogical in their point of view. This suggests that regardless of their 
evaluation of an attitude object, individuals varied in their capacity to appreciate an 
alternative position. This finding is noteworthy in that it demonstrates that attitudes 
are not deterministic and that some who hold attitudes strongly may yet be open to 
dialogue. It thus adds a new dimension to the study of attitudes. Beyond the number 
of individuals who express themselves for or against a given issue, one could also 
thus inquire into how malleable their expressed attitude might be in an encounter 
with an alternative perspective. 
 
The findings of the third inquiry thus provide evidence that the socio-cognitive 
structure varies across point of view types, and that different types are marked by 
different intrapersonal features. These differences are cognitive inasmuch as the 
various latitudes are in themselves of a cognitive nature. Equally, they are social, 
inasmuch as which latitude is affected depends on the contextual and argumentative 
features of the content being debated.  
 
Taken together, therefore, the three empirical studies undertaken for the purposes of 
the present thesis demonstrate that the point of view may be conceptualised as a 
social-cum-psychological phenomenon that is implicated in the social behaviour of 
subjects and that varies in its socio-cognitive architecture. The studies provide 
evidence that points of view vary in type–monological, dialogical, metalogical–in 
their treatment of an alternative point of view’s rationale, and that such variance is 
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marked (a) by interpersonal characteristics that preclude some points of view, but 
not others, from positioning themselves functionally in relation to a different 
background of intelligibility, and (b) by intrapersonal features that lead to the 
variable treatment of an alternative by some points of view, but not others, with 
acceptance, rejection, or indifference.  
 
The study of points of view  
 
In our time, the point of view has been popularised. It was conceptually adopted by 
the leading international bank HSBC in a marketing campaign that sought to 
promote the bank as a culturally sensitive organisation that has, what in this thesis 
has been termed to be, a metalogical point of view. In this campaign, the bank 
sought to promote and market its ability to appreciate diverse points of view in terms 
of their cultural legitimacy, and that it could thus address its clients’ particular needs 
more fully. The point of view has also been popularised in the new public sphere, 
i.e. the world wide web, by organisations such as the BBC whose website includes a 
‘Have Your Say’ online public space in which individuals the world over can 
express themselves with regards to some particular issue that arises in the news. And 
at the time of submission of this thesis, opposing points of view are being aired by 
The Economist in its present billboard campaign across London. The point of view 
construct being postulated in this thesis offers a way to study these encounters, 
wherein individuals articulate their own perspectives with regards to some 
substantive issue with the knowledge of the existence of alternative perspectives that 
are based on different understandings of the issue.  
 
Considering that the point of view has featured in widely influential theories in the 
social sciences and beyond, as detailed in Chapter 3, in some sense it is little wonder 
that it has been demonstrated in this thesis to be a social-psychological phenomenon 
itself worthy of investigation. What this thesis has aspired to, that some other 
scholars have proposed or hinted at but that has not effectively been undertaken, is 
the very conceptualisation of point of view. The main contribution of the present 
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thesis lies in the study of points of view as explanandum (Hempel & Oppenheim, 
1948). Consequently, this thesis has been able to describe the social-psychological 
nature of points of view in terms of their interpersonal and intrapersonal 
characteristics. The second major contribution of this thesis lies in the postulation of 
points of view in a nested model, alongside attitudes and social representations, that 
provides a multilevel theory of social behaviour, as detailed hereunder.   
 
The point of view as a phenomenon of inquiry 
 
This thesis is the first of its kind to cast an inquiring eye into the point of view 
phenomenon in itself. In so doing, it has revealed that the human capacity to relate to 
the perspective of the other is subject to individual differences. Whilst, as Theory of 
Mind proponents may advocate, the potential to relate to another’s perspective is an 
evolved characteristic of human cognition, the degree to which subjects do so in real 
terms various markedly. This thesis has demonstrated that, whilst there is an 
inclination towards cognitive consistency, the propensity to relate to another’s 
perspective varies across individuals and across issue domains. It has demonstrated 
that such variance is a function of the socio-cognitive structure of points of view, 
which leads to variable reactions to the encounter with an alternative perspective in 
terms of its acceptance, rejection, or indifference. Which of these cognitive 
structures is implicated for a given point of view is circumscribed both by content 
and context pertaining to the issue. Furthermore, this thesis has suggested that such 
variances in points of view, that have been characterised as three types depending on 
their openness to alternatives (i.e. monological, dialogical, and metalogical) are 
fundamentally implicated in social relations and are associated with isomorphic 
variability in acculturation, the ability to fit into more than one social system, the 
ability to forge bonding and bridging social capital, and the propensity for achieving 
integration. This thesis has thus brought to light the heuristic value of studying 
points of view, inasmuch as this concept can provide an explanation, in part, of 
manifest social relations.  
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This thesis has also advanced our understanding of human subjects’ outlooks by 
dispelling some faulty presumptions that circulate in the social psychological 
literature. Firstly, it has demonstrated that relating to another’s perspective is not a 
linear, unidimensional affair. In measures of narrow-mindedness, the different types 
of perspectives vary along a single-continuum from narrow, to medium, to broad 
(Rokeach, 1951a, 1951b; Pettigrew, 1959; Detweiler, 1980). However, human 
subjects have a variable capacity to understand that their own point of view is 
relative and that others’ perspectives may be equally plausible as their own. 
Essentially, this means that some human perspectives are two-dimensional, retaining 
a capacity to judge their own outlook and that of another at the same time. Only 
monological points of view can be characterised as unidimensional in their appraisal 
of different points of view along a single continuum. This finding needs to be 
considered in measures of narrow-mindedness. Secondly, the presumption of an 
association of closed-mindedness to personality is demonstrably faulty. This 
presumption goes back to Adorno’s studies of the authoritarian personality (Adorno, 
Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Kruglanski, 2004). This thesis has 
demonstrated conclusively that individuals’ points of view differ depending on the 
issue being studied, and whilst there is a correlation between point of view types on 
different issues, this is far from deterministic. Finally, this thesis has provided 
evidence that points of view towards a given issue are not necessarily stable. The 
relative stability of perspectives has been assumed in studies of closed-mindedness 
(Kruglanski, 2004). This thesis has demonstrated that this is a faulty presumption, 
and that points of view are malleable and change over time, for example as a 
function of education. 
 
The fundamental relativity inherent to studying points of view clearly stands in the 
way of a straight and simple solution to explaining human behaviour. The point of 
view is not a silver bullet in the analysis, measurement, or prediction of social 
behaviour, as undoubtedly many scholars of human behaviour desire and aspire to. 
However, in itself, this is not surprising considering that point of view fills the gap 
between the more quantitative universalistic measurement of attitudes, and the more 
 266 
qualitative and contingent study of social representations. The point of view, like 
Heider’s  (1946) model of the balance of reciprocity in the cognitive organisation of 
attitudes, retains elements of both and is consequently able to materialise and 
achieve in part the objectives of both, albeit neither fully on its own.  
 
So what is its practical contribution in the study of social behaviour? As argued 
throughout this thesis, social behaviour is infinitely complex, which is why any 
simplification necessarily falls short in providing a full understanding. Traditionally, 
social psychology has either foregrounded the social or the individual, with the 
result of overlooking either the one or the other in explanations of social behaviour. 
Whilst this thesis has sought to address this gap by articulating a situational level 
explanation of social behaviour through conceptualising the point of view, this is 
held to supplement, not supplant, the other two foci. In this thesis, social 
representations have been held to describe, for a certain people, the objectification of 
certain things that pertain to them in their artifactual and cultural environment. 
Attitudes, on the other hand, are the individual’s personal evaluations of attitude 
objects. Points of view represent individuals’ outlooks with regards to objects and in 
relation to others’ views. Points of view are held to be embedded in social 
representations and in themselves to incorporate attitudes, as detailed hereunder. 
They thus serve to provide a conditional explanation of social behaviour (see 
Chapter 3) that occurs by virtue of an individual having a particular point of view in 
a certain situation. The point of view is itself a function of the characteristics of the 
person (e.g. predispositions, or attitudes) and the environment in which it finds itself 
(e.g. culture, or social representations).  
 
This situational level in the explanation of social behaviour has heretofore been 
missing in social psychology. Both the characteristics of the person and the 
environment bear on the point of view that is adopted by a subject at a given point in 
time. Consequently, inquiry in this thesis has been undertaken into both 
interpersonal and intrapersonal features of points of view, to provide a social-cum-
psychological formulation of the construct that, alongside social representations and 
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attitudes, is nested in a transitive and taxonomic model of social behaviour. 
Formulated at the situational level, the point of view is able to provide an 
explanation of social behaviour as it takes place in situ. Empirically, if one wants to 
understand some particular aspect of social reality, the model helps in recognising 
what to look for as well as outline where (i.e. at which level) to look for it. 
 
A nested model of social behaviour 
 
Social psychology has been described as a discipline with a long past and a short 
history (Farr, 1991). This has been borne out in the present thesis. The philosophical 
roots of the construct have been traced back to the works of Immanuel Kant. Our 
present understanding of points of view, however, comes from more recent works in 
the social psychological literature that have grappled with constructs and processes 
corollary to points of view. This thesis takes this enterprise forward, by taking up 
inquiry into a new piece of the jigsaw puzzle of an explanation of social behaviour. 
This explanation, alongside attitudes on the one hand as an intrapersonal construct, 
and social representations on the other as a societal one, serves towards providing a 
transitive explanation of social behaviour that retains taxonomic priority in its 
formulation. This thesis suggests that points of view are located within social 
representations as the individual outlooks human subjects adopt in positioning 
themselves in social reality with regards to some issue. Moreover, the attitudes a 
subject holds towards the object and others with whom the subject stands in relation 
are in themselves incorporated in the point of view of the subject regarding the issue, 
that is reasonable given the social representation in which it is itself embedded (see 
Figure 4, Chapter 3). These varying levels of explanation of social behaviour, and 
the contribution the inquiry of points of view makes in this regard, are reviewed in 
turn hereunder. The utility of this model of social behaviour lies in its capacity to 
orient the inquirer to which aspect of social behaviour is implicated in social reality, 
and what understanding accrues from inquiry into such aspect.  
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At a societal level, one studies the processes and contents of social representations as 
they circulate in a given public. A useful conception at this level is that made by 
Moscovici (1988) between hegemonic, emancipated, and polemical social 
representations. However, other than hegemonic representations that are 
characterised by a single version of reality that does not admit alternative 
representations (Gillespie, 2008), social representations are mostly characterised by 
different opinions and interpretations that co-exist within the same framework of 
understanding that constitutes the representation (Fraser, 1994). These differences 
translate into different points of view, that in a social representations inquiry need to 
be mapped out and pieced together systemically despite their differences, if an 
understanding of the social representation in its collective, as Harré (1984) 
advocates, is to be achieved.  
 
The relevance of the social and argumentative context has been demonstrated and 
discussed in the third empirical inquiry (see Chapter 7). As such, studying points of 
view requires a robust understanding of the social representations of the issue 
investigated, as this exists for the groups studied. A monological point of view in 
favour of some issue may be an altogether different discursive phenomenon for one 
group than it may be for another. Whilst the point of view will be the same in its 
socio-cognitive architecture, that is, it may similarly accept or reject alternative 
positions to other points of view, its manifestation in discourse may be wholly 
different. For example, individuals may be equally monological and fundamentalist 
in advocating tolerance as they may be in advocating intolerance, as Osgood (1978) 
noted. For this reason, a study of points of view requires contextualisation to achieve 
generalisation–relative to an issue and pertaining to a particular group–as pertains to 
a social representations inquiry. 
 
The discovery of certain points of view might warrant detailed investigation into 
their characteristics. This clearly overlaps with a social representations study, but 
such extended inquiry aims to understand how some individuals or groups are 
positioning themselves in some particular way, given a particular social 
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representation and given particular other points of view that exist toward the object. 
This is the study of points of view at the situational level of explanation that looks at 
orientations, the justifications provided for them, and the cognitive characteristics 
that typify them. A full understanding at this level requires an understanding of the 
argumentative structure that legitimates that position as well as an appreciation of 
the relational aspects of relating to someone else’s position, both manifestly in social 
relations and introspectively in social cognition. At this level, the distinction 
between metalogical, dialogical, and monological points of view is a useful one. 
This in itself can be discerned from accounts or assessed through self-categorisation. 
This becomes the study of the points of view of some regarding some object, as they 
relate with others. It aims to understand (1) how the object exists for the subjects 
being studied, (2) who is the other in relation to whom the subject/s position 
themselves in social affairs, (3) the argumentative content of a point of view, and (4) 
its socio-cognitive structure.  
 
A concrete example illustrates this point more fully. The only empirical work to 
claim an inquiry of points of view is Moghaddam’s (2006) “From the terrorists’ 
point of view: What they experience and why they come to destroy”. Moghaddam’s 
work illustrates the fact that a given social representation in a given public does not 
prescribe any specific behaviour, but legitimates certain action sequences (Wagner, 
1993). Some, however, are compelled to take up arms and sacrifice themselves to 
the cause whilst others are not. A social representations inquiry would investigate 
the sense-making of matters such as war, foreign policy, the West, Islam, and so on, 
in a given public. One finding of such inquiry might be the plausibility of 
martyrdom or suicide-bombing. This, however, in and of itself provides no 
information as to the reasons why certain people are resorting to certain behaviours 
amidst a myriad of alternative and equally plausible positions that they are able to 
take within the same social representation. Why do some individuals advocate 
diplomacy whereas others advocate armed conflict, given the same struggle? For 
instance, the divergent perspectives between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestinian 
struggle against Israel at present bear testimony to this. What changes between the 
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two factions is not the struggle itself, nor the representations of the other, but the 
point of view on how the issue may or may not be resolved.  
 
The point here is that what might be changing across these identified groups is not a 
representation of the object per se, but a preference for particular relations with that 
object. These preferences are justified by reasons; they are reasonable given the 
social representation. A point of view study, such as Moghaddam’s, inquires into 
these reasons, and answers the question of what points of view people are taking 
towards the object given the social representation, and why. It is in the capacity for 
answering the what and the why that this thesis makes a critical contribution, that is, 
in its capacity to direct attention towards the investigation of interpersonal and 
intrapersonal features of points of view, by which subjects legitimate some 
alternatives and not others and on the basis of which they position themselves in 
relation with the object and with others in some ways and not others. 
 
The third level in the model is attitudes. This is useful if one should want to discover 
more concretely how many are for or against a particular issue, at a given point in 
time. Even here, however, a point of view inquiry would supplement this aspect of 
an explanation of social behaviour. As noted in Chapter 7, the same attitude 
responses may be marked by differences in point of view types. To go back to the 
finding presented in Chapter 7 in line with the illustration above, certain Maltese 
respondents strongly agreed that Malta should reciprocate the intolerance 
supposedly directed towards Catholics by Muslims nations, by being itself intolerant 
towards Muslims in Malta. However, there were differences between this cluster of 
respondents in their point of view types, meaning that a number of them were 
monological, but others were dialogical, and yet others metalogical. Which means to 
say that some have the capacity to appreciate that different positions towards the 
issue may be legitimate, whilst others are more fundamentalist in their own 
judgment and are unable to see the other side of the coin.  
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This understanding is highly consequential, in that dialogical and metalogical types 
are amenable to dialogue in a way that monological types are not, because of their 
inability to see things from a different angle–the hallmark of dialogue. Besides the 
heuristic interest of knowing how many in a given population may be fundamentalist 
in this way (i.e. monological and unable to see things differently), this also means to 
say that, in this case, the battle for hearts and minds over the matter is wide open in 
the Maltese public. Should a course of events be more desirable than another from a 
political perspective, then this data would be particularly useful for policymakers 
(alongside qualitative information on which positions are contestable for whom and 
why). Whilst attitude measurement provides a suitable aggregate measure of how 
many are for or against an issue, and at times this may be all that is required, an 
analysis of points of view, even at this level, adds a relevant and highly 
consequential dimension to sheer head-counts. It affords a measure of how many 
stand to be convinced otherwise through dialogue.  
 
A fuller explanation of social behaviour in its manifold complexity requires the 
study of the phenomenon in its various manifestations across all levels. Attitude 
studies provide an indication of diversity within the field. Points of view studies look 
at individual positioning in social behaviour, as individuals adopt a perspective and 
relate to others on the basis of it, along with the justifications provided that sustain 
particular positions. Social representations studies piece these together by 
considering the various points of view as they relate systemically. In practical terms, 
extending the example further, a Maltese citizen walking on the promenade when a 
group of Muslims are praying in protest in public may be experience an element of 
hatred towards them. This describes the individual’s attitude (at the time) as a 
cognitive response to a given stimulus. It does not tell us how this attitude will be 
translated into some behaviour at this point in time. This would require a situational 
explanation of social behaviour. So, if asked about it, the individual might make 
reference to certain conditions that are in place at the time that justify a negative 
attitude towards the group, for instance, they have chosen a prominent public place, 
or, there’s only men in the protest, or, that old lady cannot walk the dog on this 
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promenade right now, so I’m hating them. This describes the individual’s point of 
view at the time, that relates to the object in question as well as to others that are part 
of the individual’s present relations, such as bystanders, tourists, and so on. It thus 
provides an explanation of social behaviour in situ, from the point of view of the 
individual. At this level we can thus comprehend a rationale for action displayed by 
this individual in interpersonal behaviour, e.g. voicing an objection in public, 
grunting, cheering, or walking away with indifference. We can also comprehend this 
behaviour in terms of its socio-cognitive latitude structure, that is, what conditions 
are objectionable now that might not be in other circumstances, for instance, what if 
there were women in the protesting groups, what if it wasn’t just Muslims, what if it 
wasn’t a prominent public promenade, and what if they did not obstruct, etc.?  
 
What such analysis will describe is the reasons why this behaviour is seen in this 
way by this individual in this situation. What it will not tell us is why is it rational 
for a Maltese to object to Muslim worship in public in Malta. And what else may be 
rational in the face of such an event. Answering these questions has to do with the 
social representations of Islam in Malta that might be very different from the social 
representations of other religions, or from the social representations of the same 
object in a different public. The context-rationality of a point of view that in certain 
circumstances justifies a certain act is given by the social representations that 
circulate in the public in which it occurs.  
 
This example demonstrates how the model outlined provides transitive explanations 
of social behaviour that retain taxonomic priority, and that, in spite of its apparent 
complexity, enables social and psychological inquiry to come closer to a fuller 
explanation of social behaviour. Moreover, the formulation of the point of view in 
this model affords an understanding of social behaviour as it takes place in the 
conditions in which it is manifest, given both environmental influences (e.g. 
presence of a mob) as well as the individual’s own psychological makeup (e.g. high 
need for closure). The model provides conceptual clarity as well as a blueprint for 
looking at social behaviour in social reality across different levels of explanation. It 
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brings some much-needed refinement to the discipline by bringing together the 
various explanations together in a multilevel social psychological model of human 
behaviour.  
 
Conclusion: Limitations and scope for further study 
 
In spite of the contributions outlined above, this inquiry is not without shortcomings. 
A primary shortcoming of this thesis compared to other studies is the opportunistic 
nature of the three empirical inquiries. Compared to certain commanding works such 
as Durkheim’s Le Suicide (1897) or Moscovici’s La Psychanalyse (1961), the 
present inquiry lacks a singular empirical focus. One therefore wonders, for 
example, whether different points of view are similarly identifiable across different 
issues, or indeed different cultures, compared to what the first study details. One also 
wonders whether the relational outcomes and structural variations identified in the 
subsequent two studies are generalisable across settings. Whilst these limitations do 
not detract from the merits of any of the studies undertaken, further empirical 
inquiry is required to address these concerns. In addition, the opportunistic selection 
of case studies was undertaken in consideration of the implications that conditions in 
the public sphere have on human relations. Public spheres may be more or less open 
to alternative social realities. Consequently, not every public sphere affords the same 
opportunities for investigating social relations in the same way. This condition, as 
outlined in Chapter 1, has prevented an empirical focus on a singular issue. Instead, 
this thesis has proceeded to identify and study cases wherein public spheres manifest 
the requisite conditions for inquiry into their multifarious nature. 
 
Two other queries, however, present more serious limitations to the claims that this 
thesis is able to advance. The first is well articulated by Moscovici (1985a), when he 
argues whether the phenomenon of social influence found to be operative in a group 
would apply more for one type of problem and less for another. In essence, does the 
description of the phenomenon hold without reference to the object being judged? 
This issue relates to whether a social phenomenon changes as a function of the social 
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conditions in which it occurs. Can the point of view, as a social psychological 
construct, be extrapolated from the context in which it occurs? In other words, are 
there general processes underlying instantiations of points of view that occur across 
contexts? In an attempt to test whether this critique is a valid one, the third study 
adopts a three-pronged approach to investigate whether the findings generalise 
equally to different issue-domains. However, addressing this concern appropriately 
requires further social psychological study into the interplay between social 
conditions and individual attributes, a focus that has characterised social psychology 
since its inception.  
 
Addressing the contextual-contingency concern more fully requires investigation 
into the function points of view serve in the construction of social representations. If 
points of view are individual positions in systemic social representations, as 
postulated in this thesis, then a change in part leads to a change in whole, meaning 
that the co-construction of social representations takes place as a function of the 
legitimation of certain points of view. Conversely, further inquiry is required into 
understanding the role social representations play in human ontogeny, by which 
individuals come to develop one point of view and not another. As Sherif and Sherif 
(1968) point out, the groups in which a child is born are not merely external realities 
but reference groups that serve to anchor the child’s own perspective. Duveen 
(2001) echoes these claims in the social representations literature. In addition, given 
that group differences may mark differences in points of view, it becomes 
reasonable to enquire also into linguistic affordances and point of view types, that is, 
one wonders how and whether language constrains or prescribes particular types of 
point of view in certain cases.  
 
The latter is particularly pertinent in view of Gillespie’s (2008) identification of 
alternative representations, that are isomorphic to the points of view identified in this 
thesis. According to Gillespie, hegemonic representations are devoid of alternative 
representations, polemical representations have alternative representations that are 
asymmetrical and used as rhetorical-counter points to further one’s own agenda, 
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whilst emancipated representations interact with a description of the alternative 
representation on its own terms. Similarly, points of view in this thesis have been 
demonstrated to vary along these very characteristics: monological points of view 
exclude an alternative perspective; dialogical points of view recognise but denigrate 
an alternative; whereas metalogical points of view accord rightfulness and 
legitimacy to alternative perspectives. This line of reasoning seems to suggest that 
certain knowledge systems may foster particular types of points of view on the basis 
of the nature of the social representations that are in circulation, i.e. whether these 
are hegemonic, polemical, or emancipated. It would seem that hegemonic social 
representations may be synonymous with monological points of view, polemical 
social representations with dialogical ones, and emancipated social representations 
with metalogical ones. Whether given certain types of social representations in a 
given public also equates with a higher incidence of certain points of view is an 
interesting empirical question. If it does, then there would be a clear case for 
adopting certain principles in the public sphere to foster a certain kind of thinking 
amongst individuals who participate in that public. Should this be the case, then the 
aspects of power and social influence and their association with points of view 
would emerge as additional areas of inquiry. It would be reasonable to hypothesise 
that different point of view types exercise different forms of power and are 
differentially inclined to certain forms of social influence.  
 
Another question that emanates from this conceptual association between points of 
view and social and alternative representations is what semantic barriers might be at 
play at the socio-cognitive level of the point of view. Gillespie (2008) identified a 
list of semantic barriers that prohibited polemical representations from full dialogue 
with the other. It would be worth inquiring into whether these semantic barriers may 
also be characteristic of dialogical points of view. Similarly, given that metalogical 
points of view are capable of entering into full dialogue with one another and are 
seemingly unimpeded by any barriers, how can metalogical thinking be fostered? 
Perspective-taking, as Piaget discovered, may well be maturational, but as this thesis 
demonstrates, metalogical thinking does not necessarily characterise adult thinking. 
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This is to say that not all adults demonstrate metalogical points of view at all times, 
just as not all adult cognition takes place at the Piagetian logical operations level of 
maturation. Indeed, Kruglanski (2004) argues for the evolutionary benefits of 
closed-mindedness, in terms of a need for closure that serves to cut infinite 
information processing and that enables subjects to act decisively at certain times. 
Still, the question of ontogenesis and points of view, particularly metalogical ones, is 
a pertinent one and one that requires further inquiry. This is particularly relevant 
considering the fact that points of view are also amenable to influence, as the third 
empirical study indicates. As argued above, it is worth inquiring into what forms of 
policy might foster this on a societal level. It is also opportune to study this further at 
the micro-genetic level of interpersonal relations, such as, for instance, 
psychotherapeutic intervention. 
 
A further concern emanates from the opposite end of psychological inquiry and 
relates to intra-psychological functioning. One necessarily wonders what 
relationship, if any, may exist between types of point of view and the underlying 
neuro-biological structure that provides the biological basis for cognition. One 
wonders what the interplay between the biological make-up and the adoption of 
particular types of point of view might be, and whether this may have served 
adaptive purposes during the course of human evolution. Addressing this concern 
requires the analysis of neuro-biological mechanisms by which the co-determination 
of biology and points of view may be investigated.  
 
Whilst the point of view has been demonstrated to enhance the understanding of 
public opinion over the mere measurement of attitudes, it is worth noting that the 
industry standard Likert-scale retains much appeal in terms of both its utility in 
attitude measurement as well as its amenability to scale construction. These reasons 
are sufficient for postulating recommendations to this form of behavioural 
measurement in a cautious way, and, on the basis of the findings of this thesis, there 
is no reason to suggest that any use of the Likert-scale is ill advised. However, this 
thesis is in a position to propose that the study of points of view, complementary to 
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attitude measurement, considerably enhances the social sciences’ inquiry into public 
opinion. As in the Multicultural Ideology scale used in the third empirical inquiry 
(Chapter 7), scales constructed on the basis of Likert-scale attitude measures can be 
fruitfully cross-tabulated with points of view for an indication of the openness to 
alternatives. On the other hand, this necessarily raises the issue of an adequate 
operationalisation of points of view in different contexts and with regard to different 
issue-domains, as well as questions of validity and reliability of the measurement of 
point of view types. The fact that these are not unidimensional and that they are not 
straightforwardly personality-based, as presumed in the social judgment literature, 
places some evident obstacles to the construction of psychometric measurement-
scales in the fashion of personality research. Yet, given these constraints, one still 
wonders how points of view can be typified consistently and reliably.   
 
It seems therefore that more questions have been raised in the course of this thesis 
than answers provided. Nevertheless, as set out in the introductory chapter, enough 
has been done to warrant further inquiry and extension of scope. In this sense, 
Durkheim’s words in his preface to Suicide provide a salutary remark: “There is 
nothing necessarily discouraging in the incompleteness of the results thus far 
obtained. They should arouse new efforts, not surrender […] This makes possible 
some continuity in scientific labour,–continuity upon which progress depends 
(1952/2002, p. xxxiv)”.  
 
The extension of scope that is brought about by the above concerns is in line with 
the model for social behaviour presented and may be characterised along two 
dimensions, both equally pertinent to the findings of the present investigation. On 
the one hand, the scope of this study needs to be extended to include higher order as 
well as lower order levels of explanation. According to Wagner & Hayes’ (2005) 
typology, the requirement is to include both the societal and the personal levels. The 
ontogenetic focus of the development of certain points of view for certain people 
thus extends on the one hand into sociogeny, that is, in the construction of social 
realities in which certain people with certain points of view are embedded, and on 
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the other hand into phylogeny, that is, the evolved cognitive baggage that marks the 
human species.  
 
In line with this genetic complexity that marks human social cognition (Tomasello, 
1999; Tomasello et al., 2005), this thesis has demonstrated that the point of view 
construct has clear overlaps both with social representations and attitudes. Whilst 
social representations provide explanations of social behaviour at the societal level 
of explanation, and attitudes at the personal level, it is clearly pertinent for social 
researchers to mind the gap if they are to achieve an understanding of social 
behaviour in situ. The model propagated in this thesis thus comes to serve as a 
multilevel theory of social behaviour that is able to furnish explanations of social 
behaviour across levels. The point of view is the social-cum-psychological construct 
that bridges this gap, and that provides a situational explanation for action that is 
conditional and circumstantial.  
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Appendix I 
Interview Guide – Root of all Evil 
 
Intro: 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
Study about belief and its consequences, undertaken as part-fulfilment of an MSc at 
LSE. 
 
These interviews are part of this study. 
 
No right and wrong answers, aim is to map the diversity of views and perspectives. 
Some agree, some disagree; it is interesting to know how this happens. 
 
Confidentiality. Identity is not disclosed. 
 
Participation is consensual, as is answering any of the questions which may be put 
forth by myself. You may refuse to answer any questions, for whatever reasons you 
may have, which reasons you are under no obligation to provide. You may also 
terminate interview at any time. 
 
Not a question and answer sequence but a casual conversation around the topic. 
 
 
Preliminary questions (setting the scene and leading to the core topic): 
 
What beliefs do you think are important to foster in our children today? 
 
What beliefs & principles are important to you in your own life? 
 
Are religious beliefs important in today’s world? 
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Quotations (to be handed to participants following preliminary questions): 
 
-Good people do good things, evil people do evil things, it takes religion for good 
men to do evil things 
 
-We are atheists when it comes to fairies, unicorns and hobgoblins, and also when it 
comes to most gods, such as Thor, Ra, Aphrodite. Some of us go one god further 
 
-It is certainty not faith that is the root of evil, and the non-religious can do certainty 
as well as the religious 
 
-Faith makes good men better, and evil people worse. 
 
What do you make of these readings? 
 
Questions/Topics to be covered: 
 
 - Science 
 
Should scientific thought replace religious belief? 
Should religious belief be submitted to scientific scrutiny? 
Does believing in scientific claims require a leap of faith? 
 
 - Morality 
 
Does religion lead to warped morals? 
Is morality a genetic product, or is it a product of upbringing? 
 
 - Children 
 
Can faith be considered a virus which infects the young across generations? 
 
 - Evil 
 
Is religion a source of evil? 
Would removing religion from society eradicate evil? 
 
 - Atheism 
 
Is atheism the rational alternative? 
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Participant Number:    ______ 
 
Sex:   Male   Female 
 
 
Nationality:  _________________ 
 
 
Year of Birth:   _________________ 
 
Ethnic Origin: White   Black 
   Asian   Chinese 
   Mixed   Other  _____________ (please specify) 
 
Education:  No Formal Education  Primary 
   Secondary    Tertiary 
 
Religious/Spiritual Belief:  Religious 
     Non-Religious 
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Appendix II 
Interview Guide – Maltese in London 
 
Intro 
How long have you been in Britain? 
What do you do here? 
What is life like? 
Present 
How is life like in the UK? 
How is it like for as a Maltese migrant? 
What’s different here from Malta? 
Recent Past 
Let me take you a little back. What was life like when you initially got here? 
Distant Past 
Let me take you a little further back. What was it like before you came here, in 
Malta? 
Present 
So do you feel settled here? Belong? 
How do you see life in Malta, from here? 
What do you make of the Maltese? 
Future 
How do you see yourself in, say, 10 years’ time? 
General 
Do you go to Malta? How often? 
What do you do when you’re there? 
How do you see life in the UK when there? 
What is it like coming back?
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Appendix III 
Statistical Analyses – Maltese in London TST data 
 
ANOVA 
  Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 6.057 2 3.028 .195 .824 
Within Groups 528.700 34 15.550   
Personality 
Total 534.757 36    
Between Groups 4.900 2 2.450 1.622 .213 
Within Groups 49.850 33 1.511   
Relationships 
Total 54.750 35    
Between Groups .000 2 .000 . . 
Within Groups .000 10 .000   
Gender 
Total .000 12    
Between Groups .111 2 .056 .559 .582 
Within Groups 1.689 17 .099   
Age 
Total 1.800 19    
Between Groups 21.606 2 10.803 1.492 .240 
Within Groups 238.950 33 7.241   
Interests 
Total 260.556 35    
Between Groups 1.600 2 .800 .626 .551 
Within Groups 15.333 12 1.278   
Life 
Circumstances 
Total 16.933 14    
Between Groups 2.169 2 1.084 .576 .569 
Within Groups 50.798 27 1.881   
Profession 
Total 52.967 29    
Physical Features Between Groups .633 2 .317 .378 .699 
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Within Groups 5.867 7 .838    
Total 6.500 9    
Between Groups .929 2 .464 .859 .439 
Within Groups 10.810 20 .541   
Nationality 
Total 11.739 22    
Between Groups .000 2 .000 . . 
Within Groups .000 14 .000   
Migration 
Total .000 16    
Between Groups .417 2 .208 3.750 .065 
Within Groups .500 9 .056   
Faith 
Total .917 11    
Between Groups .000 2 .000 . . 
Within Groups .000 6 .000   
Name 
Total .000 8    
Others, Sexual orientation, Aspirations, and Residence have fewer than two groups 
for dependent variable so no statistics were computed. 
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Appendix IV 
Questionnaire – Social Issues 
 
*** This email is being sent by the Registrar's Office on behalf of Mr Gordon 
Sammut. Your personal details were not disclosed in order to send this email. The 
Office of the Registrar does not assume responsibility for the information contained 
in this message. Please do NOT reply to this email address. In case of any queries, 
kindly send your email to gordon.sammut@um.edu.mt*** 
 
 
Dear Student, 
 
I would like to invite your participation in this online survey. This survey involves 
the study of three social issues that have attracted widespread debate earlier this 
year, namely the student stipends issue, the Muslim prayer protest at Sliema, and the 
voting rights issue. At the end of the study, which should take no more than 10 
minutes to complete, you will be able to sign up for a €100 voucher draw. You are 
therefore encouraged to answer honestly and truthfully the questions that are 
presented, as they apply to yourself. Please note that there are no right or wrong 
answers in this study. The only answer that counts is your own opinion on these 
issues. Your participation is important as the study seeks an understanding of the 
opinions that circulate in the Maltese public, including your own. Your participation 
is therefore highly valued. To proceed to the survey, please click the link hereunder: 
 
 
 
Yours truly, 
 
Gordon Sammut 
Dept of Psychology 
University of Malta 
 
 
***This email has been sent to undisclosed recipients and no personal data has been 
collected by the sender of this email***  
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Stage 1: Points of view* 
*stages not named but progress bar indicates which stage out of 5 
 
 
Page 1:  
 
Earlier this year a number of politicians and public officials recommended revisions 
to the University student stipend system. These recommendations were debated by 
the media and by the general public. Following is a list of arguments that have been 
proposed during the course of the debate. Kindly indicate the extent to which you 
agree or disagree with the following statements using the scale provided (where 1 
means “totally disagree” and 5 means “totally agree”): 
 
"Stipends are a privilege not a right, and one that the country cannot afford. Students 
in Malta are already lucky to not have to pay tuition fees, so stipends should be 
removed" 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
"Stipends are a necessity. Stipends are for everyone because everyone has a right to 
education, so stipends must be untouched"  
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
"It is important for the stipend system to be sustainable and not hinder investment in 
quality education, whilst also assisting those in need. However, revising the system 
might mean not all will continue to a stipend "  
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
"Whilst certain students do not need stipends and they spend their monthly 
allocation on non-essentials, for others the stipend is the only way they can afford 
university. It is important that some form of the stipend system be retained" 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
"Stipends provide students with spending money. Some students benefit from 
stipends as they do not have other means of financial support. Other students spend 
their stipends on luxuries. The stipend system should ensure that the funds allocated 
for stipends support needy students and are a good investment in higher education"  
 
1  2  3  4  5 
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And which one of these arguments presented comes closest to your own view: 
 
 
 
"Stipends are a privilege not a right, and one that the country cannot afford. Students 
in Malta are already lucky to not have to pay tuition fees, so stipends should be 
removed" [Code as Monological - ] 
 
[ ] 
 
"Stipends are a necessity. Stipends are for everyone because everyone has a right to 
education, so stipends must be untouched" [Code as Monological + ] 
 
[ ] 
 
"It is important for the stipend system to be sustainable and not hinder investment in 
quality education, whilst also assisting those in need. However, revising the system 
might mean not all will continue to get a stipend " [Code as Dialogical - ] 
 
[ ] 
 
"Whilst certain students do not need stipends and they spend their monthly 
allocation on non-essentials, for others the stipend is the only way they can afford 
university. It is important that some form of the stipend system be retained" [Code as 
Dialogical + ] 
 
[ ] 
 
"Stipends provide students with spending money. Some students benefit from 
stipends as they do not have other means of financial support. Other students spend 
their stipends on luxuries. The stipend system should ensure that the funds allocated 
for stipends support needy students and are a good investment in higher education" 
[Code as Metalogical] 
 
[ ] 
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Earlier this year a group of Muslim worshippers gathered on the Sliema promenade 
to pray in public in protest after MEPA closed a private apartment they were using 
for their prayers. The protest attracted considerable attention by the media and the 
general public. Following is a list of arguments that have been proposed during the 
course of the debate. Kindly indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with 
the following statements using the scale provided (where 1 means “totally disagree” 
and 5 means “totally agree”):  
 
"Malta must stand up for Maltese culture and must never allow any change to our 
way of life, or we will soon be handing our country over to others "  
 
1  2  3  4  5 
  
"Multiculturalism is the way forward whether anyone likes it or not. There is no 
reason why different cultures should not co-exist"  
 
1  2  3  4  5 
  
"Believers have a right to their own faith, but freedom of religion should be tolerated 
only insofar as it does not impinge on the rights of others. Extreme tolerance should 
not be allowed"  
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
"The real problem is not Muslims but the warped version of Islam that some states 
and individuals espouse and that most Muslims reject. Muslims in Malta need our 
support not our hatred"  
 
1  2  3  4  5 
  
"My way is not the only way, and to be free is to allow others to be free too. 
Everyone has a right to their own beliefs and to worship according to their own faith. 
Similarly, everyone is free to take a view on the practices of another religion and has 
the liberty, within reason, to express those thoughts. These rights should be defended 
whether we agree with the protest or not." 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
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And which one of these arguments presented comes closest to your own view: 
 
 
"Malta must stand up for Maltese culture and must never allow any change to our 
way of life, or we will soon be handing our country over to others " [Code as 
Monological - ] 
 
[ ] 
  
"Multiculturalism is the way forward whether anyone likes it or not. There is no 
reason why different cultures should not co-exist" [Code as Monological + ] 
 
[ ] 
  
"Believers have a right to their own faith, but freedom of religion should be tolerated 
only insofar as it does not impinge on the rights of others. Extreme tolerance should 
not be allowed" [Code as Dialogical - ] 
 
[ ] 
 
"The real problem is not Muslims but the warped version of Islam that some states 
and individuals espouse and that most Muslims reject. Muslims in Malta need our 
support not our hatred" [Code as Dialogical + ] 
 
[ ] 
  
"My way is not the only way, and to be free is to allow others to be free too. 
Everyone has a right to their own beliefs and to worship according to their own faith. 
Similarly, everyone is free to take a view on the practices of another religion and has 
the liberty, within reason, to express those thoughts. These rights should be defended 
whether we agree with the protest or not." [Code as Metalogical] 
 
[ ] 
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Earlier this year a debate arose in Malta over whether Maltese citizens who live or 
work overseas should have a say in the issue of governance, and whether they 
should be allowed to fly in and cast their vote. Following is a list of arguments that 
have been proposed during the course of the debate. Kindly indicate the extent to 
which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the scale provided 
(where 1 means “totally disagree” and 5 means “totally agree”):  
 
 
The elected government should reflect only the will of the majority of Maltese 
citizens resident in the country at the time of the election.  
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Maltese citizens resident abroad still have a vested interest in Maltese governance, 
so it is important that they have equal voting rights to any other Maltese citizens.  
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
At times, some Maltese citizens need to be abroad for a while. Others, however, 
move abroad on a permanent basis. It is important that elections reflect the will of 
those who have to bear the consequences of the outcome, so Maltese migrants’ 
rights to vote in Malta should be restricted.  
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
 Malta’s membership in the EU has opened up opportunities for work and study in 
other countries. Maltese who exploit these opportunities whilst they are available are 
not necessarily permanent migrants to these countries, so they should be allowed to 
vote like other Maltese nationals.  
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Democratic elections should reflect the will of all eligible citizens. The Maltese 
should come together at election time and respect equally each other’s wills and 
interests, even if either or both of these differ from their own.  
 
1  2  3  4  5 
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And which one of these arguments presented comes closest to your own view: 
 
 
The elected government should only reflect the will of the majority of Maltese 
citizens resident in the country at the time of the election. [Monological -] 
 
[ ] 
 
Maltese citizens resident abroad still have a vested interest in Maltese governance, 
so it is important that they have equal voting rights to any other Maltese citizens. 
[Monological +] 
 
[ ] 
 
At times, some Maltese citizens need to be abroad for a while. Others, however, 
move abroad on a permanent basis. It is important that elections reflect the will of 
those who have to bear the consequences of the outcome, so Maltese migrants’ 
rights to vote in Malta should be restricted. [Dialogical -] 
 
[ ] 
 
 Malta’s membership in the EU has opened up opportunities for work and study in 
other countries. Maltese who exploit these opportunities whilst they are available are 
not necessarily permanent migrants to these countries, so they should be allowed to 
vote like other Maltese nationals. [Dialogical +] 
 
[ ] 
 
Democratic elections should reflect the will of all eligible citizens. The Maltese 
should come together at election time and respect equally each other’s wills and 
interests, even if either or both of these differ from their own. [Metalogical]. 
 
[ ] 
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Stage 2: Ego-Involvement 
 
1. For you personally, how important is the issue of student stipends on a scale from 
1 to 10, with 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest: 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
 
 
2. For you personally, how important is the issue of Muslim prayers on a scale from 
1 to 10, with 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
 
 
3. For you personally, how important is the issue of migrant voting on a scale from 1 
to 10, with 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
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Stage 3: Latitudes 
 
Following is a list of nine arguments that have been made in the media in 
connection with the stipends issue. Could you indicate the extent to which you agree 
or disagree with these arguments using the scale provided (where -2 means “totally 
disagree” and +2 means “totally agree”):  
 
 
1. Students spend their money on leisure and the country 
cannot afford this luxury. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
2. Stipends should be revised so the money can be 
reinvested in providing better higher education, such as 
by financing the library and IT facilities. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
3. Students should be given a choice as to whether they 
receive stipends. Those who do should then pay it back 
in future and those who do not should be granted tax 
rebates (i.e. pay less tax when they start working). 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
4. Students who receive stipends are duty-bound to repay 
society. They should be obliged to work locally for a 
certain number of years before they are allowed to leave 
as they please. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
5. It is important for the stipend system to be sustainable. 
Students who feel that they do not need the stipend 
should have the option of opting out. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
6. Everyone in Malta has a right to education, and stipends 
ensure that students who are not wealthy are able to 
pursue higher education. Stipends are therefore essential 
for inclusive education. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
7. Stipends should remain, as they are an incentive for 
youth to study rather than leave their studies to enter the 
world of work prematurely. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
8. If students were forced to work to pay their way through 
university, they would not have enough time for 
studying. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
9. Stipends should remain in full as they provide spending 
money to students and this stimulates consumption and 
helps the economy. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
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Following is a list of nine arguments that have been made in the media in 
connection with the Muslim prayers issue. Could you indicate the extent to which 
you agree or disagree with these arguments using the scale provided (where -2 
means “totally disagree” and +2 means “totally agree”):  
 
 
1. The Maltese find no objection to Catholics praying in 
private or in public, so Muslims should enjoy the same 
privileges. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
2. The fact that certain Muslim countries are intolerant 
does not mean we should ourselves become intolerant. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
3. Everyone is entitled to their own beliefs and one of the 
most important freedoms is the freedom of religion and 
worship. A temple or mosque in one’s locality is part of 
that freedom. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
4. There is no harm done. They should not be allowed to 
do whatever they want but if what they want is harmless 
then we should let them do it. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
5. All should have a right to worship, and all have a duty to 
obey the law. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
6. If we start being tolerant of these practices then 
eventually we will be permitting much else. We do not 
want to jeopardize our Maltese heritage. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
7. There is a mosque in Paola already, so Muslims should 
limit their prayers to the confines of that mosque. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
8. Christians are not allowed to pray publicly in Muslim 
countries, so Muslims should not expect to be able to 
pray publicly in Malta. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
9. Malta is a Catholic country not a Muslim country. If 
immigrants do not like the way things are, they are free 
to leave. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
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Following is a list of nine arguments that have been made in the media in 
connection with the migrant voters issue. Could you indicate the extent to which you 
agree or disagree with these arguments using the scale provided (where -2 means 
“totally disagree” and +2 means “totally agree”): 
 
 
 
1. Only Maltese nationals who live and work in Malta 
should be allowed to vote in general elections. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
2. Long-term Maltese migrants to other countries should 
not be allowed to vote. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
3. Maltese nationals who permanently work abroad should 
not be allowed to vote. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
4. Maltese nationals who have been away from Malta for 
more than six months should not be allowed to vote. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
5. Malta is a democratic country and the Maltese have a 
right to vote in a general election. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
6. Maltese nationals who are away from Malta for only a 
short period of time should be allowed to vote. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
7. Maltese nationals who are abroad to work or study but 
who are still Maltese should be allowed to vote. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
8. Maltese nationals who live or work abroad but who have 
a Maltese passport should be allowed to vote. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
9. All Maltese nationals have a right to their say in matters 
of governance in their country of origin, whether they 
live or work in Malta or have a Maltese passport, or 
otherwise. 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
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Stage 4: Multiculturalism 
 
Following is a list of statements about cultural diversity. Please indicate the extent to 
which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements,  
using the following 5 point scale where 1 means “totally disagree” and 5 means 
“totally agree”. 
 
 
 
1. 
 
We should recognize that cultural and racial diversity is a 
fundamental characteristic of [national] society. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
2. 
 
We should help ethnic and racial minorities preserve their 
cultural heritages in [country]. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
3. 
 
It is best for [country] if all people forget their different ethnic 
and cultural backgrounds as soon as possible. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
4. 
 
A society that has a variety of ethnic and cultural groups is more 
able to tackle new problems as they occur. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
5. 
 
The unity of this country is weakened by people of different 
ethnic and cultural backgrounds sticking to their old ways. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6. 
 
If people of different ethnic and cultural origins want to keep 
their own culture, they should keep it to themselves. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
7. 
 
A society that has a variety of ethnic or cultural groups has more 
problems with national unity than societies with one or two 
basic cultural groups. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
8. 
 
We should do more to learn about the customs and heritage of 
different ethnic and cultural groups in this country. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
9. 
 
Immigrant/ethnic parents must encourage their children to retain 
the culture and traditions of their homeland. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
10. 
 
People who come to [country/region] should change their 
behaviour to be more like us. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
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Stage 5: Demographic Data 
 
1. Gender: Male/Female [Drop-down menu] 
 
2. Age: [Drop-down menu starting 16 to 65+] 
 
3. Marital Status: [Drop-down menu] Married/Single/Divorced-Annulled-
Separated/Widowed/Cohabiting 
 
4. Nationality: Preferably country list drop-down menu, if not available as follows: 
[Drop-down menu + Other*] Maltese/Other 
[*Other – blank space next to “(Please specify)”] 
 
5. Place of Residence: [Drop-down menu + Pop-Up window with definitions using 
‘?’ as a cue for pop-up*] Southern Harbour/Northern Harbour/South Eastern/ 
Western/Northern/Gozo and Comino 
[*Pop-up window] Definitions :  
Southern Harbour - Zabbar, Xghajra, Valletta, Tarxien, Santa Lucija, Paola, 
Marsa, Luqa, Kalkara, Senglea, Floriana, Fgura, Cospicua, Vittoriosa.  
Northern Harbour - Ta’ Xbiex, Swieqi, Sliema, Santa Venera, San Gwann, St. 
Julians, Qormi, Pieta’, Pembroke, Msida, Ħamrun, Gżira, Birkirkara.  
South Eastern - Zurrieq, Zejtun, Safi, Qrendi, Mqabba, Marsaxlokk, Marsaskala, 
Kirkop, Gudja, Ghaxaq, Birzebbugia.   
Western - Zebbug, Siggiewi, Rabat, Mtarfa, Mdina, Lija, Iklin, Dingli, Balzan, 
Attard.  
Northern  - St. Paul’s Bay, Naxxar, Mosta, Mgarr, Mellieha, Gharghur.  
Gozo and Comino - Rabat, Fontana, Għajnsielem and Comino, Gharb, Ghasri, 
Kercem, Munxar, Nadur, Qala, San Lawrenz, Sannat, Xaghra, Xewkija, Zebbuġ. 
 
6. Religion: [Drop-down menu] 
No religion/Jewish/Christian Protestant/ Christian Roman Catholic/Christian 
Orthodox/Muslim/Buddhist/Hindu/Animistic/Other* (Please specify option)] 
 
7. Faculty: [Drop-down menu] Built Environment/Arts/Dental Surgery/Economics, 
Management & Accountancy/Education/Engineering/Information & Communication 
Technology/Laws/Medicine & Surgery/Science/Theology 
 
8. What work does your father usually do? [check one*] 
 
Unskilled: such as farm labour, food service, house cleaner 
Skilled work: such as technician, carpenter, hairdresser, seamstress 
White collar (office) work: such as clerk, salesperson, secretary, small business 
Professional: doctor, lawyer, teacher, business executive       
Not currently working:  [  ] unemployed     [  ] retired     [  ] homemaker     [  ] 
student [*option to check further] 
Other (specify): _________________________ 
Don’t know 
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Not Applicable 
 
9. What work does your mother usually do? [check one*] 
 
Unskilled: such as farm labour, food service, house cleaner 
Skilled work: such as technician, carpenter, hairdresser, seamstress 
White collar (office) work: such as clerk, salesperson, secretary, small business 
Professional: doctor, lawyer, teacher, business executive       
Not currently working:  [  ] unemployed     [  ] retired     [  ] homemaker     [  ] 
student [*option to check further] 
Other (specify): _________________________ 
Don’t know 
Not Applicable 
 
 
If you would like to proceed to the €100 voucher draw click Proceed. If you do not 
want to provide your details (email address) for entering the draw, click Submit. 
Your personal details will not be saved if you select this option.  
 
[Proceed to voucher draw/Submit] 
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Stage 6: €100 voucher draw 
 
If you would like to enter the €100 voucher draw please enter your email address in 
the space provided. Should you be the lucky winner of the draw, you will be 
contacted on the email address provided. If you do not wish to provide your details 
to enter the draw please click Submit and leave your email address blank.  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
 
Thank you very much for your participation in this study. Should you have any 
queries about this study or would like further details, please do not hesitate to 
contact me. 
 
Gordon Sammut 
Room 214 
Department of Psychology 
Tel: 2340 2305 
Email: gordon.sammut@um.edu.mt 
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Appendix V 
Statistical Analyses – Social Issues 
 
 
 
Statistics 
 StypePOV MtypePOV VtypePOV 
Valid 247 247 247 N 
Missing 0 0 0 
 
 
StypePOV 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Monological 51 20.6 20.6 20.6 
Dialogical 135 54.7 54.7 75.3 
Metalogical 61 24.7 24.7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 247 100.0 100.0  
 
 
MtypePOV 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Monological 58 23.5 23.5 23.5 
Dialogical 109 44.1 44.1 67.6 
Metalogical 80 32.4 32.4 100.0 
Valid 
Total 247 100.0 100.0  
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VtypePOV 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Monological 41 16.6 16.6 16.6 
Dialogical 117 47.4 47.4 64.0 
Metalogical 89 36.0 36.0 100.0 
Valid 
Total 247 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Correlations 
 StypePOV MtypePOV VtypePOV 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .075 -.028 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .192 .624 
StypePOV 
N 247 247 247 
Correlation Coefficient .075 1.000 .251** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .192 . .000 
MtypePOV 
N 247 247 247 
Correlation Coefficient -.028 .251** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .624 .000 . 
Kendall's tau_b 
VtypePOV 
N 247 247 247 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Statistics 
 Stipends 1 Stipends 2 Stipends 3 Stipends 4 Stipends 5 
Valid 247 247 247 247 247 N 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 
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Frequency Table 
 
Stipends 1 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 122 49.4 49.4 49.4 
2 56 22.7 22.7 72.1 
3 48 19.4 19.4 91.5 
4 17 6.9 6.9 98.4 
5 4 1.6 1.6 100.0 
Valid 
Total 247 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Stipends 2 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 8 3.2 3.2 3.2 
2 24 9.7 9.7 13.0 
3 40 16.2 16.2 29.1 
4 62 25.1 25.1 54.3 
5 113 45.7 45.7 100.0 
Valid 
Total 247 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Stipends 3 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 18 7.3 7.3 7.3 
2 33 13.4 13.4 20.6 
3 77 31.2 31.2 51.8 
4 69 27.9 27.9 79.8 
5 50 20.2 20.2 100.0 
Valid 
Total 247 100.0 100.0  
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Stipends 4 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 3 1.2 1.2 1.2 
2 4 1.6 1.6 2.8 
3 20 8.1 8.1 10.9 
4 48 19.4 19.4 30.4 
5 172 69.6 69.6 100.0 
Valid 
Total 247 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Stipends 5 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 4 1.6 1.6 1.6 
2 18 7.3 7.3 8.9 
3 33 13.4 13.4 22.3 
4 78 31.6 31.6 53.8 
5 114 46.2 46.2 100.0 
Valid 
Total 247 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Statistics 
 Muslim 
Prayers 1 
Muslim 
Prayers 2 
Muslim 
Prayers 3 
Muslim 
Prayers 4 
Muslim 
Prayers 5 
Voting 
Rights 1 
Valid 247 247 247 247 247 247 N 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Statistics 
 Voting Rights 2 Voting Rights 3 Voting Rights 4 Voting Rights 5 
Valid 247 247 247 247 N 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
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Muslim Prayers 1 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 41 16.6 16.6 16.6 
2 44 17.8 17.8 34.4 
3 57 23.1 23.1 57.5 
4 48 19.4 19.4 76.9 
5 57 23.1 23.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 247 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Muslim Prayers 2 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 14 5.7 5.7 5.7 
2 21 8.5 8.5 14.2 
3 73 29.6 29.6 43.7 
4 76 30.8 30.8 74.5 
5 63 25.5 25.5 100.0 
Valid 
Total 247 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Muslim Prayers 3 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 6 2.4 2.4 2.4 
2 12 4.9 4.9 7.3 
3 38 15.4 15.4 22.7 
4 81 32.8 32.8 55.5 
5 110 44.5 44.5 100.0 
Valid 
Total 247 100.0 100.0  
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Muslim Prayers 4 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 19 7.7 7.7 7.7 
2 35 14.2 14.2 21.9 
3 97 39.3 39.3 61.1 
4 61 24.7 24.7 85.8 
5 35 14.2 14.2 100.0 
Valid 
Total 247 100.0 100.0  
 
Muslim Prayers 5 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 9 3.6 3.6 3.6 
2 18 7.3 7.3 10.9 
3 53 21.5 21.5 32.4 
4 79 32.0 32.0 64.4 
5 88 35.6 35.6 100.0 
Valid 
Total 247 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Voting Rights 1 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 39 15.8 15.8 15.8 
2 42 17.0 17.0 32.8 
3 56 22.7 22.7 55.5 
4 53 21.5 21.5 76.9 
5 57 23.1 23.1 100.0 
Valid 
Total 247 100.0 100.0  
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Voting Rights 2 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 28 11.3 11.3 11.3 
2 55 22.3 22.3 33.6 
3 48 19.4 19.4 53.0 
4 57 23.1 23.1 76.1 
5 59 23.9 23.9 100.0 
Valid 
Total 247 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Voting Rights 3 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 19 7.7 7.7 7.7 
2 28 11.3 11.3 19.0 
3 53 21.5 21.5 40.5 
4 78 31.6 31.6 72.1 
5 69 27.9 27.9 100.0 
Valid 
Total 247 100.0 100.0  
 
Voting Rights 4 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 12 4.9 4.9 4.9 
2 18 7.3 7.3 12.1 
3 42 17.0 17.0 29.1 
4 63 25.5 25.5 54.7 
5 112 45.3 45.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 247 100.0 100.0  
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Voting Rights 5 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 6 2.4 2.4 2.4 
2 16 6.5 6.5 8.9 
3 55 22.3 22.3 31.2 
4 52 21.1 21.1 52.2 
5 118 47.8 47.8 100.0 
Valid 
Total 247 100.0 100.0  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Stipends Issue 247 1 10 8.37 2.085 
Muslim Prayers Issue 247 1 10 5.85 2.645 
Voting Rights Issue 247 1 10 6.18 2.623 
Valid N (listwise) 247     
 
 
Correlations 
 Stipends Issue StypePOV 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.043 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .506 
Stipends Issue 
N 247 247 
Pearson Correlation -.043 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .506  
StypePOV 
N 247 247 
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Correlations 
 Muslim Prayers 
Issue MtypePOV 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.070 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .274 
Muslim Prayers Issue 
N 247 247 
Pearson Correlation -.070 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .274  
MtypePOV 
N 247 247 
 
 
Correlations 
 Voting Rights 
Issue VtypePOV 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.072 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .259 
Voting Rights Issue 
N 247 247 
Pearson Correlation -.072 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .259  
VtypePOV 
N 247 247 
 
 
 
Correlations 
 MtypePOV MIdeo 
Pearson Correlation 1 .238** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
MtypePOV 
N 247 236 
Pearson Correlation .238** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
MIdeo 
N 236 236 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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USE ALL. 
COMPUTE filter_$=(MtypePOV = 1). 
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ 'MtypePOV = 1 (FILTER)'. 
VALUE LABELS filter_$ 0 'Not Selected' 1 'Selected'. 
FORMAT filter_$ (f1.0). 
FILTER BY filter_$. 
EXECUTE. 
DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology 
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MIdeo 54 13 46 31.22 8.025 
Valid N (listwise) 54     
 
 
USE ALL. 
COMPUTE filter_$=(MtypePOV = 2). 
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ 'MtypePOV = 2 (FILTER)'. 
VALUE LABELS filter_$ 0 'Not Selected' 1 'Selected'. 
FORMAT filter_$ (f1.0). 
FILTER BY filter_$. 
EXECUTE. 
DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology 
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MIdeo 104 10 46 31.11 6.542 
Valid N (listwise) 104     
 
 
USE ALL. 
COMPUTE filter_$=(MtypePOV = 3). 
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ 'MtypePOV = 3 (FILTER)'. 
VALUE LABELS filter_$ 0 'Not Selected' 1 'Selected'. 
FORMAT filter_$ (f1.0). 
FILTER BY filter_$. 
EXECUTE. 
DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology 
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MIdeo 78 15 50 35.38 6.205 
Valid N (listwise) 78     
 
 
FILTER OFF. 
USE ALL. 
EXECUTE. 
ONEWAY MulticulturalIdeology BY MtypePOV 
  /MISSING ANALYSIS. 
 
 
ANOVA 
MIdeo 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 938.856 2 469.428 10.141 .000 
Within Groups 10785.631 233 46.290   
Total 11724.487 235    
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Descriptive Statistics - MONOLOGICAL 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
SAccept 32 2 8 4.78 1.453 
SNonC 32 0 5 1.16 1.247 
SReject 32 1 6 3.03 1.356 
Valid N (listwise) 32     
 
Descriptive Statistics - DIALOGICAL 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
SAccept 71 1 8 4.79 1.603 
SNonC 71 0 4 1.46 1.012 
SReject 71 0 5 2.73 1.230 
Valid N (listwise) 71     
 
Descriptive Statistics - METALOGICAL 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
SAccept 32 2 9 5.22 1.539 
SNonC 32 0 4 1.28 1.198 
SReject 32 0 6 2.53 1.502 
Valid N (listwise) 32     
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FILTER OFF. 
USE ALL. 
EXECUTE. 
ONEWAY SAccept SNoncommit SReject BY StypePOV 
  /MISSING ANALYSIS. 
 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 4.565 2 2.282 .945 .391 
Within Groups 318.768 132 2.415   
SAccept 
Total 323.333 134    
Between Groups 2.288 2 1.144 .919 .402 
Within Groups 164.349 132 1.245   
SNonC 
Total 166.637 134    
Between Groups 4.080 2 2.040 1.157 .318 
Within Groups 232.853 132 1.764   
SReject 
Total 236.933 134    
 
 
Descriptive Statistics - MONOLOGICAL 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MAccept 55 0 9 4.78 1.474 
MNonC 55 0 6 1.38 1.340 
MReject 55 0 8 2.84 1.761 
Valid N (listwise) 55     
 
 
Descriptive Statistics - DIALOGICAL 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MAccept 108 2 9 5.27 1.405 
MNonC 108 0 6 1.80 1.338 
MReject 108 0 5 1.94 1.240 
Valid N (listwise) 108     
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Descriptive Statistics - METALOGICAL 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MAccept 79 2 9 5.27 1.542 
MNonC 79 0 5 1.53 1.422 
MReject 79 0 4 2.20 1.497 
Valid N (listwise) 79     
 
 
FILTER OFF. 
USE ALL. 
EXECUTE. 
ONEWAY MAccept MNoncommit MReject BY MtypePOV 
  /MISSING ANALYSIS. 
 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 10.021 2 5.010 2.330 .100 
Within Groups 514.013 239 2.151   
MAccept 
Total 524.033 241    
Between Groups 7.089 2 3.545 1.899 .152 
Within Groups 446.171 239 1.867   
MNonC 
Total 453.260 241    
Between Groups 29.667 2 14.833 6.995 .001 
Within Groups 506.833 239 2.121   
MReject 
Total 536.500 241    
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T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(1 2) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=MAccept MNoncommit MReject 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Group Statistics 
 MPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
1 29 4.76 1.683 .313 MAccept 
dimension1 
2 26 4.81 1.234 .242 
1 29 1.17 1.197 .222 MNonC 
dimension1 
2 26 1.62 1.472 .289 
1 29 3.07 2.069 .384 MReject 
dimension1 
2 26 2.58 1.332 .261 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances assumed .834 .365 -.122 53 .903 MAccept 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -.124 51.071 .902 
Equal variances assumed .944 .336 -1.230 53 .224 MNonC 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -1.216 48.289 .230 
Equal variances assumed 5.591 .022 1.035 53 .305 MReject 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  1.059 48.306 .295 
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Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed -.049 .402 -.855 .757 MAccept 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-.049 .395 -.842 .744 
Equal variances assumed -.443 .360 -1.166 .280 MNonC 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-.443 .364 -1.175 .289 
Equal variances assumed .492 .475 -.461 1.446 MReject 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.492 .465 -.442 1.426 
 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(3 4) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=MAccept MNoncommit MReject 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Group Statistics 
 MPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
3 86 5.35 1.469 .158 MAccept 
dimension1 
4 22 4.95 1.090 .232 
3 86 1.78 1.250 .135 MNonC 
dimension1 
4 22 1.86 1.670 .356 
3 86 1.87 1.206 .130 MReject 
dimension1 
4 22 2.18 1.368 .292 
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Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances assumed 4.601 .034 1.177 106 .242 MAccept 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  1.402 42.777 .168 
Equal variances assumed 2.825 .096 -.263 106 .793 MNonC 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -.222 27.309 .826 
Equal variances assumed 1.937 .167 -1.046 106 .298 MReject 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -.970 29.892 .340 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed .394 .335 -.270 1.059 MAccept 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.394 .281 -.173 .962 
Equal variances assumed -.085 .321 -.721 .552 MNonC 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-.085 .381 -.865 .696 
Equal variances assumed -.310 .296 -.897 .277 MReject 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-.310 .319 -.962 .342 
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T-TEST GROUPS=MtypePOV(1 2) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=MAccept MNoncommit MReject 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 MtypePOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Monological 55 4.78 1.474 .199 MAccept 
Dialogical 108 5.27 1.405 .135 
Monological 55 1.38 1.340 .181 MNonC 
Dialogical 108 1.80 1.338 .129 
Monological 55 2.84 1.761 .238 MReject 
Dialogical 108 1.94 1.240 .119 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances assumed .025 .875 -2.057 161 .041 MAccept 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -2.024 104.243 .045 
Equal variances assumed .093 .760 -1.869 161 .063 MNonC 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -1.868 108.605 .064 
Equal variances assumed 11.324 .001 3.788 161 .000 MReject 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  3.391 82.065 .001 
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Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed -.487 .237 -.954 -.019 MAccept 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-.487 .240 -.963 -.010 
Equal variances assumed -.414 .222 -.852 .023 MNonC 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-.414 .222 -.854 .025 
Equal variances assumed .901 .238 .431 1.371 MReject 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.901 .266 .372 1.430 
 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=MtypePOV(1 3) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=MAccept MNoncommit MReject 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 MtypePOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Monological 55 4.78 1.474 .199 MAccept 
Metalogical 79 5.27 1.542 .173 
Monological 55 1.38 1.340 .181 MNonC 
Metalogical 79 1.53 1.422 .160 
Monological 55 2.84 1.761 .238 MReject 
Metalogical 79 2.20 1.497 .168 
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Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances assumed .521 .472 -1.820 132 .071 MAccept 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -1.834 119.551 .069 
Equal variances assumed 1.543 .216 -.614 132 .540 MNonC 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -.621 120.544 .536 
Equal variances assumed .659 .418 2.241 132 .027 MReject 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  2.177 103.788 .032 
 
Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed -.484 .266 -1.010 .042 MAccept 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-.484 .264 -1.006 .038 
Equal variances assumed -.150 .244 -.632 .333 MNonC 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-.150 .241 -.628 .328 
Equal variances assumed .634 .283 .074 1.193 MReject 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.634 .291 .056 1.211 
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T-TEST GROUPS=MtypePOV(2 3) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=MAccept MNoncommit MReject 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Group Statistics 
 MtypePOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Dialogical 108 5.27 1.405 .135 MAccept 
Metalogical 79 5.27 1.542 .173 
Dialogical 108 1.80 1.338 .129 MNonC 
Metalogical 79 1.53 1.422 .160 
Dialogical 108 1.94 1.240 .119 MReject 
Metalogical 79 2.20 1.497 .168 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances assumed 1.140 .287 .012 185 .990 MAccept 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  .012 158.819 .990 
Equal variances assumed 1.306 .255 1.301 185 .195 MNonC 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  1.289 162.169 .199 
Equal variances assumed 11.154 .001 -1.333 185 .184 MReject 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -1.295 148.666 .197 
 
 338 
 
Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed .003 .217 -.425 .430 MAccept 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.003 .220 -.432 .437 
Equal variances assumed .265 .203 -.137 .666 MNonC 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.265 .205 -.141 .670 
Equal variances assumed -.267 .200 -.663 .128 MReject 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-.267 .206 -.675 .141 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics - MONOLOGICAL 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
VAccept 39 3 8 5.28 1.255 
VNonC 39 0 5 1.36 1.347 
VReject 39 0 5 2.36 1.460 
Valid N (listwise) 39     
 
Descriptive Statistics - DIALOGICAL 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
VAccept 114 0 9 4.73 1.391 
VNonC 114 0 9 1.79 1.669 
VReject 114 0 6 2.47 1.284 
Valid N (listwise) 114     
 
Descriptive Statistics - METALOGICAL 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
VAccept 86 1 7 4.91 1.261 
VNonC 86 0 8 1.35 1.643 
VReject 86 0 6 2.74 1.312 
Valid N (listwise) 86     
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FILTER OFF. 
USE ALL. 
EXECUTE. 
ONEWAY VAccept VNoncommit VReject BY VtypePOV 
  /MISSING ANALYSIS. 
 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 8.996 2 4.498 2.566 .079 
Within Groups 413.723 236 1.753   
VAccept 
Total 422.720 238    
Between Groups 11.414 2 5.707 2.195 .114 
Within Groups 613.457 236 2.599   
VNonC 
Total 624.870 238    
Between Groups 5.329 2 2.664 1.520 .221 
Within Groups 413.768 236 1.753   
VReject 
Total 419.096 238    
 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=VotingPOV(1 2) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=VAccept VNoncommit VReject 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 VPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
1 26 5.35 1.441 .283 VAccept 
dimension1 
2 13 5.15 .801 .222 
1 26 1.65 1.325 .260 VNonC 
dimension1 
2 13 .77 1.235 .343 
1 26 2.00 1.442 .283 VReject 
dimension1 
2 13 3.08 1.256 .348 
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Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances assumed 7.175 .011 .446 37 .658 VAccept 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  .535 36.449 .596 
Equal variances assumed .213 .647 2.009 37 .052 VNonC 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  2.057 25.696 .050 
Equal variances assumed .349 .558 -2.290 37 .028 VReject 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -2.400 27.340 .023 
 
Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed .192 .431 -.681 1.066 VAccept 
Equal variances not assumed .192 .359 -.536 .921 
Equal variances assumed .885 .440 -.008 1.777 VNonC 
Equal variances not assumed .885 .430 .000 1.769 
Equal variances assumed -1.077 .470 -2.030 -.124 VReject 
Equal variances not assumed -1.077 .449 -1.997 -.157 
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T-TEST GROUPS=VotingPOV(3 4) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=VAccept VNoncommit VReject 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Group Statistics 
 VPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
3 47 4.60 1.527 .223 VAccept 
dimension1 
4 67 4.82 1.290 .158 
3 47 1.91 1.679 .245 VNonC 
dimension1 
4 67 1.70 1.670 .204 
3 47 2.47 1.177 .172 VReject 
dimension1 
4 67 2.48 1.364 .167 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances assumed .931 .337 -.850 112 .397 VAccept 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -.825 88.171 .412 
Equal variances assumed .428 .514 .670 112 .504 VNonC 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  .670 98.825 .505 
Equal variances assumed 4.000 .048 -.039 112 .969 VReject 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -.040 107.186 .968 
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Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed -.225 .265 -.750 .300 VAccept 
Equal variances not assumed -.225 .273 -.767 .317 
Equal variances assumed .213 .318 -.418 .844 VNonC 
Equal variances not assumed .213 .319 -.419 .846 
Equal variances assumed -.010 .245 -.496 .477 VReject 
Equal variances not assumed -.010 .239 -.484 .465 
 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=VotingPOV(1 3) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=VAccept VNoncommit VReject 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 VPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
1 26 5.35 1.441 .283 VAccept 
dimension1 
3 47 4.60 1.527 .223 
1 26 1.65 1.325 .260 VNonC 
dimension1 
3 47 1.91 1.679 .245 
1 26 2.00 1.442 .283 VReject 
dimension1 
3 47 2.47 1.177 .172 
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Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances assumed .146 .703 2.050 71 .044 VAccept 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  2.086 54.340 .042 
Equal variances assumed .269 .605 -.683 71 .497 VNonC 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -.731 62.387 .467 
Equal variances assumed 1.483 .227 -1.500 71 .138 VReject 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -1.415 43.593 .164 
 
Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed .750 .366 .021 1.480 VAccept 
Equal variances not assumed .750 .360 .029 1.472 
Equal variances assumed -.261 .382 -1.023 .501 VNonC 
Equal variances not assumed -.261 .357 -.975 .453 
Equal variances assumed -.468 .312 -1.090 .154 VReject 
Equal variances not assumed -.468 .331 -1.135 .199 
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T-TEST GROUPS=VotingPOV(1 4) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=VAccept VNoncommit VReject 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Group Statistics 
 VPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
1 26 5.35 1.441 .283 VAccept 
dimension1 
4 67 4.82 1.290 .158 
1 26 1.65 1.325 .260 VNonC 
dimension1 
4 67 1.70 1.670 .204 
1 26 2.00 1.442 .283 VReject 
dimension1 
4 67 2.48 1.364 .167 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances assumed 1.784 .185 1.705 91 .092 VAccept 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  1.624 41.461 .112 
Equal variances assumed 1.496 .224 -.130 91 .897 VNonC 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -.144 57.101 .886 
Equal variances assumed .041 .840 -1.492 91 .139 VReject 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -1.455 43.376 .153 
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Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed .525 .308 -.087 1.137 VAccept 
Equal variances not assumed .525 .324 -.128 1.178 
Equal variances assumed -.048 .366 -.774 .679 VNonC 
Equal variances not assumed -.048 .330 -.709 .614 
Equal variances assumed -.478 .320 -1.114 .158 VReject 
Equal variances not assumed -.478 .328 -1.139 .184 
 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=VotingPOV(1 5) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=VAccept VNoncommit VReject 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 VPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
1 26 5.35 1.441 .283 VAccept 
dimension1 
5 86 4.91 1.261 .136 
1 26 1.65 1.325 .260 VNonC 
dimension1 
5 86 1.35 1.643 .177 
1 26 2.00 1.442 .283 VReject 
dimension1 
5 86 2.74 1.312 .142 
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Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances assumed 2.835 .095 1.504 110 .135 VAccept 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  1.401 37.343 .170 
Equal variances assumed .858 .356 .864 110 .389 VNonC 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  .970 50.452 .337 
Equal variances assumed .129 .720 -2.476 110 .015 VReject 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -2.353 38.374 .024 
 
Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed .439 .292 -.139 1.018 VAccept 
Equal variances not assumed .439 .314 -.196 1.074 
Equal variances assumed .305 .353 -.394 1.004 VNonC 
Equal variances not assumed .305 .315 -.327 .937 
Equal variances assumed -.744 .301 -1.340 -.149 VReject 
Equal variances not assumed -.744 .316 -1.384 -.104 
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T-TEST GROUPS=VotingPOV(2 3) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=VAccept VNoncommit VReject 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Group Statistics 
 VPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
2 13 5.15 .801 .222 VAccept 
dimension1 
3 47 4.60 1.527 .223 
2 13 .77 1.235 .343 VNonC 
dimension1 
3 47 1.91 1.679 .245 
2 13 3.08 1.256 .348 VReject 
dimension1 
3 47 2.47 1.177 .172 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances assumed 3.410 .070 1.265 58 .211 VAccept 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  1.774 38.218 .084 
Equal variances assumed .536 .467 -2.289 58 .026 VNonC 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -2.721 25.651 .012 
Equal variances assumed .086 .771 1.628 58 .109 VReject 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  1.568 18.257 .134 
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Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed .558 .441 -.325 1.441 VAccept 
Equal variances not assumed .558 .315 -.079 1.195 
Equal variances assumed -1.146 .501 -2.148 -.144 VNonC 
Equal variances not assumed -1.146 .421 -2.012 -.279 
Equal variances assumed .609 .374 -.140 1.358 VReject 
Equal variances not assumed .609 .388 -.206 1.424 
 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=VotingPOV(2 4) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=VAccept VNoncommit VReject 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Group Statistics 
 VPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
2 13 5.15 .801 .222 VAccept 
dimension1 
4 67 4.82 1.290 .158 
2 13 .77 1.235 .343 VNonC 
dimension1 
4 67 1.70 1.670 .204 
2 13 3.08 1.256 .348 VReject 
dimension1 
4 67 2.48 1.364 .167 
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Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances assumed 2.218 .140 .895 78 .374 VAccept 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  1.223 25.940 .232 
Equal variances assumed 1.727 .193 -1.910 78 .060 VNonC 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -2.338 21.528 .029 
Equal variances assumed .918 .341 1.467 78 .146 VReject 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  1.552 17.948 .138 
 
Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed .333 .372 -.408 1.074 VAccept 
Equal variances not assumed .333 .272 -.227 .893 
Equal variances assumed -.932 .488 -1.904 .040 VNonC 
Equal variances not assumed -.932 .399 -1.760 -.104 
Equal variances assumed .599 .408 -.214 1.412 VReject 
Equal variances not assumed .599 .386 -.212 1.411 
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T-TEST GROUPS=VotingPOV(2 5) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=VAccept VNoncommit VReject 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Group Statistics 
 VPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
2 13 5.15 .801 .222 VAccept 
dimension1 
5 86 4.91 1.261 .136 
2 13 .77 1.235 .343 VNonC 
dimension1 
5 86 1.35 1.643 .177 
2 13 3.08 1.256 .348 VReject 
dimension1 
5 86 2.74 1.312 .142 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances assumed 1.412 .238 .683 97 .496 VAccept 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  .948 22.253 .353 
Equal variances assumed 1.157 .285 -1.219 97 .226 VNonC 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -1.503 19.088 .149 
Equal variances assumed .221 .639 .857 97 .394 VReject 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  .885 16.226 .389 
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Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed .247 .361 -.470 .964 VAccept 
Equal variances not assumed .247 .260 -.293 .787 
Equal variances assumed -.580 .476 -1.524 .364 VNonC 
Equal variances not assumed -.580 .386 -1.387 .227 
Equal variances assumed .333 .388 -.438 1.104 VReject 
Equal variances not assumed .333 .376 -.463 1.129 
 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=VotingPOV(3 5) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=VAccept VNoncommit VReject 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 VPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
3 47 4.60 1.527 .223 VAccept 
dimension1 
5 86 4.91 1.261 .136 
3 47 1.91 1.679 .245 VNonC 
dimension1 
5 86 1.35 1.643 .177 
3 47 2.47 1.177 .172 VReject 
dimension1 
5 86 2.74 1.312 .142 
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Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances assumed 1.964 .163 -1.261 131 .210 VAccept 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -1.192 80.622 .237 
Equal variances assumed .132 .717 1.885 131 .062 VNonC 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  1.873 92.985 .064 
Equal variances assumed 1.632 .204 -1.202 131 .232 VReject 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -1.241 103.818 .217 
 
Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed -.311 .247 -.800 .177 VAccept 
Equal variances not assumed -.311 .261 -.831 .208 
Equal variances assumed .566 .300 -.028 1.160 VNonC 
Equal variances not assumed .566 .302 -.034 1.166 
Equal variances assumed -.276 .230 -.731 .178 VReject 
Equal variances not assumed -.276 .222 -.717 .165 
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T-TEST GROUPS=VotingPOV(4 5) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=VAccept VNoncommit VReject 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 VPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
4 67 4.82 1.290 .158 VAccept 
dimension1 
5 86 4.91 1.261 .136 
4 67 1.70 1.670 .204 VNonC 
dimension1 
5 86 1.35 1.643 .177 
4 67 2.48 1.364 .167 VReject 
dimension1 
5 86 2.74 1.312 .142 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances assumed .224 .637 -.415 151 .679 VAccept 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -.413 140.437 .680 
Equal variances assumed .138 .711 1.308 151 .193 VNonC 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  1.305 140.890 .194 
Equal variances assumed .682 .410 -1.225 151 .222 VReject 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -1.220 139.295 .225 
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Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed -.086 .208 -.496 .324 VAccept 
Equal variances not assumed -.086 .208 -.498 .326 
Equal variances assumed .353 .270 -.180 .885 VNonC 
Equal variances not assumed .353 .270 -.182 .887 
Equal variances assumed -.267 .218 -.696 .163 VReject 
Equal variances not assumed -.267 .219 -.699 .166 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics - VRights 1 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
VAccept 26 3 8 5.35 1.441 
VNonC 26 0 5 1.65 1.325 
VReject 26 0 5 2.00 1.442 
Valid N (listwise) 26     
 
Descriptive Statistics - VRights 2 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
VAccept 13 4 7 5.15 .801 
VNonC 13 0 4 .77 1.235 
VReject 13 0 4 3.08 1.256 
Valid N (listwise) 13     
 
Descriptive Statistics - VRights 3 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
VAccept 47 0 9 4.60 1.527 
VNonC 47 0 9 1.91 1.679 
VReject 47 0 6 2.47 1.177 
Valid N (listwise) 47     
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Descriptive Statistics - VRights 4 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
VAccept 67 0 7 4.82 1.290 
VNonC 67 0 9 1.70 1.670 
VReject 67 0 5 2.48 1.364 
Valid N (listwise) 67     
 
Descriptive Statistics - VRights 5 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
VAccept 86 1 7 4.91 1.261 
VNonC 86 0 8 1.35 1.643 
VReject 86 0 6 2.74 1.312 
Valid N (listwise) 86     
 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total  
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Gender * MtypePOV 247 100.0% 0 .0% 247 100.0% 
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Gender * MtypePOV Crosstabulation 
MtypePOV  
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
Count 32 67 60 159 
% within Gender 20.1% 42.1% 37.7% 100.0% 
% within MtypePOV 55.2% 61.5% 75.0% 64.4% 
Female 
% of Total 13.0% 27.1% 24.3% 64.4% 
Count 26 42 20 88 
% within Gender 29.5% 47.7% 22.7% 100.0% 
% within MtypePOV 44.8% 38.5% 25.0% 35.6% 
Gender 
Male 
% of Total 10.5% 17.0% 8.1% 35.6% 
Count 58 109 80 247 
% within Gender 23.5% 44.1% 32.4% 100.0% 
% within MtypePOV 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 23.5% 44.1% 32.4% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.481a 2 .039 
Likelihood Ratio 6.637 2 .036 
N of Valid Cases 247   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 20.66. 
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T-TEST GROUPS=GenderR(1 2) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 GenderR N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Male 83 29.75 7.667 .842 MIdeo 
dimension1 
Female 153 34.07 6.231 .504 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Equal variances 
assumed 
2.408 .122 -4.680 234 .000 -4.318 MIdeo 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -4.403 141.495 .000 -4.318 
 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed .923 -6.136 -2.500 MIdeo 
Equal variances not assumed .981 -6.257 -2.380 
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Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total  
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
ArtsSC * 
StypePO
V 
245 99.2% 2 .8% 247 100.0% 
 
 
ArtsSC * StypePOV Crosstabulation 
StypePOV  
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
Count 12 54 27 93 
% within ArtsSC 12.9% 58.1% 29.0% 100.0% 
% within StypePOV 23.5% 40.6% 44.3% 38.0% 
Sciences 
% of Total 4.9% 22.0% 11.0% 38.0% 
Count 39 79 34 152 
% within ArtsSC 25.7% 52.0% 22.4% 100.0% 
% within StypePOV 76.5% 59.4% 55.7% 62.0% 
ArtsSC 
Arts 
% of Total 15.9% 32.2% 13.9% 62.0% 
Count 51 133 61 245 
% within ArtsSC 20.8% 54.3% 24.9% 100.0% 
% within StypePOV 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 20.8% 54.3% 24.9% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.933a 2 .051 
Likelihood Ratio 6.234 2 .044 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.757 1 .029 
N of Valid Cases 245   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 19.36. 
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Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total  
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
ArtsSC * VtypePOV 245 99.2% 2 .8% 247 100.0% 
 
 
ArtsSC * VtypePOV Crosstabulation 
VtypePOV  
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
Count 7 53 33 93 
% within ArtsSC 7.5% 57.0% 35.5% 100.0% 
% within VtypePOV 17.5% 45.3% 37.5% 38.0% 
Sciences 
% of Total 2.9% 21.6% 13.5% 38.0% 
Count 33 64 55 152 
% within ArtsSC 21.7% 42.1% 36.2% 100.0% 
% within VtypePOV 82.5% 54.7% 62.5% 62.0% 
ArtsSC 
Arts 
% of Total 13.5% 26.1% 22.4% 62.0% 
Count 40 117 88 245 
% within ArtsSC 16.3% 47.8% 35.9% 100.0% 
% within VtypePOV 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 16.3% 47.8% 35.9% 100.0% 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.794a 2 .007 
Likelihood Ratio 10.599 2 .005 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.158 1 .142 
N of Valid Cases 245   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 15.18. 
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Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total  
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
YrStudyU * VtypePOV 246 99.6% 1 .4% 247 100.0% 
 
 
YrStudyU * VtypePOV Crosstabulation 
VtypePOV  
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
Count 17 39 44 100 
% within YrStudyU 17.0% 39.0% 44.0% 100.0% 
% within VtypePOV 41.5% 33.3% 50.0% 40.7% 
Year 1 
% of Total 6.9% 15.9% 17.9% 40.7% 
Count 14 31 16 61 
% within YrStudyU 23.0% 50.8% 26.2% 100.0% 
% within VtypePOV 34.1% 26.5% 18.2% 24.8% 
Year 2 
% of Total 5.7% 12.6% 6.5% 24.8% 
Count 4 30 21 55 
% within YrStudyU 7.3% 54.5% 38.2% 100.0% 
% within VtypePOV 9.8% 25.6% 23.9% 22.4% 
Year 3 
% of Total 1.6% 12.2% 8.5% 22.4% 
Count 6 17 7 30 
% within YrStudyU 20.0% 56.7% 23.3% 100.0% 
% within VtypePOV 14.6% 14.5% 8.0% 12.2% 
YrStudyU 
Years 4/5 
% of Total 2.4% 6.9% 2.8% 12.2% 
Count 41 117 88 246 
% within YrStudyU 16.7% 47.6% 35.8% 100.0% 
% within VtypePOV 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 16.7% 47.6% 35.8% 100.0% 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.161a 6 .058 
Likelihood Ratio 13.036 6 .042 
Linear-by-Linear Association .879 1 .348 
N of Valid Cases 246   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 5.00. 
 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total  
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
YrStudyU * StypePOV 246 99.6% 1 .4% 247 100.0% 
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YrStudyU * StypePOV Crosstabulation 
StypePOV  
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
Count 19 53 28 100 
% within YrStudyU 19.0% 53.0% 28.0% 100.0% 
% within StypePOV 37.3% 39.6% 45.9% 40.7% 
Year 1 
% of Total 7.7% 21.5% 11.4% 40.7% 
Count 14 33 14 61 
% within YrStudyU 23.0% 54.1% 23.0% 100.0% 
% within StypePOV 27.5% 24.6% 23.0% 24.8% 
Year 2 
% of Total 5.7% 13.4% 5.7% 24.8% 
Count 14 29 12 55 
% within YrStudyU 25.5% 52.7% 21.8% 100.0% 
% within StypePOV 27.5% 21.6% 19.7% 22.4% 
Year 3 
% of Total 5.7% 11.8% 4.9% 22.4% 
Count 4 19 7 30 
% within YrStudyU 13.3% 63.3% 23.3% 100.0% 
% within StypePOV 7.8% 14.2% 11.5% 12.2% 
YrStudyU 
Years 4/5 
% of Total 1.6% 7.7% 2.8% 12.2% 
Count 51 134 61 246 
% within YrStudyU 20.7% 54.5% 24.8% 100.0% 
% within StypePOV 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 20.7% 54.5% 24.8% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.898a 6 .822 
Likelihood Ratio 2.946 6 .816 
Linear-by-Linear Association .252 1 .616 
N of Valid Cases 246   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 6.22. 
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Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total  
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
YrStudyU * MtypePOV 246 99.6% 1 .4% 247 100.0% 
 
 
YrStudyU * MtypePOV Crosstabulation 
MtypePOV  
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
Count 23 37 40 100 
% within YrStudyU 23.0% 37.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
% within MtypePOV 39.7% 33.9% 50.6% 40.7% 
Year 1 
% of Total 9.3% 15.0% 16.3% 40.7% 
Count 17 25 19 61 
% within YrStudyU 27.9% 41.0% 31.1% 100.0% 
% within MtypePOV 29.3% 22.9% 24.1% 24.8% 
Year 2 
% of Total 6.9% 10.2% 7.7% 24.8% 
Count 8 28 19 55 
% within YrStudyU 14.5% 50.9% 34.5% 100.0% 
% within MtypePOV 13.8% 25.7% 24.1% 22.4% 
Year 3 
% of Total 3.3% 11.4% 7.7% 22.4% 
Count 10 19 1 30 
% within YrStudyU 33.3% 63.3% 3.3% 100.0% 
% within MtypePOV 17.2% 17.4% 1.3% 12.2% 
YrStudyU 
Years 4/5 
% of Total 4.1% 7.7% .4% 12.2% 
Count 58 109 79 246 
% within YrStudyU 23.6% 44.3% 32.1% 100.0% 
% within MtypePOV 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 
% of Total 23.6% 44.3% 32.1% 100.0% 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 17.747a 6 .007 
Likelihood Ratio 22.502 6 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.225 1 .040 
N of Valid Cases 246   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 7.07. 
 
 
ONEWAY MulticulturalIdeology BY YrStudyU 
  /MISSING ANALYSIS. 
 
ANOVA 
MIdeo 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 198.208 3 66.069 1.325 .267 
Within Groups 11520.235 231 49.871   
Total 11718.443 234    
 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total  
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
FWork * StypePOV 177 71.7% 70 28.3% 247 100.0% 
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FWork * StypePOV Crosstabulation 
Count 
StypePOV  
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
Unskilled 1 9 4 14 
Skilled 14 34 10 58 
White collar 10 24 13 47 
FWork 
Professional 7 32 19 58 
Total 32 99 46 177 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.800a 6 .340 
Likelihood Ratio 7.255 6 .298 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.038 1 .153 
N of Valid Cases 177   
a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 2.53. 
 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total  
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
FWork * MtypePOV 177 71.7% 70 28.3% 247 100.0% 
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FWork * MtypePOV Crosstabulation 
Count 
MtypePOV  
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
Unskilled 3 7 4 14 
Skilled 8 29 21 58 
White collar 11 24 12 47 
FWork 
Professional 12 24 22 58 
Total 34 84 59 177 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.562a 6 .736 
Likelihood Ratio 3.705 6 .717 
Linear-by-Linear Association .013 1 .910 
N of Valid Cases 177   
a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 2.69. 
 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total  
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
FWork * VtypePOV 177 71.7% 70 28.3% 247 100.0% 
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FWork * VtypePOV Crosstabulation 
Count 
VtypePOV  
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
Unskilled 4 5 5 14 
Skilled 11 29 18 58 
White collar 7 22 18 47 
FWork 
Professional 7 30 21 58 
Total 29 86 62 177 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.310a 6 .769 
Likelihood Ratio 3.187 6 .785 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.293 1 .255 
N of Valid Cases 177   
a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 2.29. 
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Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total  
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Place of Residence * 
StypePOV 
247 100.0% 0 .0% 247 100.0% 
 
 
Place of Residence * StypePOV Crosstabulation 
Count 
StypePOV  
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
Gozo and Comino 7 6 5 18 
Northern 7 26 12 45 
Northern Harbour 11 44 14 69 
Souther Eastern 7 13 9 29 
Southern Harbour 9 22 12 43 
Place of Residence 
Western 10 24 9 43 
Total 51 135 61 247 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.346a 10 .500 
Likelihood Ratio 9.071 10 .525 
N of Valid Cases 247   
a. 2 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 3.72. 
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Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total  
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Place of Residence * 
MtypePOV 
247 100.0% 0 .0% 247 100.0% 
 
 
Place of Residence * MtypePOV Crosstabulation 
Count 
MtypePOV  
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
Gozo and Comino 5 10 3 18 
Northern 15 15 15 45 
Northern Harbour 11 30 28 69 
Souther Eastern 8 14 7 29 
Southern Harbour 12 18 13 43 
Place of Residence 
Western 7 22 14 43 
Total 58 109 80 247 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.048a 10 .354 
Likelihood Ratio 11.420 10 .326 
N of Valid Cases 247   
a. 1 cells (5.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 4.23. 
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Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total  
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Place of Residence * 
VtypePOV 
247 100.0% 0 .0% 247 100.0% 
 
 
Place of Residence * VtypePOV Crosstabulation 
Count 
VtypePOV  
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
Gozo and Comino 5 6 7 18 
Northern 9 22 14 45 
Northern Harbour 6 36 27 69 
Souther Eastern 7 13 9 29 
Southern Harbour 5 15 23 43 
Place of Residence 
Western 9 25 9 43 
Total 41 117 89 247 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 17.085a 10 .073 
Likelihood Ratio 17.481 10 .064 
N of Valid Cases 247   
a. 2 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 2.99. 
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Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total  
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
RelYNU * StypePOV 247 100.0% 0 .0% 247 100.0% 
 
 
RelYNU * StypePOV Crosstabulation 
Count 
StypePOV  
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
Religious 45 113 50 208 RelYNU 
Not Religious 6 22 11 39 
Total 51 135 61 247 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .878a 2 .645 
Likelihood Ratio .919 2 .631 
Linear-by-Linear Association .786 1 .375 
N of Valid Cases 247   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 8.05. 
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Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total  
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
RelYNU * MtypePOV 247 100.0% 0 .0% 247 100.0% 
 
 
RelYNU * MtypePOV Crosstabulation 
Count 
MtypePOV  
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
Religious 51 95 62 208 RelYNU 
Not Religious 7 14 18 39 
Total 58 109 80 247 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.024a 2 .134 
Likelihood Ratio 3.852 2 .146 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.119 1 .077 
N of Valid Cases 247   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 9.16. 
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Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total  
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
RelYNU * VtypePOV 247 100.0% 0 .0% 247 100.0% 
 
 
RelYNU * VtypePOV Crosstabulation 
Count 
VtypePOV  
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
Religious 37 96 75 208 RelYNU 
Not Religious 4 21 14 39 
Total 41 117 89 247 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.533a 2 .465 
Likelihood Ratio 1.665 2 .435 
Linear-by-Linear Association .364 1 .546 
N of Valid Cases 247   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 6.47. 
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Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total  
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
AgeRU * StypePOV 247 100.0% 0 .0% 247 100.0% 
 
 
AgeRU * StypePOV Crosstabulation 
Count 
StypePOV  
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
<20 35 84 42 161 
21-30 15 37 10 62 
AgeRU 
>31 1 14 9 24 
Total 51 135 61 247 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.716a 4 .103 
Likelihood Ratio 9.278 4 .055 
Linear-by-Linear Association .867 1 .352 
N of Valid Cases 247   
a. 1 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 4.96. 
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Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total  
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
AgeRU * MtypePOV 247 100.0% 0 .0% 247 100.0% 
 
 
AgeRU * MtypePOV Crosstabulation 
Count 
MtypePOV  
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
<20 36 65 60 161 
21-30 15 34 13 62 
AgeRU 
>31 7 10 7 24 
Total 58 109 80 247 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.346a 4 .175 
Likelihood Ratio 6.530 4 .163 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.309 1 .129 
N of Valid Cases 247   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 5.64. 
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Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total  
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
AgeRU * VtypePOV 247 100.0% 0 .0% 247 100.0% 
 
 
AgeRU * VtypePOV Crosstabulation 
Count 
VtypePOV  
Monological Dialogical Metalogical Total 
<20 25 73 63 161 
21-30 11 35 16 62 
AgeRU 
>31 5 9 10 24 
Total 41 117 89 247 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.572a 4 .334 
Likelihood Ratio 4.708 4 .319 
Linear-by-Linear Association .760 1 .383 
N of Valid Cases 247   
a. 1 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 3.98. 
 
 
GET 
  FILE='/Users/Home/Documents/Gordon/PhD/3rd/POVs.sav'. 
DATASET NAME DataSet1 WINDOW=FRONT. 
ONEWAY MulticulturalIdeology BY MuslimPOV 
  /MISSING ANALYSIS. 
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ANOVA 
MIdeo 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 2786.663 4 696.666 18.005 .000 
Within Groups 8937.824 231 38.692   
Total 11724.487 235    
 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(3 5) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 MPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
3 83 30.13 6.245 .685 MIdeo 
dimension1 
5 78 35.38 6.205 .703 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.159 .691 -5.350 159 .000 -5.252 MIdeo 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -5.351 158.500 .000 -5.252 
 
Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed .982 -7.191 -3.313 MIdeo 
Equal variances not assumed .982 -7.191 -3.314 
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T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(3 4) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Group Statistics 
 MPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
3 83 30.13 6.245 .685 MIdeo 
dimension1 
4 21 34.95 6.407 1.398 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.175 .677 -3.144 102 .002 -4.820 MIdeo 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -3.095 30.342 .004 -4.820 
 
Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed 1.533 -7.861 -1.779 MIdeo 
Equal variances not assumed 1.557 -7.998 -1.641 
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T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(2 3) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Group Statistics 
 MPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
2 26 36.62 6.350 1.245 MIdeo 
dimension1 
3 83 30.13 6.245 .685 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.144 .705 4.601 107 .000 6.483 MIdeo 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  4.560 41.284 .000 6.483 
 
Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed 1.409 3.690 9.276 MIdeo 
Equal variances not assumed 1.422 3.613 9.353 
 
 
 380 
T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(1 2) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 MPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
1 28 26.21 5.921 1.119 MIdeo 
dimension1 
2 26 36.62 6.350 1.245 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.088 .768 -6.229 52 .000 -10.401 MIdeo 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -6.212 50.927 .000 -10.401 
 
Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed 1.670 -13.752 -7.050 MIdeo 
Equal variances not assumed 1.674 -13.763 -7.040 
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T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(1 4) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 MPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
1 28 26.21 5.921 1.119 MIdeo 
dimension1 
4 21 34.95 6.407 1.398 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.122 .729 -4.936 47 .000 -8.738 MIdeo 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -4.879 41.284 .000 -8.738 
 
Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed 1.770 -12.300 -5.177 MIdeo 
Equal variances not assumed 1.791 -12.354 -5.122 
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T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(1 5) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 MPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
1 28 26.21 5.921 1.119 MIdeo 
dimension1 
5 78 35.38 6.205 .703 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.058 .811 -6.788 104 .000 -9.170 MIdeo 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -6.940 49.768 .000 -9.170 
 
Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed 1.351 -11.849 -6.491 MIdeo 
Equal variances not assumed 1.321 -11.825 -6.516 
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T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(1 3) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 MPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
1 28 26.21 5.921 1.119 MIdeo 
dimension1 
3 83 30.13 6.245 .685 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.004 .951 -2.908 109 .004 -3.918 MIdeo 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -2.986 48.798 .004 -3.918 
 
Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed 1.348 -6.589 -1.247 MIdeo 
Equal variances not assumed 1.312 -6.556 -1.281 
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T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(4 5) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 MPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
4 21 34.95 6.407 1.398 MIdeo 
dimension1 
5 78 35.38 6.205 .703 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.032 .858 -.281 97 .779 -.432 MIdeo 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -.276 30.865 .784 -.432 
 
Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed 1.536 -3.480 2.616 MIdeo 
Equal variances not assumed 1.565 -3.624 2.760 
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T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(2 5) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 MPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
2 26 36.62 6.350 1.245 MIdeo 
dimension1 
5 78 35.38 6.205 .703 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.013 .909 .871 102 .386 1.231 MIdeo 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  .861 42.061 .394 1.231 
 
Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed 1.413 -1.572 4.034 MIdeo 
Equal variances not assumed 1.430 -1.655 4.116 
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T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(2 4) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 MPOV N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
2 26 36.62 6.350 1.245 MIdeo 
dimension1 
4 21 34.95 6.407 1.398 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.004 .951 .889 45 .379 1.663 MIdeo 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  .888 42.783 .379 1.663 
 
Independent Samples Test 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal variances assumed 1.871 -2.104 5.430 MIdeo 
Equal variances not assumed 1.872 -2.113 5.439 
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Case Processing Summary 
 
N 
Marginal 
Percentage 
Monological 32 18.2% 
Dialogical 98 55.7% 
StypePOV 
Metalogical 46 26.1% 
Unskilled 13 7.4% 
Skilled 58 33.0% 
White collar 47 26.7% 
FWork 
Professional 58 33.0% 
Year 1 66 37.5% 
Year 2 44 25.0% 
Year 3 42 23.9% 
YrStudyU 
Years 4/5 24 13.6% 
Sciences 70 39.8% ArtsSC 
Arts 106 60.2% 
Religious 147 83.5% RelYNU 
Not Religious 29 16.5% 
Other 6 3.4% 
Single 161 91.5% 
MaritalRU 
Married 9 5.1% 
<20 126 71.6% 
21-30 40 22.7% 
AgeRU 
>31 10 5.7% 
Male 63 35.8% GenderR 
Female 113 64.2% 
Gozo and Comino 14 8.0% 
Northern 34 19.3% 
Northern Harbour 45 25.6% 
Souther Eastern 20 11.4% 
Southern Harbour 28 15.9% 
Place of Residence 
Western 35 19.9% 
Valid 176 100.0% 
Missing 69  
Total 245  
Subpopulation 150a  
a. The dependent variable has only one value observed in 142 (94.7%) 
subpopulations. 
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Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 328.822    
Final 296.097 32.725 36 .625 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .170 
Nagelkerke .197 
McFadden .094 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
of Reduced 
Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 296.097a .000 0 . 
FWork 305.328 9.231 6 .161 
YrStudyU 302.482 6.385 6 .381 
ArtsSc 300.154 4.057 2 .132 
RelYNU 296.803 .706 2 .702 
MaritalRU 297.056 .960 4 .916 
AgeRU 299.043 2.946 4 .567 
GenderR 296.104 .008 2 .996 
PlaceofResidence 309.502 13.406 10 .202 
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the 
final model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by 
omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all 
parameters of that effect are 0. 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting 
the effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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Parameter Estimates 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Exp(B) 
StypePOVa 
B 
Std. 
Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Intercept 3.172 1.762 3.241 1 .072    
[FWork=1.00] 1.263 1.221 1.070 1 .301 3.537 .323 38.736 
[FWork=2.00] -.674 .602 1.253 1 .263 .510 .157 1.659 
[FWork=3.00] -.714 .640 1.244 1 .265 .490 .140 1.717 
[FWork=4.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[YrStudyU=1.00] -1.819 1.019 3.185 1 .074 .162 .022 1.196 
[YrStudyU=2.00] -1.033 .976 1.120 1 .290 .356 .053 2.411 
[YrStudyU=3.00] -1.879 .975 3.718 1 .054 .153 .023 1.031 
[YrStudyU=4.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[ArtsSc=1.00] .751 .519 2.092 1 .148 2.119 .766 5.859 
[ArtsSc=2.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[RelYNU=1.00] -.496 .684 .526 1 .468 .609 .159 2.327 
[RelYNU=2.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[MaritalRU=1.00] .354 1.789 .039 1 .843 1.424 .043 47.453 
[MaritalRU=2.00] -.767 1.579 .236 1 .627 .464 .021 10.255 
[MaritalRU=3.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[AgeRU=1.00] .020 1.591 .000 1 .990 1.021 .045 23.089 
[AgeRU=2.00] -.682 1.592 .184 1 .668 .506 .022 11.447 
[AgeRU=3.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[GenderR=1] .004 .501 .000 1 .993 1.004 .376 2.684 
[GenderR=2] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[PlaceofResidence
=Gozo and 
Comino] 
-.332 .812 .168 1 .682 .717 .146 3.520 
[PlaceofResidence
=Northern] 
1.564 .757 4.268 1 .039 4.778 1.084 21.066 
Dia-
logical 
[PlaceofResidence
=Northern 
Harbour] 
1.826 .720 6.430 1 .011 6.208 1.514 25.457 
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[PlaceofResidence
=Souther Eastern] 
.847 .781 1.175 1 .278 2.332 .504 10.785 
[PlaceofResidence
=Southern 
Harbour] 
.751 .704 1.138 1 .286 2.119 .533 8.418 
 
[PlaceofResidence
=Western] 
0b . . 0 . . . . 
Intercept 2.354 1.974 1.422 1 .233    
[FWork=1.00] 1.010 1.290 .613 1 .434 2.745 .219 34.433 
[FWork=2.00] -1.443 .682 4.475 1 .034 .236 .062 .899 
[FWork=3.00] -.803 .685 1.374 1 .241 .448 .117 1.716 
[FWork=4.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[YrStudyU=1.00] -1.903 1.111 2.936 1 .087 .149 .017 1.315 
[YrStudyU=2.00] -1.492 1.095 1.856 1 .173 .225 .026 1.924 
[YrStudyU=3.00] -2.015 1.082 3.468 1 .063 .133 .016 1.112 
[YrStudyU=4.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[ArtsSc=1.00] 1.118 .568 3.868 1 .049 3.059 1.004 9.321 
[ArtsSc=2.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[RelYNU=1.00] -.595 .749 .632 1 .427 .551 .127 2.392 
[RelYNU=2.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[MaritalRU=1.00] -.377 2.181 .030 1 .863 .686 .010 49.262 
[MaritalRU=2.00] -1.009 1.837 .302 1 .583 .365 .010 13.361 
[MaritalRU=3.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[AgeRU=1.00] .745 1.863 .160 1 .689 2.106 .055 81.049 
[AgeRU=2.00] -.457 1.880 .059 1 .808 .633 .016 25.227 
[AgeRU=3.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[GenderR=1] .037 .554 .005 1 .946 1.038 .350 3.074 
[GenderR=2] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[PlaceofResidence
=Gozo and 
Comino] 
-.214 .969 .049 1 .825 .807 .121 5.397 
[PlaceofResidence
=Northern] 
1.626 .850 3.657 1 .056 5.082 .960 26.893 
Metalo
gical 
[PlaceofResidence
=Northern 
Harbour] 
1.524 .831 3.362 1 .067 4.590 .900 23.399 
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[PlaceofResidence
=Souther Eastern] 
1.299 .899 2.086 1 .149 3.664 .629 21.341 
[PlaceofResidence
=Southern 
Harbour] 
1.173 .799 2.158 1 .142 3.233 .676 15.469 
 
[PlaceofResidence
=Western] 
0b . . 0 . . . . 
a. The reference category is: Monological. 
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
 
 
 
Warnings 
Unexpected singularities in the Hessian matrix are encountered. This indicates that either 
some predictor variables should be excluded or some categories should be merged. 
The NOMREG procedure continues despite the above warning(s). Subsequent results 
shown are based on the last iteration. Validity of the model fit is uncertain. 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
N 
Marginal 
Percentage 
Monological 30 18.0% 
Dialogical 80 47.9% 
MtypePOV 
Metalogical 57 34.1% 
Unskilled 12 7.2% 
Skilled 55 32.9% 
White collar 45 26.9% 
FWork 
Professional 55 32.9% 
Year 1 60 35.9% 
Year 2 41 24.6% 
Year 3 42 25.1% 
YrStudyU 
Years 4/5 24 14.4% 
Sciences 66 39.5% ArtsSC 
Arts 101 60.5% 
Religious 139 83.2% RelYNU 
Not Religious 28 16.8% 
MaritalRU Other 6 3.6% 
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Single 152 91.0%  
Married 9 5.4% 
<20 117 70.1% 
21-30 40 24.0% 
AgeRU 
>31 10 6.0% 
Male 59 35.3% GenderR 
Female 108 64.7% 
Gozo and Comino 12 7.2% 
Northern 33 19.8% 
Northern Harbour 44 26.3% 
Souther Eastern 19 11.4% 
Southern Harbour 27 16.2% 
Place of Residence 
Western 32 19.2% 
Valid 167 100.0% 
Missing 78  
Total 245  
Subpopulation 165a  
a. The dependent variable has only one value observed in 165 (100.0%) 
subpopulations. 
 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 343.306    
Final 271.862 71.444 38 .001 
 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .348 
Nagelkerke .399 
McFadden .208 
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Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
of Reduced 
Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 271.862a .000 0 . 
MulticulturalIdeology 292.442 20.580 2 .000 
FWork 276.861 4.999 6 .544 
YrStudyU 281.839 9.977 6 .126 
ArtsSc 274.430 2.568 2 .277 
RelYNU 274.511 2.649 2 .266 
MaritalRU 278.726 6.864 4 .143 
AgeRU 277.133 5.271 4 .261 
GenderR 272.848 .986 2 .611 
PlaceofResidence 288.348 16.486 10 .087 
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the 
final model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting 
an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of 
that effect are 0. 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the 
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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Parameter Estimates 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Exp(B) 
MtypePOVa 
B 
Std. 
Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Intercept -2.383 2.170 1.205 1 .272    
MulticulturalIdeology .088 .042 4.438 1 .035 1.092 1.006 1.185 
[FWork=1.00] -.077 1.024 .006 1 .940 .926 .124 6.894 
[FWork=2.00] .403 .642 .395 1 .530 1.497 .425 5.268 
[FWork=3.00] .118 .626 .036 1 .850 1.125 .330 3.835 
[FWork=4.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[YrStudyU=1.00] .782 .824 .901 1 .343 2.186 .435 11.001 
[YrStudyU=2.00] .250 .785 .101 1 .751 1.283 .275 5.980 
[YrStudyU=3.00] .260 .796 .107 1 .744 1.298 .273 6.177 
[YrStudyU=4.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[ArtsSc=1.00] .821 .525 2.444 1 .118 2.273 .812 6.366 
[ArtsSc=2.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[RelYNU=1.00] .833 .693 1.445 1 .229 2.301 .591 8.952 
[RelYNU=2.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[MaritalRU=1.00] 22.160 1.738 162.64
6 
1 .000 4.207E9 1.396E8 1.268E11 
[MaritalRU=2.00] 2.518 2.042 1.520 1 .218 12.401 .226 679.160 
[MaritalRU=3.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[AgeRU=1.00] -2.745 1.958 1.965 1 .161 .064 .001 2.983 
[AgeRU=2.00] -1.601 1.981 .654 1 .419 .202 .004 9.785 
[AgeRU=3.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[GenderR=1] .413 .544 .577 1 .448 1.511 .521 4.387 
[GenderR=2] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[PlaceofResidence=Go
zo and Comino] 
.569 1.292 .194 1 .659 1.767 .140 22.247 
[PlaceofResidence=No
rthern] 
-1.995 .859 5.392 1 .020 .136 .025 .733 
Dia-
logical 
[PlaceofResidence=No
rthern Harbour] 
-1.103 .875 1.588 1 .208 .332 .060 1.845 
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[PlaceofResidence=So
uther Eastern] 
-1.427 .968 2.171 1 .141 .240 .036 1.602 
[PlaceofResidence=So
uthern Harbour] 
-1.997 .912 4.798 1 .028 .136 .023 .810 
 
[PlaceofResidence=W
estern] 
0b . . 0 . . . . 
Intercept -7.739 2.673 8.382 1 .004    
MulticulturalIdeology .195 .049 15.893 1 .000 1.215 1.104 1.338 
[FWork=1.00] -.322 1.102 .085 1 .770 .725 .084 6.285 
[FWork=2.00] .681 .688 .982 1 .322 1.977 .514 7.608 
[FWork=3.00] -.604 .689 .769 1 .381 .547 .142 2.108 
[FWork=4.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[YrStudyU=1.00] 3.214 1.386 5.380 1 .020 24.890 1.646 376.387 
[YrStudyU=2.00] 2.812 1.369 4.222 1 .040 16.649 1.139 243.446 
[YrStudyU=3.00] 3.037 1.337 5.163 1 .023 20.848 1.518 286.293 
[YrStudyU=4.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[ArtsSc=1.00] .492 .586 .704 1 .402 1.635 .518 5.156 
[ArtsSc=2.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[RelYNU=1.00] -.012 .712 .000 1 .987 .988 .245 3.989 
[RelYNU=2.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[MaritalRU=1.00] 19.071 .000 . 1 . 1.916E8 1.916E8 1.916E8 
[MaritalRU=2.00] .372 1.819 .042 1 .838 1.451 .041 51.273 
[MaritalRU=3.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[AgeRU=1.00] -.617 1.935 .102 1 .750 .540 .012 23.921 
[AgeRU=2.00] .012 1.951 .000 1 .995 1.012 .022 46.300 
[AgeRU=3.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[GenderR=1] .583 .603 .935 1 .334 1.791 .550 5.832 
[GenderR=2] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[PlaceofResidence=Go
zo and Comino] 
-.863 1.528 .319 1 .572 .422 .021 8.436 
[PlaceofResidence=No
rthern] 
-1.421 .905 2.464 1 .116 .241 .041 1.424 
[PlaceofResidence=No
rthern Harbour] 
-.822 .933 .776 1 .378 .439 .071 2.737 
Metal
ogical 
[PlaceofResidence=So
uther Eastern] 
-2.242 1.130 3.934 1 .047 .106 .012 .974 
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[PlaceofResidence=So
uthern Harbour] 
-1.521 .982 2.400 1 .121 .219 .032 1.496  
[PlaceofResidence=W
estern] 
0b . . 0 . . . . 
a. The reference category is: Monological. 
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
N 
Marginal 
Percentage 
Monological 29 16.5% 
Dialogical 86 48.9% 
VtypePOV 
Metalogical 61 34.7% 
Unskilled 13 7.4% 
Skilled 58 33.0% 
White collar 47 26.7% 
FWork 
Professional 58 33.0% 
Year 1 66 37.5% 
Year 2 44 25.0% 
Year 3 42 23.9% 
YrStudyU 
Years 4/5 24 13.6% 
Sciences 70 39.8% ArtsSC 
Arts 106 60.2% 
Religious 147 83.5% RelYNU 
Not Religious 29 16.5% 
Other 6 3.4% 
Single 161 91.5% 
MaritalRU 
Married 9 5.1% 
<20 126 71.6% 
21-30 40 22.7% 
AgeRU 
>31 10 5.7% 
Male 63 35.8% GenderR 
Female 113 64.2% 
Gozo and Comino 14 8.0% 
Northern 34 19.3% 
Northern Harbour 45 25.6% 
Souther Eastern 20 11.4% 
Southern Harbour 28 15.9% 
Place of Residence 
Western 35 19.9% 
 397 
Valid 176 100.0% 
Missing 69  
Total 245  
Subpopulation 150a  
a. The dependent variable has only one value observed in 140 (93.3%) 
subpopulations. 
 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 333.570    
Final 275.236 58.334 36 .011 
 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .282 
Nagelkerke .325 
McFadden .163 
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Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Model 
Fitting 
Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
of Reduced 
Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 275.236a .000 0 . 
FWork 277.083 1.847 6 .933 
YrStudyU 290.492 15.256 6 .018 
ArtsSc 284.522 9.286 2 .010 
RelYNU 280.452 5.216 2 .074 
MaritalRU 277.974 2.738 4 .603 
AgeRU 277.568 2.332 4 .675 
GenderR 277.008 1.772 2 .412 
PlaceofResidence 289.272 14.037 10 .171 
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the 
final model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by 
omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all 
parameters of that effect are 0. 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting 
the effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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Parameter Estimates 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Exp(B) 
VtypePOVa 
B 
Std. 
Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Intercept 1.594 2.073 .591 1 .442    
[FWork=1.00] -1.010 .915 1.218 1 .270 .364 .061 2.190 
[FWork=2.00] -.186 .634 .086 1 .769 .830 .240 2.877 
[FWork=3.00] -.259 .684 .143 1 .705 .772 .202 2.951 
[FWork=4.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[YrStudyU=1.00] .880 .867 1.032 1 .310 2.412 .441 13.184 
[YrStudyU=2.00] 1.090 .844 1.666 1 .197 2.974 .568 15.563 
[YrStudyU=3.00] 2.250 .964 5.450 1 .020 9.492 1.435 62.802 
[YrStudyU=4.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[ArtsSc=1.00] 1.738 .618 7.905 1 .005 5.683 1.693 19.081 
[ArtsSc=2.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[RelYNU=1.00] -2.004 1.112 3.250 1 .071 .135 .015 1.191 
[RelYNU=2.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[MaritalRU=1.00] -1.436 1.751 .673 1 .412 .238 .008 7.358 
[MaritalRU=2.00] .423 1.669 .064 1 .800 1.526 .058 40.182 
[MaritalRU=3.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[AgeRU=1.00] -1.044 1.750 .356 1 .551 .352 .011 10.860 
[AgeRU=2.00] -.133 1.818 .005 1 .942 .876 .025 30.913 
[AgeRU=3.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[GenderR=1] .165 .547 .090 1 .764 1.179 .403 3.447 
[GenderR=2] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[PlaceofResidence=Go
zo and Comino] 
.413 .939 .193 1 .660 1.511 .240 9.525 
[PlaceofResidence=No
rthern] 
.066 .717 .008 1 .927 1.068 .262 4.356 
[PlaceofResidence=No
rthern Harbour] 
1.016 .821 1.533 1 .216 2.763 .553 13.801 
Dia-
logical 
[PlaceofResidence=So
uther Eastern] 
.510 .787 .421 1 .517 1.666 .356 7.791 
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[PlaceofResidence=So
uthern Harbour] 
.423 .884 .229 1 .632 1.527 .270 8.637  
[PlaceofResidence=W
estern] 
0b . . 0 . . . . 
Intercept -.604 2.178 .077 1 .781    
[FWork=1.00] -.632 .992 .406 1 .524 .532 .076 3.714 
[FWork=2.00] -.164 .677 .058 1 .809 .849 .225 3.199 
[FWork=3.00] .104 .711 .021 1 .884 1.110 .275 4.471 
[FWork=4.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[YrStudyU=1.00] 2.527 1.047 5.831 1 .016 12.522 1.610 97.409 
[YrStudyU=2.00] 1.718 1.048 2.688 1 .101 5.573 .715 43.453 
[YrStudyU=3.00] 3.262 1.125 8.408 1 .004 26.101 2.878 236.707 
[YrStudyU=4.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[ArtsSc=1.00] 1.402 .652 4.626 1 .031 4.063 1.132 14.575 
[ArtsSc=2.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[RelYNU=1.00] -1.990 1.141 3.042 1 .081 .137 .015 1.279 
[RelYNU=2.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[MaritalRU=1.00] -.984 1.809 .296 1 .586 .374 .011 12.954 
[MaritalRU=2.00] 1.000 1.785 .314 1 .575 2.719 .082 90.000 
[MaritalRU=3.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[AgeRU=1.00] -1.248 1.804 .479 1 .489 .287 .008 9.851 
[AgeRU=2.00] -.775 1.881 .170 1 .680 .461 .012 18.391 
[AgeRU=3.00] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[GenderR=1] -.372 .590 .399 1 .528 .689 .217 2.189 
[GenderR=2] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[PlaceofResidence=Go
zo and Comino] 
1.095 1.013 1.169 1 .280 2.988 .411 21.745 
[PlaceofResidence=No
rthern] 
.612 .806 .576 1 .448 1.844 .380 8.946 
[PlaceofResidence=No
rthern Harbour] 
1.920 .889 4.665 1 .031 6.823 1.195 38.972 
[PlaceofResidence=So
uther Eastern] 
.446 .955 .217 1 .641 1.561 .240 10.158 
Metalog
ical 
[PlaceofResidence=So
uthern Harbour] 
2.124 .925 5.266 1 .022 8.361 1.363 51.281 
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 [PlaceofResidence=W
estern] 
0b . . 0 . . . . 
a. The reference category is: Monological. 
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
